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Doing Post-Western Sociology : domination, resistance and individuation

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We are living in a global turn (Dufoix, 2013) in sociology which imposes theoretical and methodological detours, displacements, reversals and conversions. The issue of the de-westernisation of knowledge and the construction of a new dialogue between China and Europe are therefore raised in sociology (Roulleau-Berger, Li Peilin, 2012). Another issue is the idea of the on-going de-colonialisation reconfiguration process within *ethnoscapes* (Appadurai, 2001) which have taken shape out of assemblages of knowledge originating with sociologists from China, Japan, India and Korea. These *ethnoscapes* may have limited contact with European scientific spaces and are defined according to scientific conventions and norms which are distanced from forms of colonial domination of knowledge; they also are producing the globalization of critical theories in different ways (Keucheyan, 2013). In today's world, sociology has become internationalised and has been rejuvenated in other societies such as Asian societies... Centres of gravity in human science knowledge have been displaced towards Asia - South, East, Central and Pacific Asia - where, in regional forums, intellectuals from China, Japan, Korea, India continually discuss the modes of producing epistemic autonomies in a context of non-Western hegemony. These exchanges are widely ignored in the Western world where numerous intellectuals still believe in the reign of the universalisation of the Western approach to science when Michael Kuhn is speaking (2013) about the marginalization of Eurocentrism and the weakening of European traditions in social sciences. We can perceive a diversity of Westernisms - some more Eurocentric; others more Americanocentric - either merging or in tension. As there is a diversity of Westernisms there is also a plurality of Easternisms situated in different epistemic spaces and constructed and ordered into hierarchies according to differentiated political, historical and civilisational processes. The ambition of Post-Western Social Sciences is to tear down or weaken the hierarchies between Westernisms and Easternisms. After Post-Colonial Studies, we have witnessed the emergence of what we call a *Post-Western Sociology* in the context of globalisation and circulation of ideas, concepts and paradigms in which some scholars are producing epistemic autonomy. We will stop to conceive relationships as being between entities, worlds, pre-constituted cultures, or in terms of a clear and contrasted heterogeneity between these elements. An unmaking of pairs in order to work on the variations of degree and intensity, the theoretical continuities and discontinuities between located knowledge in China and in Europe.

1. Post-Western Sociology and connected knowledge

There are numerous avenues leading to emancipation from Westernisms:

- Awareness and use of non-hegemonic theories while keeping in mind the fact that they cannot become hegemonic
- The production of a renovated Westernism integrating fragments of non-hegemonic thinking while retaining epistemic frameworks derived from hegemonic frameworks
- The construction of genuine planes of epistemological equivalence between hegemonic and non-hegemonic thinking
- The co-production of hybrid thinking by means of a strong emancipation from the processes of epistemic hegemony.

So new centres of knowledge production are born out of :

- a) the refusal to imitate Western epistemic framework (Li Peilin, 2008)
- b) a concern to control hybridizations of Western and non-Western knowledge based on the dynamics of the de-territorialization and re-territorialization of non indigenous knowledge (Qu Jingdong, 2015; He Rong, 2008; Zhao Liwei, 2009)
- c) the recognition and validation of places of conjunction and disjunction between Western and non-Western knowledge
- d) the existence of “epistemic white zones”, that is, zones in which the epistemic frameworks constructed in different societal contexts cannot come into contact.

Post-Western Sociology proceeds from de-centrings and the renewing of universalisms originating in different Eastern and Western spaces; it is above all relational, dialogue-based, multi-situated and refuses term for term structural comparisons and favours intersecting viewpoints concerning registers of understanding, agreement and disagreement as well as the scientific practices of the co-present actors. Post-Western Sociology is first and foremost rhizomatous in that it is constructed from connections between points located in knowledge spaces governed by very different regimes of signs and the non-correspondence of different types of situated knowledge. It does not equate Post-Western Sociologies with “Sociologies of East Asia”.

Post-Western Sociology is constructed from conjunctions and disjunctions which cannot be conceived according to a binary mode. It relies on different knowledge processes (Roulleau-Berger, 2013):

- “Knowledge niches” which appear to be specifically European or Asian and do not signify a transferability of knowledge

-“Intermediary epistemological processes” which encourage the partial transfer of knowledge from Europe to Asia and from Asia to Europe

- “Transnational epistemological spaces” in which European knowledge and Asian knowledge are placed in equivalence

2.Hegemonies and epistemic autonomy

Rajev Bhargava (2013) considers of epistemic injustice three forms:

- the imposition of a change affecting the content of the epistemic frameworks

- the alteration of fundamental epistemic frameworks

- the damaging or loss of the capacity of individuals to maintain or develop their own epistemic frameworks

Chinese, Japanese, Korean and Indian scholars consider that the Western epistemic frameworks has prevented from accessing their own systems of meaning and interpretation and from understanding their own societies. Epistemic autonomies are asserted today, one which has been constructed differently according to societal contexts.

In China, the assertion of an epistemic autonomy among sociologists for example means the re-establishment of continuities with epistemic frameworks which had been constructed in the Chinese history then forgotten (Li Peilin, Qu Jingdong 2011). An epistemic autonomy is asserted today, one which has been constructed differently according to societal contexts (Xie Lizhong, 2012). Contemporary Chinese sociologies constructed from conceptions of the process therefore appear to be placed within a sort of mosaic of situated and contextualized constructivisms often against backgrounds of historical or civilizational contexts in which objective constructivism, critical constructivism, sociologies of action, interpretative constructivism, organizational or strategic constructivism, interactionist constructivism, subjective constructivism and more cohabit.

In South-Korea, the demand for an epistemic autonomy partly goes through processes of testing and reformulating Western theories. Han Sang Jin and Young Hee Shim (2010) argue for a methodological cosmopolitanism “from the bottom” taking into consideration the genealogical characteristics of Asian history, culture and volume of civilizations in order to define the plural Asian and overlapping modernities (Kim, 2014).

In Japan, Kazuhiko Yatabe (2015) will show how the intellectual life is organized with two processes : on one hand the pendular oscillation between the passion of Western and Asian spirit; on another hand overtaking modernity. According to Kazuhisa Nishihara (2010), social scientists, after having suffered from the influence of American positivism, in Post-Modern Sociology (1980-2000) have integrated authors like Foucault, Luhman, Habermas, Bourdieu and Giddens to state today their fitting into a transnational and global sociological space.

Shujiro Yasawa (2013) showed how recently a reflexive sociology in Japan is produced around the production of a transcendental Subject.

In India, social sciences were born under British colonial rule. Sociology emerged in 1919, at Mumbai University. During the time of post-independence, sociology produced a replica of the uses of anthropological theories and those of the struggle against the production of the discourse of the colonial State on the Indian society, or “Sinhalese”, as a non-modern society (Madan, 2011; Patel, 2013).

In contemporary Chinese, Japanese, Indian and Korean sociologies, the dynamic co-existence of different paradigms could be an issue but it requires the acknowledgment of blind-spots in Western theories. So the most pressing task, however, is to investigate the ways in which theoretical *continuities and discontinuities*, connections and disjunctions are formed between seats of knowledge located at different places in the world and potentially capable of bringing to light a *transnational intermediate space* that is both local and global.

3.Continuities of sociological knowledge and common signification: domination and resistance

We deal with the *continuities of sociological knowledge and common concepts* between major theoretical issues in European and Chinese sociologies. This approach while not exhaustive is rather eloquent regarding what remains of common knowledge. We have identified the following topic as illustration of shared theoretical spaces : domination and resistance.

The issue of domination processes in contemporary societies remains a fundamental issue in sociology around the world. Whilst in French sociology the issue of domination refers to inequalities, in Chinese sociology it tends to refer to power. In French sociology, although domination was mainly dealt with by the Bourdieusian movement, it is today presented in various theoretical approaches but can take on various statuses according to trends. It is thought of as singular in structuro-functionalist paradigms and in the plural in interactionist paradigms. In a context in which inequalities and wage and moral insecurities increasingly combine, domination is increasingly thought of as plural, domination mechanisms dilute, diffract, and reconstruct themselves.

In French sociology, while it is no longer possible to consider the issue of domination as singular, which presupposes the existence of a unified social system, we are largely invited to think about plural figures of domination, ordinary and less ordinary (Martucelli, 2004), visible and less visible. The figures of dominations are constructed by the Institutions –like work for example-, Institution is defined as multipolar process (Lallement, 2007, 2010).

Moreover, ethnic, social, and economic dominations must be distinguished from each other. They develop both on a vertical axis by following hierarchical orders and on a horizontal axis by following the dynamics which block or maintain access to recognised "places" in the social space. Modes of domination which can be qualified as complexes are always associated with sustainable maintenance of one or multiple profound asymmetries. They diversify by building

on the mechanisms linked between them through convergent effects between actors spread out in space, exercising varied activities, and occupying various positions compared to institutional authorities. On a horizontal level these modes of domination can be linked in a continued and discontinued mode. For example, new global "elites" rely on these mechanisms beginning from actions that are sometimes linked and sometimes disjointed. These modes of domination are organised from networks that crisscross social, economic, and cultural spaces at a local and global level. Moreover, we spoke about *reticular dominations* which are built in arrangements between places, temporalities, and situations and produce *multisituated inequalities* at a local and global level (Roulleau-Berger, 2010).

While dominations multiply and diversify, resistances follow the same movement and appear more or less visible (Détrez, 2015), uncertain, reticular. So if we are speaking about the plurality of dominations we will also develop the plurality of resistances. We have to distinguish individual and collective resistances and it depends of the repertory of economic, social and moral resources. The way of simultaneously thinking about the coexistence of dominations and resistances was explored through works on individual and collective mobilisations in working class French suburbs (Boubeker, 2008). Populations in precarious situations confronted with unemployment, segregation, and discrimination develop economic, social, and cultural resistance strategies through a "collective intelligence" and reflexive competencies.

In French sociology, some sociologists consider that each group has relative autonomy and that the "weak" groups are capable of making their voices heard by the stronger groups through using relationships of conflict, struggle and distancing as well as relationships of negotiation and exchange (Payet, Laforgue, 2008). Today individuals are considered as being more capable of understanding what they are doing whilst they are doing it. Their competencies structure social life and vice versa. In a period in which structuralist-functional thought has weakened, we increasingly consider the way in which individuals, in the incessant work which they do to create meaning, produce norms and conventions. As co-producers of the social worlds that they live in and traverse, they always have a capacity to interpret and invent roles in various situations. An individual's competency has been defined as his/her capacity to recognise the plurality of normative fields and to identify their respective contents, the ability to identify the characteristics of a situation (Lepetit, 1995). The actor is inscribed and inscribes him/herself in a diversity of spaces and temporalities, competency asserting itself in the capacity to use repertoires of various roles and to combine experiences and resources of different natures in a more or less original way.

When did we test the limits of the concept of habitus defined by Pierre Bourdieu in French sociology? Why did we promote the concept of resources and not that of capital or habitus to reflect upon the simultaneity of dominations and resistances? We began to take a certain theoretical distance when we wanted to note that subaltern groups were capable of producing "weapons of the weak".

Michael Pollak (1990) responded as follows: "*Certain concepts that were forged to take into account the link between psychic and social, between the individual and the collective, as*

much in sociology as in social psychology, came from analysing processes and phenomena endowed with a relatively high degree of stability. This applies to literature on socialisation, to the concepts of habitus and capital, which essentially study the reciprocal adjustment between individual tendencies and social structure. These conceptualisations in no way exclude studying times of crisis, or phenomena of imbalance and transition from one state to another. All the same, too global and too attached to the conception of the unity of the person, they do not necessarily facilitate the analysis of extreme situations, different from standard transition crises, and which return the individual to improvisation, to trickery, to spontaneously decoding unforeseen and uncertain situations" (L'expérience concentrationnaire, page 190). From the moment that European, and particularly French, sociologists started to work on phenomena of unemployment, precariousness, poverty, and migration, a majority of them backed Michael Pollak's position.

This need to consider the simultaneousness of processes of domination and resistance imposed the idea of combining effects of social constraint and the forces which weigh on individuals and collectives. Moreover, it necessitates considering creativity and interpretive capacities; we increasingly considered that the organisation of social worlds is anchored in the activities of competent actors, situated in time and space, and makes use of rules and resources in a diversity of contexts of constraint and action. The reflexive capacity of individuals is bound in situations of interaction and various contexts of everyday social activity. Thinking the simultaneousness of processes of domination and resistance means to articulate regimes of domination and critical competencies, to reconcile critical sociology and the sociology of criticism as Luc Boltanski (2009) proposed us.

In the Chinese context, sociologists are introducing the issue of domination but have not yet named it. Here we can find an approach in which social domination is anchored in social structures and social relations of production. Sociologists place an emphasis on class domination which appears to be violently produced in a context of augmentation that is always greater than social inequalities. Here political power, economic power, and domination merge. Regimes of social domination are also regimes of social control. The State forms and informs policy frameworks and practical processes in civilian life in collaboration with other local and contextual elements (Chen Guangjin, 2012). Political and symbolic power is thought of as exercised through "situation constructions" and "situation constraints" knowing that, in each situation, members reconstruct the meaning and the modalities of their actions (Guo Yuhua, 2012). Thus the complexity between "strong" and "weak", the resistance capacities of workers, unemployed youth, and peasants over and above large collective movements, is seized on. In China, the theory of Scott (1990) was heavily promoted for working on daily forms of peasant resistance, these occult discourses or occult practices (hidden transcripts) which express ways of revolting against situations of contempt, humiliation, and disrepute. Some Chinese sociologists focus on the way the dominated produce discourse (Shen Yuan, 2011) in an authoritarian context in which forms of collective mobilisation and "public discourses" of revolt are not authorised. Dong Haijun(2008) showed how peasants with "weak identities" everyday produced "subaltern politics" to defend their

rights, protest against situations of social injustice and to develop a survival ethic. Some researchers including Lu Dewen (2012) showed how using the “weapons of the weak” could lead to extreme situations such as self-immolation when peasants tried to stop the demolition of their houses ; he improved the concept of “weapons of the weak” in considering they are parochial, local-specific and bifurcated.

However, they also resemble the ideas of M. De Certeau (1980) that were promoted in France when he spoke of the "arts of the weak", meaning the ordinary practices the dominated undertake to adjust to their circumstances, which are tactical more than strategic. Individuals – often unemployed people, precarious workers, migrant workers, etc. –assigned to places in areas of low legitimacy and low integrative socialization, are confronted with situations of high unpredictability and social insecurity and take up the "weapons of the weak" to develop techniques of self-government, strategies of local and global economics of survival and resistance in intermediate, interstitial, discrete spaces (Rouilleau-Berger, 1991 ; 2011).

In the two contexts sociologists hunt for reflection on dominations and resistances through moral economies, mainly converging in the way of thinking about the status of moral economies in societies inhabited by strong fights for public and social recognition. In both contexts, the drawings of moral boundaries are distinct. Drawing moral boundaries is a way of confronting the new social conflicts which can happen anytime along these boundaries, in Chinese as well as in European societies. The moral boundaries are seen as places of crystallization of alliances and conflicts between different social groups. At the individual level, constraints, dominations and action mean more loss of *self*. Moral boundaries appear as crossing points, but also, places of domination, social conflict and competition for access to moral goods and places of access to self-government. In European and Chinese societies today, dominations produce a visibility of new moral boundaries that means assignments, separations, and stigmatization.

4. Discontinuities of sociological knowledge and non-common sense : autonomy, individuation and subjectivation

The concept of autonomy has followed a different trajectory in Chinese and French contexts. First, however, we will question individuation as a broader narrative used to analyse some of the great ruptures in Western history to dissociate the study of individuation processes from the historical experience of Western modernity and to think the plurality of individuation’s models (Martucelli, 2014). We will question this narrative which shows Western societies as a linear process in progressive individualisation

Chinese sociologists now speak about the paradox of autonomy which characterises a process of individuation that cuts through Chinese society, in which the least well-equipped in social, economic, and symbolic capital lose a barely acquired autonomy. Li Youmei (2012) has stressed the collision effect between individual autonomy and the autonomy of social groups which were formed after 1978. Despite this, Chinese authors mainly refer to the theories of Jeremy Bentham, Norbert Elias, and Ulrich Beck retaining the idea that autonomy in the

second modernity reminds one of social, economic, political, cultural, and individual resources as well as those offered through Social Welfare. However, Li Youmei insists on the idea that autonomy cannot be defined as a linear process but rather as complex and contradictory. She notably refers to Karl Popper's notion of the "paradox of freedom" and adds that the notion of paradoxical autonomy means that losing and gaining autonomy exist in an interdependent relationship. Essentially, if certain individuals gain autonomy this means that others lose it. The development of the socialist market economy has led to increasingly competitive relations between individuals to access a position. The very rapid transformations of Chinese society has produced relatively brutal points of conflict when individuation and belonging to a community boil down to cohabitation relationships. The concept of "collective individualism" produced by Alexis de Tocqueville is often used in Chinese sociology to understand how social groups with divergent interests form and how different types of social conflict are born.

In Western European sociology, autonomy has been defined as a largely shared aspiration and a very binding norm before which individuals are unequal. For the past twenty years, particularly in France, sociology has taken on a subjectivist turn (Ehrenberg, 2010) which confirms the very socio-centred way European societies examine themselves, particularly with the process of "self-totemisation". Issues of autonomy and subjectivity have assumed an important status in sociological research. This status varies according to paradigms, but has provided impetus to a certain number of researchers focusing on processes of individuation, or, more precisely, on the work of societies and work on oneself. On the European, and particularly French sociological scene, the contemporary individual who appears uncertain, introspective, self-sufficient... is at the heart of sociological reflection. This phenomenon highlights commitment to the individuation process as a civilising process (Elias, 1991) that is characterised more by the rise of the autonomy norm than by a generalised decline in private space. While social structures previously concerned the individual, while the level of reflexivity was coherent with the social structure, nowadays the individual is thought of as being unable to establish her/his limits in either reflexivity, interiorised schemes or social roles (Kaufman, 2004). François Dubet (2009) proposed envisaging autonomy via the concept of experience, returning social experiences to society and including analysis of the ordeals that confront individuals and which make them act. Following the same trend, Danilo Martuccelli (2010) has considered ordeals help us to show, in a singular way, how social ecologies are more and more personalized, how to question intragroupal and interindividual variations in a singularist society, how to identify problems which form this historically this specific mode of individuation which structural processes to create the individual are formed, how to articulate in situ global processes and local configuration. These tensions, specific to each ordeal, appear to be fundamental to the modern experience; in every society, the individual is confronted with a very large number of ordeals and they make up part of the perception that these individuals have of their own lives. It also means to redefine subjectivity as including affects and introducing the "structures of feelings" (Bastide, 2015)

Chinese sociologists have introduced the issue of subjectivity in various ways. For example, Sun Liping and Guo Yuhua (2002) used a project on memories of the difficult times during collectivisation and the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960) in the North of the Shaanxi province to demonstrate that women suffered from the obligation to leave the domestic sphere and participate in collective production but remember their intense mobilisation and their revolutionary elation although they were engaged in a process of instrumentalisation. Recently, Sun Feiyu (2013) in the exploration of the *Suku* - the practice of confessing individual suffering in a political context and in a collective public forum- has combined power, identity and subjectivity to analyse the production of revolutionary truth, on the one hand, and social suffering, on the other.

5. Between discontinuities and continuities of sociological knowledge : self, we and me

In Chinese sociology the self is not disassociated from the *we* whereas in Europe sociology, the self is primarily inscribed in a process of individuation before being linked to *we*. However, the issue of intersubjectivity is dealt with in terms of sociologies inspired by pragmatism and interactionism. For example, the issue of the *guanxi* has a very strong presence throughout the entire Chinese sociological field. Yang Yiyin (2012) poses the hypothesis of the fabrication of a *double we* in the construction of an order of interactions. She explains how, to define an interpersonal *guanxi*, the legacy of the kinship regime and relationships of trust and reciprocal obligation must be taken into consideration. The *we* is produced on the one hand by the *guanxi* that draw the particular boundaries of *me*; or more precisely what Fei Xiao Tong (1948) called the *chaxu geju*, and on the other hand through categories, identifications, and social memberships.

When a *double we* is constructed in Chinese sociology, European sociologists would first think of identities based on *me* and *I* as moments of construction in the process of *self* during which the individual meets *others* and can then become *we*. Yang Yiyin (2012) shows how *we* implies "being one of us" which is characterised by three traits:

- The permeability of the boundaries of *we* in the sense that those who are not part of "being one of us" can become a part, and inversely "insiders" can become "outsiders".
- The elasticity of the boundaries of *we* in which routes depend on contexts and circumstances.
- Individual autonomy in the sense that the individual places others within the precise borders of *me*.

In Chinese sociology the notion of *guanxi* distinguishes itself from concepts of social ties or social relations in the sense that it appears larger and combines with historical, familial, geographical, subjective and cultural dimensions. The *guanxis* have been chosen by Chinese sociologists to analyse the circulation of social and symbolic resources and the construction of

social ties. Why does the notion of *guanxi* seem so strong in Chinese social sciences? The *guanxi* becomes a concept which allows the issue of categorisation and social identification to be addressed. Western researchers are perceived as having a tendency to first reason in terms of categorisation, roles, and statuses and then in terms of differentiated modes of association beginning with the nature and intensity of relations and interactions. Chinese researchers tend to first reason in terms of relations of exchange, retribution, gratification (Bian Yanjie, Wang Wenbin, 2012; Wang Wenbin, Zhao Yandong, 2012) and interactions, and then in terms of roles and categorisations.

However, the boundaries of the *self* in Chinese sociology are also conceived in relation to the *guanxi*. According to forms and types of *guanxi*, relationships with others will take up a different position and the *me* will not be situated in the same place. We insist on the importance of the *guanxis* in the construction of individual and collective identities by recalling that it is inherent in Chinese civilisation both past and present. It also explains that the individual/group relationship above all means the construction of a social relationship which can reduce itself neither to a social categorisation nor to a social role.

If in Europe theories of *me*, the *I* and the *Others* appear as distinct moments in a discontinuous process of the *self*, they appear less significantly in a continuous process in Chinese works. They also signal the construction of discontinuous access to the *narrative and reflexive selves*. The *capabilities* (Sen, 1992) that is the moral competences act upon (1) the modes and forms of the recomposition of resource repertoires, namely the capacity to control the degree of predictability of situations of change, (2) the way in which discontinuous narratives are rendered continuous and (3) the conditions of access to the *narrative and reflexive selves*. If the *narrative self* is fragmented, the *reflexive self* of the individual is put through an ordeal and recomposes itself differently according to the societal context (Roulleau-Berger, 2011).

In France we have also focused on the alteration of the *self*. However, this signifies saturation thresholds beyond which individuals lose their reflexive capacity. Phenomena of repetition and intensification of situations of disqualification and/or humiliation can produce the irreversibility of the feeling of shame of their own *self*. More irreversibility means greater alteration of moral competences and greater blocking of narratives. Increased production of discontinuities in the *narrative and reflexive selves* leads to the situations to be managed appearing more contrasted and disjointed and to more retrospective losses (Sennett, 2000) and more discontinuous narratives, that is, phenomena of alteration to the *self*. When confronted with remodelling, readjustments and conflicts in identity, “weak” individuals experience increasing difficulties in adjusting their different *selves* and in saving face. They oscillate between social esteem and contempt, between esteem and shame of the *self*, according to the roles played in different social spaces.

However, the narrativity issue compels us to “situate” the *self* which is constructed differently in the Chinese and European contexts. The Subject in Europe and the individual in China experience more and more difficulties in accessing the culture of the *self* and in saving face in

situations of social suffering. The culture of the *self* and the concern for the *self* thus represent major intellectual stakes in both Chinese and European societies.

Conclusion

If sociologies appear connected (Bhabra, 2014), at certain moments they can also appear to be disconnected or to connect only to disconnect and reconnect to the rhythm of local or world events and according to the effects of the circulations of ideas, norms and knowledge which may be diffused more rapidly during certain periods and more slowly during others.. Even if the mosaic metaphor allows the assertion of the equal value of all cultures, their right to exist and flourish and the existence of multiple paths to knowledge, it does not necessarily mean reciprocal exchanges of knowledge, concepts, methods and practices. The use of the concept of connection-disconnection-reconnection enables us to escape from the vision of a global mosaic of co-present sociologies organised around fixed stable indigenous knowledge without any real points of contact between them

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My Views on the Debate over “Depoliticizing Ethnicity in China”

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In his essay “A new perspective in guiding ethnic relations in the 21st century: “Depoliticising” ethnicity in China”¹, Professor Ma Rong of the Department of Sociology, Peking University, questions the ethnic policies adopted by the Chinese government since 1949, going on to propose a new ethnic perspective, shifting from the current policies that “politicise and institutionalise” ethnic minority issues, to ones that gradually “depoliticise” ethnicity. Since its publication, his essay has aroused intense debate among PRC ethnologists, drawing both approval and censure. This book collects some major writings contributing to this debate. To aid readers’ understanding, I set out here to straighten out and explore some of the main contents and opinions of the debate purely from the angle of an outsider (new to the debate) and a layman (not a specialised researcher in the field of nationality or ethnic issues).

1. Ma: Why depoliticise ethnic issues?

This essay, Ma’s most influential work, is by no means the only one setting out his position: he has expounded it in many others. Taken together, we see that his proposed “depoliticising” of ethnic issues relies mainly on two aspects of evidence:

1.1 Difference between the concepts of “nation” and “ethnic group”

The two Chinese words *minzu* (“nation”) and *zuqun* (“ethnic group,” “ethnicity”) have, argues Ma, totally different meanings. He believes that “nation” and “ethnic group” are distinct concepts in western literature.

Given their respective time of appearance and inner meaning, they represent human groupings at totally different levels and reflect different forms of identity in human society under different historical conditions. “Nation” is related to “nationalism” and the political movement for “national self-determination” taking place in the Western Europe in the 17th century. The term “ethnic group”, in contrast, only appeared in the 20th century and is commonly used in the U.S., being gradually adopted by other countries. It refers to groups that exist and identify with a pluralist country with various historical

¹Ma Rong, “A new perspective in guiding ethnic relations in the 21st century: ‘depoliticising’ ethnicity in China”, *Journal of Peking University* (Philosophy and social sciences), Issue 6, 2004. See also Xie, Lizhong (ed), *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*, World Scientific Publishing:2014, pp. 1-27 .

backgrounds, cultures, and traditions (including language, religion, and place of origin), and even distinctive physical features.²

These ethnic groups may to some degree be perceived as “sub-cultures” of these societies. In simpler terms, the term “nation” mainly refers to human groupings that emerge from and correlate to “nationalism” and political movements for “national self-determination” originally taking place in the 17th century in Western countries, then gradually spreading to non-western countries, and often identify with a political entity (i.e. the nation-state) with territorial borders. The term “ethnic group”, in contrast, refers mainly to human groupings that exist within a nation-state and are tied together by cultural, physical and other non-political factors. Therefore,

there are important differences between ethnic groups, which are characterised by distinct cultural traditions and histories, and nations, which are political entities tied to a more or less stable territory.³

Given the fundamental distinctions between the concepts of “nation” and “ethnic group”, overlooking such differences, or making indiscriminate uses of the two, or otherwise replacing one with the other, may result in undesirable outcomes in social practices. For example, if we make no distinction between the two by using the term “nation” to refer to both human groupings which identify with a political entity with territorial borders, such as a nation-state, and those that exist within a nation-state and are tied together by cultural, physical and other non-political factors, then it is very likely to instil, among some members of the latter, an awareness of “national self-determination”, or even “national independence”, that often accompanies with strong political implications and territorial claims. This is exactly what has happened for many years in Mainland China. For years, we in Mainland China have used the term “*minzu*” to refer to both the people (“Chinese nation”, or *zhonghua minzu*), which identifies with “China” as a territorial state, and all ethnic groups (i.e. Han, Tibetan, Mongolian, Hui, Yao, Miao and Uygur, etc.) that exist within the territory of “China” and are tied together by cultural, physical and other factors. And this may have resulted in the “national consciousness” among some members of the “ethnic groups” and created an excuse to be taken advantage of by Xinjiang and Tibetan separatists.

The primary aim of Ma’s theory on depoliticising of ethnicity, therefore, is to try to remind us of the existence of such distinctions and the possibility of us getting into unnecessary trouble and “politicalizing” the “ethnic” issues that would bear no political implications due to conceptual confusion.

1.2 Two types of policies for managing ethnic relations and the varied outcomes

Ma points out that based on historical experiences of both China and abroad, government policy has always played an important guiding role during the evolution and development of ethnic relations.

²See Xie, Lizhong (ed) , *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*, p.3.

³See Xie, Lizhong (ed) , *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*, p.4.

Government policy plays an important role in guiding group identity and adjusting the boundaries of a political entity. Throughout the history of social development, governments have generally adopted two contrasting policies for regulating ethnic relations: one views ethnic groups mainly as political entities and the other views them primarily as cultural groups. The former policy emphasises ethnic groups' integrity, political power and "territorial" conservation. The latter prefers to treat ethnic relations as cultural interactions, and to deal with the problems between people of different ethnic backgrounds as affairs among individuals rather than between groups as a whole, even though the common characteristics of the ethnic group membership are given recognition. By emphasizing the cultural characteristics of ethnic groups, their political interests are diluted. Furthermore, in processes of migration, the historical connection between ethnic groups and their traditional residence is gradually loosened.⁴

These two contrasting policy orientations are, in Ma's words, "politicising" and "culturalising" ethnic policies. Examples of the former orientation include modern European nationalist movements aimed at establishing "nation-states", policies of the former USSR for dealing with domestic ethnic relations, ethnic policies carried out by various countries in recent years, and the *minzu zhengce* ("national policies") of the post-1949 Chinese government. Examples of the latter include ethnic policies of ancient China, ethnic policies of contemporary India, and ethnic minorities policies of the USA.

These contrasting policies, Ma notes, will have totally different actual effects on the evolution of ethnic relations. The former policy, in effect, causes members of each ethnic group to envision them as a "nation" with political and territorial connotations, which gradually strengthens their "national self-determination" or "national independence" consciousness. The natural results are waves of nationalist movements aimed at establishing "one nation, one state" and eventually, the formation of new nation-states one after another, or even the disintegration of former multi-ethnic political entities (i.e. the Ottoman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire in modern world history, various modern colonial systems in the world, and some contemporary multi-ethnic nations, like the former USSR and Yugoslavia, etc.). The latter policy, on the contrary, does not lead to disintegration of multi-ethnic political entities and may under certain conditions help promote integration or assimilation among individual ethnic groups that belong to different political entities. For example, modern nations, such as the U. S. , prefers to treat ethnic differences as cultural differences, therefore allowing the formation and conservation of a multi-ethnic political entity – nation – while the differences among ethnic groups are recognised and conserved. In ancient China, however,

although there is always politics in issues concerning race, nationality and ethnic groups, ideas on "majority–minority relations" or "civilised–barbarian relations" were to a great extent "culturalised" in the Chinese cultural tradition, in both theory and practice. This strategy enabled the civilised group in the core region to unify and embody the ethnic minorities in periphery areas. In addition, the Chinese tradition of treating ethnic differences as "cultural differences" made it possible to implement the

⁴See Xie, Lizhong (ed) , *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*, P.6.

policy of “transforming barbarian into civilised”, which resulted in attracting ethnic minorities from the periphery areas and the ultimate formation of a unified pluralist Chinese nation with the Han group in the central plain as the core.⁵

Apparently, for any country that has an existing multi-ethnic presence, it is only wise to adopt as far as possible a “culturalising” policy, not the opposite, for dealing with ethnic relations, so as to avoid national disintegration. This constitutes one of the main grounds for Ma to advocate his theory on depoliticising ethnicity.

Ma advances his proposed depoliticising of ethnicity based on this(those) viewpoint, a fundamental ground for his criticism of “national” policies adopted by Chinese governments since 1949. He believed that the international political situation after the founding of New China in 1949 left the Chinese government with no choice but to ally with the then Soviet Union. The government copied almost all the Soviet models in terms of social organizations and economic affairs and also followed the Soviet model by politicizing and institutionalizing the ethnic minorities in China. Specific measures included organizing large-scale “identification of nationalities”, practicing a “regional national autonomy” system for all ethnic minorities, and implementing a series of policies in favour of ethnic minorities in the administrative, educational, economic and cultural areas. These policies have ever since played an important role in strengthening ethnic consciousness, consolidating ethnic identity and inevitably politicalizing ethnic issues. Ma believed that “the Chinese should learn from their ancestors and their experience for thousands of years in guiding ethnic relations. They also should look to other nations for both positive and negative lessons. China might in the future consider changing the direction of managing its ethnic relations from the “politicising” to “culturalising” route. The de-politicising route might lead China in a new direction, strengthening national identity among ethnic minorities while guaranteeing the prosperity of their cultural traditions,”⁶ and ultimately constructing a “politically united” modern civil nation under the condition of “cultural pluralism”

2. Criticisms of Ma: Can and should ethnic issues be depoliticised?

Ma’s viewpoint on depoliticising ethnic issues has since its publication quickly attracted criticism from a number of his academic colleagues. Contrary to the afore-mentioned two arguments, the critics are mainly targeting at the following two aspects:

2.1 Is there a substantial distinction between the concepts of “nation” and “ethnic group”?

A thorough review of the critics’ articles reveals that one of the primary gaps between them and Ma lies in the fact that the former overlooks or even clearly denies in their articles, wittingly or unwittingly, any distinction between the concepts of “nation” and “ethnic group”. In the opinion of critics including Hao Shiyuan, Chen Jianyue and Wang Xien, as opposed to

⁵See Xie, Lizhong (ed) , *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*, p.9.

⁶See Xie, Lizhong (ed) , *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*, p. 24.

that of Ma, “nation” and “ethnic group” are concepts that are basically interchangeable, or “two different concepts referring to the same matter”. For example, in an article Chen explicitly criticised Ma for replacing the term “nation” – which is commonly used (especially to refer to ethnic minorities such as Tibetan, Mongolian, Uyghur and Yao Nationalities) in the context of the present Chinese literature - with “ethnic group” and treating “ethnic group” and “nation” separately as cultural and political concepts, and for Ma’s conclusion that “ethnic relation” is necessarily a cultural relation given the cultural implication of “ethnic group”, and that “regional national autonomy will under certain circumstances inevitably lead to ‘national independence’ or ‘national disintegration’⁷ Chen found “critical errors in logic” in Ma’s argument:

- (1) after replacing the term “nation” with “ethnic group”, he did not emphasise the identity between these two concepts, but on the contrary placed these two concepts that are originally used to describe the same things as “different points on a continuum”;
- (2) he went on to make “nation” and “ethnic groups” opposing concepts, arguing that “ethnic groups” as groups with certain cultural heritage and history, are very different from “nations” which are political entities connected to established lands”;
- (3) he connected the concept of nation and national self-destruction, national states and nationalism to stigmatise it, asserting that it “is likely to be associated with a certain political entity and separationist movements that have the power to execute “national self destruction” and establish “national states”;
- (4) he completely abandoned the stigmatised concept of “nation” in an attempt to establish the value and significance of “ethnic group” which he place on the same continuum: “the reason we distinguish between ‘nation’ and ‘ethnic group’ in the Chinese language is because the different use of these terms may actually imply varied orientations for viewing, understanding, and managing ethnic relations.⁸

Wang Xien, on the other hand, points out that there might be some practical difficulties in replacing “nation” with “ethnic group” in the Chinese context. He argues that

the concept of “ethno” might be distinguished from “nation”, but to applying this change to China would be difficult and awkward, such as trying to replace “national minorities” with “ethnic minority”, “national policies” with “ethnic policies”, or “national theories” with “ethnic theories”. The difficulty is that in China, terms such as “national groups”, “national policies” and “national theories” are so ingrained in people’s minds that they are not just widely used as policy terms and social language, but have also been accepted among scholars. Given that the objects described can be expressed clearly, they do not need to be replaced.⁹

⁷Chen Jianyue, “Establishing a multiethnic harmonious society and resolving ethnic issues — ‘Depoliticising’ and ‘culturing’ ethnic issues”, See also Xie, Lizhong (ed) , *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*, P. 78.

⁸See Xie, Lizhong (ed) , *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*, p. 79.

⁹Wang Xien, “On ‘afterthoughts’ of China’s ethnic issues and ‘being practical’—Debating Ma”, See also Xie, Lizhong (ed) , *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*, p. 132.

Chen Yuping expresses his viewpoints in related essays that “there are different scholarly conceptions of the term. Therefore, presently, we try not to accurately define the term. Instead, we should focus on the relations between different definitions, which would be more conducive to furthering research on the matter.”¹⁰ For the sake of simplicity, therefore, it seems best to regain the term “nation” because everyone is used to it.

Ma proposes to use the term “nation” to refer to human groupings that identify with a political entity (“state”) with a territorial boundary, and the term “ethnic group” to refer to those that exist within a “state” and are tied together by cultural, physical and other non-political factors. Based on this proposal, there could be many ethnic groups (i.e. Tibetan ethnicity, Hui ethnicity, etc.) but only one nation, the “Chinese Nation”, within the territory of China. Conversely, in the essays of the above-mentioned critics, as both identity groups (e.g. “Tibetan”, “Hui”) and the “Chinese Nation” (identity group at the “state” level) are all termed “nation”, it is unavoidable to use “multi-national states” to refer to countries like “China”, the “Soviet Union” and the “United States”, which, according to Ma, would be more appropriately referred to as “multi-ethnic states”.

2.2 Can “ethnic issues” be depoliticised?

Nevertheless, most of the criticism tends to concentrate on Ma’s policy proposition of “depoliticising ethnicity (ethnic issues)”. Roughly speaking, criticism has mainly centered on the following arguments:

(1) Ethnic issues should not, and are not very likely to, be limited to cultural aspects.

Hao Shiyuan insists in this regard that

National questions or ethnic problems, however labelled, exist in all multi-national countries. They manifest themselves in many aspects, including politics, economy, culture and social life, making it hard to sort them into the abstract categories of “politicization” and “acculturation.”¹¹

Opposing the idea of culturalising ethnic issues, Hao quotes D. Smith:

believing that it is possible to “return” nationalism to any arena including the cultural arena is both naïve and fundamentally wrong.¹²

Zhou Daming also believes that while currently the broad scholarly consensus is that ethnic groups are population groups segregated by culture, and have culture traditions and historical backgrounds, but we cannot deny or overlook the underlying political nature of ethnic

¹⁰Chen Yuping, “My views on ‘depoliticizing ethnic issues’”, See also Xie, Lizhong (ed) , *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*, p. 139.

¹¹Hao Shiyuan, “Establishing a socialist harmonious society and ethnic relations,”, See also Xie, Lizhong (ed) , *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*, p. 40.

¹²See also Xie, Lizhong (ed) , *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*, p. 47.

groups, given the innumerable, historically-formed links between ethnic groups and their places of residence.¹³

Chen Jianyue points out from a political science perspective that like other human community, "Nation"¹⁴ is also a community of interests, but also a unique community of interests:

as a relatively stable collective form in human society, the nationality offers its members the prospect of a set of interests that no other group can provide: the continuity of a specific economic life, common cultural heritage and share of political power."¹⁵

Relations among "nationalites" are in fact interest relations, because "all inter-national interactions are interactions between national interests."¹⁶ Politics, indeed, "refers to interest-based decisions that people make and implement in human communities".¹⁷

Hence, national(ethnic) issues are in essence political. "As political, national issues must be solved through political systems and public policies. Attempts to "depoliticise" and "culturise" them are fruitless."¹⁸

Chen Jianyue believes Ma's arguments on depoliticising of ethnic issues "all stem from his failure at the starting point of his research to consider interests as a basic driver for national development."¹⁹

"Enculturation" and "politicisation" are, Wang Xien argues,

inappropriate descriptors for classifying national policy orientations for several reasons. First of all, as Ma states, "national and ethnic issues are, at any time and in any country, bound to be political in nature" (Ma, 2007b). Next, policies and institutions aimed at resolving such politicised national and ethnic issues are still political actions set up and carried out by the state. Thirdly, even where these policies were aimed at confining national and ethnic issues within the realm of "culture", their ultimate goal was still political stability. Hence, "enculturation" and "politicizing" cannot be used to categorise national policies; nor can they be used to evaluate their faults and merits.²⁰

Chen Yuping also explicitly disapproves of the proposition of "depoliticising" national issues, stating that "the idea lacks theoretical support, hence, cannot and should not be implemented,"²¹ because most national issues are not likely to be solved without resorting to political platforms such as state power and national policies.

¹³See also Xie, Lizhong (ed) , *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*, P.58,59.

¹⁴Note: As mentioned above, the majority of Ma's critics deny or ignore the difference between "nation" and "ethnic group".

¹⁵See Xie, Lizhong (ed) , *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*, p.73.

¹⁶See Xie, Lizhong (ed) , *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*, p. 73.

¹⁷See Xie, Lizhong (ed) , *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*, p. 62.

¹⁸See Xie, Lizhong (ed) , *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*, p. 77

¹⁹See Xie, Lizhong (ed) , *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*, p. 77.

²⁰Wang Xien, 'On 'Afterthoughts' of China's ethnic issues and 'Being Practical' – Debating Ma," See also Xie, Lizhong (ed) , *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*, Pp. 93-94.

²¹Chen yuping, "My views on 'depoliticizing ethnic issues", See also Xie, Lizhong (ed) , *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*, p. 142.

(2) The disintegration of the Soviet Union and ethnic separatist activities in China are not the outcomes of “politicising ethnic issues”.

Hao Shiyuan believes the failure of the Soviet Union to address national issues could be explained in two different ways.

Firstly, while the former Soviet Union established policies, laws and mechanisms for solving national issues and promoting national equality, it failed to implement them. Its highly centralised government promoted big-Russian nationalist chauvinism, leading to a lack of cohesion with non-Russian nationalities; secondly, the Soviet Union dealt with national issues using a “politicised” system setup and policy orientation, which not only fortified the power of each nationality, but even wrote freedom of secession into law; non-Russian nationalities were thus led to start separatist movements claiming “national independence” or “nationalism.”²²

The first explanation, although not explicitly expressed, was apparently favored more by Hao Shiyuan, who criticised the latter as having no sufficient evidence to make it a more convincing explanation. In other words, Hao doubts that the disintegration of the former Soviet Union was due more to politicising of its national(ethnic) policies than a highly centralised political system that promoted big-Russian nationalist chauvinism, as well as its failure to effectively implement laws, policies and mechanisms to promote national(ethnic) equality.

Chen Jianyue using relevant studies to support this, showing that the break-up was not due to politicising of ethnic policies; on the contrary, “it might have worked out better for the Soviet Union to have adopted regional autonomy or a regional state system...”²³

As regards the nationalist-separatist activities in China, Hao Shiyuan also denies any connection with politicising national issues. Hao believes that compared with social issues like population, poverty and employment, national issues are characterised by being more universal, long-lasting, complex, global and significant. Given these characteristics, it is hard to establish a set of independent indices and predictable timelines for solving national issues in relation to other social issues like population, poverty and employment. It is the reason national issues are prevalent in all multi-national states, including developed countries.²⁴

Yet, China is currently at the early stage of socialist development the main conflict is between rapid increase in material demand and slow growth of social productivity. Almost all social issues faced by China are produced due to or in relation to this major conflict; national issues are no exception.

China’s national issues thus appear complicated and varied, but fundamentally stem from the conflict between demands for economic and cultural development by nationalities and

²²Hao Shiyuan: *Establishing a Socialist Harmonious Society and Ethnic Relations*. See also Xie, Lizhong (ed) , *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*, Pp. 39-40.

²³Chen Jianyue: *Establishing a Multiethnic Harmonious Society and Resolving Ethnic Issues – ‘Depoliticizing’ and ‘Culturalizing’ Ethnic Issues*. See also Xie, Lizhong (ed) , *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*, Pp. 76.

²⁴Hao Shiyuan: *Establishing a Socialist Harmonious Society and Ethnic Relations*. See also Xie, Lizhong (ed) , *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*, Pp. 33.

regions, and their inability to develop, which is — the key theme of national issues in China.
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In this process, it is likely that national conflicts arise from the imbalance of development among nationalities and regions. Furthermore, “separatists, religious extremists and international terrorist organizations are not without impact. They utilise the most prevalent and general social issues to create rumours, confuse the public, initiate dissatisfaction and create trouble. In order to protect the nation from these negative outside influences, we need to fundamentally increase development, implement co-development and realise mutual prosperity.”²⁶

Wang Xien also argues that the existence of separationist forces does in fact influence China’s national relations and cohesion. However, using the existence of these forces as a measure of the quality of methods to resolve national issues may not be reasonable. 27

In today’s world, separationist trends and movements are explicitly or implicitly present, They are caused by national awareness induced by the theory of “one nation, one state”, and the maximised utilization of this awareness by various social forces and interest parties.²⁸

Fairly speaking, from a worldwide perspective, the Tibet and Xinjiang issues in China are no more serious than similar issues in other nations. Then why do they receive so much attention? There is only one answer, and that is the long-term support, connivance and speculation by international opposition forces.²⁹

(3) The results of “acculturating ethnic issues” in the USA and India fall short of Ma’s ideal.

A major empirical basis for Ma proposed depoliticising of ethnic issues lies in America’s success in solving racial and ethnic issues by “acculturating.” Hao Shiyuan finds this dubious: even given that US ethnic policies are “acculturating” in nature, the outcomes fall short of the success Ma envisions. On the contrary, its implementation actually produced what Huntington and Brzezinski feared, a politicisation of ethnic group relations and challenges to national identity.³⁰

From a different angle, Wang Xien discusses “why are there no separationist forces that threatened the integrity of the U. S. ”, arguing that

the political reasons behind this cannot be ignored; more importantly, the US is an immigrant country with little over two centuries of history. On coming to the US,

²⁵Hao Shiyuan: Establishing a Socialist Harmonious Society and Ethnic Relations. See also Xie, Lizhong (ed) , *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*, Pp. 34.

²⁶Hao Shiyuan: Establishing a Socialist Harmonious Society and Ethnic Relations. See also Xie, Lizhong (ed) , *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*, Pp. 36.

²⁷Wang Xien, On “afterthoughts of China’s ethnic issues and “being practical”- debating Ma. See also Xie, Lizhong (ed) , *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*, P. 125

²⁸See Xie, Lizhong (ed) , *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China* ,P. 126.

²⁹Wang Xien, On “afterthoughts of China’s ethnic issues and “being practical”- debating Ma. See also Xie, Lizhong (ed) , *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*, P. 126.

³⁰Hao Shiyuan, See also Xie, Lizhong (ed) , *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*, p. 43.

immigrant ethnic groups or nations were rapidly disintegrated and swallowed by industrialisation and urbanisation. The biggest issue they faced in their new social environment immersion and acceptance in the local society as fast as possible; it was that they lacked opportunities to create their own nationalities and conspire to gain independence. In other words, the immigrant identities of the majority of ethnic groups and racial groups in the U.S. meant that there were no historical and regional bases for them to engage in national separatist activities. Without this identity, it cannot be guaranteed that there would not be separatist issues. In fact, some aboriginal Indians in the U. S. have long engaged in “separatist” activities, claiming to be the “first nation”, and have been making continual efforts in “independence” and “nation-building”.³¹

Chen Jianyue is doubtful, too, about the other success story that Ma advanced in support of his proposed acculturating-oriented approach to ethnic issues—India. Examples he cites show that “India is less than perfectly harmonious in its ethnic relations.”³² He quotes A. H. Sornjee, an Indian political researcher, who clearly states,

“there exist surprising levels of diversity and disintegration in India, far surpassing Holland, Austria and Canada in extent. When conflicts based on caste, rank, religion and region are put in the context of ethnicity, they no longer follow the route of power-sharing for the purpose of unification, but waver between conflict and compromise”.

It is hard, Chen argues, “in the face of all these bloody facts of inter-ethnic conflicts, to find traces of the ‘important success story of India after its establishment’.”³³

How then to understand and evaluate these disputes between Ma and his critics?

3. An initial assessment: My views on the debate

My initial assessment of Ma Rong’s debate between with his critics is summarised as follows:

3.1 The distinction between “nation” and “ethnic group” must be recognised.

Ma Rong proposes distinguishing the terms “nation” and “ethnic group” from each other to refer separately to identity groups that are organised in the form of a political entity such as a “state”, and those that are tied together by cultural and physical factors within a “state”. This proposal is of great value, in my opinion, for the primary reason— advanced also by Ma— that in the present literature, they indeed represent human groupings at totally different levels and reflect different forms of identity in human society; one is organised by political entities like states while the other is not. If we do not use different terms having distinct meanings to represent them separately, we are very likely to cause confusion in expression. For example, if we use the term “nation (*minzu*)” to refer to both the “Chinese nation” and ethnic minority

³¹Wang Xien, On “afterthoughts of China’s ethnic issues and “being practical”- debating Ma, See also Xie, Lizhong (ed) , *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*, p. 125.

³²Chen Jianyue, “Establishing a multiethnic harmonious society and resolving ethnic issues –‘depoliticising’ and ‘culturalising’ ethnic issues,” See also Xie, Lizhong (ed) , *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*, p. 80.

³³Chen Jianyue, “Establishing a multiethnic harmonious society and resolving ethnic issues –‘depoliticising’ and ‘culturalising’ ethnic issues,” See also Xie, Lizhong (ed) , *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*, p. 81.

groups like “Tibetan Nation”, “Hui Nation” and “Korean Nation”, it would indeed be very perplexing: are the “Chinese nation” and “Tibetan” or “Hui” nationalities the same kind of identity groups? Or are they different? If the former is true, then why is not or could not the latter be organised in the form of individual states? If the former is not true, then what is the reason why they are not distinguished in conceptual terms?

In fact, conundrums like this are to be found in the essays of Ma’s critics. For example, in his essay “Establishing a socialist harmonious society and ethnic relations,” Hao Shiyuan writes:

The Han nationality and the national minority groups are interdependent, and the same interdependency also exists between the national minorities, which formed the historical cause for China’s multi-national structure, and also propelled China on the road of national revitalization.³⁴

Nationalities do not receive differential treatment based on size, length of history or development stage, but were recognised as a member of the Chinese Nation, this is a reflection of real national equality, and also constitutes the basic requirements for the implementation of the regional national autonomy policy.³⁵

The nation that we are building is an organic collective and innovation of 56 nationalities.”³⁶

As seen from these three sentences, there is an obvious logical issue in applying the term “nation” both to the “Chinese nation” and “56 nationalities”, which are in effect human groupings at two different levels.

Similar predicament is also seen in the articles of other critics. The only difference is that they may have noticed and tried hard to avoid it. Chen Jianyue, for example, states in his article “Establishing a multi-national harmonious society and resolving national Issues – ‘depoliticising’ and ‘culturalising’ national issues”, that public policies aimed at adjusting inter-national relations in multi-national states

can be categorised into two types: one is community policies aimed at building the *guozu* (“state-nation”); the other is national preferential policies aimed at providing national minorities with preferential terms.³⁷

Here, apparently, the author encounters the awkward situation of having to differentiate two types of “nation” from each other. To solve it, he has no choice but to adopt a new term, *guozu* (which is exactly what Ma regards as a “nation”) to refer to the type of identity group different from an ethnic minority. Likewise, in his “On ‘Afterthoughts’ of China’s national issues and ‘being practical’ – debating Ma”, Wang Xien also has to choose “the Chinese nation on a national level” and “basic nations under the rule of the national state”³⁸ to solve

³⁴Hao Shiyuan, “Establishing a socialist harmonious society and ethnic relations,” See also Xie, Lizhong (ed) , *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*, p. 36.

³⁵Hao Shiyuan, See also Xie, Lizhong (ed) , *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*, p. 45.

³⁶Hao Shiyuan, *Establishing a Socialist Harmonious Society and Ethnic Relations*. See also Xie, Lizhong (ed) , *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*,p. 50.

³⁷Chen Jianyue, *Establishing a Multiethnic Harmonious Society and Resolving Ethnic Issues – ‘Depoliticising’ and ‘Culturalising’ ethnic issues*, See also Xie, Lizhong (ed) , *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*, p. 70.

³⁸Wang Xien, “On ‘Afterthoughts’ of China’s Ethnic Issues and ‘Being Practical’ – Debating Ma,” See also Xie, Lizhong (ed) , *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*, p. 99.

that predicament. Therefore, it can be seen that from a logical point of view, it is of high necessity that we adopt different terms to reflect identity groups that are organised in the form of a political entity such as a “state”, and those that are tied together by cultural and physical factors within a “state”.

But this does not necessarily mean, apart from the “nation-ethnic group” pair as proposed by Ma, we can not use other concept pairs to represent the two different identity groups. The above-mentioned concept pairs (i.e. “state-nation”/ “nation”, “nation”/ “basic nation”, etc.), together with those present in the early 20th century Chinese literature (i.e. “big nationalism”/“small nationalism” used by Liang Qichao, etc.) and those mentioned by certain ethnologists (i.e. “broad nation” / “narrow nation”, etc.), share some similarities and can not, from a logical point of view, be deemed true or false in practice. Given that in the context of current Chinese literature people are accustomed to the usage of “nation” as a representation of objects implied in the English language (that is, any human identity group organised in the form of a political entity such as a “state”), using the term “ethnic group” to refer to any identity group that is tied together by cultural and physical factors within a “state” would seem a simpler and more appropriate option.

3.2 “Ethnic” issues should not, and are difficult to, be depoliticised.

Recognizing “nation” and “ethnic group” as two distinct identity groups does not, of course, entail accepting “depoliticising ethnic issues.” As to whether ethnic issues should be depoliticised, I lean towards of Ma’s critics: “ethnic” issues should not, and cannot without difficulty, be depoliticised.

The chief reason for this is the fact that ethnic groups and relations do in fact involve interests or interest-based relationships. Solving such problems by political means (political communication, political institutions or public policy, etc.) thus seems inevitable. Given Ma’s critics have already discussed it extensively, I shall not elaborate on this, beyond adding that economic, social, political and cultural issues are never indispensable. Any culture, of any type, always infiltrates into or is embodied in a particular type of economic, social and political life. Their realisation, further, has always to resort to a particular economic, social and political form. For example, polygamy or polyandry may be deemed a certain type of culture. But once practiced, it may give rise to social and economic forms that differ from those under monogamous arrangements. Furthermore, its legitimacy has to be established and guaranteed by “political” activities such as legislation, administration and jurisdiction; the same also applies to religious belief. Even if we recognise that “ethnic group” is a different types of identity groups from “nation” are mainly formed on a cultural basis, it does not therefore mean the former could not at once be a group possessing certain political qualities and demonstrating certain political character; as such, it might be a safer way to say that the issues arising from “ethnic groups” or their relationships could not better be solved by such political measures as making them all independent states, than by treating them as individual subgroups (and relationships among subgroups) within a “nation” (such as the “Chinese” or “American” nation).

The question of whether or not “ethnic” issues could be depoliticised forces us to direct our attention to another relevant question: as Ma points out, the entity to which the term “nation”

refers actually is composed of two different identity groups, the distinctions between which require conceptual clarification. Even if we recognise or accept what Ma proposes, however, an important question remains in need of clarification: is the distinction between these two different groups an objective reality determined by inherent properties of the two? Or a subjective construct determined by the acquired will and practice of their members?

Without question, we have two choices to make before an answer to this question emerges: The first choice is related to what is commonly known as traditional “realism” while the second is to “social constructivism”.

Based on traditional “realism”, we are able to form a theory on the distinction between “nation” and “ethnic group” that may be described as follows:

(1) Nation and ethnic group, are, regardless how termed, objective realities that exist naturally and independent of human will.

(2) An “ethnic group” is a type of human community that came into being gradually during the pre-modern period. It has the following basic characteristics: formed mainly on the basis of shared identification factors such as blood relationship, physique and culture; having no fixed territorial consciousness (an “ethnic group” may live in different geographic locations, or is able to migrate among different places even when living together); not linking itself permanently to a political entity such as a “state” (an ethnic group may live either in different states or within the territory of one state with other ethnic groups), amongst others. In contrast, “nation” is a type of modern community gradually developed during the process of modernization. Its basic characteristics are: formed mainly on identification of modern sovereign states; having comparatively clear territorial boundaries and sovereignty consciousness; linking itself explicitly to a particular state (“one-nation, one-state”), amongst other characteristics.

(3) An “ethnic group” may evolve into a “nation”, but certain economic foundation and social, historical conditions are required for the evolution to occur, with one of the most important conditions being the formation and development of capitalist mode of production. Capitalism required for its development that political institutions (e.g. a modern state characterised by monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force) be utilised to establish unified market economy, civil society and order based on rule of law, maintain the security of people’s life and wealth, and safeguard external expansion; this facilitated the formation and development of the “nation,” a human community that identified with the modern sovereign state (materials for its formation may either come from pre-existing “ethnic groups” in an earlier capitalist society, or not from them; in the case of the former, either an “ethnic group” or multiple “ethnic groups” can evolve into a “nation”). Hence, the evolution of “ethnic group” into “nation” was a natural, historical process that was independent of the subjective wishes of their members (while forming a “national consciousness” among them remains one of the required conditions, the process as a whole was independent of it).

(4) The formation and development of modern “nations” is a constant process, which will not end in the formation of “state-nations” as we see now. Conversely, with constant expansion of the capitalist production mode in spatial terms, there is a need for the

current “state-nations” to further integrate with each other as required by the development needs of the capitalist production mode, which will give rise to emergence of bigger, and fewer “nations” than the present ones, and eventually – as perceived under the present and foreseeable technical conditions – to the formation of a “human nation” (all human beings belong to a nation-state, or global nation-state).

If we accept the above theory, then it may be safe to say that the distinctions between “ethnic group” and “nation” resemble the “objectivity” of distinctions between water and water vapour (in spite of certain links between the two, they depend on totally different objective conditions). Were it not for the development of capitalism, albeit to varying degrees, “national consciousness” (i.e. the idea of redefining a non-political identity group such as an “ethnic group” as a political group) alone would not, or would with difficulty, necessitate the transformation of “ethnic group(s)” (non-political identity group) into “nation” (political identity group) in practice. In other words, according to this theory, without the required objective historical conditions, “ethnic” issues could not be depoliticised in reality (which also suggests that serious political consequences would be caused if we confuse the terms “ethnic group” and “nation” at the conceptual level).

In comparison, based on “social constructivism”, we are able to form the following theory on the distinctions between “nation” and “ethnic group”:

- (1) “nation” and “ethnic group”, irrespective of appellation, are NOT “objective realities” that are naturally existent and independent of man’s will, but “discursive realities” constructed under the guidance of particular human discourse systems (e.g. “nationalism”).
- (2) Although the above distinctions between “ethnic group” and “nation” still remain valid - that is, the former is a non-politicalised identity group that came into being gradually during the pre-modern period, while the latter is a politicalised and nationalised identity group gradually developed during the process of modernisation – such a distinction is NOT as a completely natural existence as that between water and water vapour; on the contrary, it is caused due to the distinctions of discourse systems to which the constituent group members belong.
- (3) Hence, the evolution of ethnic groups and nations is entirely independent of changes in objective, historical conditions; as a matter of fact, it only stems from changes in the discourse systems of group members. If, under the guidance of a certain “nationalistic” discourse, a strong sense of “national” consciousness starts to ferment among members of a group previously known to possess only “ethnic” characters, it is very likely that in reality they may shift their perceived group identity from a non-politicalised “ethnic group” into a politicalised “nation”. Similarly, if members of any group having already been constructed as a “nation” abandons their “nationalistic” discourse and accepts certain new discourses (e.g. culturalised “ethnic group” discourse), it is also likely that they may redefine the group identity by shifting to a non-political “ethnic group”.
- (4) Therefore, the historical inevitability of all peoples integrating into a single “human nation” does not exist. Whether or not the mankind will eventually evolve into a unified

“nation” is entirely dependent on the discourse system – probably a better way to describe it is “Global Nationalism” – that is formed among the majority of people around the world and accepted by these people. And it is irrelevant to the global expansion process of capitalist production mode (or “socialist production mode” as expected by Marxists).

If we accept the above theory, it seems reasonable to suggest that given that the distinctions between “ethnic group” and “nation” stem completely from discourse construction and no physical barrier exists to separate them from each other, there should be no objectively-existing constraint force that can prevent a previously culturalised “ethnic group” from evolving into a politicised “nation”. Answering whether “ethnic groups” should be politicalised should be entirely dependent on the discourse system in question; there can be no such thing as the only correct or appropriate answer. People guided by discourse frameworks like “de-politicizing ethnic issues” tend to favour depoliticising ethnic issues, while those guided by the opposite tend to firmly support for politicising them. As regards the question of whether or not “ethnic” issues should be “depoliticised”, there is no standard answer as the only correct one that everyone must accept. Hence, “depoliticising” ethnic issues is in essence an extremely difficult mission, one that is impossible to accomplish, or at the best one of the many policy options to choose from, that is supported by no objective basis in terms of reasonableness, and is entirely dependent on a particular discourse system.

As we can in fact see from Ma’s essays, some of his opinions on the relationship between “ethnic group” and “nation” are to a certain degree very similar to the above “social constructivist” position. He points out clearly that there is no impassable gulf between “an ethnic group” and “a nation”. With changes in the internal and external conditions (socio-economic development, guidance of government policies and propelling of external forces), an “ethnic group” and a “nation” are transferable.³⁹ If this is the case, then, as we have perceived, depoliticising “ethnic” issues would be an undertaking so extremely costly and unbearable that it is nearly impossible to accomplish in the real world.

3.3 The relationship between “ethnic group” and “nation” is one between “pluralism” and “unity”.

Given the above two points, the following conclusion seems to follow: the core of the question concerning the relationship between ethnic group and nation is not between culturalising or politicising, but rather between pluralism and unity. The latter relationship is not the “cultural pluralism - political unity” relationship proposed by Ma, but a pluralism-unity relationship involving economic, political, social, cultural and other aspects (in the case of individuals, one between “national (or citizen) status” and “ethnic group member status”), or, in Hao Shiyuan’s words, between unification and diversification, or similarities and differentiation.⁴⁰ In other words, irrespective of what specific field it might be (i.e.

³⁹Ma, A new perspective in guiding ethnic relations in the 21st century: Depoliticisation of ethnicity in China”. See also Xie, Lizhong (ed), *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*, P. 4, 16.

⁴⁰Hao Shiyuan, “Establishing a socialist harmonious society and ethnic relations”, See also Xie, Lizhong (ed), *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*, P. 40.

economic, political, social and cultural), there are at least two different levels, i.e. nation-state and “ethnic groups” within a nation-state. At the nation-state level, efforts must be taken to establish a unified pattern that covers all economic, political, social and cultural fields within the entire range of the nation-state, while at the “ethnic group” level, it is also imperative that sufficient room be left for all “ethnic groups” so that they are able to develop differentiated economic, political, social and cultural forms and styles on the basis of their respective historical and realistic characteristics. The all-around “unification” (at the nation-state level) and “diversification” (at the “ethnic group” level) in economic, political, social and cultural fields should be the basic direction for properly addressing the relationship between “nation” and “ethnic group”.

In view of the debate between Ma and his critics, I am emphasizing here on two main points: First, as Ma mentioned specifically in his article, the unification at the state level should not only cover economic, social and political fields but also include the cultural field. Ma states repeatedly in his article that the nation-state level, a certain ‘cultural identity’ should also be established; it would otherwise be hard to establish a new ‘collective identity’ at this level. A nation-state must explore a ‘common culture’ shared by all ethnic groups from its historical development and cultural tradition...

Much as we divide a ‘political structure’ into different levels, we may similarly divide ‘culture’. Habermas emphasises that national identity requires a national cultural unity to create a group identity at the nation-state level. “Culture” in a state, therefore, should be regarded as a multi-levelled structure, with at least two important levels comprised by ‘nation’ and ‘ethnic group’...

If a common culture and shared perception is missing at the nation-state level, conflicts among different cultures at the ethnic group level will be inevitable, making them hard to live harmoniously with each other. Therefore, political systems and administrative restrictions alone are not enough. A certain level of unified cultural identity is also needed at the state level.⁴¹

He also points out that countries with a strong emphasis on “cultural pluralism”, like the United States, “also implement powerful measures for a ‘unified national culture’”.⁴²

I agree completely with Ma about these statements. Hence, as with Ma’s proposal, I fully agree that we must make every effort to build a “Chinese culture” shared by all ethnic groups of the “Chinese nation”, which should include the perception of identity with the “Chinese nation”, one or several languages and world outlook, values and moral principles mutually shared by members of all ethnic groups, as well as beliefs and customs commonly observed by all ethnic groups, amongst others. And like what Ma describes, there will never be solid economic, social and political unification until cultural unification is achieved at the state level.

Second, as Ma’s critics emphasise repetitively, “pluralism” at the ethnic group level should not merely remain at the cultural field but cover economic, social and political fields as well. We should allow different ethnic groups to build economic, social and political forms with their own unique characteristics by enabling them to make choices on their own while taking

⁴¹Ma, A new perspective in guiding ethnic relations in the 21st century: “Depoliticising” ethnicity in China, See also Xie, Lizhong (ed) , *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*, p. 27-28.

⁴²See Xie, Lizhong (ed) , *Depoliticization of Ethnic Questions In China*, p. 17.

into account their historical tradition, realistic conditions and perception without prejudice to the unified nation-state mechanism.

Here, I need to elaborate on three points:

- (1) At the ethnic group level, pluralism should be allowed, albeit at varying levels and within a certain range, not only in the cultural field (religious belief, values, etc.), but also the economic (industrial structure, property forms, etc.), social (marriage, family, community, etc.) and political (legislation, consultation, administration and jurisdiction, etc.) fields (discussed earlier these, will not be revisited here).
- (2) carrying out pluralism at the ethnic group level must observe an absolute precondition of avoiding damage to the unified nation-state mechanism, whether it be in the economic, social, political or cultural field. Specifically, economic pluralism should not interfere with or damage overall “national economic” operations at the nation-state level; social pluralism should not interfere with or damage social solidarity or social integration at that level; political pluralism should not interfere with cause damage the existence and operation of the nation-state as a political entity;⁴³ and cultural pluralism should not interfere with or damage identification and knowledge-sharing at the nation-state level.
- (3) this all-around yet measured pluralism at the ethnic group level should not be understood as a mere temporary measure that has to be taken under particular historical conditions, but a permanent necessity that must be carried into the future. Not only out of respect for historical traditions of all ethnic groups, or consideration of the internal and external conditions for them to live and develop, this is due as well to doubts about and renunciation of the “monistic” view of truth and its relevant behavioural patterns (e.g. a “non-discretionary” strategy), as well as understanding and appreciation of the pluralistic perception.

In addressing the “nation-ethnic group” relationship based on the above principles, the biggest problem remains that of properly dividing the duties, rights and interests of nation-state and ethnic groups in economic, political, social and cultural terms, i.e. establishing the boundaries of duties, rights and interests between the two in those terms. It is nothing but a component of the problem concerning the nation-society relationship in the modern history. As with the problem of the nation-society relationship, there may be a lot of perceptual discrepancies and endless detailed disputes over it. We cannot however expect all these problems to vanish completely given a “pluralistic unity” consensus among people. Nevertheless, we can still manage to list some duties and rights that can and must be borne by “nation-states” alone; for example, duties and rights of monopoly of armed force (apart from the state, no ethnic group is allowed to possess armed forces); duties and rights of determining territorial borders, defending territorial security and resolving territorial disputes; duties and rights of conducting reciprocal exchanges with other nation-states; duties and rights of formulating and

⁴³Neil MacCormick finds a basic principle to be followed here: “self-autonomy” at the ethnic group level neither allows nor needs the form of sovereign state. See N. MacCormick: “Does a Nation Need a State? A Review on Liberal Nationalism”, in Edward Mortimer & Robert Fine, eds., *People, Nation and State: The Meaning of Ethnicity and Nationalism*, trans. Liu Hong, Huang Haihui, Minzu University Press, 2009, Pp.156. In this sense, I concur that Ma’s proposed “depoliticising ethnicity” is quite accurate and appropriate in the de-nationalising perspective.

implementing legal norms to be observed by all citizens within the state; and duties and rights to handle administrative affairs at the state level, and so on and so forth.

From this perspective, current problems arising from China's ethnic policies may be related, not to "politicising" affairs and relationships of "ethnic groups" which were originally "cultural groups", but to examining whether or not the relationship between the "Chinese nation" and the presently-determined 56 ethnic groups is reasonably and appropriately addressed (in economic, social, political and cultural terms). On this, we may be facing an incessant discussion. There remains, therefore, a long way ahead of us.

Overlapping Modernities and “The Rise of the Rest”

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1. Introduction

Modern world history in the 21st century seems to be going back to the future. China and India are coming back to the front stage of history as they were before the erefore, a long way ahead of us. groups in economic, political, social and cultural terms, Historical importance of the Indian Sea and the South China Sea is reemphasized. Eurasian silk roads through vast lands and seas are reevaluated and revitalized. This ‘Rise of the Rest’ is an opening of a new future, but also a going back to the past, that is, the time before e dia are coming back to the front stage of history as they were beearly modern age,’ Eurasian civilizations were communicating and transacting more equally than in the time of European hegemony.

So now we can come to observe three stages (or sequences) of modern age: 1) the early modern, 2) the fully modern, and 3) the late modern era. The second stage of the modern era began from the Rise of the West; and the third stage, from the Rise of the Rest, the civilizational situation which resembles that of the first one. That’s why this age seems to be going back to the future. There is a feeling of déjà-vu. This situation requires us a new theoretical perspective to understand modernity and the modern age more completely. That is ate modern era. The second stage of the modern era began from the Rise of the West; and the third ss of modern age.’

2. Reasons and Flaws of Multiple Modernities Theories

The concept of one-single, unilineal modernity has been challenged. Theories of ty and the modern age more completely. That is ate modern era. The second stage of the modern era btheories, the idea of one-single modernity puts monopolizing privileges to the history of the West in claiming universality, identifying modernity with Westernization. As Max Weber classically puts, -single, unilineal modernity has been challenged. Theories cultural phenomena have appeared which (as we like to think) lie in a line of development having *universal* significance and valuene-single modernity puts monopolizing privileg

Universal status of modernity is permitted only to the West. What is left to the non-West is to follow and replicate the Western original. This idea perpetuates the historical privileges of the West. Western superiority is predestined in the past as well as in the future. In this paradigm, the followers (the non-West, or as some people calls it, ‘the rest’) are destined to live perpetually the past time of the West. That is, the rest is supposed to be permanently immature compared to the grown-up West.

The discourse has been refuted both logically and empirically. It identifies a specific, parochial history of the West with the universal. However, the universal cannot be directly identified with a specific phenomenon. If we would say something about the universal in history, we have to find some structural, ideal-typical homology among the diverse historical experiences of many civilizations and societies. In other words, the universal appears in the distinctive experiences of many histories. Thus if we mention modernity in universal sense, we have to admit in the first place the diverse paths toward modernity reflecting diversity. Here would meet universality and multiplicity.

If we talk more profoundly, the universal never ends. The universal is permanently open to the future, because universality lives on the future refutations (Karl Popper). Modernity is still waiting to be renewed and reformulated in the future. The idea of decided, predestined future contradicts the very concept of universality.

Empirically, double process of differentiation and integration has been observed in globalization. On the one hand, modernity has spread globally; on the other, distinctive modernities have emerged. What we are observing in China, India, and many other non-Western societies are not simple replications of the past history of the West, but distinctive paths of non-Western modernities.

From this perspective, there are sufficient reasons for the theorists of multiple and alternative modernities to challenge the conventional idea of one-single modernity, demanding to have emerged. What, apart from modernity, denying the Western monopoly on modernity, rejecting the Western cultural program as the epitome of modernity, the idea of one-

Nevertheless there are yet two serious flaws (weakness and limit) in the multiple modernities theories (MMT, afterwards). Firstly, MMT have not successfully proffered any clear-cut concept of modernity of its own. They just have maintained that there are many versions of modernities. With only differences, they cannot reach any alternative definition of modernity which can incorporate multiplicity and universality of modernity. Critiques of MMT have put their fingers on this vulnerable spot, arguing that MMT make the definition of modernity impossible or infinite, thus meaningless (Dirik, 2003; Schmidt, 2006; Lee, 2006). This is a weakness of MMT.

Secondly, MMT also presuppose the exclusive Western origin of modernity. Therefore, modernities of the rest are, at best, Firstly, MMT have not successfully proffered an (Gaonkar, 2001:18). Eisenstadt also contradicts himself by stating (in many places) that modernities of the rest are, at best, Firstly, MMT have not successfully proffered any clear-cut concept of modernity, to the Americas and later on throughout the world" (Eisenstadt, 2005: 31), and "in Europe and the United States, certainly, where the first cultural program of modernity originated ... The first, the so-called "original" modernity, developed in Europe ..." Eisenstadt and Schluchter, 1998: 2, 3).

In the quotes, a prominent theorist of MMT still finds *the only origin*--kind of a quasi-theological notion of *causa prima*--of modernity *only in Europe*. Here remains yet Eurocentric universality. From this perspective, distinctive paths of non-Western modernities

can be understood only through the viewpoint of and spread-out of Western modernity. It is a limit of MMT. For these weakness and limit, MMT have not yet made themselves a truly alternative theory to the classical one. We are going to attempt to overcome those limit and weakness in the following sections.

3. Overlapping Modernities and Three Stages of Modern Era

For recent decade, a remarkable new genre of historiography, so called tinctive paths of non-Western modernities can be understood only through the viewpoint of and spread-out of Western of the collapse of cold war system and 9/11 has stimulated a new approach to understanding world history focusing on overcoming Eurocentrism in historiography, we need to remember the name of Marshall Hodgson, Fernand Braudel, Leften Stavrianos, and William McNeill who had pioneered the trend of global history from 1970s. Referring to the new findings of the global history approach, what attracts our interest most is the status of the West in global history before the 19th century. In short, old war system and 9/11 has yet established solidly until the late 18th century. (Abu-Lughod 1989; Chaudhuri 1990; Blaut 1993; Goody 1996; Frenandez-Armesto 1996; Wong 1997; Frank 1998; Pomeranz 2000; Marks, 2007; Parker, 2010).

Reflecting upon these new historical evidences, we need to deepen our understanding of the Wong 1997; Frank 1998; Pomeranz 2000; Marks, 2007; Parker, 2010). rest most is the status of the West iodern period. If the European global hegemony had not been established before the 19th century, and, as many evidences have confirmed, during the European early modern era, Asian influences upon Europe were greater than those of the opposite direction (Needham 1990; Rahman 1984; al-Hassan and Hill 1986; Kuhn 1988; Temple 1999; Fran and Gills 1993; Chase-Dunn and hall 1977; Hobson 2004), how can we say the historical modern era began from exclusively Europe?

According to Hegelian myth, Vasco da Gama affirmed, during the European early modern era, Asian influences upon Europe were greater than those of the opposite direcinning of the (early) modern era, that is, the beginning of the historical modern times. However as many authors have pointed out, “Europe did not remake Asia between 1500 and 1800—Asia helped remake Europe between 500 and 1800” (Hobson 2004: 140).

According to an official Portuguese document of the 16th century, to an official Portuguese document of the 16g the European early modern era, Asian influences upon Europe were greater than those of the opposite dir


The technological gap between the East and West is well evidenced by Vasco da Gamaera, Asian influences upon Europe were greater than those of the opposite direcinning of the (early) moderat them and advised the Admiral rather to offer gold. At the same time, the Muslim merchants already on the spot affirmed to the Indians that the Portuguese were essentially pirates, possessed of nothing that the Indians could ever want. (Needham 1990:176)

Vasco da Gama, possessed of nothing that the Indians could ever want. (Needham 1990:176) ... Chinese sea trade system. European countries ... (Needham 1990) ... British in sequence ... utilized this system well for their benefits. And British industrial revolution from the latest years of the 18th century indeed marked the real breakthrough into full-fledged modern times. However, it is a simplistic myth to believe that Europe invented modern era independently and exclusively from 15-16th century. As many historians of global history have maintained, the rest (Ming China, Mughal India, Ottoman-Safavid Islam) was in many aspects more advanced than the West during the 15-16th century in question. Here comes the bottom line: If early modern era began during the time in some spots of Europe, the same with the rest.

Classical theories of modernity (CTM) interpret the peculiar situation of the 19th and 20th century as the permanent condition of world history in the past as well as in the future. Thus the amalgamation of Judaeo-Christian and Greco-Roman civilization has been interpreted as the only legitimate origin of the modern world. The statement of Max Weber privileging the universal status of the Western civilization quoted before epitomizes the ethos of CTM. If there's a stance which identifies modernity with a specific civilization, it is CTM.

According to CTM, modernity began singularly from somewhere in the western Europe around the 15th to 16th century. Modernity in the rest has been nothing else than the spread and replication of the Western original. However, Westernization of Greco-Roman civilization has started only from the 19th century. Before 19th century, as mentioned earlier, superiority of the west over the rest did not exist. If we have to say superiority in that period, it was rather for China.

Here I present a figure which summarizes my point.



[Figure 1] Overlapping Modernities and Three Stages of Modern Era

Above figure illustrates the common structure of historical modernity in societies which has proto-modern civilizational backdrops. By the term for China. ation hasurred only from thestics of some ancient civilizations which experienced erieenced modern ciormation between 800 and 200 BC in China, Greece, India, Iran, and Israel (Jaspers 1953). The sharp tension between the transcendental and the mundane, and the systematic encompassment of the sacred upon the secular was firstly conceived in this period. World ethical religions, ancient empires and cosmopolitanism emerged in this time too. The sacred's encompassment of the secular, the prime character of the proto-modernity, is very important for our argument, because the inversion of the encompassment signals the emergence of historical modernity (see the next section).

In the following part of this section, Icture of historical modernity in societies which has proto-modern civilizatike an example, the formations of modernity in China and France are structurally the same as illustrated above. The beginning of historical modernity, the early modern era, in China was earlier than that of France. It's far before the beginning of the second layer or dimension of modernity (the layer of colonizing and colonized modernity in which European colonization of the world began [Figure1]). France, on their own proto-modern context, entered the early modern era around from the 16th-17th century (Reformation and thirty years war was important); in China, as many studies have proved, early modern developments have been observed from the thriving times of Song and Yuan. Many proto-modern Chinese urally the same as illustrated above. The beginning of hist, administrative logistics have been analyzed (McNeill 1995; Shiva 1968, 1997; Elvin 1973). There are not unanimous agreements on this point. For an example, a prominent Chinese economic historian Li Bozhung prefers Ming revolution to that of Song-Yuan era (Li 2002). Nevertheless Li also has no objection to the fact that social changes toward modernity occurred in China long before the invasion of the west in the 19th century.

Civilizational encounters of the east and west influenced a lot in establishing early modernity. Impacts of 973). There are not unanimous agreements onPolo (13th century) via *Chinoiserie* (17th century) to Enlightenment movements (18th century) have been thoroughly studied and well known. On the other hand, the imports of Islamic, Indian, and European culture and technology also affected the early modern development of China.

The second layer of modernity in above figure, the colonizing-colonized modernity, began in the 19th century in China, after the defeat of Opium War. In India, it was a bit earlier (around the late 18th century). In some geographical spots like Aceh, Malacca, Battavia, Manila, the second layer began earlier than India. Still, mostly, full fledged colonization occurred in the European imperialist era, the 19th century.

Colonization is double-faceted process, colonizing-colonized. It is the double faces of modernity of that era. Semi-colonized China, and colonized Korea are surely a part of modern history. Without pains and toils of the colonized, the prosperities of colonizing countries were

not imaginable. After the world war II, in the , in the are surely a part of modern history. Without pains and toils of the colonized, the prosperities of colonizing countries were not imaginable. After the f modern histo


As [Figure1] shows, there are three layers of modernity vertically, and horizontally there are three stages of modern era. As mentioned previously, the second stage began from the Rise of the West, the third present stage, from the Rise of the Rest, the situation of which resembles the first stage.

4. A New Definition of Modernity

To complete alternative theory of modernity alternating CTM, we also need a new alternative definition of modernity. The alternative definition must be more inclusive and indicative than those of classical theories. Definitions of CTM are, in this regard, lacking and limited. Max Weber’s definition, an exemplar definition of CTM, presents three columns of modernity: rational capitalism, rational law and administration, and rational differentiation of society. This definition is too narrow to include modern phenomena of East and West. Firstly, Weber’s definition presents just one aspect of modernity. ‘Cultural modernity’ or ‘modernity standing against modernity’ like (cultural) “modernism, avant-garde, decadence, kitsch, postmodernism” (Matei Calinescu 1987[1977]) cannot be included by the classical definition. Secondly, non-capitalist, non-liberal paths and dimensions of modernity are totally missing in the definition. Thirdly, non-Western historical distinctiveness is not reflected in the definition at all.

For the above reason, alternative definition of modernity which can include the above missing dimensions must be required. That kind of definition must include Webere and indial definition too.

That definition focuses on the process which produced the historical modernity: **The great transformation of the principle of social order from the sacreditye above missing dimensions must be required. That kind of definition mus.**



[Figure2] The modern transformation of the principle of social order

Rationalization, the core of Max Weber's principle of social order rationalization, the core of Max Weber's principle of social order the secular encompassment

The sacred above transformation. Above definitions sets the formation of the proto-modernity. The studies upon the formation of the proto-modern social order the secular encompassment (Jaspers 1953; Eisenstadt 1986; Voegelin 2000; Kim 2000; Bellah 2005, 2011; Armstrong 2006). The inversion of the encompassment marks the beginning of the historical modern age. This definition is a revision of secularization thesis. Our definition emphasizes the inversion of the encompassment, and the internalization of the sacred, not the eventual withering away of the sacred. (For further explanation of the above figure see Kim (2007)).

Even though some authors identify modernity with capitalism, modernity is a much bigger and deeper concept than capitalism. Modern era including the early and late modern epoch has contained varieties of social formations in which capitalism is just one. The concept of capitalism *per se* is still under debate. I prefer to Polanyian perspective which understands social formations as various combinations/articulations of the three modes of exchange---reciprocal mode of exchange of community, distributive mode of exchange of the state, and commodity mode of exchange of market. Capitalism is a social formation in which commodity mode of market exchange prevails over other modes of exchanges. Various combinations and articulations of those three modes of exchange make variety of social formations, not only variety of capitalisms.

5. Conclusion

Let me summarize. As modernities appear plural presently, so were the origins of modernities. If we have to say who came first, as far as I know, it's China. Islam (Osman-Safavi) and India (Mughal) probably followed. Europe seems to be the latest comer into the train of historical modernity, who, until now, has successfully surpassed the advanced. That surpassing occurred around the middle or the late 18th century. What is important is that the plural origins were not isolated each other, they were substantively interconnected. Among the important knots of the civilizational networks, historical modernity sprouted. China came first by chance. Important is that the plural origins were not isolated each other, they were substantively interconnected. Among the important knots of the civilizational networks, historical modernity sprouted. China came emanently. *Hubris* is probably the gravest sin in history as in ethics. In the time of the each other, they were substantively interconnected.

In this presentation I have maintained that Modernity is both single and multiple. The appearances of modernity of each society are different each other reflecting the unique and distinctive historical path toward modernity. This is cultural heterology of modernity. Still, all those distinctive modernities share a common definition of modernity (the secular's encompassment of the sacred) and a common structure of overlapping modernities. We can call this structural homology of modernity.

The Globalization of Critical Theories

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The sociology of ideas is an emerging field in contemporary sociology. Randall Collins' monumental *The Sociology of Philosophies* is one of the best-known contributions to this new field. Collins' book is subtitled *A Global Theory of Intellectual Change*. His methodology is macrosociological, and it favors the historical *longue durée*. Other, more microsociological, approaches exist in the sociology of ideas, like for instance the one chosen by Neil Gross in his book *Richard Rorty: The Making of an American Philosopher*. When one chooses a global approach, like Collins, the question of the viewpoint arises immediately. Without being carefully controlled, a "global" perspective always risks unintentionally to become a "western" perspective. There is no "view from nowhere", of course, knowledge is always rooted in geography and history. However, an effort to reflect upon the spatial and temporal coordinates in which one speaks is especially required when one analyses "large processes" and makes "huge comparisons", to quote Charles Tilly's book on macrosociological methodology.

Here, I would like to talk about the sociology of one specific type of ideas, namely "critical" ideas. Like Randall Collins, I will try to adopt a global perspective, with however less historical depth, since I am going to focus on contemporary critical ideas, that is, critical ideas since the 1970s. And I will be concerned with the content of contemporary critical ideas, as well as their social and political conditions of production. In fact, what the sociology of ideas should try to understand, in my opinion, is the interplay between the two: how the sociology of contemporary critical thinkers leads them to elaborate certain kinds of ideas, and how conversely these ideas can sometimes find their way in (large or small) social groups, thus becoming social "forces".

Three quick points before I start. First, I will be using the terms "critical" or "radical" theories to refer broadly to the ideas of the left. A more precise definition of these terms is of course required, we can come back to this problem in the discussion. The main point being that the definition of "critical theories" is historical, this is not a transhistorical or transcendental category. What counts as a "critical theory" today is not necessarily the same as in the past. For example, Liberalism - or some forms of Liberalism - was a critical theory in the 18th century, when absolutist regimes ruled. It is no longer a critical theory today.

Secondly, what I am referring to here is "critical theories" in the plural, and not "Critical Theory" in the singular, and with a capital "C" and "T". Critical Theory in the singular commonly refers to the Frankfurt school, to Max Horkheimer's famous distinction between

“traditional” and “critical” theory. “Critical theories” in the plural is a much wider category, that includes past and present members of the Frankfurt school, but also many other critical schools of thought.

Thirdly, not so long ago, one would have referred to “Marxism” rather than “critical theories”, because Marxism was so dominant as a critical theory for a century. But it is no longer dominant, so we have to widen the categories we use, and make room for non-Marxist critical theories. We are stuck with this unsatisfactory notion of “critical theories”, until new political and intellectual events will maybe allow us to clarify our concepts.

Globalization

So what are the main characteristics of critical theories today? A first characteristic is that critical theories are increasingly globalized. Globalization affects trade, finance, communication, literature, as scholars of *weltliteratur* have shown. It also concerns critical theories. So the first question I want to raise is: what is the nature of this globalization of critical ideas?

Ideas have always moved around the globe. The globalisation of thought in general, and of critical thinking in particular, is certainly not a new phenomenon. Among many others, French historian Serge Gruzinski has studied, in his great book *The Mestizo Mind*, what he calls “the intellectual dynamics of colonization and globalization”, starting in fifteenth century Latin America. This dynamics certainly concerns critical doctrines as well.

Jose Carlos Mariategui, one of the founders of Latin American Marxism, is an interesting case. In 1928, Mariategui published his classic book entitled *Siete ensayos de interpretacion de la realidad peruana*. In this book, he adapts a critical theory, namely Marxism, that was born in Europe in the middle of the 19th century to the Latin American context, and particularly to the Andean social reality. To do this, he is led to innovate theoretically inside of Marxism, because the working class was numerically weak in Peru at the time, and that there existed a massive Indian peasantry. Mariategui is one of the first to combine Marxism and Indianism (*Indigenismo*), a theoretical hybrid central to contemporary Latin American progressive politics, in places like Chiapas, Equator, or Bolivia, for instance. So this is a clear example of “travelling theory”, to mention Edward Saïd’s famous concept, and there are others. We could think of CLR James, Tran Duc Thao, Frantz Fanon, Mao...

Yet starting from the last third of the 20th century, say the end of the 1970s, there has been a clear acceleration of this globalization of critical theories. Since the 19th century, up until that time, critical theories were mainly elaborated in occidental and oriental Europe. Today, on the contrary, they are more and more disseminated across the globe. Thus, among the most read and debated critical thinkers today, we find the Peruvian Anibal Quijano, the Slovene Slavoj Zizek, the Indian Gayatri Spivak, the Japanese Koijin Karatani, the Mexican Nestor Garcia Canclini, the Argentinean Ernesto Laclau, the Cameroonesse Achille Mbembe... This geographic diversity is clearly new in the history of critical theories. Europe remains an

important centre for the production of critical theories. One can think of writers like Alain Badiou, Toni Negri, Jacques Rancière, Giorgio Agamben, or Axel Honneth. But for the last thirty years or so, a profound movement has started, that has led to the delocalization or decentring of critical theories in new countries.

I am not saying of course that these countries didn't produce critical thinking until now. I am saying that on the model of Pascale Casanova's "World Republic of Letters", a "World Republic of Critical Theories" is currently in the process of formation, and that theories elaborated in countries until now absent from this Republic are becoming increasingly visible.

Americanization

This globalization of critical theories is closely linked to their Americanization. Globalization and Americanization, in other words, are two interlocked features of critical theories. In this "World Republic of Critical Theories" I was talking about, as in globalization in general, there are hegemonic powers, and there is one in particular: the United States. Historically, the hegemonic centre of gravity of critical theories has moved westward: first, Eastern and Central Europe for classical Marxism, then Western Europe for so-called "occidental" Marxism, and now Anglo-America. If this westward movement continues, Asia might become a new centre of gravity for critical theories in the future.

All the thinkers I just quoted, including the European ones, teach in US universities on a regular basis. Some have made their entire academic careers there, others have come more recently. Some teach simultaneously in universities of other countries, for example in universities of their countries of origin. Others only teach in the US. But in all these cases, the US academe has been a strong attractor for them. This of course has important consequences in terms of the content of the critical theories they elaborate, and also from the point of view of their relationship to politics. I will come back to this.

Two main reasons explain this attraction of US universities for contemporary critical thinkers. I will mention one now, and the other in a minute. The first is that the US academe has a long history of integrating intellectual exiles, or « refugee scholars », as Lewis Coser has famously labelled them. During the Second World War, many scientists - natural or social scientists - settled in the US. This is the case of members of the Frankfurt school, or of Logical Positivists, for example. Since then, the US academe has become a global intellectual "hub".

So the globalization of critical theories has really two components: first, a diversification of the national origin of critical thinkers, and secondly, the Americanization of their careers.

This Americanization of critical theories doesn't mean that these thinkers have lost any political or intellectual specificity related to their country of origin. In this "World Republic of Critical Theories", national origins still matter. Two examples of what I have in mind. First, the case of Ernesto Laclau. Laclau moved to Great Britain in the sixties, and he has since then participated in Anglo-American debates about "post-Marxism", hegemony, the "empty signifier", etc. Yet his theories have always been influenced by his Argentinean origins, and

in particular by a typically Argentinean political phenomenon: *peronismo*, in its classical form, that of Juan Domingo Peron himself, or its contemporary form, that is *kirchnerism*. One cannot understand Laclau's theory of "populist reason" without taking this fact into account. In fact, as a young philosopher in Argentina, Laclau was a member of the local nationalist left, of a movement led by Jorge Abelardo Ramos. And in the years before his death last year, he became a strong advocate of Nestor and Cristina Kirchner's left populist policies.

Second example: Gayatri Spivak. Spivak came to the US in the 1960s as well. She is the translator of Jacques Derrida's *Grammatology*, and she has been an important protagonist in debates about postcolonial and feminist theory, mainly enunciated in the theoretical language of poststructuralism. Yet in her case too, national origins matter. For instance, in her famous text "Can the Subaltern Speak?", she discusses the racial and gender dynamics involved in the practice of the *sati*, which is the Indian religious ritual by which widows immolate themselves with their husbands, and which was banned by the British in the 19th century. So in this case too national origins matter.

In sum, Americanization implies a degree of intellectual homogeneity, but this homogeneity is not total. The personal trajectory of critical thinkers still matters. And what also matters is the relative power of their country of origin in the "World Republic of Critical Theories". Coming from a small country with no critical tradition, with poor institutions of higher education or publishing houses, and a non-international language, is obviously not the same as coming from the US or Europe.

Professionalization

A third characteristic of critical theories is their professionalization, that is the fact that critical thinkers today are almost exclusively academics. Journalists, union or party leaders, guerrilleros like the Subcomandante Marcos, produce critical theories too. But in most cases, these theories are elaborated by professors, and more specifically by professors in the human sciences. In the past, one could find critical thinkers with a background in the natural sciences like Kropotkin, Anton Pannekoek, or Amadeo Bordiga. But this seems to be less the case today, for reasons that have to do with the evolution of natural sciences. Donna Haraway is originally a biologist by training, but she is clearly an exception.

This professionalization or academization of critical theories has several consequences. First, it in part explains the Americanization of these theories - and this is the second cause of Americanization I was telling you about. The fact that critical thinkers are mostly academics implies that they are subject to the sociological laws that govern the global academic field. This field is dominated by US universities, in terms of financial means, as well as intellectual influence. So Americanization and professionalization are linked to one another, in the sense that professionalization reinforces Americanization. The fact that the English language is the *lingua franca* of our time also contributes to this dominance of US universities.

Secondly, professionalization doesn't only concern critical theories. This is a much wider process, that affects the production of knowledge in the natural and social sciences in general today. This professionalization is a consequence of an increased division of labour. As Karl Marx clearly saw, a constantly deepening division of labour is a condition of the accumulation of capital, in the work process in general, and in intellectual labour in particular. Critical theories, like any other kind of theory, are caught in this process.

A third implication of this professionalization is that it is a major break with previous periods in the history of critical theories, and particularly with classical Marxism. Marx, Lenin, Trotsky, Rosa Luxemburg, Gramsci or Mao, were not academics. They were political leaders and journalists. If and when they taught and wrote, which they often did, it was in party schools and journals, and not in universities and academic journals. At the time, universities were in fact elitist institutions, that had little to do with the mass institutions they have become since then. Of course, the fact that today's critical thinkers are mostly academics has important implications for the way their ideas are shaped, the conceptual language they use, and also for their relationship to politics.

Politics

A fourth characteristic of critical theories is their increasingly distant relationship to politics. This feature is connected to the previous one, since the logic of professionalization has diverted these thinkers from the political field. In fact, the political and the intellectual fields have become more and more separate or autonomous in the second half of the 20th century.

Here, it is useful to go back to Perry Anderson's understanding of the transition from classical to occidental Marxism. According to Anderson, the failure of the German revolution in 1923 provoked a split in the history of Marxism, that gave rise to the distinction between classical and occidental Marxism. The classical Marxists (Kautsky, Lenin, Trotsky, Rosa Luxemburg...) had two distinctive features. First, they were historians, economists, sociologists, that is, their writings were mostly empirical. Most of these writings, in fact, had to do with the immediate political conjuncture.

Secondly, classical Marxists were organization leaders, they were political strategists confronted to real political problems. These two distinctive features of classical Marxists were connected to one another. It is because they were political leaders that they needed empirical knowledge of the social environment they operated in. On the other hand, their leading positions in the working class movement provided them with first hand knowledge of the social world.

Occidental Marxism, according to Perry Anderson, emerges when these two features of classical Marxism fade away. In the middle of the 1920s, working class organizations are defeated in most European countries. This historic defeat gave rise to a new relationship between Marxist intellectuals and working class organizations. The prominent Marxists of the following historical period (from 1923 to 1968, say) - that is Adorno, Sartre, Althusser, Della

Volpe, Marcuse... - although different in many respects, have characteristics that are exactly the opposite of the ones of classical Marxists. First, they no longer have organic ties with working class organizations, and in particular with communist parties. They certainly no longer occupy positions of leadership. In cases where they are members of communist parties - as in the cases of Althusser, Lukacs, or Della Volpe - they maintain conflictive relationships with the leaderships of these parties.

Furthermore, the ideas occidental Marxists elaborate are abstract ideas. Abstraction is a central feature of occidental Marxism. Whereas classical Marxists were empirical in their approach to the social world, occidental Marxists are mostly philosophers, often specialized in epistemology and aesthetics. And as in the case of classical Marxism, the two characteristics of occidental Marxists are connected: the abstract language in which they write finds its origin in the fact that they are increasingly distant from working class organizations. A sort of « flight towards abstraction » is thus typical of occidental Marxism. If you compare Rudolf Hilferding's *Finance capital* to Adorno's *Minima Moralia*, or Lenin's *State and Revolution* to Althusser's *For Marx*, you will get a sense of this distinction between classical and occidental Marxism...

The transition from classical to occidental Marxism can be explained by several causes. With the emergence of Stalinism in the second half of the 1920s, an orthodox dogmatic Marxism arises, and it becomes the official doctrine of the Soviet Union and of affiliated parties in the West. This puts Marxist intellectuals in a difficult situation: they either have to conform to this new orthodoxy, or to distance themselves from working class organisations. Remaining intellectually creative most of the time leads Marxists to distancing themselves from these organizations.

So how can we situate contemporary critical theories in relationship to this distinction between classical and occidental Marxism? This separation between theory and practice, that started with occidental Marxism, has clearly increased in critical theories today. It is highly unlikely today that critical thinkers be members of working class organizations, and even more unlikely that they occupy positions of leadership. Slavoj Zizek, for example, was a dissident in Slovenia in the 1970s and 1980s. He even ran as a candidate for the presidential election in the year 1990. But he has no organic ties to organizations today, and this can be said of most critical thinkers. There are a few exceptions: French philosopher Daniel Bensaïd, who was a leader of the *New Anticapitalist Party* in France, is one of them. But this post-Trotskyite organization is very small compared to, say, the German social democracy of the beginning of the 20th century, or the Italian Communist party of the 1960s, who both had millions of members.

There is one interesting exception to this rule, which is Alvaro Garcia Linera, the vice-president of Bolivia. Garcia Linera is the author of influential writings on the Indigenous question or social movements in Bolivia, and of more theoretical writings on Lenin or Bourdieu. But he is also committed to mass politics, to the point of becoming vice-president of his country. So one could say that Garcia Linera is a kind of “classical Marxist”, in a historical age where there are very few.

What about the abstraction typical of occidental Marxism? Are contemporary critical theories abstract in the same sense? They certainly are. One could argue that there is a return to “metaphysical” themes - even religious themes, as we will see in a minute - in critical theories today, as in the work of Alain Badiou, for instance. The critique of the “subject” one can find in feminist or postcolonial theory, or in the “Ljubljana school” (Slavoj Žižek, Mladen Dolar, Alenka Župancic), is another example of “metaphysical” questions widely discussed today. On the other hand, an object so central to classical Marxism as the capitalist state has received no original treatment since the classic debate between Nicos Poulantzas and Ralph Miliband in the 1970s, with the possible exception of Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin’s book *The Making of Global Capitalism*, which is a major contribution to the understanding of the functioning of the American state as a global state.

At the same time, there has been a return to empirical analysis starting from the 1960s and 1970s. Class analysis by Erik Olin Wright, the study of long waves of capitalist development by Giovanni Arrighi, or of capitalist crisis by Robert Brenner, are examples of this tendency. So the “flight towards abstraction” is continuing within contemporary critical theories, with however some counter-tendencies.

Religion

An interesting aspect of critical theories is that they contain many references to religion, mainly to Christianity and Judaism. Here are a few examples. Alain Badiou devoted an important book to Saint Paul, entitled *Saint Paul. The Foundation of Universalism*. In this book, Badiou argues that Saint Paul is a typical example of a “subject” who is constituted in “fidelity” to an “event”, a religious event in this case, but an event that can be political, scientific, or artistic. This relationship between “subject” and “event” is further elaborated in Badiou’s books *Being and Event* and *Logics of the Worlds*, where there are also references to religious doctrines, for example to Blaise Pascal.

Giorgio Agamben also wrote a book about Saint Paul, entitled *The Time that is Left*, which is a commentary of the Epistle to the Romans. References to Roman sacred law (in *Homo Sacer*, for example), Christian eschatology, or the Hebraic tradition are frequent in Agamben’s work. In their book *Empire*, Michael Hardt and Toni Negri refer to Saint Francis of Assisi, the so-called “Poverello”. Negri has also written a book about Job, entitled *The Labour of Job*. Several of Slavoj Žižek’s books refer to religious questions, for example *The Fragile Absolute*, whose subtitle is *Why is the Christian Legacy Worth fighting For?*

Apart from Badiou, there is another pascalian strand in contemporary critical theories, the one exemplified by Daniel Bensaïd. Bensaïd is the author of a book entitled *Le pari mélancolique (The Melancholic Wager)*, where revolutionary commitment is presented as analogous to Pascal’s famous wager. Bensaïd is also the author of a book about Joan of Arc, and another about the Marranos – the Marranos are the Jews who were forced to convert in Spain and Portugal starting from the 15th century, but who continued to practice Judaism in secret. In

these dark times, according to Bensaïd, revolutionaries are a bit like Marranos, they have to secretly keep on believing.

How are we to explain this presence of religious references in critical theories? Two quick points before I answer this question. First, this relationship between critical theories and religious doctrines has political implications. The way critical theories conceive of religion will have an impact on the way progressive and revolutionary movements interact with religious movements in the future, in the western world and elsewhere. So this issue will weigh on the sociology of revolutionary movements in the future.

Secondly, past critical theories already made references to religious doctrines. Roland Boer has written a great book on this topic, entitled *Criticism of Heaven. On Marxism and Theology*. One can think of Ernst Bloch's study of Thomas Münzer, published in 1921, entitled *Thomas Münzer, Theologian of Revolution*, or of Lucien Goldmann's *The Hidden God*, a study of the "tragic vision" in Racine and Pascal. In fact, Goldmann compared the belief in socialism to a form of religious faith. Mariategui wrote an article about Joan of Arc in 1929. Walter Benjamin's project of connecting historical materialism and some aspects of Jewish messianism is also well known.

However, these references to religious thought were relatively marginal in past critical theories. In the Marxist "canon", that is the main Marxist thinkers until the 1970s, religion was certainly an object of analysis. But it is one thing to study the function of religion in capitalist society, as Marx or Lenin or Gramsci did, but quite another to be inspired by religious doctrines like Goldmann and Benjamin have, or like Badiou, Negri, Žižek and Bensaïd today.

So how can we explain this presence of religion in contemporary critical theories? The answer has two components. Firstly, these religious references are concerned not with religion in general, but with one particular theological problem: the problem of belief or faith. It is the case of Pascal, Saint Paul, the Marranos, and Job. The question these religious figures raise is the following: how is it possible to keep on believing, to maintain faith in God, when circumstances are hostile to belief? Why should one believe in God when the world seems so unfair or irrational?

Contemporary critical thinkers have felt the need to answer a similar question, because in the 20th century, all attempts at constructing a socialist society have failed, or ended in disaster. At the end of the past century, the historical record is obviously not very good for the belief in socialism. This is why this belief, like the belief in God, needs justification, against all evidence. And this is when Pascal or Saint Paul come in. Justifying belief against evidence is what theology does best, and this is one reason why critical thinkers have been interested with such theological arguments today.

A second aspect of this question is more sociological. The so-called "return of religion" at the end of the 20th century is not only observable in critical theories. It is a much more general phenomenon. Whether the "disenchantment of the world" - as Max Weber would have put it - continues today, or a "return of religion" is taking place, is in fact a debatable question. But

what seems certain is that religion has made a comeback in the political field, with currents like Islamism or evangelical fundamentalism. This new alliance of religion and politics is an important aspect of contemporary politics.

This is why some critical thinkers - Terry Eagleton or Michael Löwy are examples - have taken up the challenge, and try to demonstrate that there is a progressive, or even revolutionary, side to religions. This is basically what Terry Eagleton has been saying in his controversies with Christopher Hitchens and Richard Dawkins, or in the introduction to a new edition of *The Gospels* he recently published. This is also what Michael Löwy or Enrique Dussel try to show in their many writings about “liberation theology” in Latin America.

The End of Marxist Hegemony

The last aspect of contemporary critical theories I will mention is maybe the most important. It is the fact that Marxism is no longer hegemonic in critical theories. As a theory, Marxism is alive and well today. One could even argue that never in its history Marxism has been analytically so rich and interesting, in particular in the Anglo-American world, but not only. Authors like Robert Brenner, Giovanni Arrighi, Immanuel Wallerstein, David Harvey, Mike Davis, Leo Panitch... have developed, in their respective fields, innovative Marxist perspectives. Marxism has also been able, in recent years, to take on new objects, for example ecology. Thus, ecological Marxism, with authors like John Bellamy Foster, Paul Burkett, Ted Benton, James O'Connor... is one of the most creative areas of Marxism. This capacity to adapt to the intellectual challenges of a new epoch is maybe the main criterion by which one can judge the vitality of an intellectual tradition - and I think it is quite obvious that Marxism has passed this test.

However, even if Marxism is analytically at its most interesting today, it has lost its hegemony over critical theories, the working class, and social movements more generally. From the end of the 19th century to the 1980s, Marxism was the main language in which the experience of injustice was formulated, not only in the West, but in many other parts of the world. Marxism was not only a theory elaborated by and for intellectuals, it was an ideology conveyed by organizations and regimes that included millions of people. Almost all of these organizations and regimes have disappeared. Today, for the first time in their history, Marxists have become a minority in a wider set of critical theories, where non-Marxist critical theories dominate. The dominant theoretical language in this wider set is poststructuralism, that one can find for instance in postcolonial and cultural studies.

Now, a hypothesis one can make is that the current economic crisis, which is an “organic” crisis of the system as a whole, as Gramsci would have put it, is going to change intellectual relations of force inside of critical theories. Marxism is a theory of crisis *par excellence*, whereas non-Marxist critical theories, like poststructuralism, or Jacques Rancière’s philosophy, or Axel Honneth’s recognition theory, have very little to say about crisis. So after a post-Marxist parenthesis, it is possible - desirable in my opinion - that Marxism in more classical forms will come back.

Domination, resistance and agency

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The issue of domination is central in occidental sociology. Indeed, even if Max Weber's book, *The Domination*, has been translated only recently, Weber's analyses of domination are crucial for contemporary sociology. They were then developed by Pierre Bourdieu. But in Bourdieu's sociology as in Weber's one, the domination process implies the complicity of the dominated. Because they share the belief in the principles of their domination, the dominated internalize it, and don't contest.

For example, in *La domination masculine*, women don't argue and don't contest males' supremacy because they share the same belief in males' superiority. Because women are socialized in the same world, with the same norms as men, because girls read books, watch cartoons, hear sentences (at home, at school, etc) that teach them gender norms and inequalities, they believe too that these gender norms are natural. Women are then complicit in their domination. When *La domination masculine* was published, many feminist researchers have protested against this vision of domination, where dominated (here, women), are not only victims but also complicit. They denounce what they call the French sociologists and anthropologists' androcentrism. If Bourdieu, or Godelier, don't see women's resistances, it's because they are men, and don't try to see these resistances. And even if women don't resist and don't revolt against the men's domination, that doesn't mean that they believe in it. According to the anthropologist Nicole-Claude Mathieu, « surrender is not consent » (*Céder n'est pas consentir*) : women often obey, because they are tired, because they are afraid, but it doesn't mean they consent. According to Christine Delphy indeed, « the price paid by women who resist is incalculable. It is therefore not surprising that we can not always resist the temptation to « dilute » the challenge ».

Surrender is not consent, and we must not underestimate the possibilities of resistances. Thus; James C. Scott has opposed public text and hidden text: even in contexts of strong tyranny such as slavery, social exploitation or caste, scenes of formal interactions should not obscure the many ways to express disapprovals, and resistances; For example, in their own places (such as slave quarters), dominated can say jokes and songs, or in the public place, they can have facial expressions, gestures, sighs, uttered "in the back" of the master, that he does not see-or pretends not to see. All of these micropractices are described as political or infrapolitics, or of what Nancy Fraser names "politics of everyday life" and are sufficient to rule out the idea of naturalization of domination.

That is also the program supported by the concept of agency, sometimes translated as "capacity to act", or, in some Spinozist reminiscences 'power to act' : the aim is to break

with the fatalistic and deterministic character of studies about domination. Agency claims that in the vice undeniably tight of constraints and gender hierarchies, women still have a "game", a space for action. They can "negotiate" at the "margins", for example in daily life. If these concepts are extremely challenging, because they allow to understand the nuances of the reports to domination, the concrete conditions of their emergence and deployment are rarely described. Is agency definitive and general, does it remain compartmentalized on a domain or can it spread in other domains of life? How are established borders between the place of consent or subordination, and that of resistance, the agency, and how do they fluctuate ? How does agency combine itself with other attitudes of everyday life? As Kathy Davis and Sue Fisher explain in their book, *Negotiating at the margins*, "the notion that women's everyday lives provide a site for understanding their subordination has raised questions about the generalizability of women's lived experiences. Both the ways these experiences are generated as well as the similarities and differences in women' everyday lives have become topics for feminist analysis." Similarly, the assumption that a relationship exists between power and resistance has raised questions about how we simultaneously can hold onto the view that women construct their own lives AND that they do so within determinant conditions. These questions have been both dilemmatic and difficult to investigate. Fisher and Davis pose the "dilemma": on the one hand, if we focus on asymmetrical social structures, we tend to lose sight of how women reduce and reproduce but also resist and undermine these structures. We then run the risk of treating women as if they are passive victims of repressive systems. On the other hand, if we focus on women's agency, we often fail to locate this agency within a social and/or political context. Here if women resist but are not successful, we run the risk of blaming the victim -of attributing responsibility to women for conditions over which they often have little control."

Several surveys invite us to think about much paradoxical situations than the rigid interpretative systems can assume. Anthropologists for example have emphasized the apparent contradictions between attitudes of challenge to the established order, and maintaining practices that perpetuate this established order itself: Lilia Abu Lughod described how Bedouin women sing their distress but are veiled, look down, keep quiet and serve men and what is more, defend the validity of this order social. Women workers of nicaraguaises maquilas condemn in interviews their working conditions and their precarity, but day after day, they return to the factories, try to produce more and better, and defend a perfectionist vision of work, strengthening in the very same time the constraints that weigh on them. What to do with all these situations where dominated women protest and resist, but also submit, and moreover even defend the principles of their domination?

Interviews with the women novelists Maghreb can leave the same first printing of inconsistency and misunderstanding. Rare are those who transgress the traditional order and dare refusing to marry, or dare divorcing. Moreover, a troubling paradox is that writing even when it is really vehement and denunciatory takes its place in more or less painful arrangements of traditional assignments. It does not fundamentally disturb: the requirements are in the will to have time to write, to access the publication. They don't call into question the

very principles of married life and family, nor the distribution of tasks in family life. With few exceptions, they don't challenge the primacy of their roles of good mother and good wife, but want to exist beyond or in addition to this assignment. Those who hold these positions have also started writing "really" once their children raised. Of course it is a question of time availability, but also of mental availability and priority. Thus, for Zohra, "the priority is the children," as for Insaf, and the arguments belong to a code of ethics:

"The first thing that occupied me was the success of my children. I came in literature after fifty years, it not bothered me, because I felt and I am convinced that first ... a woman, she must do his duty at home first! I can not be famous, and my son, he has not studied! I don't admire that! (...) because as I told you, I am convinced ... I have to do my house, I respect my husband, I make the duties of all women, ironing, cooking, stuffs like that, I do ... "(Insaf)

Hafida's words are really interesting too. She explains that first, she installed in her family what she calls a "war" in order to write, and then , she sees as progress the fact that she dealt with it. She recognizes, in her words, "her fault" that is having forgotten the priorities that put family first, and especially before her. The "wisdom" seems to be defined by the ability to adjust to the demands, stop protesting, learn to "tell softly". For Hafida, her husband is "as a father and a husband. The evening, he is my husband, the day he is my father."

"I took still a little bit of wisdom: I write late at night, and I get up early, but I stopped at seven, to be ... for my family. I really stops me with affection ... I tried to reason myself (...) But in fact it was a little my fault (...) Writing was as a person who had no arms and legs, but it was ... love. It was my passion. (...) I had decided to stop the war. I changed my attitude, that is to say, tell ... slowly. "

In interviews, there are a lot of similar cases where the role, including domestic role, seems not only internalized but even claimed, and has an identity value. How to explain then that in the same person's acts, can coexist resistance practices, strategic simulations practices (such as hide cigarettes when the husband comes back), and internalizing practices of domination and its principles? A french popular proverb says "Who says nothing consents". But these women say and write their challenges to the established order, but nevertheless agree.

We can clearly see how the concepts of "surrender" (accept because we can not do otherwise) and "consent" (accept because we agree) have fuzzy boundaries. The continued acceptance of domestic constraints and the fact that even women with gender awareness consent "to reproduce this asymmetrical relationship" is often understood as an "enigma".

Many answers were given to this dilemma : first, idyllic miracle of love; which would explain that women do most of domestic tasks (but we can still wonder why it would be always women, and how it can be thought as idyllic) or on the contrary; exploitation masked by the

myth of love. We can find other explanations, such as biological structures or psychoanalytical ones, or, in more sociological way, internalization of norms of “care”. This “care” become naturalized standards of "feminine qualities", and become a way to naturalize the basis of social inequality.

Claim constraints would also have other role : present herself as a good wife, a good mother, a woman who has completed her tasks before devoting herself to write seems really important for these women. Similarly, in line with Christopher Dejours' work, Natacha Borgeaud-Garciandia explains that some Maquila workers claim imposed qualities (for example, be excellent worker, produce more and more). For these researchers, this would be a way to appropriate the rules, and to fight against total alienation. The integration and exacerbation of imposed values (being hard worker, or here being a good housewife and a devoted mother) are then elevated to "moral conduct" during a "normalization process" ("it's normal "): transferring the constraints to the order of “morality” would thus allow finding an unit in the self-image that is experienced. Thus, the "moral posture” protects the suffering one by giving meaning to the work. This allows a self-building process which develops from within the relationships of power and domination.

This echoes Judith Butler's work: in a psychoanalytic reading of Foucault, Althusser, Nietzsche and Hegel. She draws up a genealogy of the subject in and by the domination framework. The subjection is both the form of power, and the place of production of the subject. It refers to "both the process by which one becomes subordinate to power and the process by which one becomes a subject”. The psychic internalization of norms is thus one of these forms of existence: "I prefer to exist in the subordination than not exist ". According to Butler, repetition and reiteration is the way to transform subordination. Submission is also control, because they learn how to do well, and better than others. We can see here how the pride to do the mother's and wife's duties can enter this explanatory framework of self-constitution : the need to "do" becomes the pride of "doing excellently."

But this consent of mothers' and wives' duties and the claims of their skills deserve to be questioned. Indeed they don't always consent : on other stages, on other subjects, they protest and challenge, by the simple fact of writing and publishing. These boundaries between resistance and acceptance, refusal and consent indicate the existence and the complexity of heterogeneous and often contradictory dispositions. The concept of dispositions can help us to understand why and how both can co-exist " the voice "and" loyalty "within the meaning of Hirschman. According to Hirschman, we have to choose between “voice” (protest), “exit” or “loyalty” (acceptance).

If we want to understand these women, and how they act, without thinking they are mad or schizophrenic, we have to explain their different socializations, and the way it build different mental dispositions. These women were born in Algeria or in Morocco. For the older generation, they were educated at the French school for the older generation, they were taught French literature, and now, have international channels and they work. But these women were nonetheless also socialized to traditional roles of mother and wife, to "feminine qualities",

such as care and sacrifice for the family. Thus, the detailed examination of the various socializations that these women have experienced can help understanding why some of them fall out with standards, refuse marriage, decide to divorce, while others claim the contrary, but also to understand individual variation in the same woman, against any interpretation that would see there nonsense and absurdity.

The interviews reveal contradictory socializations : for example, these women talked about their fathers, who often appear as the mythological figure of Janus bi-frons : they wanted education and knowledge for their daughters, in a time when girls didn't go to school, but at the same time, they defend for these girls the traditional norms of honor. The difference between girls and boys, and the allocation of domestic tasks to women and girl is thus part of this implicit transmission. Dalila describes a tolerant and egalitarian father, who made no difference between girls and boys. But for her, egalitarianism is about access to education, and is absolutely not on the domestic scene, as if egalitarianism in the tasks was not even thinkable. For most of them, the question of equality between girls and boys is thus interpreted as equal feelings of the father, and not as equality of treatment, as if it was not even possible nor thinkable.

Worse, it is even the parents' tolerance during these women's teenage hood which becomes terrible constraint, because it is implicit: if parents say they have confidence, then you have to earn this confidence, to be worthy, not to fail. The paradox of this confidence more panoptic than the tighter monitoring is extremely hard to bear. Assia Djébar wrote she was perpetually as a " wise girl "who felt put upon her, the look of the father. Bouchra evoked "a control that does not tell its name", and Karima said she felt like a "leash" (as for a dog) : "the leash was: I have confidence in you, anyway you will never betray me. It was terrible because there was guilt.. If he had forbidden us to leave, we would have known immediately that we sin. But then, "you see, I let you out, I leave you all freedom, and I know that the more women are locked up, the more they sin, and you, you will not sin, because you are free .." THE sin ... It was very wicked. "

As Danièle Kergoat pointed it out : "These differences [make] sense if we abandon [the] Pavlovian pattern that the fight would be a response (mediated or not by the degree of consciousness) to the conditions of life, and if we substitute a reasoning in terms of social practices, that is to say, a coherent set (not necessarily conscious) of behaviors and attitudes in daily life. " So we can better understand why, as the Nicole-Claude Mathieu remarks, "the transgression of a norm is not necessarily subversion of a system of thought."

So finally: does everything change, or does nothing change when women starts to write? On the one hand, they insist on the changes because they write and publish. But on the other hand, most of them denounce inequalities but i the same time, continue to do the household.

The analogy with another survey is striking: in *Reading the Romance*, Janice Radway reports the words of passionate readers of romance novels. Even if feminist analysis would see in these books stereotypes and conservative visions of women, readers highlight the resistance that this reading means to them. Because they resist to the husband who wants them to be seated at his side in front of television, because they spend the money needed to purchase the collection, because they delay the preparation of the meal to finish the book in progress, so, for them, reading is resistance.

But if the books -that some write or that other read- provide a kind of bubble, paradoxically, perhaps it is thanks to this bubble, where women can have some rest and some dreams, that they don't revolt and go on with their lives, day after day. Thus, the evolution of Hafida' husband's reaction is interesting: first, he was really opposed to his wife's writing, criticized her work, destroyed her papers. Then, as she explained, he has "softened" and let her write, and even sometimes complimented her. If Hafida is grateful, I wonder if her husband was not "simply" reassured about the rebellion of his wife: she writes, but continues to perform all household tasks. The question is then to know if dominants have interest in leaving room to the dominated's agency?

Similarly, one of the romance novels' readers met by Janice A. Radway believed that if a woman managed to endure for three years her husband's reproach and disapproval about her reading activity, she will be successful ... But should we see evidence of the husband's understanding and respect for his wife's reading or writing activity, or rather the release of his concern about the consequences of reading or writing? Janice A. Radway herself emphasizes the ambivalences of this "compensatory" function of reading: the most avid reader in the group of women she met started reading on the advice of her doctor, alarmed by her state of physical and mental exhaustion, due to the care and attention she bore to "her husband, three children and her house". As he could prescribe painkillers or other antidepressants, he enjoined her to devote an hour a day in a leisure activity "for her own pleasure." If readers insist on the daily transgression of these few hours reading, this parenthesis "compensatory" also allow them to bear the burden of material and emotional pressure, and to continue to consider that this is not only a duty, but even feminine qualities. It takes place in a system where "caring about oneself (...) is to enter into resistance," and take a few hours for themselves is indeed a transgression they live with pride but also with guilt.

So, when one negotiate at the margins, to quote Fisher and Davis' book, does it mean we have to stay in these margins? Or rather, can these disturbances in the margins reach the very heart of social relations, in a movement from the periphery to the center? Above all, how can we deal with the articulation of these "resistances" and "independence declarations", which stay very individual, (the way of saying to the other "leave me alone") with the collective awareness? Can these acts of resistance transcend their immediate sphere and transform the collective behaviors and norms?

The romance novels' readers from Smithton, the novelists in Algeria and Morocco say that reading, writing have profoundly changed them. By what right, what position can we deny the truth of this assertion, the truth of what they say, feel and live ? As Janice A. Radway

highlighted , "to do so would be to ignore the admittedly limited but nonetheless real ways in which people resist to the negative effects of their social situation".

Write, or read, open to other perspectives, develop reflexivity, allow intellectual autonomy, drawing dividing lines in the evidence of the natural.. Nevertheless, Janice Radway leaves opened the question of collective political efficacy.

So, is this agency only a safety valve for the dominants? Or is it a kind of loophole threatening the dam? Hope or pessimism? As conclusion, we can listen to Hafida, who expressed the ambivalence and paradoxes of writing : ""To be honest, it was my revenge. These books, this is my revenge, that should not be underestimated. As we say in Arabic but I translate it in French (and I translate in english)... One should not underestimate a small branch, it can blind you.""

His Majesty the People: An analysis of the infant-People of China's Revolution

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Since 1949, along with the foundation of The People's Republic of China, especially along with the Land Revolution, the historical phenomenon called People rose up in China and become the most important subjectivity of China. China had already become, as the name of the country announced, the "People's Republic". However, who are the people? Where the people came from? What does it mean to become people? In this paper, the author wants to explore these questions through a Freudian analysis on the so-called people whose vicissitudes had already been indicated by a political technique that was used throughout the land revolution called *Su-ku*---telling your suffering.

1. The rise of the People

In a *Marxism Encyclopedias* that was published in Beijing of 1993, the definition of the PEOPLE has it like this:

"People refers to a fundamental social group that against the 'enemy'. It usually refers to a summation of those classes, social stratum and social groups. Those labor masses who are working on the production of material goods are the subject of the People. The people include not only all those classes who were exploited and oppressed, but also those exploiting classes who play positive roles in some given revolutionary or historical background. 'People' is a historical conception. It refers to different meanings in different country and different historical period.....in our country, people are the master of our society and country. All power in China belong to the people....." -----Liao Gailong, Sun Liancheng, Chen youjin, ed. *A General Survey of Marxism Encyclopedias*. Pp361. 1993. Beijing, People's Daily Publisher.

This definition, like so many other similar definitions of the people in other Chinese dictionaries, has shown a new historical/political phenomenon in Chinese history ever, the People. However, those who are familiar with Chinese modern history would know that the connotation of people did not come into being only through Chinese revolution. As the most important key term as well as the most important historical subject of Chinese revolution and

the “new” China, the term people that were defined by China’s revolution indicates several authentic and crucial transformations in modern China.

The first characteristic of people that was defined by China’s revolution is that, of course, people refer to a kind of new subjectivity in China. This doesn’t only mean a historical transformation of Chinese identification along with the whole history of 20th century’s China and the formation of modern Chinese nationality, this also refers to one of the most important understanding of CPC (Chinese Party of Communism) on China’s revolution: people are the source of the power for CPC like the Mother Earth for Antaios---CPC must rely on the people in order to get its power, to become itself and to achieve its historical task, to win the revolution and to create a new world.

Secondly, people represent something new. This doesn’t only mean it is a new historical phenomenon that was created by CPC itself. Surely people must be created and led by CPC. However, “people” further refers to a kind of new ethos that emerged in the whole 20th century’s China. We can find it clearly from the New Cultural Movement to the cultivation of a new Chinese model in 1950s and early 1960s called Lei Feng. This also shown a new attitude toward Chinese tradition and a reversal of time view in China: the hope of China is only in the future that would be—highly possible—created by the people, not in the past, that was indicated by those traditional Confucianism wisdoms and traditions.

Thirdly, because it is new, and because it means the “hope” of China and the abolishment of the past, people must have its perversion characteristics. Being hope of the future doesn’t mean it’s innocent. People must be pervert in order to be revolutionary. This perversion doesn’t only mean people are something evil—of course evil towards its enemies, for example, towards its own history—, but also mean something active and powerful, something that never been found in the history of China.

As the master of history, people must carry out its responsibility for saving China through creating a new China. However, people can’t do it until it was born into history, like a baby.

2. The Creation of the People: the case of *Su-ku* movement

Although people are so important for new china, people don’t come from nowhere. In order to come into history, people must be created from history at first. People are created in many ways from various resources. Here I would like to take one example: a political technique that were used widely among the Land Revolution in order to achieve the political purpose of mass mobilization.

In *Social Suffering and Political Confession: Su-ku in Modern China*, I has already analyzed how *Su-ku* was used by the CPC as a revolutionary education technique for the purpose of mass mobilization as well as national identification. However, that book doesn’t give a further discussion on how an ordinary person—especially peasants—became people throughout the telling your suffering movement.

In a dictionary that was published in 1952, *Su-ku* is defined as followings:

“Su-ku means to share an oral personal history about being persecuted by class enemies both for the purpose of inspiring class hatred in the listeners, while reaffirming one’s own class standing.” (Chen 1952: 331)

During the Land Revolution, *Su-ku* was used widely among rural areas. How the people were created through a political confession technique?

People are the ordinary persons, in China, especially in the Land Revolution, people are peasants; however, an ordinary person/peasant can’t just become the people naturally. For the same reason, people could also become enemy and enemy could become people. People are not something that were naturally born, they must be created throughout a series of procedures.

China’s traditional rural society before the revolution was a self-sufficient community that consisted of kinship lineage, and was dominated by local elites, either as “protective brokerage” or “entrepreneurial brokerage”. Such a structure could be described as a patriarchal despotism. The ordinary peasants relied on local elites on almost every aspect of their daily lives because the local elites owned almost all resources including wealth, power, qualification of morality interpretation and connections with the power of central government and with the world outside. In such self-sufficient local society, the local elites played a role of father to local ordinary peasants. There were both love and hatred emotions from the local peasants to local elites. On the one hand, the peasants need local elites on almost everything, and the establishment of local elites’ authority is also justified by various aspects including his economic success, political status, moral superiority and even his age. Even those entrepreneurial brokerages still had this kind of similar function like a primal father. And local elites were those people who got their “historical rights”. On the other hand, there were also hatred feelings toward those landlords, especially from those exiled peasants (Thaxton, 1997). This ambivalent relationship consists of the very basic political structure of traditional rural China. Along with the love and hatred feelings toward landlords, ordinary peasants put landlord as their model as well as identification.

In *Su-ku* movement, peasants must learn from the party cadres/work teams how to abandon their traditional way of life and moralities which fixed into their society, to re-create their own life story and re-interpret their own history. In other words, they must grasp a kind of confessional technique, and use it as a methodology of reflecting and weaving their own lives and history into a totally fresh ideology. More important than mass mobilization, the purpose of this reflection and weaving is national identification. The authority of a new modernized bureaucratic system, throughout this kind of technique as well as other political techniques, drilled first time ever in China’s history down to the grass-roots level of China’s local society

(Guo, Yuhua & Sun, Liping, 2002). This procedure, just like Foucault's analysis on four kinds of "goals" in between *savior* and *connaissance*: selection, normalization, hierarchicalization and centralization. Through those procedures, revolutionary truth was made and spoken. Peasants started to feel themselves as evil wealthy landlord or persecuted poor/hired peasants. The Nietzsche's hypothesis emerged along with the Reich's hypothesis: truth was made along with revolutionary stories which twisted of both oppressive and repressive.

Moreover, in that book, I have already shown how this kind of confessional technique could ideally inspire huge emotional feelings and how this kind of emotions could be thrown towards two directions: great love to CPC as well as the new society/state and great hate to KMT as well as the old society.

Truth and knowledge about history and local society started to be re-constructed out of this kind of confessional practice of most ordinary life stories. When peasants learned how to look at their own commonplace situations in a new way, that is, from a revolutionary perspective of class oppression, they must got their own reasonable consequence, which was to paraphrase: this old social and political system which has brought us so much suffering must be destroyed!

People must be born throughout a series of revolutionary rituals like *Su-ku*. However, once the peasants started to get their own class consciousness and to be awakened to become the people, the educator, the party must immediately acknowledge that the party comes from the people, party must rely on the people and fight for the goods of the people. Just like what Mao says, The CPC's army

"is powerful because all its members have a discipline based on political consciousness; they have come together and they fight not for the private interests of a few individuals or a narrow clique, but for the interests of the broad masses and of the whole nation. The sole purpose of this army is to stand firmly with the Chinese people and to serve them wholeheartedly." (Mao, 1945: 214)

Party comes from the people, however, party are superior to people, must lead the people, protect the people and fight for the people. Moreover, such kind of internalization from its beginning, has a moral sense. In *Su-ku* movement, those work teams who carried out land revolution and *Su-ku* movement in countryside represented the "real" authority of the new world. For the purpose of mass mobilization, they must educate the "people". In other words, ordinary peasants and soldiers are children in the beginning who did not know the truth of revolution.

Once the classes of landlord, poor peasant, middle peasant and rich peasant were made, the past lives of themselves became lives with chains. Their life got a new meaning of suffering. Hard work, poor life, exploitation, and other related elements, all those sufferings in his

miserable life, were the very element of his own freedom through his confession. Once the chains were taken away, and once the poor peasants were inserted into a system of virtue through *Su-ku* practice, in other words, once they were liberated, and were told they had been in a kind of virtue such as hard working as well as in a chain of exploitation, they were put into a chain of more genuinely. They must perform as “real” poor peasants. They lost their chances of becoming landlord, or even dreaming of it. They must hate the class of landlord because of their guilt. This guilt was made out and was shifted inside, not only of the landlord, but also of the peasants. They must realize the sufferings in their past life, and more importantly, the political meaning of the suffering. Meanwhile, landlord must realize their guilt. They must feel guilty for their past daily lives.

Thus in revolutionary China, *Su-ku* started from a class-oppressive hypothesis, which provided peasants a drive to speak about suffering, and end with opening up a space where daily suffering and power met each other. In such a political confession, suffering became a kind of justification and right. Only a certain class of people deserved it. It indicated a kind of moral meaning. It represented revolutionary truth. Usually the more suffering the peasants found out in his/er political confession practice, the more justice s/he represented. The past suffering in confession became a justified certificate for today’s request of more resources, such as land, food, and power. And moreover, oppressive hypothesis was not the only dimension within *Su-ku* practice. Along with the mass production of revolutionary truths, people started to feel happy about the liberation, about the “new world”.

Thus in this political confession practice, a double reversal happened: firstly, those former poor and hired peasants, who used to be the “ruled class” is now standing up and becoming the “ruling class”, or the master of the “new society”; and secondly, those “oppressing stories” of the “old society” —which used to be the most ordinary and justified stories— become a kind of evil patricidal stories because people finally realized that, it were themselves, who had been the true master of history! This double reversal brought a kind of legitimate revolutionary patricidal: the guilty sense that used to be brought by destroying the former “ruling class” because of the lower level position of the people is now abolished. Furthermore, the former suffering had also brought a solid basis for revolutionary sublimation: it’s for the goods of all the people and the development of a new China!

People can feel the “good” of revolution and they are getting away from the “old” and “evil” society. By such construction of a linear history, CPC adopted a role of “savior”, “God”, or a role of “therapeutic”: it is the One that can heal the suffering of Chinese; it is the One that can save China.⁴⁴

3. His Majesty the People/baby

In this section I would like to make a bold connection between the Freudian infant and the Chinese revolutionary people. If so, this paper might have a conclusion of The Baby’s

⁴⁴ There are a large number of the “red songs” that were written in China’s revolution for appraising CPC. And many of them portrayed CPC as the messiah of China.

Republic of China throughout its analysis of The People's Republic of China. However, it seems to be a very risky and arbitrary connection. How could the people be infantile?

Freud's baby is firstly a narcissism baby that will "develop" from animism-auto-Eroticism period to object choice period and finally the scientific period, from pleasure principle to the reality principle. He must identify himself with his father and choose his mother. Freud resembles infant with primary people, especially on their narcissism way of dealing with the world through magic, which shows the same kind of omnipotence of thought. Baby might be strengthless, however, they never weak, they have been powerful. They may be innocent, however, they do have their own wishes/desires and their own way of classify the world which makes themselves polymorphously perversion.

In *Su-ku* case, methodology of "free association" was also used for the purpose of creating new subjectivity. This method must be "free" in order to justify the legitimation of the confession. However, it is not really free. Method of free association in Freud's clinical works doesn't really mean "free" association whether because Freud doesn't believe individual could think freely or not. The revolutionary ideal type is, words of suffering could bring awakening effect on the subjectivity. Talk could cure once it digs something out of the darkness of life world. Understanding brings freedom! And life world is supposed to be totally changed after understanding was achieved. The result of this confession, as showed above, is the born of a new kind of historical phenomenon, the Freud's baby-patients and the people.

People need to be reborn in order to become the subjectivity of the history, to carry on his burden and move on as the master of the country and themselves. This kind of new born baby master (the people) is cast into a strong but meanwhile weak role: they are powerful, however, they do not know it. They must be educated in order to know, to get strong. They would be powerful if you educate them enough and mobilize them enough.

Freud's baby needs to kill his father in order to grow up and become H/himself, so are the people. But in order to grow up, they must get castrated/circumcised in order to convert. *Su-ku* is a kind of castration. The Land Revolution always involved with history and politics of the village (Sun, Feiyu, 2012). That is to say, people are not always disciplined. They could refuse, misunderstand and even manipulate the CPC's policies and requests (Sun, Feiyu, 2012). For the parents, people were created doesn't mean the creation is finished. They must be educated and cultivated forever, just like the revolution. In other words, we could say that the people must be disciplined, be educated in order to keep themselves people, just like Freud's baby must be castrated/circumcised in order to convert to the God-father.

Through the castration, People, like Oedipus himself, came into being the master of the history because of the knowledge. They/he know the secret of the world/themselves/himself and thus became the king of the world. After Oedipus heard about his own fate, he tried hard to get rid of it and to built his own history. However, his efforts of saving himself is exactly the beginning of his own fate into the eternal circle. This is also what the people falled into when they started to know themselves and to fight for themselves. The collective efforts of the people in the revolution actually lead to their own destiny of suffering after ten years(Sun, Feiyu and Ralph Thaxton, 2015).

The only problem left is, where is the mother? In order to answer this question, we might want to argue along with John O'Neill that there is no mother in Freud's Oedipus complex though Oedipus complex means killing the father and marrying the mother. John O'Neill argues that, the secret of western civilization (as well as its modern science and basic tradition of political philosophies from Hobbes to Rock and Rousseau) that was disclosed by Freudian Oedipus complex is parthenogenesis (O'Neill, 2011). That is to say, mother and father were/are the same one. In other words, if we want to analyze the Chinese revolutionary people with Freudian infant theory, we might want to reduce the Freudian Oedipus triangle into a dualistic hermaphrodite story. Once we have done this, there are only two kinds of authorities left: the new mother/father of country/party/Mao, and the former local bully. And the revolutionary story then becomes a new identification/narcissism story: to kill the former father in order to get born and to become H/himself. As analyzed above, this killing had already been legitimized by a kind of new ethos of 20th century's China, though many scholars have already analyzed the myth of modern revolution as the young generation against older generation.

However, this is still only part of the story. As we discussed above, the relationship of CPC and the people are not that simple: on the other side, CPC must rely on the people in order to achieve its historical task, or to win the revolution. In other words, people, though baby of CPC, are simultaneously the parents of CPC. CPC always emphasize the important role of the people for them as the parental role as well as its source of power. That is to say, we now have an eternal mutual-born relationship between the people and the CPC.

Freudian baby got ambivalent feeling toward his/er parents. And this happens in-between this kind of mutual-born parental-baby relationship too. On the one hand, People are powerful and politically born, however, they have their own language, norms and activities of dealing with the world. From a local society's perspective, the invasion of state power would immediately fall into a context of local society that has its own culture, history and politics. It is here we can find Foucault's thoughts on power which the distribution of power is in a "complex circuits, and in a whole play of demands and responses" (Foucault, 1977: 85). Under such a circumstance, if he/she knows how to play the game, or in other words, if he/she knows how to use the proper language, "everyone could make use of the enormity of absolute power for themselves, to their own ends and against others: it was a kind of placing of mechanisms of sovereignty, a given possibility, at the disposal of whoever is clever enough to tap them, to divert its effects to their profit" (Foucault, 1977: 85). However, on the other hand, as the baby of the people, CPC got similar role and behaviors toward its parenting people too. That is why, among the people, including CPC members, the castration of thought reform system became a kind of ever-new movement, allowing or even encouraging everybody to confess their own daily lives, finding out the deepest source of improper thoughts from life history. Everybody needs to cultivate themselves in order to keep his/er ever-new characteristic, that is, to keep him/erself as a baby. Through confession, this system always allows those confessors to correct the past errors and make a fresh start.

As we can find from *Su-ku* movement, it was the confession that often determined those people's liberty, misfortune, or in one word: destiny. This could be exactly described in Foucault's words: "the words have been the instruments...these discourses have really

affected lives; these existences have effectively been risked and lost in these words” (Foucault, 1977: 79).

People are the revolutionary confessional baby.

4. Social Neurosis of infamous man

Freud’s baby never grows up, no matter how old s/he becomes. Meanwhile, what’s past is never past, history is always happening right now. They want/are wanted to become new people, however, the poverty of historical imagination always invites the history back. Just like what Freud shows in his definition of neurosis, the future and the past are all collected into the current being of patients. However, in our case, the neurosis tends to be social neurosis according to its own characteristics.

During the revolution, the revolutionary senses of conscience and guilty ironically twisted together with the traditional morality: in revolution, part of the traditional morality was not abandoned, but strengthened. Moreover, ordinary peasants could only interpret the new ideology with their own life world. On the other hand, during this construction process of different class, CPC’s work teams played a role of authoritarian state exactly as Horkheimer describes (Horkheimer, 1970). The authority of CPC reached every aspect of life and had been enforced to the utmost in all phases of life from the decision of identity to the interpretation of history, from the distribution of land to decisions of life and death. The “free structuring” was also strictly guided. The authoritarian state is repressive in all of its forms. Thus besides the new father that was brought by revolutionary reversal to rural area, that is, besides the establishment of peasants’ authority, there is another real “authority” hidden behind: the authoritarian state.

A series of modern policies, directories, and handbooks that were issued and distributed to ensure the new world is created according to “standard qualities”. The core of this standard revolutionary practice is that the different classes and their different roles in the new revolutionary morality and their social values were actually determined by a series of “quantities” or skills. For example, the more lands a landlord had owned, the more evil he would become in revolution, or the better skills of *Su-ku* a peasant had, the more opportunities he would have to become a “model” for new morality, to join CPC and to become part of new authority. People become all equal within themselves. The landlord were created but meanwhile disappeared. Only the title left. People were classified into different classes but meanwhile all becoming the same social being. It is here that what Marcuse’s critical analysis on capitalism can also be used for understanding revolution: there was a change of social values and morality from “autonomous judgment and personal responsibility” to “standardized skills and qualities” (Marcuse, 1955: 87). Through such a technique, CPC successfully built up different identities and different feelings for different social-political groups. Thus on the one hand, in *Su-ku* movement, peasants started to have the feeling of class oppression. Under such a circumstance, the psychological repression and sociological class oppression are all twisted together in such a political confession movement. However,

on the other hand, peasants could have this kind of feeling only because they had already been “liberated” and become “equal” with each other.

All of these happened after the restoration of a new authority. Looking beyond the village level, we can find that such kind of new domination, just as Marcuse says, is “normally no longer personal” (Marcuse, 1955: 68). The superego becomes “automatization” and “depersonalized”. Within such kind of mechanism, “everything thus said is registered in writing, accumulates and constitutes dossiers and archives” (Foucault, 1977: 84). Such kind of mechanism thus brought a new relation in-between power, discourse and daily life. And the former self-sufficient rural society becomes part of the “organized” communism state. Now we can say that China revolution has a similar process of abolishing the traditional family that Marcuse describes. However, there are essential differences between the two processes: what the China revolution tried to abolish was a traditional kinship lineage community; and the self of peasant was not “individual” self, but a self that was embedded into the community. Moreover, different from Marcuse’s individual, Chinese peasant’s reactions to the domination of state in revolution are even more complicated. Revolution was not a “pure” process. And people in such a historical process was not “one-dimensional”, neither the revolution itself. There were endless conflicts in various aspects and in every periods. From the story of *Su-ku*, what we can find is not only a revolutionary myth of Oedipus, but also a possibility of discussing a new kind of social neurosis of Foucaultian infamous man and Revolutionary People.

So we have the social neurosis which is mentioned by Freud himself by the end of his work on civilization and its discontent. The first purpose of using the term of social neurosis is to describe the daily suffering that is brought by the interaction between individual, local society and state society. This suffering does not only mean the “real” suffering that happens in daily life, but also includes those “constructed” sufferings through *Su-ku* (constructed suffering in the past daily life), and other revolutionary practices such as classification (sufferings of those people from “counter-revolutionary camp”). Suffering is the way for Freud to question culture (Marcuse, 1955: 17). This is why do I also choose suffering as my perspective of looking at China’ revolution, in which *Su-ku* itself becomes the test of Enthomethodology. And because of this, I choose *Su-ku* as an abnormal method for understanding normal or daily sufferings, and furthermore, for understanding the revolution, and even the whole approach of China toward modernity.

Comparing to Freudian confession, *Su-ku* is more collective instead of private, more public/political instead of secret confessional practice. Meanwhile, the new constructed “people” become the powerful authority, and thus played the roles of both speaker and listener. They talk within themselves, they hear their own stories and they narcissistically identify themselves within themselves. Neurosis has already become the basic characteristic of people.

People were finally born from history into history. A new type of Foucaultian relationship were established between power, discourse and daily lives. However, just like what Foucault says, we would never know these people of infamous man’s lives if the light of power had not

illuminated those infamous men. In such an investigation and research work, peasants started to take another scheme of interpreting their own lives. This new relation brought a new way of regulation and formatting daily lives. Meanwhile, history does not disappear along with the end of the *Su-ku* movement. So do us, those infamous infantile-people.

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The Concept of Social Control in the Early American and Chinese Sociology

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I. America

1 - There was a notable intellectual phenomenon in early American sociology, that is, most of important sociologists all made reference to the concept of “social control”. How to understand it? Among other things, there are two factors contributed to the phenomenon. First, the main Europe social thoughts in the nineteenth century especially that of August Comte and Herbert Spencer, have been affected deeply the rise and development of the early American Sociology. Second, the social-historical context from which the early American social sciences emergence lead to the formation of American concept of social control.

Some American sociologists thought that social control was an important idea in the European sociology in the nineteenth century, for example, Robert E. Park (1955: 88) pointed out, in the classification of disciplines proposed by Comte, “the earlier and more elementary sciences, particularly physics and chemistry, had given man control over external nature; the last science, sociology, was to give man control over himself”. The practical aim of Comte’s program for the new science was to “establish government on the secure foundation of an exact science and to give to the predictions of history something of the precision of mathematical formulae” (ibid: 187). Both Comte and Spencer address “society” as “organism”, though they come from different intellectual context. But, what more important is that they have essential difference in term of the use and understanding of the concept. For Comte, society is a collective organism, such organism is an immense organism which has essential meaning, not mere in the sense of biological analogy; he characterized the social consensus and solidarity as “collective”. The individual is “an abstraction”. “Man exists as man only by participation in the life of humanity.” Then, in a very real sense, thus the individual man was “an organ of the Great Being”, and the Great Being was humanity. (ibid: 209-10) Late Comte (1908, 2009; Wernick, 2001) proposed the religion of humanity which elucidated the mysterious Great Being, which implicated such concept of organism or community.

On the other hand, Spencer proposed the concept of social organism based on the methodological individualism. In Spencer’s organism, it “exists not for itself but for the benefit of the separate organs of which it is composed”, there is not any “intrinsic relations” between the individuals who compose it, such individual finds in the community as a whole “a suitable milieu, an environment adapted to his needs and one to which he is able to adapt himself”; therefore, such organism is merely a kind of “social aggregates”, it “realistically as a great animal, a leviathan...and a very low –order leviathan at that” (ibid: 210-13). Therefore, Park thought that Spencer proposed the concept of “control”, nevertheless, it is just the

concept which displays the paradox in the Spencer's social theory: "How does a mere collection of individuals succeed in acting in a corporate and consistent way?" (ibid: 213) So far as the concept of social control proposed by American sociologists, such comprehension about the thought of European sociologists is an important intellectual stimulation factor.

Secondly, it is well known that American social science emerged from the period after American Civil War, until the First World War, historians call it the Gilded Age and the Progressive Era. This is an age of America rapidly into modernization; it is also the period of social reconstruction. Many researchers (e.g., Ross, 1990) have pointed that, early American exceptionalism was in the crisis, and the rise of American social science was response to the crisis and offered some kind of correction of it. However, the basic American values based on the Protestant ethics have not ever suffered radical change. Nevertheless, American Protestantism must adjust itself to the changing world; the social gospel movement represented such a adjustment. The movement combined "the chosen nation theme, the belief that America would be involved in establishing Christ's Kingdom on earth, with faith in human perfectibility, inevitable progress, and theistic evolutionism" (Greek, 1992: 50). The social gospel was a key factor in the establishment of sociology in America. In addition, American sociology's initial agenda was in large measure set by social gospel theology, it plea for "a moralistic, scientific, reform-oriented sociology" (ibid: 69). The Progressive Movement rises subsequently, it comprehensively implementing this "new theology program" in the sense of more worldly, more scientific, more strong politically. Therefore, some researchers (e.g. Vidich and Lyman, 1985) think that the rising of American social sciences means the problematic transformation from traditional theodicy into modern scientific-oriented sociodicy, the former offered a "justification of the ways of God to man in the face of evil and misfortune", the latter deal with "a vindication of the ways of society to man" (ibid: 1). The thesis of social control in early American Sociology was addressed in such intellectual and moral atmosphere. George Vincent, an early member of Sociology Department of University of Chicago, once offered the formulation in a article (Vincent, 1896: 490): "Social control is the art of combining social forces so as to give society at least a trend toward an ideal."

2 - Particularly, the discourse on social control in the early American Sociology has the characteristic of difference and richness, in view of the difference in research orientations and emphases among the sociologists. As space is limited, we will only choose some typical and important discourse in the field.

Edward A. Ross, one of founding fathers of American Sociology, whose *Social Control: A Survey of the Foundations of Order* was published in 1901, regarding as the first systematic work on social control in sociology. In view of its subtitle, the relation between social control and social order is its central thesis; this is in accord with the intellectual and social-historical context discussed above. Ross thought that the natural order based on sympathy, sociability and sense of justice is "rough and imperfect"; in modern society, social control is necessary: "The social personality must control them if our social order is to go down like a house of cards. A policy of *Laissez-faire*, not in respect to law alone, but also in respect to education,

public opinion, religion, and suggestion, would certainly tend to renew among us the confusion that prevailed in northern Europe in the seventh century” (Ross, 1901: 55-6). Based on this, Ross has investigated the “means of social control” at large, include “public opinion, suggestion, personal ideals, social religion, art and social evaluations” which Ross called “ethical”, and “law, belief, ceremony, education and illusion” which he called “political”. Ross recognized the importance of institutional means of social control (such as law), nevertheless, he still thought that the more radical, more effective means of social control must be those full of emotions and touch man’s inner spiritual domain. This especially embodied in his discourse on social religion. Ross thought that there emerged two kinds of emotion from old human institution of family, one was piety to the head of the family, the other was sympathy with the other members of the family; the former was “the root of obedience and duty”, the latter was “the root of fellowship and brotherly love”; and from which gradually developed two kinds of religion: legal religion and social religion. (ibid: 199) Although social religion emphasized fraternity or brotherhood, which assumes somewhat Christian character, what Ross really emphasis was it functioning as a spiritual bond in the modern society. Ross writes, “Coupled with a purely religious sense of nearness to or communion with a superior consciousness, these generate beliefs as to invisible bonds between self and others” (ibid: 207). After all, “The conviction that men are spiritually related is unquestionably efficacious in modifying conduct” (ibid: 208). As a sociologist, Ross basically “concerned with the social conditions that created harmony” (Janowitz, 1975: 89).

Ross’s contemporaries, such as W. I. Thomas and Charles H. Cooley, also made reference to the problem of social control. Both have pragmatic ideas and emphasized the importance of rational control in the scientific sense, though there are distinct differences in the research orientation and research methods between them. Thomas (1966: 37) thought that “Our success in controlling nature gives us confidence that we shall eventually be able to control the social world in the same measure”. With the social evolution, the rational technique in social life becomes more and more important:

We are less and less ready to let any social processes go on without our active interference and we feel more and more dissatisfied with any active interference based upon a mere whim of an individual or a social body, or upon preconceived philosophical, religious, or moral generalizations. (ibid)

Therefore, he criticized what he called common-sense sociology, on the one hand, on the other, he advocated and practiced himself the scientific social investigation, and in term of which conduct the rational, scientific, and active control of social life.

In terms of Cooley, his research focus on the analysis of process of interaction involves the problems of human nature, self, social group and social process, this approach in essential is a theory of social control, because the development of individual self is a social process, “society” participate the process in terms of various ways and forms. Meanwhile, Cooley (1920) also emphasized the importance of “rational control by the standards” in the social life; he even extended this rational control to the field of international relations, search for the possibility of peaceful international order.

There is some similarity in research orientation between Cooley and George Herbert

Mead, however, both its broadness and depth of approach, Mead's theory is beyond that of Cooley. As one of American classic pragmatists, Mead proposed a kind of systematic social theory with naturalist character. Undoubtedly, the self theory is the center of Meadian theory, as Mead repeatedly reiterated, the self is social self, from start to finish, the formation of self is a kind of social process. More than that, Mead's concept of sociality is a relational concept in the sense of cosmology or nature, in other words, this sociality exists universally in the cosmos or nature; because always exist transforms between the new and the old, and the sociality is "the stage betwixt and between the old system and the new" (Mead, 1932: 47), "sociality is the capacity of being several things at once" (ibid: 49). It is from this "social process" emerged life, consciousness, intelligence, mind, etc., so that the human self can form and develop; on the other hand, the development of self always within communities, experiences the stages of play, game and generalized other, the individual become finally the formal member of community to which he belongs (Mead, 1934). Thus, Meadian theory is in essential a kind of theory of social control, because the processes always in the interaction and interdependence of "relations" or "sociality". Particularly, Mead (1925/1964) once addresses the problem of "The Genesis of the self and social control":

The human individual is a self only insofar as he takes the attitude of another toward himself. Insofar as this attitude is that of a number of others, and insofar as he can assume the organized attitudes of a number that are cooperating in a common activity, he takes the attitudes of the group toward himself, and in taking this or these attitudes he is defining the object of the group, that which defines and controls the response. Social control, then, will depend upon the degree to which the individual does assume the attitudes of those in the group who are involved with him in his social activities. (ibid: 290)

Meanwhile, in view of his theoretical perceptive, Mead could deal with satisfactorily the problem of relation between individuality and community in the theory of social control: "Self-criticism is essentially social criticism, and behavior controlled by self-criticism is essentially behavior controlled socially. Hence social control, so far from tending to crush out the human individual or to obliterate his self-conscious individuality, is, on the contrary, actually constitutive of and inextricably associated with that individuality; for the individual is what he is, as a conscious and individual personality, just in as far as he is a member of society, involved in the social process of experience and activity, and thereby socially controlled in his conduct." (Mead, 1934: 255) This unity further embodied in the Meadian distinction between I and Me: "'Social control' is the expression of the 'me' over against the expression of the 'I'. It sets the limits, it gives the determination that enables the 'I', so to speak, to use the 'me' as the means of carrying out what is the undertaking that all are interested in" (ibid: 210).

On the other hand, the idea of social control got further extended and deepens in terms of empirical research in the early American sociology, especially in the relevant research of "the Sociological School of Chicago" under the direction of Robert E. Park. Park proposed a theoretical framework, so as to guide the empirical researches. Park (1955: 227) defined sociology as "the science of collective behavior". Collective behavior is realized through the social processes; there are four typical forms in the social processes, that is, competition,

conflict, accommodation and assimilation, and the idea of social control permeates the whole processes:

The community and the natural order within the limits of the community, it appeared, are an effect of competition. Social control and the mutual subordination of individual members to the community have their origin in conflict, assume definite organized forms in the process of accommodation, and are consolidated and fixed in assimilation. (Park, 1967: 209)

Thus, “social control is the central fact and the central problem of sociology” (Park, 1955: 227). And Social problems were divided into three classes: problems of administration; problem of policy and polity; problem of social forces and human nature. Park thought that social control may be studied in each one of these categories, in other words, “all social problems turn out to be problems of social control” (1967: 209). In the view of Park,

Society is everywhere a control organization. Its function is to organize, integrate, and direct the energies resident in the individuals of which it is composed. One might, perhaps, say that the function of society was everywhere to restrict competition and by so doing bring about a more effective co-operation of the organic units of which society is composed. (Park, 1967: 83)

Therefore, social control and collective behavior can applied to same object, what is different in that the former refers to “mechanism’, and the latter refers to “process” (Turner, 1967: xii) Moreover, Park has investigated in detail the “elementary forms” of social control, especially the mechanism of public opinion and institutions (ibid: 212-4). In addition, Park’s natural history research on American race relations and ecological studied in ecological order and social order further deepen and extended the central thesis of “social control and social order” in the American sociology.

3 - Summary:

a. Social control and social order. In general, the discourse on social control in early American Sociology is around the thesis of “social control and social order”, although there are difference among researchers in focuses, perspectives, research orientations and research methods. “The problem of order” has been the central thesis in sociology; in a sense, the rise of sociology is responsive to universal “order crisis” in the West World. Just as Janowitz (1975: 82) pointed out, the term “served as a comprehensive basis for a sociological examination of the social order”. We find in the relevant researches of Ross, Cooley, Mead and Park that the thesis is in the central position, and these researchers proposed their approaches to the problem of order in accord with their respective theoretical orientations.

b. social control, Social organization, and social process. According to Janowitz (ibid), social control was “a central concept for analyzing social organization and the development of industrial society”; it referred to “the capacity of a society to regulate itself according to desired principles and values”. Social organization per se represses social creativity and collective problem solving. This view in fact is the concretization of the first thesis. Moreover,

in the early sociology, the researches on social organization were always involved social process, in a sense, the two researches are identical. We can find in early American sociology the closed relations between them. In addition, “social control is not the achievement of collective stability”, it “organizes the cleavages, strains, and tensions of any society” (ibid: 85).

c. social control and democracy. In early sociology, social control was separated from coercive control. We find in early American sociology that in the “means of social control”, public opinion, suggestion, personal ideals and social region were emphasized especially; in Cooley’ and Mead’ relevant researches, communication was central. Mead (2002: 87) once emphasized social control was different from political control:

The control that is exercised by and through the institution becomes more effective as it becomes less institutional.....the most effective government is through public opinion. Social control, in so far as it is institutional, involves friction and fails to carry with it that recognition of the identity of interests which must be the foundations of proper social control.

This conception of social control is essentially a kind of concept of democracy. In terms of Mead, his research is in some sense offered foundations of social theory for democracy.

d. social control and sociodicy. It is well known that American Protestantism has exerted great influence on the American social science in the process of its formation. Therefore, as one central concept in American sociology, social control was bestowed strong character of Protestant ethics, as a kind of means for the realization of good society or social ideals.

II. China (summary)

The concept of social control in early American sociology especially elaborated by E. A. Ross was introduced into early Chinese sociology in 1930s; however, in the context of localization or Cinicization of sociology, the concept was reinterpreted and reformulated as a concept with Chinese characteristics.

We may explore the question in terms of two aspects. Firstly, some Chinese sociologists’ direct discussion on the concept; secondly, some studies in the nature, structures, changes and questions of Chinese society by Chinese sociologists in that time have relevance to the idea of social control, though these researchers have not reference to the concept.

In term of the former, Wu Zelin, Chinese sociologist and ethnologist, and Sun Benwen, Chinese sociologist and social psychologist, were main representatives. Wu’ work *Social control* was published in 1930, which first introduced the concept into Chinese sociology. Wu Zelin, however, didn’t copy the American sociological concept; instead, he restated the idea in Chinese way. Briefly, his contributions at least embodied three aspects. 1) The title of the work indicates that he gave the concept a Chinese name (社会约制, she hui yue zhi, which may be translated as “social binding”), of cause, it means that he proposed a new understanding of the meanings of social control. For example, he distinct its broad sense and

narrow sense; the former emphasized the interaction or reciprocity, the latter emphasized domination, or “social control existed by corporation”; Wu was interested in the board sense, although he recognized that social control in modern complex society mainly took on its narrow sense. 2) Wu thought that there was an important confusion between the means or tools and methods of social control in the discussions on the social control offered by American sociologists, he made a distinction between the two and elaborated them respectively, which was considered as his one creative idea. 3) Wu’s related discuss used extensive materials coming from Chinese cultural tradition and social life, sometimes, even the concepts he adopted stem from American Sociologists, he also gave them names with Chinese characters and expounded them with materials in Chinese history and society, made them into Chinese concepts. For example, he applied Thomas’s famous four wishes to elaborate the psychological roots of means of social control, which is full with creativity.

Sun Benwen, on the other hand, as a social theorist and social psychologist, whose main contributes in this respect consist in that he brought the concept into his comprehensive general theory system, identified it position in the sociological theory (*The principles of Sociology*, 1935) in the one hand (In this respect, what Sun Benwen has done similar to what Parsons ever done in his *The Social System.*), on the other, he has elaborated the psychological mechanisms of social control systematically and widely, including much of related psychological, social, cultural factors such as attitudes, opinion, rumor, mass behavior, custom, fashion, morality, law, religion, personality, suggestion, propaganda, education, leaders and great persons, etc. (*Social psychology*, 1947) Of cause, like Wu Zenlin, Sun’s discussions also adopted plenty of materials and documents coming from the history, traditional culture and social life of China.

As for the second one, there in fact are many interesting researches in the early Chinese social sciences. For instance, Yang Kaidao’ (famous rural sociologist in that time) important studies in the institute of local rules and regulation in the history of China, took on the total system of rural governance (including local rules, the Bao-Jia system, Barn for famine relief and rural schools), which embodied typically social control system with Chinese characteristics. For another example, Fei Xiaotong’ (famous sociologist and anthropologist) insightful research on “Rural China” also reveal deeply characteristic Chinese ideas of social order and social control.

III. Conclusions and discussion (summary)

This immature, incomplete study inspired by my reading of works of American sociologists and early Chinese sociologists; originally, I think it should be designed as a double comparative study, that is, comparison of early American sociology with early Chinese sociology in respect to the discussions on concept of social control, and that the transformation of meanings and uses of the concept from the early sociology to modern sociology (mainly refer to after World War II) in the West. Therefore, I concern two kinds of questions: How early American sociologists and Chinese sociologists understand and apply the concept of social control? What are differences between them? Why so? And the differences in meanings and uses of social control in early and modern sociology, How this transformation happened?

There are some preliminary conclusions and theses need further inquiry.

Firstly, the concept of social control is a **total concept** in the early sociology, either in America or in China. As Janowitz (1975: 82) pointed out, “originally, the term dealt with a generic aspect of society and served as a comprehensive basis for a sociological examination of the social order”. We can find it especially in the relevant researches of Ross, Mead, Park, Wu Zelin and Sun Benwen. Moreover, these discussions on social control always related to those of social organization and social process, the latter are essentially identical which refer to capacities of a society and processes of it organized itself.

Secondly, it is interesting that both the discussions on the question of social control in the early American sociology and the introduction and reformulation of the concept in early Chinese sociology are in the periods of great changes respectively; either in America or in China, the thesis of social control both connected with the problem of social reconstruction. However, more importantly, we also find that there are great differences among them, which mainly embodied in their views of social order and the social values behind. For example, the remarkable features of Protestant ethics, progressive, activist, democratic, and pragmatistic characters permeating into the American sociology, but not existed in the early Chinese sociology or so obviously, though both proposed reform-oriented sociology and programs for social construction.

Thirdly, whether those researches by Yang Kaidao and Fei Xiaotong mentioned above may be inquired in terms of the idea of social control, though these studies embodied some similarity between them.

Finally, we find that early sociology emphasized the positive, active, interactive and general meanings of social control, whereas modern sociology after World War II more intent to understand and use the concept in the sense of the negative, passive, coercive and narrow or professional. Although it is a very interesting and important thesis, and there are some important clues about the transformation in the early sociology, however, it beyond the present study.

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The Social Attitudes of Youth Generation in China

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Introduction

1. Here I will describe some social attitudes of the youth generation of China.
2. The social attitude will be defined as the recognitions, judgments and evaluations of the respondents towards various social issues such as social justice, social trust and social conflicts.
3. The data used in this report is from the CSS2013 (China Social General Survey in 2013, Institute of Sociology, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) which includes 10206 respondents.

Introduction

4. The groupings based on ages of respondents.
 - ① the youth group, which includes those who are 35 years old and younger;
 - ② the middle-aged group, which includes those who are 36-59 years old;
 - ③ the elderly group, which includes those who are 60 years old and older. .

1. Satisfaction with Job

(1) environment of workplace (%)

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | total | N |
|------------|---|-----|-----|-----|------|------|------|------|-----|------|-------|------|
| youth | 3.3 | 1.6 | 3.9 | 3.6 | 17.8 | 12.9 | 15.4 | 21.6 | 7.5 | 12.5 | 100 | 1349 |
| Middle | 3.3 | 2.7 | 4.9 | 4.4 | 19.1 | 15.6 | 13.5 | 18.8 | 6.6 | 11.2 | 100 | 2695 |
| older | 2.8 | 2.0 | 5.2 | 6.0 | 15.9 | 15.9 | 10.7 | 22.2 | 7.1 | 12.3 | 100 | 252 |
| All | 3.2 | 2.3 | 4.6 | 4.2 | 18.5 | 14.8 | 14.0 | 19.9 | 6.9 | 11.6 | 100 | 4296 |
| statistics | Pearson $X^2=27.945$ (sig.=0.063) , likelihood ratio=28.379 (sig.=0.057) , $\gamma=-0.058$ (sig.=0.003) | | | | | | | | | | | |

mean: youth: 6.72, the middle: 6.46, The elderly: 6.61, All: 6.55

(2) the easiness of job (%)

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 合计 | N |
|------------|---|-----|-----|-----|------|------|------|------|-----|-----|-----|------|
| youth | 5.1 | 4.1 | 7.5 | 7.4 | 18.4 | 11.2 | 13.0 | 16.9 | 8.0 | 8.3 | 100 | 1352 |
| Middle | 5.9 | 6.2 | 9.7 | 8.1 | 19.7 | 13.6 | 12.0 | 14.7 | 4.6 | 5.4 | 100 | 2700 |
| older | 3.6 | 2.8 | 7.1 | 8.7 | 13.0 | 12.6 | 10.3 | 25.3 | 7.9 | 8.7 | 100 | 253 |
| All | 5.5 | 5.3 | 8.9 | 7.9 | 18.9 | 12.8 | 12.2 | 16.0 | 5.8 | 6.5 | 100 | 4305 |
| statistics | Pearson $X^2=81.275$ (sig.=0.000) , likelihood ratio=80.096 (sig.=0.000) , $\gamma=-0.063$ (sig.=0.001) | | | | | | | | | | | |

mean: the youth: 6.72, the middle-aged: 6.46, the elderly: 6.61, All: 6.55

(3) the security of job (%)

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | total | N |
|------------|---|-----|-----|-----|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|
| youth | 2.5 | 1.6 | 4.0 | 4.2 | 11.0 | 7.7 | 11.4 | 22.0 | 12.9 | 22.6 | 100 | 1351 |
| Middle | 2.5 | 2.3 | 4.0 | 4.4 | 13.5 | 9.2 | 11.7 | 21.7 | 12.6 | 18.0 | 100 | 2699 |
| older | 1.2 | 1.2 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 10.3 | 11.9 | 7.1 | 26.6 | 11.1 | 21.8 | 100 | 252 |
| All | 2.4 | 2.0 | 4.0 | 4.3 | 12.5 | 8.9 | 11.3 | 22.1 | 12.6 | 19.7 | 100 | 4302 |
| statistics | Pearson $X^2=33.122$ (sig.=0.016) , likelihood ratio=33.954 (sig.=0.013) , $\gamma=-0.051$ (sig.=0.010) | | | | | | | | | | | |

mean: the youth: 7.34, the middle-aged: 7.09, the elderly: 7.38, All: 7.18

(4) wage and welfare (%)

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | total | N |
|------------|---|-----|------|-----|------|------|------|------|-----|-----|-------|------|
| youth | 5.7 | 4.9 | 7.5 | 7.9 | 20.7 | 16.0 | 14.0 | 13.9 | 3.9 | 5.4 | 100 | 1341 |
| Middle | 6.6 | 5.9 | 10.0 | 9.6 | 22.7 | 15.2 | 12.2 | 11.0 | 3.5 | 3.2 | 100 | 2667 |
| older | 4.4 | 5.6 | 8.4 | 9.6 | 22.1 | 18.1 | 7.6 | 12.0 | 4.0 | 8.0 | 100 | 249 |
| All | 6.2 | 5.6 | 9.2 | 9.1 | 22.0 | 15.6 | 12.5 | 12.0 | 3.7 | 4.2 | 100 | 4257 |
| statistics | Pearson $X^2=50.339$ (sig.=0.000) , likelihood ratio=49.471 (sig.=0.000) , $\gamma=-0.080$ (sig.=0.000) | | | | | | | | | | | |

mean: the youth: 5.67, the middle-aged: 5.29, the elderly: 5.65, All: 7.537

(5) chance for promotion (%)

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | total | N |
|------------|---|------|------|-----|------|------|------|------|-----|-----|-------|------|
| youth | 11.3 | 5.9 | 6.2 | 6.0 | 19.3 | 11.5 | 14.5 | 14.1 | 4.4 | 6.7 | 100 | 929 |
| Middle | 19.7 | 7.5 | 10.0 | 6.8 | 18.9 | 12.8 | 8.3 | 9.7 | 3.3 | 3.1 | 100 | 1391 |
| older | 18.1 | 12.0 | 10.8 | 8.4 | 21.7 | 9.6 | 8.4 | 8.4 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 100 | 83 |
| All | 16.4 | 7.0 | 8.6 | 6.5 | 19.1 | 12.2 | 10.7 | 11.4 | 3.7 | 4.4 | 100 | 2403 |
| statistics | Pearson $X^2=50.339$ (sig.=0.000) , likelihood ratio=49.471 (sig.=0.000) , $\gamma=-0.080$ (sig.=0.000) | | | | | | | | | | | |

mean: the youth: 5.52, the middle-aged: 4.59, the elderly: 4.42, All: 4.94

(6) chance to exert your own capability (%)

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | total | N |
|------------|--|------|------|-----|------|------|------|------|-----|-----|-------|------|
| youth | 11.3 | 5.9 | 6.2 | 6.0 | 19.3 | 11.5 | 14.5 | 14.1 | 4.4 | 6.7 | 100 | 929 |
| Middle | 19.7 | 7.5 | 10.0 | 6.8 | 18.9 | 12.8 | 8.3 | 9.7 | 3.3 | 3.1 | 100 | 1391 |
| older | 18.1 | 12.0 | 10.8 | 8.4 | 21.7 | 9.6 | 8.4 | 8.4 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 100 | 83 |
| All | 16.4 | 7.0 | 8.6 | 6.5 | 19.1 | 12.2 | 10.7 | 11.4 | 3.7 | 4.4 | 100 | 2403 |
| statistics | Pearson X ² =50.339 (sig.=0.000) , likelihood ratio=49.471 (sig.=0.000) , γ =-0.080 (sig.=0.000) | | | | | | | | | | | |

mean: the youth: 5.52, the middle-aged: 4.59, the elderly: 4.42, All: 4.94

2. Satisfaction with Life

(1) the degree of education (%)

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | N | |
|------------|--|-----|------|------|------|------|------|------|-----|-----|-------|--|
| youth | 4.9 | 3.2 | 8.1 | 8.2 | 22.1 | 15.7 | 15.4 | 14.5 | 4.3 | 3.7 | 2514 | |
| Middle | 8.1 | 5.8 | 10.1 | 9.8 | 21.4 | 13.5 | 10.5 | 12.2 | 3.7 | 4.9 | 5646 | |
| older | 8.2 | 5.9 | 12.2 | 10.1 | 19.3 | 12.0 | 9.6 | 12.6 | 4.2 | 5.9 | 2019 | |
| All | 7.3 | 5.2 | 10.0 | 9.5 | 21.1 | 13.8 | 11.6 | 12.8 | 3.9 | 4.8 | 10179 | |
| statistics | Pearson X ² =158.852 (sig.=0.000) , likelihood ratio=161.857 (sig.=0.000) , γ =-0.079 (sig.=0.000) | | | | | | | | | | | |

mean: youth: 5.72, the middle: 5.31, The elderly: 5.30, All: 5.41

(2) the health (%)

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | N | |
|------------|--|-----|-----|-----|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|--|
| youth | 0.7 | 0.7 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 8.1 | 9.2 | 16.2 | 29.7 | 16.6 | 14.1 | 2512 | |
| Middle | 3.8 | 2.8 | 4.8 | 5.9 | 13.4 | 12.1 | 14.2 | 22.3 | 10.9 | 9.9 | 5643 | |
| older | 4.1 | 4.4 | 7.6 | 9.4 | 15.0 | 12.7 | 13.2 | 19.0 | 7.2 | 7.5 | 2018 | |
| All | 3.1 | 2.6 | 4.7 | 5.8 | 12.4 | 11.5 | 14.5 | 23.5 | 11.6 | 10.5 | 10173 | |
| statistics | Pearson X ² =560.334 (sig.=0.000) , likelihood ratio=598.226 (sig.=0.000) , γ =-0.252 (sig.=0.000) | | | | | | | | | | | |

mean: youth: 7.56, the middle: 6.62, The elderly: 6.08, All: 6.74

(3) social communication/interaction (%)

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | N | |
|------------|---|-----|-----|-----|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|--|
| youth | 1.0 | 0.7 | 1.9 | 2.8 | 13.0 | 13.9 | 18.0 | 28.6 | 12.6 | 7.6 | 2513 | |
| Middle | 0.9 | 1.3 | 2.4 | 3.3 | 14.3 | 14.0 | 17.2 | 24.4 | 11.0 | 11.1 | 5647 | |
| older | 0.8 | 1.9 | 2.8 | 3.3 | 15.4 | 14.6 | 14.0 | 22.9 | 11.6 | 12.7 | 2020 | |
| All | 0.9 | 1.3 | 2.4 | 3.2 | 14.2 | 14.1 | 16.8 | 25.2 | 11.5 | 10.5 | 10180 | |
| statistics | Pearson X ² =88.430 (sig.=0.000) , likelihood ratio=90.693 (sig.=0.000) , γ =-0.0132 (sig.=0.261) | | | | | | | | | | | |

mean: youth: 7.11, the middle: 7.05, The elderly: 7.03, All: 7.06

(4) household economic conditions (%)

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | N |
|------------|--|-----|-----|------|------|------|------|------|-----|-----|-------|
| youth | 2.0 | 2.7 | 6.1 | 7.0 | 22.1 | 19.5 | 18.2 | 15.5 | 4.7 | 2.4 | 2512 |
| Middle | 5.5 | 4.9 | 8.6 | 10.3 | 22.7 | 16.7 | 13.1 | 12.1 | 3.6 | 2.4 | 5642 |
| older | 3.5 | 4.9 | 8.0 | 8.9 | 19.3 | 17.9 | 14.2 | 14.3 | 4.7 | 4.5 | 2018 |
| All | 4.2 | 4.4 | 7.9 | 9.2 | 21.9 | 17.6 | 14.6 | 13.4 | 4.1 | 2.8 | 10172 |
| statistics | Pearson $X^2=206.905$ (sig.=0.000) , likelihood ratio=212.811 (sig.=0.000) , $\gamma=-0.054$ (sig.=0.00) | | | | | | | | | | |

mean- youth: 5.98. the middle: 5.41. The elderly: 5.77. All: 5.62

(5) leisure and entertainment (%)

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | N |
|------------|--|-----|-----|-----|------|------|------|------|-----|-----|-------|
| youth | 4.3 | 4.4 | 6.7 | 7.3 | 18.8 | 16.1 | 17.1 | 15.8 | 5.8 | 3.8 | 2507 |
| Middle | 6.4 | 5.6 | 8.9 | 9.3 | 19.5 | 15.2 | 13.7 | 12.5 | 4.2 | 4.8 | 5618 |
| older | 3.5 | 4.1 | 7.5 | 7.3 | 19.3 | 15.2 | 13.4 | 16.3 | 6.1 | 7.6 | 2013 |
| All | 5.3 | 5.0 | 8.1 | 8.4 | 19.3 | 15.4 | 14.5 | 14.1 | 5.0 | 5.1 | 10138 |
| statistics | Pearson $X^2=151.524$ (sig.=0.000) , likelihood ratio=149.999 (sig.=0.000) , $\gamma=0.008$ (sig.=0.492) | | | | | | | | | | |

mean- youth: 5.89. the middle: 5.51. The elderly: 6.05. All: 5.71

(6) totally speaking, the degree of satisfaction with life (%)

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | N |
|------------|--|-----|-----|-----|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| youth | 0.5 | 0.9 | 2.1 | 3.3 | 14.9 | 16.1 | 21.6 | 25.3 | 10.4 | 4.9 | 2514 |
| Middle | 1.4 | 1.6 | 3.4 | 4.8 | 17.4 | 16.5 | 17.8 | 22.5 | 8.6 | 5.9 | 5650 |
| older | 1.0 | 1.3 | 2.3 | 4.3 | 14.2 | 15.6 | 17.3 | 24.6 | 9.3 | 10.0 | 2018 |
| All | 1.1 | 1.4 | 2.9 | 4.3 | 16.1 | 16.3 | 18.6 | 23.6 | 9.2 | 6.5 | 10182 |
| statistics | Pearson $X^2=136.950$ (sig.=0.000) , likelihood ratio=135.340 (sig.=0.000) , $\gamma=0.005$ (sig.=0.661) | | | | | | | | | | |

mean- youth: 6.89. the middle: 6.61. The elderly: 6.94. All: 6.75

(7) generally speaking, I am a happy person (%)

| | Disagree very well | disagree | Disagree moderately | Agree moderately | agree | Agree very well | In total | N |
|------------|--|----------|---------------------|------------------|-------|-----------------|----------|-------|
| youth | 2.4 | 7.6 | 12.7 | 39.4 | 31.6 | 6.4 | 100.0 | 2499 |
| Middle | 2.5 | 8.9 | 14.9 | 37.2 | 29.2 | 7.1 | 100.0 | 5572 |
| older | 1.8 | 6.7 | 13.1 | 36.8 | 30.7 | 10.9 | 100.0 | 1991 |
| All | 2.3 | 8.2 | 14.0 | 37.7 | 30.1 | 7.7 | 100.0 | 10062 |
| statistics | Pearson $X^2=63.275$ (sig.=0.000) , likelihood ratio=61.018 (sig.=0.000) , $\gamma=0.034$ (sig.=0.009) | | | | | | | |

3. Social trust

(1) trust on relatives and friends (%)

| | Distrust completely | Distrust moderately | Trust moderately | Trust very well | In total | N |
|------------|--|---------------------|------------------|-----------------|----------|-------|
| Youth | 0.6 | 3.9 | 59.8 | 35.8 | 100.0 | 2508 |
| The middle | 0.4 | 4.2 | 56.2 | 39.2 | 100.0 | 5603 |
| Elderly | 0.4 | 4.4 | 52.9 | 42.3 | 100.0 | 1997 |
| all | 0.5 | 4.2 | 56.4 | 39.0 | 100.0 | 10108 |
| statistics | Pearson $X^2=23.351$ (sig.=0.001) , likelihood ratio=23.349 (sig.=0.000) , $\gamma=0.066$ (sig.=0.000) | | | | | |

(2) trust on neighborhoods (%)

| | Distrust completely | Distrust moderately | Trust moderately | Trust very well | In total | N |
|------------|--|---------------------|------------------|-----------------|----------|------|
| Youth | 1.3 | 19.6 | 70.3 | 8.8 | 100.0 | 2470 |
| The middle | 1.2 | 12.5 | 68.0 | 18.3 | 100.0 | 5534 |
| Elderly | 1.0 | 7.7 | 68.8 | 22.4 | 100.0 | 1983 |
| all | 1.2 | 13.3 | 68.8 | 16.8 | 100.0 | 9987 |
| statistics | Pearson $X^2=264.858$ (sig.=0.000) , likelihood ratio=279.777 (sig.=0.000) , $\gamma=0.269$ (sig.=0.000) | | | | | |

(3) trust on leaders/bosses of your unit (%)

| | Distrust completely | Distrust moderately | Trust moderately | Trust very well | In total | N |
|------------|--|---------------------|------------------|-----------------|----------|------|
| Youth | 4.7 | 34.0 | 55.3 | 6.0 | 100.0 | 1440 |
| The middle | 4.6 | 24.4 | 61.1 | 10.0 | 100.0 | 2395 |
| Elderly | 5.3 | 26.3 | 56.3 | 12.1 | 100.0 | 430 |
| all | 4.7 | 27.8 | 58.6 | 8.8 | 100.0 | 4265 |
| statistics | Pearson $X^2=58.653$ (sig.=0.000) , likelihood ratio=58.855 (sig.=0.000) , $\gamma=0.150$ (sig.=0.000) | | | | | |

(4) trust on policemen/policewomen (%)

| | Distrust completely | Distrust moderately | Trust moderately | Trust very well | In total | N |
|------------|--|---------------------|------------------|-----------------|----------|------|
| Youth | 6.0 | 28.9 | 53.6 | 11.5 | 100.0 | 2313 |
| The middle | 5.3 | 21.1 | 55.8 | 17.9 | 100.0 | 4903 |
| Elderly | 2.4 | 15.2 | 57.0 | 25.4 | 100.0 | 1715 |
| all | 4.9 | 22.0 | 55.4 | 17.7 | 100.0 | 8931 |
| statistics | Pearson $X^2=225.535$ (sig.=0.000) , likelihood ratio=229.971 (sig.=0.000) , $\gamma=0.231$ (sig.=0.000) | | | | | |

(5) trust on judges from law courts (%)

| | Distrust completely | Distrust moderately | Trust moderately | Trust very well | In total | N |
|------------|--|---------------------|------------------|-----------------|----------|------|
| Youth | 5.3 | 29.2 | 55.2 | 10.3 | 100.0 | 2101 |
| The middle | 5.8 | 23.2 | 55.5 | 15.4 | 100.0 | 4233 |
| Elderly | 3.2 | 16.7 | 57.7 | 22.4 | 100.0 | 1457 |
| all | 5.2 | 23.6 | 55.8 | 15.4 | 100.0 | 7791 |
| statistics | Pearson $X^2=155.753$ (sig.=0.000) , likelihood ratio=157.400 (sig.=0.000) , $\gamma=0.194$ (sig.=0.000) | | | | | |

(6) trust on leading cadres from the party and government (%)

| | Distrust completely | Distrust moderately | Trust moderately | Trust very well | In total | N |
|------------|--|---------------------|------------------|-----------------|----------|------|
| Youth | 9.0 | 40.3 | 44.4 | 6.2 | 100.0 | 2167 |
| The middle | 8.1 | 31.4 | 49.0 | 11.4 | 100.0 | 4818 |
| Elderly | 6.0 | 24.1 | 54.0 | 15.9 | 100.0 | 1716 |
| all | 7.9 | 32.2 | 48.9 | 11.0 | 100.0 | 8701 |
| statistics | Pearson $X^2=193.005$ (sig.=0.000) , likelihood ratio=197.618 (sig.=0.000) , $\gamma=0.206$ (sig.=0.000) | | | | | |

(7) trust on entrepreneurs (%)

| | Distrust completely | Distrust moderately | Trust moderately | Trust very well | In total | N |
|------------|--|---------------------|------------------|-----------------|----------|------|
| Youth | 6.7 | 49.0 | 41.6 | 2.7 | 100.0 | 1986 |
| The middle | 6.7 | 40.5 | 47.7 | 5.1 | 100.0 | 3798 |
| Elderly | 5.0 | 36.9 | 50.2 | 7.9 | 100.0 | 1165 |
| all | 6.4 | 42.4 | 46.4 | 4.9 | 100.0 | 6949 |
| statistics | Pearson $X^2=93.545$ (sig.=0.000) , likelihood ratio=93.952 (sig.=0.000) , $\gamma=0.156$ (sig.=0.000) | | | | | |

(8) trust on teachers (%)

| | Distrust completely | Distrust moderately | Trust moderately | Trust very well | In total | N |
|------------|--|---------------------|------------------|-----------------|----------|------|
| Youth | 1.2 | 11.6 | 68.7 | 18.4 | 100.0 | 2450 |
| The middle | 1.4 | 8.8 | 64.0 | 25.8 | 100.0 | 5376 |
| Elderly | 1.0 | 6.2 | 61.2 | 31.7 | 100.0 | 1869 |
| all | 1.3 | 9.0 | 64.7 | 25.1 | 100.0 | 9695 |
| statistics | Pearson $X^2=123.545$ (sig.=0.000) , likelihood ratio=125.891 (sig.=0.000) , $\gamma=0.184$ (sig.=0.000) | | | | | |

(9) trust on doctors (%)

| | Distrust completely | Distrust moderately | Trust moderately | Trust very well | In total | N |
|------------|--|---------------------|------------------|-----------------|----------|------|
| Youth | 1.8 | 18.9 | 66.7 | 12.6 | 100.0 | 2459 |
| The middle | 2.0 | 12.1 | 65.7 | 20.1 | 100.0 | 5479 |
| Elderly | 1.1 | 9.2 | 63.9 | 25.7 | 100.0 | 1946 |
| all | 1.8 | 13.2 | 65.6 | 19.4 | 100.0 | 9884 |
| statistics | Pearson $X^2=195.045$ (sig.=0.000) , likelihood ratio=195.988 (sig.=0.000) , $\gamma=0.222$ (sig.=0.000) | | | | | |

(10) trust on strangers (%)

| | Distrust completely | Distrust moderately | Trust moderately | Trust very well | In total | N |
|------------|--|---------------------|------------------|-----------------|----------|------|
| Youth | 41.6 | 51.5 | 6.6 | 0.3 | 100.0 | 2434 |
| The middle | 46.4 | 47.9 | 5.5 | 0.3 | 100.0 | 5428 |
| Elderly | 42.9 | 49.8 | 6.8 | 0.4 | 100.0 | 1942 |
| all | 44.5 | 49.2 | 6.0 | 0.3 | 100.0 | 9804 |
| statistics | Pearson $X^2=195.045$ (sig.=0.000) , likelihood ratio=195.988 (sig.=0.000) , $\gamma=0.222$ (sig.=0.000) | | | | | |

4. Social Justice (Fairness)

(1) On the system of entrance examinations for higher education (%)

| | Very unfair | Moderately unfair | Moderately fair | very fair | In total | N |
|------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|-----------------|-----------|----------|------|
| Youth | 3.6 | 17.8 | 68.3 | 10.3 | 100.0 | 2243 |
| The middle | 2.8 | 13.4 | 69.1 | 14.7 | 100.0 | 4609 |
| Elderly | 1.7 | 10.7 | 70.2 | 17.3 | 100.0 | 1499 |
| all | 2.8 | 14.1 | 69.1 | 14.0 | 100.0 | 8351 |
| statistics | $\gamma=0.168$ (sig.=0.000) | | | | | |

(2) On the compulsory education (primary and junior middle) (%)

| | Very unfair | Moderately unfair | Moderately fair | very fair | In total | N |
|------------|--|-------------------|-----------------|-----------|----------|------|
| Youth | 1.9 | 12.3 | 67.2 | 18.6 | 100.0 | 2449 |
| The middle | 2.0 | 8.5 | 69.0 | 20.6 | 100.0 | 5245 |
| Elderly | 1.3 | 8.9 | 68.1 | 21.7 | 100.0 | 1745 |
| all | 1.8 | 9.5 | 68.4 | 20.3 | 100.0 | 9439 |
| statistics | Pearson $X^2=36.008$ (sig.=0.000) , likelihood ratio=34.958 (sig.=0.000) , $\gamma=0.077$ (sig.=0.000) | | | | | |

(3) On civil rights really shared by citizens) (%)

| | Very unfair | Moderately unfair | Moderately fair | very fair | In total | N |
|------------|-------------------------------|-------------------|-----------------|-----------|----------|------|
| Youth | 8.6 | 38.5 | 46.6 | 6.3 | 100.0 | 2262 |
| The middle | 7.9 | 31.1 | 54.0 | 7.0 | 100.0 | 4666 |
| Elderly | 4.8 | 27.9 | 57.3 | 10.0 | 100.0 | 1576 |
| all | 7.5 | 32.5 | 52.7 | 7.4 | 100.0 | 8504 |
| statistics | $\gamma = 0.153$ (sig.=0.000) | | | | | |

(4) On the judicial and law enforcement (%)

| | Very unfair | Moderately unfair | Moderately fair | very fair | In total | N |
|------------|--|-------------------|-----------------|-----------|----------|------|
| Youth | 8.7 | 39.3 | 46.6 | 5.4 | 100.0 | 2184 |
| The middle | 8.0 | 33.1 | 52.2 | 6.7 | 100.0 | 4373 |
| Elderly | 4.3 | 28.6 | 57.7 | 9.4 | 100.0 | 1472 |
| all | 7.5 | 34.0 | 51.7 | 6.8 | 100.0 | 8029 |
| statistics | Pearson $X^2 = 100.429$ (sig.=0.000) , likelihood ratio=102.849 (sig.=0.000) , $\gamma = 0.160$ (sig.=0.000) | | | | | |

(5) On the healthcare (%)

| | Very unfair | Moderately unfair | Moderately fair | very fair | In total | N |
|------------|--|-------------------|-----------------|-----------|----------|------|
| Youth | 4.0 | 25.7 | 64.5 | 5.8 | 100.0 | 2406 |
| The middle | 3.9 | 22.2 | 65.6 | 8.3 | 100.0 | 5205 |
| Elderly | 3.6 | 18.4 | 68.1 | 10.0 | 100.0 | 1826 |
| all | 3.9 | 22.3 | 65.8 | 8.0 | 100.0 | 9437 |
| statistics | Pearson $X^2 = 51.979$ (sig.=0.000) , likelihood ratio=53.054 (sig.=0.000) , $\gamma = 0.115$ (sig.=0.000) | | | | | |

(6) On the opportunities of jobs and employment (%)

| | Very unfair | Moderately unfair | Moderately fair | very fair | In total | N |
|------------|--|-------------------|-----------------|-----------|----------|------|
| Youth | 7.9 | 48.0 | 41.6 | 2.4 | 100.0 | 2380 |
| The middle | 9.2 | 42.8 | 44.7 | 3.3 | 100.0 | 4902 |
| Elderly | 6.0 | 38.5 | 50.4 | 5.1 | 100.0 | 1519 |
| all | 8.3 | 43.5 | 44.8 | 3.4 | 100.0 | 8801 |
| statistics | Pearson $X^2 = 71.088$ (sig.=0.000) , likelihood ratio=70.695 (sig.=0.000) , $\gamma = 0.110$ (sig.=0.000) | | | | | |

(7) On the distributions of income and wealth (%)

| | Very unfair | Moderately unfair | Moderately fair | very fair | In total | N |
|------------|---|-------------------|-----------------|-----------|----------|------|
| Youth | 14.7 | 48.9 | 33.8 | 2.6 | 100.0 | 2389 |
| The middle | 17.8 | 47.3 | 32.7 | 2.3 | 100.0 | 5085 |
| Elderly | 14.6 | 43.1 | 38.5 | 3.8 | 100.0 | 1660 |
| all | 16.4 | 46.9 | 34.0 | 2.6 | 100.0 | 9134 |
| statistics | Pearson X ² =43.819 (sig.=0.000) , likelihood ratio=42.799 (sig.=0.000) , γ =0.034 (sig.=0.027) | | | | | |

(8) On the system of social securities (%)

| | Very unfair | Moderately unfair | Moderately fair | very fair | In total | N |
|------------|---|-------------------|-----------------|-----------|----------|------|
| Youth | 6.8 | 33.3 | 55.1 | 4.8 | 100.0 | 2318 |
| The middle | 8.6 | 28.8 | 55.1 | 7.5 | 100.0 | 5082 |
| Elderly | 7.3 | 23.7 | 54.4 | 14.6 | 100.0 | 1856 |
| all | 7.9 | 28.9 | 54.9 | 8.2 | 100.0 | 9256 |
| statistics | Pearson X ² =168.480 (sig.=0.000) , likelihood ratio=157.997 (sig.=0.000) , γ =0.126 (sig.=0.000) | | | | | |

(9) On the system of appointment and assessment of leading cadres (%)

| | Very unfair | Moderately unfair | Moderately fair | very fair | In total | N |
|------------|---|-------------------|-----------------|-----------|----------|------|
| Youth | 17.1 | 44.1 | 35.2 | 3.6 | 100.0 | 2182 |
| The middle | 17.4 | 38.4 | 39.7 | 4.4 | 100.0 | 4566 |
| Elderly | 14.2 | 33.8 | 44.9 | 7.1 | 100.0 | 1554 |
| all | 16.7 | 39.0 | 39.5 | 4.7 | 100.0 | 8302 |
| statistics | Pearson X ² =81.595 (sig.=0.000) , likelihood ratio=79.691 (sig.=0.000) , γ =0.115 (sig.=0.000) | | | | | |

(10) On the rural-urban comparison based on the social rights (%)

| | Very unfair | Moderately unfair | Moderately fair | very fair | In total | N |
|------------|---|-------------------|-----------------|-----------|----------|------|
| Youth | 14.2 | 52.4 | 32.0 | 1.4 | 100.0 | 2307 |
| The middle | 16.6 | 49.9 | 31.7 | 1.8 | 100.0 | 4865 |
| Elderly | 12.0 | 50.4 | 35.0 | 2.6 | 100.0 | 1624 |
| all | 15.1 | 50.7 | 32.4 | 1.8 | 100.0 | 8796 |
| statistics | Pearson X ² =32.562 (sig.=0.000) , likelihood ratio=32.667 (sig.=0.000) , γ =0.040 (sig.=0.012) | | | | | |

(11) general social justice/fairness (%)

| | Very unfair | Moderately unfair | Moderately fair | very fair | In total | N |
|------------|--|-------------------|-----------------|-----------|----------|------|
| Youth | 5.4 | 39.2 | 54.0 | 1.4 | 100.0 | 2423 |
| The middle | 4.9 | 30.5 | 62.3 | 2.3 | 100.0 | 5313 |
| Elderly | 2.5 | 21.8 | 71.1 | 4.6 | 100.0 | 1852 |
| All | 4.5 | 31.0 | 61.9 | 2.5 | 100.0 | 9588 |
| statistics | Pearson $X^2=218.654$ (sig.=0.000) , likelihood ratio=219.477 (sig.=0.000) , $\gamma=0.241$ (sig.=0.000) | | | | | |

5. Social Conflicts

(1) the conflict between the poor and the rich (%)

| | No conflict | Not so serious | Moderately serious | very serious | In total | N |
|------------|---|----------------|--------------------|--------------|----------|------|
| Youth | 10.2 | 38.2 | 41.5 | 10.2 | 100.0 | 2433 |
| The middle | 16.9 | 39.0 | 33.1 | 11.0 | 100.0 | 5313 |
| Elderly | 16.9 | 39.0 | 33.1 | 11.0 | 100.0 | 1846 |
| all | 15.7 | 39.1 | 34.8 | 10.4 | 100.0 | 9592 |
| statistics | Pearson $X^2=117.410$ (sig.=0.000) , likelihood ratio=121.472 (sig.=0.000) , $\gamma=-0.120$ (sig.=0.000) | | | | | |

(2) the conflict between the bosses and the employees (%)

| | No conflict | Not so serious | Moderately serious | very serious | In total | N |
|------------|---|----------------|--------------------|--------------|----------|------|
| Youth | 9.1 | 59.1 | 28.6 | 3.2 | 100.0 | 2364 |
| The middle | 15.8 | 54.6 | 24.9 | 4.7 | 100.0 | 4770 |
| Elderly | 17.7 | 53.6 | 23.6 | 5.0 | 100.0 | 1448 |
| all | 14.3 | 55.7 | 25.7 | 4.3 | 100.0 | 8582 |
| statistics | Pearson $X^2=93.386$ (sig.=0.000) , likelihood ratio=99.284 (sig.=0.000) , $\gamma=-0.085$ (sig.=0.000) | | | | | |

(3) the conflict between the officials and the people (%)

| | No conflict | Not so serious | Moderately serious | very serious | In total | N |
|------------|---|----------------|--------------------|--------------|----------|------|
| Youth | 8.8 | 38.3 | 39.2 | 13.8 | 100.0 | 2334 |
| The middle | 17.3 | 39.3 | 31.7 | 11.7 | 100.0 | 5090 |
| Elderly | 21.1 | 39.6 | 30.1 | 9.2 | 100.0 | 1779 |
| all | 15.9 | 39.1 | 33.3 | 11.8 | 100.0 | 9203 |
| statistics | Pearson $X^2=163.228$ (sig.=0.000) , likelihood ratio=174.062 (sig.=0.000) , $\gamma=-0.161$ (sig.=0.000) | | | | | |

6. Democratic consciousness

(1) the common people should move away when the government want to remove their houses for rebuilding (%)

| | Agree very well | Agree moderately | Moderately disagree | Disagree very well | In total | N |
|------------|---|------------------|---------------------|--------------------|----------|------|
| Youth | 5.1 | 32.3 | 46.3 | 16.3 | 100.0 | 2434 |
| The middle | 11.0 | 39.8 | 36.3 | 12.9 | 100.0 | 5368 |
| Elderly | 15.2 | 46.0 | 28.9 | 9.9 | 100.0 | 1903 |
| all | 10.3 | 39.2 | 37.4 | 13.1 | 100.0 | 9705 |
| statistics | Pearson $X^2=288.221$ (sig.=0.000) , likelihood ratio=298.115 (sig.=0.000) , $\gamma=-0.229$ (sig.=0.000) | | | | | |

(2) the common people should follow the officials always (%)

| | Agree very well | Agree moderately | Moderately disagree | Disagree very well | In total | N |
|------------|---|------------------|---------------------|--------------------|----------|------|
| Youth | 5.4 | 33.0 | 46.2 | 15.3 | 100.0 | 2442 |
| The middle | 13.9 | 47.8 | 30.9 | 7.3 | 100.0 | 5442 |
| Elderly | 21.9 | 50.7 | 23.9 | 3.6 | 100.0 | 1957 |
| all | 13.4 | 44.7 | 33.3 | 8.6 | 100.0 | 9841 |
| statistics | Pearson $X^2=705.171$ (sig.=0.000) , likelihood ratio=703.175 (sig.=0.000) , $\gamma=-0.365$ (sig.=0.000) | | | | | |

(3) the common people need not care the state affairs for which the party and government will be responsible (%)

| | Agree very well | Agree moderately | Moderately disagree | Disagree very well | In total | N |
|------------|---|------------------|---------------------|--------------------|----------|------|
| Youth | 3.5 | 17.8 | 55.9 | 22.8 | 100.0 | 2465 |
| The middle | 10.0 | 32.8 | 44.5 | 12.8 | 100.0 | 5435 |
| Elderly | 15.4 | 39.3 | 36.6 | 8.7 | 100.0 | 1938 |
| all | 9.4 | 30.3 | 45.8 | 14.5 | 100.0 | 9838 |
| statistics | Pearson $X^2=623.135$ (sig.=0.000) , likelihood ratio=647.349 (sig.=0.000) , $\gamma=-0.343$ (sig.=0.000) | | | | | |

7. Some preliminary conclusions

- ① The level of satisfaction of the youth with their jobs is higher than those of other age groupings, but not so significantly.
- ② The level of satisfaction of the youth with their life in some concrete aspects is somewhat higher than that of other age groupings, but generally speaking, the case is inverse.
- ③ The level of social trust for the youth is lower than that of other age groupings.
- ④ The sense of social justice of youth generation is weaker than that of other grouping.
- ⑤ The sense of social conflict of the youth is weaker than that of other groupings.
- ⑥ The democratic consciousness of the youth is stronger than that of other groupings

Institution as a multipolar process. An analytical outline inspired by Durkheim

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1. Is the notion of “institution” worth saving?

Beneath layers of meaning and controversy, the notion of “institution” has served as a cornerstone of social science. The German Historical School, commonly associated with Max Weber, played a pioneering role. From its inception, the German Historical School drew upon an interdisciplinary dialogue involving law, economics, history, etc., for the purpose of identifying and interpreting socio-economic transformations occurring at the end of the 19th century (Schmoller, 1911). This approach refuses to reduce practice to abstract rational action, preferring instead to seek the logic and scope of a given practice by situating it within a dense empirical substratum. This is one of the main messages of those who, following Gustave Schmoller’s lead, directly oppose Karl Menger’s marginalist theory and thereby create the basic framework of an institutionalist tradition.

A few years later, in the United States, John Commons sought to contribute to the development of institutional economics. Gaétan Pirou (1936) boiled this project down to the following four propositions. Firstly, institutionalists are more interested in the future (analysis of the consequences resulting from current economic activity) than in the past (such as those who prefer economic materialism) or in the present (such as those who reduce economic action to cost-advantage calculation). Secondly, institutionalists consider that, in a world where scarcity rules and where competing interests are the common features of any scenario, order and organization can only come into being through collective action, which can take a variety of very different forms (congregations, corporations, political parties); the main point being that individuals are members of groups and that these groups of agglutinated individuals should be considered as living entities (Pirou, 1936, p. 140). Thirdly, individual behavior should not be studied through the lens of instrumental rationality but recognized as a characteristic of group membership, and thus individual practices are driven by “collective ambiance” and custom. Fourthly, the institutional economy prefers the notion of “transaction” to the notion of “exchange”. Among the many advantages of the term “transaction” is that it recalls that the circulation of merchandise and the contractual and benefit-sharing relationships into which people enter, cannot exist without legal rules and situations asymmetrical power.

Sociology is not short on reflection as to what instituting means, and as to what an institution can do. It is easy to understand why. To have any bearing on the collective destiny of men and women, sociologists quickly recognized the need to analyze those forces which push societies to pursue identical reproductions of themselves as well as those forces which, inversely, encourage social change. Within the vast array of sociological theories which are at our disposition today, and which can help us to conceptualize both the permanence and the transformation of societies existing in the past and the present, the notion of “institution” has

long occupied a place of privilege. Over decades, the socializing function of institutions (family, school, the State...) has effectively become a sociological given. E. Durkheim has contributed greatly to the success of the institutional perspective by assimilating the notion of institution with that of the social fact. Whatever the variant may be, 20th-century functionalism trod further upon this Durkheimian path.

In relation to this path, where are we situated today? Does it still make sense to reason in terms of institutions when the 21st-century world seems so different from the world into which western sociology was born? Should we keep the institutionalist tradition alive, or, in this new era of globalization and individuation, should we instead create new models and new concepts from scratch in order to make the ways in which groups and societies institute themselves and perpetuate themselves more intelligible? Such is the major question which the present contribution aspires to address.

Within the existing work dedicated to the study of institutions, several options are to be found today which respond to this line of questioning. At the intersection of sociology, economics and political science, some continue to draw upon functionalism-inspired perspectives, adapting them as necessary, loosening up their old frames. Such is the approach adopted by Peter Hall and David Soskice (2001) for example, and by all of those who reason in terms of functional equivalencies (where a function carried out by one institution in a given space can be carried out by a different institution in a different space) in order to analyze the forms of contemporary capitalism. In the same vein, work by Kathleen Thelen (2003-2004) opens up new and complementary perspectives by attempting to update the multiple mechanisms of institutional transformation (sedimentation, conversion...). Nonetheless, these useful and stimulating perspectives remain macrosocial. The ethnomethodological approach, along with the many similar approaches which have developed in relation to ethnomethodology, are to the contrary extremely microsocal. They tend to defy instituted social forms (Ogien, 2007). Regardless of their disciplinary perspective, those who adopt a rational-choice approach take institutions more seriously, especially when it comes to understanding their inception, their multiple purposes and their evolutions. Such is the case of the political scientist Elinor Ostrom (2005), a Nobel Prize winner in economics, who proposed a formal grammar of institutions based on the distinction between norms, rules, and strategies. Using these distinctions, E. Ostrom uses game theory to make the diversity of institutional arrangements intelligible. The perspective thus offered is original but remains indebted to the debatable (in the best sense of the word) axioms of those approaches which give strategy the leading role.

I would like to set this present reflection upon a wholly different path from those evoked above, accepting to wager that we have everything to gain from imagining *the institution as a multipolar process*. To be still more explicit, the point defended is that an institutionalist approach inspired by Durkheim remains relevant to contemporary sociology, provided that there is agreement on the three following postulates. Firstly, because of the profound transformations taking place in modern society, institutions should no longer be considered as fixed entities but instead as points of reference for social action (Turner, 2006). Secondly, Durkheim's sociology remains an intellectual reservoir upon which can draw when developing an alternative notion of institution. Finally, as a sensitizing concept (Blumer, 1954), institution is a notion which is neither meaningful nor interesting unless it can be used

with flexibility to help sociologists in elucidating the reasons behind a variety of empirical realities existing at different scales and open to conflict and contradiction.

2. Sociologists and institution

To put my contribution in context, I would like to begin by setting the sociological stage in more detail. To that end, let us begin by describing the importance of Durkheimian thought. In spite of the thematic and analytical modulations which one cannot help but notice in E. Durkheim's work, it is not surprising that he made use of the term institution. Even if the term appears late – in the preface to the second edition of *The Rules of Sociological Method* – the thesis is unambiguous. Following upon work by Paul Fauconnet and Marcel Mauss (1901), E. Durkheim argues that “there is one word which, provided one extends a little its normal meaning, expresses moderately well this very special kind of existence; it is that of institution. In fact, without doing violence to the meaning of the word, one may term an institution all the beliefs and modes of behaviour instituted by the collectivity; sociology can then be defined as the science of institutions, their genesis and their functioning” (Durkheim, 1982, p. 45). E. Durkheim completes that definition with a footnote in which he explains that institution does not necessarily entail conformism. Each of us gives life to collective institutions in his or her own way: “in assimilating ourselves to them, we individualise them” (*ibid.*, p. 47). The degree of normalization which these institutions impose is variable. Relatively high in the case of religion, it is much lower with respect to economic life. As Raymond Boudon and François Bourricaud wrote in their dictionary of sociology (*Dictionnaire critique de la sociologie*, 1986), despite such precisions, Durkheimians tend to assimilate institutions with “crystalized” social facts. These facts are characterized by permanence over time, and they have the capacity to constrain as well as to distinguish social groups.

Following E. Durkheim and the Durkheimians, numerous sociologists have tried to lay the foundation of an expanded theory of institution, whether it be as a complex of roles adequated with the social systems which constitute modern societies (Parsons, 1951), as a tutor capable of helping human beings to inhabit the social world (Berger, Luckman, 1966) or as the set of meanings which, thanks to customs and law, assure the existence of the public order in which the common life of men takes form (Müllmann, 1969). In all of these cases, one postulate – albeit a minimalist one – can be found in the definitions proposed: if indeed institutions have come into being, it is because they have responded, and most of the time continue to respond, to a functional requirement.

After functionalism lost its importance, beginning in the 1970s, in the field of sociological theory, the theme of disinstitutionalization took over, beginning with the observation that “the taken-for-granted background becomes less reliable, more open to negotiation, culturally fluid, and increasingly an object of critical debate and reflection. Accordingly the social foreground expands, and the everyday world becomes risky and precarious. The objective, sacred institutions of tradition recede, and modern life becomes subjective, contingent, and problematic.” (Turner, *op. cit.*, p. 300-301). The works of Ulrich Beck (1986) in Germany, Anthony Giddens (1984) in England or François Dubet (2002) in France can be situated in such an analytical vein.

Finally, the notion of institution currently occupies a paradoxical place in the field of social science. The primary reason is that its success has directly contributed to the weakening of its heuristic reach. In sociology, as well as in certain other similar disciplines (political science, economics, history...), the term is subject to varied usage. One consequence of such inflation is difficulty in availing oneself of the term without fear of imprecision, misinterpretation or misunderstanding. A second reason also explains the paradoxical character that we can attribute to the place occupied by the term “institution” in sociological vocabulary. Even while E. Durkheim was contributing to the legitimation of the term’s usage in sociological theory, the same E. Durkheim – beginning with his doctoral thesis – laid the foundations for disinstitutionalization, a process which leads to the appearance of a society of individuals capable of distancing themselves from the very institutions which produced them. If such a diagnosis is relevant, then the very notion of institution loses a lot of its sociological interest for the purpose of understanding social practices today.

With such an intellectual challenge in place as a backdrop, two major research strategies seem to oppose each other today. As I have suggested above, the first emphasizes the permanence and the coherence of institutional assemblages in order to characterize national spaces and the systems which constitute them (school, enterprise, family...). The variety-of-capitalisms school (Hall, Soskice, 2001) gives us a good illustration of this way of thinking and doing. The second strategy takes the individual as the central object of analysis, thus running the risk of confusing sociology and psychology and of dismissing social structures which, however, have not ceased informing collective life. This is where sociologists are often tempted to align their work with the ethnomethodological tradition, but in this respect they are not alone.

3. Institution from below

One way of moving beyond the false dilemma described above consists in taking the role of institutions seriously, but watching them closely as they function in the daily life of social actors. Thus we avoid the trap of macro-social abstraction while protecting against analytical drifts into the psychological, which only accept to look at the world through the prism of individuals and their subjectivities. To give a more concrete account of what it means to analyze institution from below, and at the same time to come out with the lessons needed for the Durkheimian outline which I will propose afterwards, I would like to present some results taken from empirical research relating to working time (an object of research which, for the purposes of the present reflection, could easily be replaced with another). During research which I carried out in company settings and among salaried employees concerned by policies encouraging flexibility promoted in France since the 1990s, three observations were unmistakably necessary (Lallement, 2003). The first was that time could not be apprehended as a social construction imposing rigid and homogenous behavioral norms for the entire population. In company settings and in family settings alike, the usage of time is increasingly subject to multiple instances of negotiation. In other words, we can no longer consider time and temporalities as mere social crystallizations, as blocks of rules and meanings which impose themselves unilaterally upon individuals.

The second observation is the following. Even during the 1990s and afterwards, while the working-time reduction policies which interested me were primarily motivated and justified

by economic considerations (such as adjusting working time to reduce salary costs), this fieldwork helped me to put my finger on other issues of a more sociological nature. The first of these is linked to the increased personalization of working time. In a company just as in the labor market, poorly-controlled flexibility can disorganize working collectivities and call forms of integration into question, simply because people adopt increasingly distinct working hours and pacing, with differences in status intensifying the competition... In other words, reconfiguring working time is not just a matter of weighing production costs but also of transforming the conditions for individual social integration into the enterprise in question or into society.

The exponentially growing number of sometimes contradictory rules appearing in companies for employee working-time management purposes constitutes a second issue for analysis. To bring working-time flexibility to life, a great deal of time and energy must be given to regulation, in the sense which Jean-Daniel Reynaud (1989) attributed to the term. Consequently, it is difficult to discern what reconfiguring work and time may imply socially if we do not first learn all of the conditions required for producing new rules, their content, their coherence, their usage, their effects... The third issue relates directly to the way in which each employee, in times of flexibility, maintains or loses control of his or her own life and attempts to attribute meaning to life by adjusting temporal demands (professional, familial, psychological...) which are not always compatible. Fatigue and stress are thus linked to the manner in which each individual, with the resources at his or her disposition, succeeds or does not succeed in linking together temporalities which are sometimes difficult to reconcile.

The last issue is cognitive. By breaking up the coherence of the Fordist paradigm (based on a relatively clear boundary between working time and time outside of work), policies developed by the French government and strategies adopted by companies have shaken up traditional oppositions between working time and time outside of work, between employment and unemployment, time on the job and time in training, etc. In the name of flexibility, significant new oppositions are being invented right before our eyes, obliging people to give up old boundaries, beginning with that which associated women with domestic work and men with the breadwinner function.

The last observation which I was able to make thanks to the fieldwork to which I am referring here, is that the relative autonomy of each of the processes elucidated above (integration, social regulation, individuation and the reconfiguration of the cognitive frames of social life). At every analytical level (micro, meso, macro) to which it is possible to refer, bringing these four poles together often represents an empirical problem. The logic and the temporalities characterizing each of these four processes have no reason to link with each other perfectly everywhere and at all times. On the whole, in order to understand the reconfigurations of work and those of contemporary social temporalities, one can no longer rely on overly generous analytical schemas (associating France for example with a dominant regime for the organization of productive activity) any more than one can reasonably decide to look solely at individual practices while turning a blind eye to the multiple institutional processes which inform them.

4. A Durkheimian grammar

Based on the empirical observations made above, I would now like to reconsider the notion of institution by giving it status as a multipolar process. To that end, E. Durkheim's work can be of real use. At the risk of upsetting purists of the history of sociology, who are attentive to the genealogies as well as the inflexions, the ruptures and even the internal contradictions in Durkheim's works, I look to Durkheim's most important texts as tools and arguments which can help us to think about institutions from the ground up, beginning with their functional components.

To justify this perspective, let us begin by revisiting E. Durkheim's first major work, *The Division of Labor in Society* (1893) furnishes, as we know, the keys to understanding the social world's gravitational movement toward a society of individuals. From this point of view, far from the caricatures associating Durkheimism with determinism, E. Durkheim draws no conclusions. Individual personality is, he writes, developed through the division of labor. "Indeed to be a person means to be an autonomous source of action. Thus man attains this state only to the degree that there is something within him that is his and his alone, that makes him an individual, whereby he is more than the mere embodiment of the generic type of his race and group. [...] The disappearance of the segmentary type of society, at the same time as it necessitates greater specialization, frees the individual consciousness in part from the organic environment that supports it, as it does from the social environment that envelops it. This dual emancipation renders the individual more independent in his own behavior. The division of labor itself contributes to this liberating effect." (Durkheim, 2014 [1893], p. 314).

As long as we do not believe that the dawning of a society of individuals necessarily implies a carting off of all happiness and harmony, it must be concluded that transformations in the contemporary world have not disproven this thesis. From this point of view, the case of productive activity is symptomatic. Recent evolution in the organization of work and the management of human resources is decidedly headed toward a surplus of individualization, both in terms of practice and in terms of evaluation and forms of recognition. This works well for some people, but less so for others who risk suffering increasingly familiar morbid and fatal consequences. We can observe "the obligatory nature of the rule that ordains that we should exist as a person" (*ibid.*, p. 315) has not disappeared. This principle of individuation imposes itself with even greater force and ambivalence.

In *On Suicide* (1897), we find two other key notions which are useful for the consideration of institution as a process. They are integration and regulation. In the first place, we can discuss integration through institution to the extent that, in a family, a school, a company..., individuals interact with each other, conform to a standardized model of passion and adopt similar ideals and common representations. Domestic society (the family) encourages the first of these operations, political society encourages the second, and religious society the third. Here also, the case of work provides us with clear examples with which to provide illustration. Never before has exclusion been so widely discussed as it has with the rise of massive unemployment and in-work poverty, which has marginalized a large portion of our contemporaries. Other forms of integration certainly do exist, and they do compensate, for whatever it is worth, the absence of employment. It nonetheless appears that integration, as Durkheim conceived of it, remains a particularly relevant social issue.

Understood as the production of rules for the purpose of assuring a spirit of discipline, regulation is also a characteristically Durkheimian concern, which also has not lost any of its appeal or pertinence. Suffice it to consider for example the regulatory inflation which over the past years accompanied the orchestration of numerous reforms relating to collective bargaining or working conditions. More than ever, productive activity, as a particular social practice, requires a shoring up of formal and informal rules. Whether imputed to the transformation of public action or to the growing number of figures which weigh upon work (client, shareholder...), the inflation of sources of regulation encourage us to reconsider institutions, in terms which differ from the traditional diffusion of norms from top to bottom.

The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912) offers a final source of inspiration for our reconsideration of institutional fact. The register privileged here is that of collective representations. We may recall that, after Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss, in this particular work E. Durkheim opposes the Kantian approach to time. For Durkheim, time “does not consist merely in a commemoration, either partial or integral, of our past life. It is an abstract and impersonal frame which surrounds, not only our individual existence, but that of all humanity. It is like an endless chart, where all duration is spread out before the mind, and upon which all possible events can be located in relation to fixed and determined guide lines. It is not *my time* that is thus arranged ; it is time in general, such as it is objectively thought of by everybody in a single civilization.” (Durkheim, 1964 [1912], p. 10). The categories of space, personality, substance, number... cannot escape law. The frames which surround and structure thought are social facts which institutions produce and help to bring to life. Still more exactly, as the anthropologist Mary Douglas (1986) contended, if institutions produce categories, this process also feeds back in a way that approximates Robert Merton’s self-fulfilling prophecies. The categories stabilize the flows of social life and to a certain point even create the realities to which they apply. To characterize that institutional component, there is room to discuss di-vision of the social world in the way proposed by Pierre Bourdieu (1980).⁴⁵

Institution as a Multipolar Process

| <i>Components</i> | <i>Elements at stake in process</i> | <i>Works of reference by E. Durkheim</i> |
|-------------------|---|---|
| Individuation | Being, increasingly, a person | <i>The Division of Labor in Society</i> |
| Integration | Interactions, conformity with a common model of passions, adoption of similar ideals. | <i>On Suicide</i> |
| Regulation | Production de rules assuring a spirit of discipline. | <i>On Suicide</i> |
| Di-vision | Collective production of categories of understanding. | <i>The Elementary Forms of Religious Life</i> |

⁴⁵ P. Bourdieu describes the principal of di-vision as “a magical act, which is to say an entirely social act involving diacrisis which introduces, by decree, adjudicatory discontinuity in natural continuity (between regions of space but also between ages, sexes, etc.” (Bourdieu, 1980, p. 65)].

4. Implications and uses

Individuation, integration, regulation and finally di-vision (which is to say the social construction of categories), such are the four poles which participate directly in the institution of social worlds. Beginning with these Durkheimian semantics, and with the ambition of entering into direct contact with contemporary transformations, it seems possible to me to move beyond Durkheim's paradigm in three complementary ways. The first consists in abandoning consideration in terms of order, equilibrium or even functional complementarity. If we are willing to admit, as I have previously suggested, that each of these poles has its own historicity and carries its own idiosyncratic issues which mobilize various actors, then there is no reason for these four components to serve as pieces which must fit together perfectly to constitute, always and everywhere, an irreproachable institutional puzzle.

In the case of work, which I am using here as a common thread merely for illustrative purposes, there is no lack of empirical arguments for indicating still more explicitly that tension, if not even contradiction, is more the norm than the exception. One example among others: over the past decades, the rules governing employment conditions have not ceased their trend toward more flexibility and permissiveness when it comes to eating away at the non-working time of employees. However, just like common representations, legal-administrative categories remain indebted to dated and obsolete schemas which are poorly suited to describe the reality of contemporary work. Mid-level managers are the first concerned. When one does not count his or her hours of work, such that working time contaminates family life, sometimes excessively, how could one hope to benefit from overtime pay? What meaning can be attributed to the pair "working time/non-working time" when the boundaries between the two realities have become porous to such a point?

A second interesting path, which is worth exploring in view of undoing some of the Durkheimian girdling, consists in accepting to wager that the institution model which I have just described can function at every level, from refined assemblages which help us to see national macro-realities, to purely individual experience where each person improvises combinations of action from these four poles which institute us as social beings. In research dedicated to a famous home-appliance company (the Godin company) (Lallement, 2009), I put this kind of analytical framework to use in order to demonstrate the extent to which the construction of work and of the worker could have progressive and singular aspects in a universe inspired by Fourierism: usage of categories such as partners (*associés*) or shareholding members (*sociétaires*); recognition of individual merit through the remuneration of talent; professional and paternalistic regulations; integration through non-working temporalities. In moving more generally from semantic (the designation of four poles) to syntactic analysis (the juxtaposition of the four poles), it appears that the different "levels" of the social world can never be held to be a mere series of duplicates of each other, but that they each constitute singular realities which invite empirical research.

This way of coming to grips with institution, not as a fixed reality, already given, but as a multipolar process which is constantly in movement and in tension, presents yet another advantage. It allows for the mobilization of analytical tools which are foreign to the Durkheimian universe. I am thinking in particular of the notion of rationalization which

structures a significant portion of Weberian work. In order to contribute to a sociology of institution, Weberian work can be used in two complementary ways. First, it can prove helpful for conducting dynamic analysis. As M. Weber (1986) puts it in his study of religion, the concept of institution must inevitably make its appearance as soon as the charismatic conception of those holding religious power and the purely voluntary organization of communes gave way to service-oriented bureaucracy of bishops seeking to legitimize the management of the Church's patrimonial affairs. In other words, it is possible to identify a mode of autonomous development of group structure. Within the field of Christianity, M. Weber identifies two ideal types – the Sect and the Church – the functioning and the evolution of which reveal the historical logic of the institutional rationalization of religious worlds.⁴⁶

The second way of bringing in M. Weber is derived from the following observation. Formal rationality and material rationality, regardless of the standard of value orienting them, in principle can never coincide with each other in any circumstance, according to M. Weber, even if that coexistence can be empirically observed in every case taken up for consideration (Weber, 1995). Applied to law for example, this means that the power of extra-legal interests systematically undermines the formal coherence of legal theory. M. Weber thus considered that, in all fields of social life, it is impossible to eliminate irrationality because material interests endlessly frustrate the elaboration of rational formalism. Each of these four poles of institution is, in one way or another, pulled back and forth by this kind of tension between forms of rationalization (Lallement, 2013).

5. Conclusion

To understand the dynamics at work in modern society, a number of sociologists have emphasized the increasing lag between the actor and the system, which E. Durkheim was among the first to clearly notice. Therefore, the problem from this perspective is understanding how individuals, who can no longer be considered as the mere product of institutional molds, can live freely together, be actors in their own stories, reconcile different registers of experience... This diagnosis does not imply any fatalistic necessity to work exclusively on a theory of the individual. Upon closer inspection, those whom we most quickly associate with such sociological undertakings do not argue for the end of institutions but rather argue that institutions are transforming. J.C. Kaufmann writes for example that, when compared to the past, institutions are now more supple and decentralized, becoming spaces in which individuals with more autonomy and responsibility are manufactured (Kaufmann, 2002, p. 139).

The conclusions of François Dubet's work on the decline of institution are more nuanced than the title of his work – *Le déclin de l'institution* – suggests. According to F. Dubet (2002), it is no longer a matter of building total orders in which each individual is linked to an all-encompassing whole, or of heroic orders in which the liberty of a select few comes at the price of submission by the greater majority, but rather of more limited orders which are more autonomous and more adjusted to the nature of the problems being treated. It is at this intermediary level that F. Dubet considers institutions must be constructed – when they can no

⁴⁶ M. Weber notably uses this opposition between Sect and Church in his essay on the protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism, published, in 1904-1905, in volumes 20 and 21 of the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*.

longer orchestrated, as no god is writing the score and no conductor is interpreting it. As may now be understood, by coming to grips with institution as a multipolar process, I am hoping to move in a similar direction, placing emphasis above all else on the different processes (individuation, integration, regulation, di-vision) which continue to inform social practices and representations.

A few years ago, Isabelle Stengers (1983) explained that one of the most important conclusions drawn from the physics of processes is that they do not exist in contradiction with the respect for singularities; to the contrary, since it is the analysis in detail of these processes, pairings, and interactions within a system which leads us to understand the rich variety of differentiated behaviors of which this system is capable. Keeping those proportions intact, the same conclusion imposes itself when it is a matter of undoing old visions of institution and promoting a procedural perspective.

By proceeding in this way, a sociologist can adapt his or her analytical tools to accommodate that modern reality which is the society of individuals. At the same time, he or she can avoid the tropism which, in the interest of being anti-sociological, encourages ogling insistently at those sciences which study the singular and dissolves social relationships in the effervescence of inter-individual micro-adjustments. Coming to grips with institution as a multipolar process also facilitates, in my opinion, the effort to maintain objectification as a methodological requirement of the highest order, while also protecting against reification. From the point of view which I have defended, institution more closely resembles – to borrow a metaphor from Jean-Daniel Reynaud – a a Tinguely machine than some well-oiled and fully integrated machine. And it is indeed that reality full of tensions, struggles and compromises for which the sociologist must empirically account.

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New Tradition of Classical and Historical Studies in Chinese Modern Transformation

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Abstract: It is back to perspectives of historical study for sociology to reconstruct the imagination of sociology, as classical sociologists did. There are many historical dimensions of Karl Marx's social studies: dialectical analysis on history of nature; structural perspective on prehistory of the present and history of the present; reconstructed narrative on events of historical concretes; and finally, evolution of family, ownership, state, and social formations...

In the same sense, in order to understand the reality of Chinese society, it should be return to the theme and context of modern transformation of Chinese social thoughts. By re-interpretation on theory of the Three Eras from classics - *Spring and Autumn Annals*, Kang Youwei proposed that if the Chinese society successfully moves to the Era of Peace from Era of War, the Idea of Cosmos Unity should be established as the universal value for world history, and Confucius Religion should be built for cultivation of mores. Kang Youwei established a historical philosophy by theory of evolution, with the intent to take China into a process of modernization by combining the Western and Chinese civilization. His founding of Chinese modern society starts from classical creation, ie. Change Chinese traditional historical view to idea of progress. He stated that Chinese history is essentially a process of innovation and founded on natural law of native people and development of industry and business. But by examination of Western middle history, Kang Youwei held that it is not enough to make only institutional change toward the Era of Peace, it is essential to bring Confucius thought up to a religion of cultivation, just like Hegel said. Therefore, even if the political regime of republic is established, a religious or sentimental principle is still required. At this point, Kang Youwei's thought is similar to Montesquieu's related judgment on the spirit of law. However, due to his religion setup is Confucius theory, his conclusion of historical end of cosmopolitan is polity of benevolence.

On the contrary, Zhang Taiyan upheld the tradition of "Six Classics are all Histories", and pushed forward the academic change from classics to history, which was carried out by Wang Guowei and Chen Yinque. Zhang Taiyan suggested against Kang Youwei's view of Chinese traditional history as a philosophical idea, especially in the period of modern transformation, for abstract historical idea could only bring to a radical revolution without sympathy sentiments for national building. Therefore new historical studies came into way in early of 20 century, with main representative of Wang Guowei and Chen Yinque. Through method of

synthetical deduction in social sciences, Wang Guowei interpreted classics by history in the work of *Institutional Change in Yin and Zhou Dynasty*, confirmed the original principle of Zhou Regime and Etiquette on basis of patriarchal clan system, and its spirit of law, mores and institutions.

Wang Guowei held that Chinese civilization was established between Yin and Zhou Dynasty. The inheritance institution was replacement of Agnatic seniority (兄终弟及制) with Primogeniture (长子继承制) in Zhou Dynasty, Patriarchal clan system (宗法) and Mourning system (丧服) was then established. These systems carried a principle of “ZunZun and QinQin”(尊尊与亲亲), as stated by Wang Guowei, “Zhou set up the system of lineal descent between legitimate and illegitimate by the way of ZunZun through QinQin, and set up the system of ancestral temple by the way of QinQin through ZunZun”“周人以尊尊之义经亲亲之义而立嫡庶之制，又以亲亲之义经尊尊之义而立庙制，此其所以文也。”(王国维，2001：297)。This means a hieratical system (five ranks system, 五等制) was established in terms of polity and kinship system (five degree system, 五服制) in terms of family. In this dual regime, a man’s political and social relationship was affirmed. The relationship was more than the ranks and identities, but further ritual and sentimental regulations. Double system of governance appeared in two levels between political and moral integrity. Confucius idealism was founded on the ritual regime, on the one hand it was feudalism, the cities was subinfeudated from monarch to princes, on the other hand the cultivation of mores were realized through kinds of ceremonies.

If we say Wang Guowei tried to reinterpret Chinese classics by historical studies on ancient times, Chen Yinque focused on the history of Middle Age. He investigated thoroughly the Middle Age of Chinese history from perspective of concourse and inter-attestation, outlined a historical landscape of interfusion between Hu and Han nationalities, mixing of various religions, migration of diverse crowds, and integration of different cultures and mores. Chen Yinque took his historical studies as a theory of No Ancient and No Modern, which means in Wei and Jin Dynasty and later the family and national systems were not like the traditional ancient times founded by Patriarchal clan system and feudalism, but on the logics of multiple international or inter-religious reality, and migration of various population. So the societies of Middle Age were no longer to follow the norms or the rules of integrity between polity and family, but with the introduction of Buddhism from Western to Eastern, and boundary changes between the different nationalities, Chinese civilization undertook a huge transformation, i.e. the personality of mandarin had dual structure of Confucianism and Taoism, as a famous intellectual Tao Yuanming. On the other hand, the political constitution also followed the dialectic logics between Hua and Yi (Chinese and its aboard, 华夷), therefore, the perspective of social analysis turned into the change of mores of mandarin and peoples.

In short, there are two waves of change of thoughts in Chinese modern transformation, which set up the new tradition of Classical and Historical Studies, and institutional and spiritual sources of social and political construction from then on.

The above discussions have taken us back to Fei Xiaotong's theory relating to analysis of Chinese double-tracked system. In *Rural Reconstruction* and *Power of Emperor and Gentry*, Fei Xiaotong held that Chinese traditional governance was made up with two parts, one was the centralization of State, just as bureaucracy system, the other was the gentry system in the local areas under level of county. Power of State did not cover the counties, the latter governance relied on autonomy of clanism, as a result two regimes were in parallel, one was called political tradition, the other was called moral tradition.

Based on these discussions, I rearranged the traditional logics of social constitution as followed.

1. Double system between feudalism and system of prefectures or counties.

Patriarchal clan system and Feudalism: the parallel logics of polity and family based on ritual institutions.

Social relationship is not only about the political and family status of someone, but also shows his position in the social and sentimental network.

The relationship between Father and Son not only represents the political and familial order, but also a perverse one between monarch and his people in natural law, i.e. the people is the father, the monarch is the son.

There fore, in the feudalism the parallel systems interact and supplement each other.

On the other hand, since Qin and Han Dynasty the system of prefectures or counties came into being, which constituted the centralization of State, but this kind of political power does not interfere the local areas under the counties, the latter governance relying on the moral cultivation by the gentry, which reflects in a degree the heritage of feudalism.

2. Double system between inland and frontier regions.

The dialectic logics between Hua and Yi (Chinese and its aboard) appeared that moral cultivation is still a focus of governance. It is said that the one who rules is the one whom people cherish to(“王者，往也”). So as an empire, China is not a nation state. China and its neighborhoods were not clearly divided by boundaries. Bilateral relationship was maintained by a series of mollification policy and pay tribute systems.

The above regulations are closely related to the subinfeudate system in feudalism. In Zhou Dynasty, cognominal subinfeudate took only half of the total. So in some frontier and marginal regions demonolatry and divination are still taking an important role, which means in the religious and cultural sense, Zhou's patriarfeudual tradition and Yin's demonolatry tradition are kept, constituting a dual system, formal and informal.

In the governance of Empire, the above two traditions provided foundation of multiple national fusion.

3. Other double systems generated from the above
 - 1) officials as historiographer or professional
 - 2) official and gentry
 - 3) hierarchy and self-cultivation(or accomplishment)
 - 4) live in official or seclusion

Where is the “west” and What is beyond?: From Max Weber's concept of “the Okzidental” to post-Western sociology

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Key words:

The Occidental “Vorbemerkung”/ “Introduction”/ “前言” Kulturländ , Universalgeschichte der Kultur

Anybody who looks through Max Weber’s “Vorbemerkung” (“Introduction”) to the *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religions-soziologie* (*Collected Essays on the Sociology of Religion*) will be impressed by the strong tone about the uniqueness of the West, e.g., the outstanding achievements of the European civilization based on the Greek intellectuals’ mathematics, physics, the experimental method of Renaissance natural science, systematic thought and rational law, distinctive music, architecture, capitalist organization, etc. When Talcott Parsons attached the “Introduction” to his English translation of *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* in 1930, this construction of the uniquely wonderful West — which may be offensive to a non-Westerner, but the non-Western part of the world weighs nothing then, spreads widely with the popular image of the self-made Protestants.

With the publications such as Said’s *Orientalism* (1978) and Amin’s *Eurocentrism* (1989), the dichotomy of the Occidental/the Oriental draws much attention in criticizing the Western dominance and subsequent inequalities worldwide. Under this context, Weber’s emphasizing of the unique Occidental maybe an obvious endorsement for his possible Eurocentrism.

But one thing need to notice is, Weber’s study on the modern Western capitalism be the essential part and benchmark of his historical-comparative study of world religions. Based on the Protestant thesis of how cultural attitude influences the economic performance, he cut into several major civilizations with the same question: why modern capitalism couldn’t grow out of these highly-developed cultures, and what would be the hindrance?

From this we can see, Weber’s concept of the Occidental could be a constructed model of development and the start point of comparison, to help us get to know “what the rest of the world is” based on “what the West is”. Methodologically, this is what he calls the strategy of “Ablenkungen” in studying social action (Weber,[1922]1988:544), i.e., to probe social reality with pure types, and find the factors of deviation. The deviations will be challenges of the

constructed ideal type, as well as approach to new concept or theory. For example, Weber's monograph on China compares Confucianism with Puritanism, with the intention of constructing different models of rationalization (Weber,[1922]1988).

Here is not the dichotomy of the Occidental/ the Oriental (or the West/ the East), but a contrast between the West and the rest (of the world). This still could not dust off the impression of an arrogant Westerner: although there may be different models of rationalization, and multi-modernities, will a hierarchy of different way of rationalization, thus latent Eurocentrism, still be existent?

To treat Weber fairly, we need to comb through the usage of "the Occidental" in his works, to puzzle out its meaning by tracing when and under what circumstance it comes into being, and how it evolves, etc.

According to Benjamin Nelson, Weber's work on the Occidental city during 1910-1911, which under the title "Nicht-Legitime Herrschaft" appears in the first volume of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 'marks a decisive turn in the way Weber's thought about the relations of East and West', the unique characteristics developed in Occidental city, such as autonomous structures, independent militia, market, court system, etc. (Nelson, 1976).

But actually, as early as since 1898, Weber began to focus on the Occidental in studying the ancient society. The Occidentals are mainly, but not only in Europe, Europe itself has different regions like North-West central or South Europe; what contrasts with the Occidental, may be East Asia, or Near East, or Egypt. An example of the arguments is, he traced the fundamental difference in ownership of land to different patterns of settlement of the Occident and East Asia (Weber, 1976:37-39).

A more direct evidence of his interest in "the Occidental" is provided by a letter Weber wrote to his sister Lili on 5 August 1912, in which he announced his interest in the history of music, to explain "why only we have 'harmonic music', although other cultures display a much sharper sense of hearing and a much more intense musical cultures" (Radkau, 2005: 367). this "we" or "Occidental", was "Europe", thus stated Theodor Kroyer, in "Foreword" for *Die Rationalen und Soziologische Grundlagen der Musik* (1921). But Weber delineated a complex cluster of different types of music, which in contrast with the Occidental music, include East Asian Music, Arabic music, Hellenic music, Byzantine music, early Christian music, Medieval church music, etc.

To explain the development of music, Weber takes some sociological, technical factors into account. But what interests him most, is the cultural ethos beneath the Occidental music. In less than 100 thousands words of the text, "the Occidental" appears more than 50 times, indicates geographical meaning (i.e. Europe), historical event (the schism of the Eastern and Western churches), division of European history (the Antique/ Middle Ages/ Modern times), religious meaning (Christianity), etc.

The climax of Weber's usage of "the Occidental" will be his "Vorbemerkung" written in 1920, for the collected essays of world's religions. Among the text of around 10 thousand words, "the Okzidental"(including several times of "the Abendlich") appears around 49 times.

From above we can see that, the theme of "the Occidental" starts early in Weber's thought, flows into his works on the institutions key to modern capitalism, with the cultural ethos diffusing in art, science, law etc.

Also from his methodological stand of "value relatedness", the question "why the Occidental so unique" is relevant to the interest of modern European (Weber, 2012: 323). Interestingly, in the Chinese translation of Weber's works, the uniqueness of the Occidental have been emphasized, Weber's division of different region, period, cultural tradition among European history is overlooked.

For example, the frequency of "西方"(the Occidental/the West) appears in the Chinese version of "Introduction" to *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* is 60 times, 49 of which is "Okidental" or "Abendland" in German version, the "Occidental" or "West", "us", "our culture" in Parson's English translation. What reinforce the impression of a integral and geographical West, is other five "西方" to refer the "Antiken", "Mittelalter" and "Renaissance", and six added by the Chinese translator.

| Chinese translation | Weber's usage | Parsons' translation |
|---------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| 1西方世界, P1N1 | des Okzidents | western civilization |
| 2西方, P1N2 | im Okzident | in the west |
| 3西洋古代世界, P1N3 | nach antiken | in antiquity |
| 4西方, P2N1 | Okzident | the west |
| 5西方, P2N2 | okzidentalen (Rechte) | western |
| 6西方, P2N3 | Okzident | the west |
| 7西方, P2N4 | | |
| 8西方, P3N1 | Okzident | the occident |
| 9西方古代世界, P3N2 | der Antike | in antiquity |
| 10西方中世纪, P3N3 | das Mittelalter | our Middle Ages |
| 11西方, P3N4 | die Renaissance | the Renaissance |
| 12西方, P3N5 | im Okzident entstanen | In the Occident |

| | | |
|-------------------|---|---|
| 13西方, P3N6 | Okzident | the west |
| 14西方, P3N7 | des Okzidents | the west |
| 15西方, P3N8 | Okzident | |
| 16 近代西方, P3N9 | der modern Okzident | the modern Occident |
| 17西方, P4N1 | Okzident | [our culture] |
| 18西方, P4N2 | (im) Okzidental (Sinn) | (in) the Western (sense) |
| 19西方, P4N3 | Okzident | Us |
| 20西方, P4N4 | Okzident | Occident |
| 21西方, P5N1 | (des) okzidental (Kapitalismus) | occidental |
| 22西方, P5N2 | (des) Okzidentes | occidental |
| 23 西方 (世界), P7N1 | (der) Okzident | occident |
| 24 西方 (世界), P7N2 | | |
| 25 (我们) 西方, P7N3 | (unsres 16. Jahrhunderts) | (ours of, ... the sixteenth century) |
| 26西方, P8N1 | (der) okzidental | western |
| 27西方(在近代), P8N2 | (der) Okzident (kennt in der Neuzeit) | (in modern times) the Occident |
| 28西方, P8N3 | (des) Okzidents | the Occident |
| 29 西方 (中世纪), P8N4 | (des) okzidental (Mittelalters) | (our Middle Ages) |
| 29西方P8N5 | (des) okzidental (Kapitalismus) | western (capitalism) |
| 30 西洋古代世界 P8N6 | der Antike | antiquity |
| 31西方, P9N1 | Abendländischen | western |
| 32西方, P10N1 | | |
| 33 近代西方, P10N2 | modern- okzidental | the modern Occident |
| 34 近代西方, P10N3 | (des)modernen Okzidents | the modern Occident |
| 35西方, P10N4 | (im) Okzident | the Occident |
| 36 近代西方, P10N5 | (im modernen) Okzident (fehlte) | the modern Occident |

| | | |
|----------------------|---|---|
| 37西方, P10N6 | | |
| 38 西方中世纪, P10N7 | die okzidental-mittelalterlichen (Kämpf) | the western medieval (struggles) |
| 39 近代西方, P10N8 | (der moderne Gegensatz) | (the modern conflict) |
| 40西方, P11N1 | des abendländischen (Bürgertums) | the western (bourgeoisie class) |
| 41西方, P11N2 | des spezifisch abendländischen Kapitalismus | (the peculiar modern form of capitalism) |
| 42西方, P11N3 | Abendlande | the western hemisphere |
| 43西方, P11N4 | der spezifisch moderne abendländischen Kapitalismus | the peculiar modern western form of capitalism |
| 44西方, P11N5 | der abendländischen (Wissenschaft) | modern science |
| 45西方, P11N6 | der abendländischen Wissenschaft | western science |
| 46西方, P11N7 | Abendlend | the West |
| 47西方, P11N8 | (die Lebens-ordnung usurer Massen Entscheidende) | |
| 48西方, P11N9 | (im) Okzident (gerade) | (in) the Occident |
| 49 西方 (社会秩序), P11N10 | (der Sozialordnung) des Okzidents | (the social structure of) the Occident |
| 50西方, P11N11 | der Okzident | the Occident |
| 51西方, P12N1 | dem Okzident | the Occident |
| 52西方, P12N2 | (der) okzidental (Kulture) | western (culture) |
| 53西方, P12N3 | (des) okzidental | occidental |
| 54 近代西方, P12N4 | (des modernen) okzidental | (the modern) occidental (form) |
| 55西方, P13N1 | okzidental | occidental |
| 56西方, P13N2 | (der) okzidental (religiösen Wirtschaftethik) | (the economic ethic of the) western (religions) |

| | | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 57西方, P13N3 | okzidental (Kulturentwicklung) | western (civilization) |
| 58西方, P13N4 | (der) okzidental (Entwicklung) | western (culture) |
| 59 (我们) 西方 , P15N1 | okzidental Kulturereligionen | (our) occidental religions |
| 60西方, P15N2 | (im) Okzident | (in the) Occident |

Sources: 康乐、简惠美译《新教伦理与资本主义精神·前言》，广西师大出版社2007年出版；

Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religions-soziologie I, J.C.B.Mohr (Paul Siebeck) Tubingen, [1920]1988;

The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, (trans. by) Talcott Parsons, Routledge 1992
。

“P” means the page where “西方” appears, “N” means its frequency on this page。

Here it shows a process of selective reinforcement of the “Occidental” as a one-piece integrity through the English and Chinese translation, i.e. the “vaguely defined geographical division”, then “transfigured into an invariant contrast of socio-cultural identities” (Arnason, 2003). For Parsons from the new Continent it is the identification with European culture, while for “the Rest” of the world it get its own image from the reflection of the West. It may be too harsh to call it a self-colonized process, but at least, the multi-realities inside the European history and society.

Actually in Weber’s times, to a German, the Occidental or the West often means well-developed capitalist countries such as England, France, and sometimes the United States. German on the other hand, stays “eastern” and backward before 1950’s, the tension goes highest in the two world wars, during which German contrasts against the Western countries. Aurel Kolnai, wrote a book, *The War Against the West*, illustrated the contrast between German people and their Western neighbors.

Under this circumstance, Weber’s illustration of the splendid Occidental world means a lot more than just sort of Eurocentrism. It is a reflection on the developmental history in Europe, an intellectual construction of a set of principles, institutions, ethics and social relations, etc. which is essential and basic for the modern times. Roth’s study on Weber’s family history indicates the bondage and emotional closeness between Weber and the western England (Roth, 1993).

Back to the question—Will the West/ the rest division leads to a hierarchy of different models of rationalization in world history? Latent in his works could we find a general research scheme for global history, i.e. , the *Universalgeschichte der Kultur*.

In his “Vorbemerkung”, Weber has a concept of “Kulturaländ” (civilized country) in the world history: “im allen kulturaländern der Erde gegebenIn China, Indien, Babylon, Aegypten, der mittleländischen, dem Mittelalter, der Neuzeit” (Weber, [1922]1988:)—Parsons translated it into “all civilized country in the earth”—that is “China, India, Babylon, Egypt, Mediterranean antiquity, and the Middle Ages, as well as in modern times”—Weber, [1930]2001:xxxiii—.

With culture offering meaning (“Sinn und Bedeutung”) for cultured man (*Kulturmenschen*) and their communal life (*menschliches Zusammenleben*), a universal history of culture (*Universalgeschichte der Kultur*) is to study what consists *Kulturwirklichkeit*, including different *Kultureisen*, or several *Lebensgebieten/ Lebenssphären* like economy, politics, technique, education, law, etc.

So for the historical individual, through everyday practice, rationalized *Lebensführung* restrains and regulates his behavior. While the *Kulturtrager* in each cultural system will influence ordinary people’s life through religious ethics.

In conclusion, we find the construction of the Occidental in Weber’s works indicate the key elements along the path of European development, i.e. the Occidental means a research tool and model of development.

Although for Weber the Occidental need not to be on the contrast of an Oriental, the Occidental/Oriental dichotomy was imposed on him during the interpretation and translation of his works. What interesting here is, the non-western world would be used to take the image of itself based on the illusion of “what the West is”.

Since 1970’s, with the globalization process, rapid development of technology, a “cultural turn” also happens in social sciences. When the cultural encounters, collides or convergence happen globally, a new research schema goes beyond the division of the Occidental/the oriental should be worked out. For us it maybe a post-western sociology which is based on the contemporary practice and common experience in Europe, in China, Japan, South Korea, etc. It should be local and down-to-earth but also global with open views. It works on the base of classical paradigms but fulfill them with new visions and responsibilities, it is both “post-“ and “ultra-”, it’s constructive, other than destructive.

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Cultural Landscape under Transformation. A post US-hegemonic trend in Korea

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Abstract

This paper explores the profound change in the cultural landscape in Korea with respect to the question of national identity vis a vis the West in general and the USA in particular. The linkage effects of the three factors illustrated in this paper, that is, new social actors of the middle class, post-conventional value orientation in the globalizing world, and the new media, will likely be felt stronger as time goes by. Likewise, the conventional image of the United States as a big brother will likely face many more challenges to come. And yet, on the whole there seems to be good prospects and increasingly better opportunities for Koreans and Americans to reconstruct their cultural relationship on the basis of mutually shared universal values, (neither ethnocentric/parochial self-interest nor conventionally given stereotypes). The proven fact that young Koreans with a higher educational background, as a rational core of the middling grassroots, are increasingly leaning toward universally acceptable global values instead of the old style of nationalism clearly point to the possibility of a better inter-cultural dialogue between Koreans and Americans and, hence, between the East and the West.

Introduction

I would like to start by drawing attention to the Pew Global Attitude Project whose results were made known publicly in December, 2002. Despite the close military and economic ties between Korea and the United States, says the report, America's image among Koreans has deteriorated to such an extent that, as an overall evaluation, 44% of Koreans have a negative opinion of the America. This figure is higher than that of most of the countries being surveyed except some Islamic countries and Argentina (49%). Furthermore, in Asia, Korea turns out to be the most critical of the American-led war on terrorism, with as many as 72% of Koreans opposing the war. Even globally, this figure ranks Korea second from the top with the exception of only a few countries in the Middle East.

By that time, a surprisingly large number of Koreans joined nationwide protest rallies, for instance, in December, 2002 to mourn the two female Korean teenage students run over by a U.S. armored vehicle, and to demand a rewriting of the agreement governing the legal status of American troops in Korea (SOFA). Triggered by the acquittal by a U.S. military court of the two American soldiers charged with the death of these girls, these rallies were initially led by

activist young through the internet, but rapidly gained enthusiastic support all over the country from every strata in society cutting across age, gender, class, and religion. These people had become morally upset and angry since American appeared not to accept any responsibility for the deaths. On Saturday night of December, the 14th, for instance, more than three hundred thousand Koreans rallied at no less than 57 locations across the nation, including the Seoul City Hall Plaza, holding votive candles and singing songs. They announced 'the day of restoring of national sovereignty', while demanding a fair and equal partnership between Korea and the U.S. This massive candle lit march turned central Seoul into a "sea of light," ending peacefully in a festive mood, with no reports of violence.

Frankly speaking, while I, as a sociologist, was taking part in the World-cup street cheering in Seoul throughout June, 2002, I became convinced that a fundamental and drastic bottom-up social change is taking place in Korea. I see a definite and unmistakable continuity between the world-cup experience (to which I will get back soon) and the candlelight march referred to above. We should also ask what (if anything) is wrong with the relationship between Korea and the U.S. (particularly on the cultural domain), and also ask ourselves why the political and social reality is changing so rapidly in Korea. The Pew Global Attitude Project 2002 and the massive anti-American rallies in Korea provide us with a sufficient stimulus to undertake this re-examination.

To recap, I would like to propose that the key to understanding the tumultuous realignment underway in the relationship between the United States and Korea lies in the profound socio-cultural transformation presently under way in Korea. This has something to do with the overall topic of our conference at Lyon, that is, a post West-hegemonic social development in East Asia. In view of the tremendous impact of September the 11th on the American society and its value orientations, a certain shift may be underway in the United States as well, at least to a certain extent. In what follows, however, I will confine myself to the Korean side of the socio-cultural transformation.

Cultural Interactions between Korea and the West

Firstly, let me provide a brief overview of the cultural interaction between Korea and the West. For a long time, Korea remained almost unknown to the West. Except for a few accounts of Korea made by such Westerners as the Portuguese merchants who sailed near to the Korean coast in the mid-sixteenth century, Father Cespedes who had short personal experiences in Korea during the *Imjin waeran* (1592-97), and Hamel who left well-known documents, meaningful contact between Korea and the West had to wait until after 1840, when the Paris Foreign Missionary Society began to dispatch its missionaries to Korea. Thereafter, many priests compiled Korean dictionaries and studied Korean customs and culture up until their martyrdom and these documents have been collected by that Society in Paris. After 1880, when treaties began to be made with the Western powers, activity within the field of Korean Studies by European scholars became increasingly frequent.

It is the United States, however, that has wielded an overwhelming influence on the destiny of the Korean people since the end of the Second World War. First of all, the U.S. and the USSR made the decision to divide the Korean peninsula and the American army came to Korea as liberator from Japanese colonialism and, hence, could act as 'big brother.' Yet the U.S. saw Korea largely from their own geopolitical interests and perspective and, with the outburst of the Korean War, Korea became a symbol and a victim of the Cold War, suffering much from territorial division, war, poverty, dictatorial military regimes, ideological confrontation, and so on. There was not much room left after all of that, to discuss questions of culture.

Yet, as Korea showed itself capable of growing fast economically (as one of the four small dragons in East Asia after Japan), and, in addition, as Korea successfully joined the global wave of democratization which finally gave rise to the first peaceful transfer of power from the ruling to the opposition party in 1997, American concern over Korea became increasingly diversified going beyond the typical areas as defense, security, international relations, while addressing attention to such new needs as the comparative political-economic study of Korean development, the role of the government and conglomerates, as well as an interest in student and other social movements, democratic transition, civil society, and culture-specific areas like art, literature, and so on.

Despite these promising changes, however, I feel that an inter-cultural dialogue is badly needed today between Koreans and Americans to advance mutual understanding. In view of the tremendous impact of September 11 upon the American way of thinking and the emergence of a new generation of social actors (or social forces) in Korea who are ready to defy the old legacies of the Cold War and authoritarianism, I suspect that major problems from now on will bear more upon the question of national identity (of cultural aspirations and imaginations) than anything else. It is no longer meaningful (and even dangerous) if we conventionally cling to an old paradigm, losing touch with the shifting reality. Thus, I would argue that it is the time to draw keen attention to the socio-cultural transformation under way in the two countries. What is at stake in Korea today is no longer simply a Weberian question of a functional equivalent for the capitalist spirit, but a cultural awakening which involves cognitive, moral and aesthetic dimensions of national identity.

Korean development would then have to be understood as a combination of such multiple trends as aggressive economic growth, political transition toward democracy, and cultural awakening in two directions: first, increasing sensitivity to the question of national identity and, secondly, a 'post-conventional' tendency toward a discursive critical re-evaluation of taken-for-granted assumptions and world-views. These two tracks seem to be deeply interrelated and the changing reality is thrown sharply into relief when we examine the role of the United States on the Korean Peninsular.

The Question of National Identity

Historically speaking, Korean intellectuals became very sensitive to the issue of national identity during Japanese colonialism while advocating *kukhak*. This tradition was originated in Japan as an effort to reestablish a national ethos in the face of external challenges. In Japan this movement acted as a spiritual support for their modernization. However, Korea was different, as Choson had lost its national will with the onslaught of the Western powers and Japanese imperialism at the end of the nineteenth century. The possibilities of an endogenous development was prevented, while any modernization effort connected to an outside power failed. Naturally, this increased disillusion with, and criticism of, the lack of leadership, internal degradation, factionalism, and a perceived outmoded traditional culture, not to mention the imperialist interests and interference of foreign countries. Furthermore, Japan propagated a colonial mentality which belittled or denied the Korean national character. In such a context, the tradition of *Kukhak* emerged as an attempt to discover the Choson spirit through a study of religion, philosophy, art, folklore, history and literature and so on. Accordingly, this discipline was to possess a strong nationalistic determination from the outset.

Since then, the quest for an independent and legitimate subjectivity manifested itself in various forms depending on historical conjunctures. During Japanese colonial rule, for instance, it provided the underlying force behind the liberation movements of various kinds and, after the Second World War, became embedded in differing efforts in support of 'One Unified Korea' against territorial division. In the age of the Cold War, the quest for national identity became imbued with a severe ideological polarization between North and South Korea over the issue of political legitimacy and orthodoxy.

This long-standing legacy of ideological polarization associated with the Cold War has finally begun to break down in Korea today. Associated with this, a significant socio-cultural transformation has begun to manifest itself. This transformation is critically related to the impact of the World-cup street cheering upon the conventional mentality of Koreans. Cultural sensitivities, ideas, dreams, and aspirations which had been cultivated in the process of democratization and which had accumulated under the surface, began to burst through finally in the form of a massive festival celebrating national pride and dignity. It was through this collective experience of self pride and dignity that Koreans became aware of their new potentialities. It was a great moment of self-awakening, comparable to the June popular democratic uprising of 1987. This new stream manifested itself again in the recent candlelight marches throughout Korea.

From the World-cup Experience to the Candlelight March

In retrospect, as the Korean soccer team defeated their formidable opponents in a series of matches with such European powerhouses as Poland, Portugal, Italy and Spain, before finally

advancing to the semifinals, the entire nation was wrapped in an enormous festive mood. People went wild over the feat of the Korean squad and took to the streets to celebrate the great victory. In line with the rising enthusiasm of the soccer lovers, "the Red Devils," Korea's official supporters, prepared for the massive cheering through on-line discussions about the proper way of cheering, costumes, roosters' songs and slogans, and so on. Defying any political motivation or agenda, the Red Devils attempted to invite all the people to the street cheering by forming a loose network of national solidarity. In the match with Spain, consequently, some 5 million people gathered together in the centers of cities across the country and for the match with Germany some 7 million joined the street cheering. Korea's unprecedented success during the tournament amazed the world, moreover, because the massive cheering was never tainted with any violence or trouble. After the game was over, the cheering crowd went so far as to clean the streets, a proof of a highly mature civic consciousness. This self-autonomous management of the street cheering successfully satisfied people's desire for national pride and dignity.

Of particular significance in this regard is the 'Be the Reds' campaign which, in fact, signalled the end of the Cold War mentality. Koreans have been deeply obsessed with the red color which evokes the memories of the Korean War and communism. Against such a backdrop, the conservative media and the elder generations, haunted by the Red complex, were worried about young people who wore red shirts and called themselves 'Red Devils.' For the past several decades, the red color was regarded as a taboo symbolic of Communism or North Korea. Under such circumstance, the 'Be the Reds' campaign reflects the young people's ardent desire to escape from the existing Cold War mentalities as well as to leave behind authoritarian and hierarchical relations and forms of social control. Young people say that they simply like the red color which they believe symbolizes passion, determination, wealth and glory. Not by accident, the majority of the population followed the Red Devils in the World Cup street cheering, in the process subconsciously escaping from the Red Complex.

Here we can sense the profound impact of the World-cup street cheering upon the Korean society beyond its merely athletic implications. On the face of it, the Red Devils was nothing more than a voluntary group of soccer lovers. Upon deeper inspection, however, we can see a strong cultural challenge against the established order and an appeal for a new order embracing humanity and upgrading national pride and dignity. In this way the people projected their dreams through slogans like "Asian Pride" and "Dream Realized." By shouting "Dae-hanminguk," they expressed their willingness and aspirations to make a new Korea, of which could all feel proud. This was a decisive turning point from the self-humiliating legacy originating from Japanese colonial subjection toward a new self-respecting sensitivity. What comes out of this experience was by no means the revival of the old paradigm of nationalism or collectivism. On the contrary, all kinds of liberal experiments such as body painting, fashions with national flag, dances, songs, modes of cheering and greetings, and so on were nicely fused with the communitarian culture emphasizing national solidarity. All these experiments were led by those in their thirties and followed by the succeeding digital generations, who, instead of surrendering themselves to hierarchical and authoritarian relationships, held up to more flexible and pluralistic voluntary organizations and value

orientations.

Thanks largely to these communitarian experiences and concurrent socio-cultural transformations, the quest for national identity may be seen now to be decisively liberated from the ideological burden of the past. This has created the room to see the United States not simply as a big brother, but as an equal partner. In the past, it was taken for granted that what the U.S. does is automatically good for Koreans. Only a few with exceptional bravery could wage an anti-American rally, as well documented by the seizure of the USA Information Center in Pusan by students of Seoul National University in 1982. But today ordinary citizens can freely ask whether the relationship between Korea and the United States is fair and equal. In other words, Koreans have begun profoundly to ask whether Americans are respecting Koreans in the terms of a reciprocal relationship.

Yet it must be stressed that the gap between the normative expectation and the reality still remains considerably large, which indicates a source of frustration. It may also be true that the quest for national identity involves ambiguities and uncertainties because Koreans are still far from completely overcoming the legacies of Japanese colonialism, national division, the Korean War, past authoritarian rule, and so on. Nevertheless, with a new President elected last December who has advocated systematic reforms, many attempts will be made to reduce the gap not only between Korea and the USA, but also domestically to reduce divisions within Korean society along many axes. In this respect, Koreans may be expected to become increasingly more capable than in the past of explicitly saying "No" when they feel their sovereignty severely damaged or degraded by external powers.

Three Factors to be Analyzed

Having said so, I would like to suggest that three factors need be taken into consideration in order to adequately understand the socio-cultural transformation under way in Korea. They are: 1) the formation of a new generation of social actors, or social forces, 2) the development of the internet as an alternative public sphere, and 3) nascent post-conventional value orientations. Taking all these factors into consideration, it will become clear that what was at stake in the recent candlelight marches in Korea was not simply a display of anti-American sentiment but the upsurge of a post-conventional moral development supported by other sociological as well as technological conditions. What I am saying here, is that there is a rational and systematic ground for this phenomenon and it is in this sense that this collective voice cannot simply be ignored and is certainly not to be underestimated.

Furthermore, I would argue that, to the extent that the Korean younger generations accept Western liberal and individual value orientations, probably far more actively than in any other Asian countries, there seems to be a far better chance than before for Koreans and Americans to understand and cooperate with each other, if the condition of equality or reciprocity is met. Despite the seeming troubles at hand, we can anticipate better relationships in terms of shared values toward individual freedom, competition and creativity, as well as a belief in fair

procedures and justice. Yet problems will arise and become serious insofar as the normative presupposition of equal respect remains damaged. It will be difficult to simply close one's eyes diplomatically if one party treats the other not as an equal partner, but as a second-ranking participant. As a concrete example, if and insofar as the American policy toward Korea continues to be dictated by its own ideological understanding of Korea as a reflection of the Cold War, without fully taking into account the implications of the post-conventional cultural awakening in Korea, the majority of Koreans will probably find it difficult to go along with the American war-drive. What is in fact involved here is not a simple display of Anti-American sentiment, but the presence of a profound conflict of moral judgment. It must be remembered that peace on the Korean peninsula is of fundamental importance and concern for Koreans themselves, whereas American foreign policy too often tends to perceive merely its own geopolitical security concerns, and Korea as a piece or instrument to be moved in a greater game.

Sociological Conditions

Of the three factors mentioned above, let me first examine the sociological conditions for cultural transformation. In this respect, I would like to pay attention to the characteristics of those who led the way in the nation's democratization movement in the 1980's. Now in their thirties and early forties, those of this generation have become the mainstay of the society, leading the IT-related industries as well as many other areas. With their devotion and struggle, they have upheld the nation's democracy in the 1980's and 1990's and laid a solid foundation for the tradition of civil participation. Many of Korea's largest NGOs (such as People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy and Citizens Coalition for Economic Justice), have been formed and led by their leadership. Moreover, they have spearheaded the nation's booming venture industry related to the info-communications revolution by developing various software and other technology. On the other hand, they have been actively involved in the politically significant net-activism.

In-depth analyses about them show a lot of interesting phenomena (Han, 2001). First, as they grew up and reached maturity in the midst of a culture of political protest in the 1980's, they have maintained and shared a collective identity as a reform-oriented social force. Second, they understand themselves as part of the "People" or "Grassroots," rather than as part of the Establishment. Third, they tend to see history and society in their keen attention to the rights and welfare of the common people rather than merely propping up the interests of a handful of power elites. Fourth, they are able to better understand through their broad social vision, the situation facing such social minorities as women, foreign laborers, the handicapped, the poor, prisoners, homosexuals, North Korean defectors and socialists. They try to embrace those minorities instead of excluding them. Fifth, they are able to maintain a sense of their national sovereignty in contrast to adopting subservient attitudes toward powerful states. Sixth, they show their support and respect to leaders who would rather live up to principles than surrender to unjustifiable and unacceptable compromises. Seventh, they are in favor of structural reforms in accordance with global standards, rather than clinging to parochialism

and national preoccupation.

An interesting hypothesis in this regard concerns the formation of a distinctive social force which I have named the "middling grassroots" by which I mean those who understand themselves as part of the middle class while identifying themselves as "People" and/or "Grassroots" at the same time. In a sense, we can say that these kinds of people have been formed as a consequence of the particular path of economic development parallel to the development of the student movement since the 1960s (Han, 1997). It is not accidental that the student activists of the 1980s are today most active in defending public interests through NGO activities while running far ahead in developing IT-related venture firms. Because of their disillusionment of politics and the mass media today, they seem to be very enthusiastic in using the Internet as an alternative forum for discussion.

The cultural root of this development may be traced back to the 16th century when private academies began to be formed as moral centers where intellectuals and students studied Confucian teachings. Originally, the separation between scholarship and politics was presupposed. However, as academies increased in number from the 17th century, "procedure evolved and a network developed among private academy students that allowed them to address matters they thought required attention." In the memorials to be sent to the throne, they dealt with not only political issues but also "a wide variety of topics pertaining to local affairs, social issues, and scholarly concerns" (Choe, 1999:44).

Of course, it must be acknowledged that this Confucian participatory tradition was limited to the upper classes and only to men. But this tradition has had a great influence on Korean history, giving rise to a strong civil society and at the same time laying the roots for a contentious middle class. Thus, one can speak of a Confucian participatory tradition historically rooted and yet radically reframed in the age of the post-traditional information society (Han, 2000).

Post-Conventional Value Orientation

However, what I would like to defend is not a Confucian, but a post-Confucian cultural orientation. By post-Confucian I mean, of course, a post-traditional, reflexive kind of attitude, according to which traditions can never be simply taken for granted, but rather persist only "in so far as they are made available to discursive justification and are prepared to enter into open dialogue not only with other traditions but with alternative modes of doing things" (Giddens, 1995:105). In this context Giddens speaks of the "post-traditional society" as "the first global society."

A post-traditional society is not a national society -- we are speaking here of a global cosmopolitan order. Nor is it a society in which traditions cease to exist; in

many respects there are impulses, or pressures, towards the sustaining or the recovery of traditions. It is a society, however, in which tradition changes its status. In the context of a globalizing, cosmopolitan order, traditions are constantly brought into contact with one another and forced to 'declare themselves' (Giddens, 1995:83)

In this respect, Confucianism cannot be an exception. I would like instead to argue, that a post-traditional and hence a post-Confucian attitude and world-view has become prevalent among younger generations in Korea.

Let me here compare two surveys I conducted in late 1999, in the process of clarifying further what I mean exactly when I talk of the post-Confucian attitude. One of these was a national survey for the population at large (general public, hereafter) and the other was designed for those who studied at Seoul National University in the 1980's (or the 386 generation). The Confucian culture was divided into two categories, that is, hierarchical and humanistic. The hierarchical mode includes four traditional Confucian values; 1) loyalty to the ruler, 2) respect for the aged, 3) the unity of king, teacher and father, and 4) the favorable treatment of the eldest son. On the other hand, the humanistic mode contains traditional ideas as 5) people-based development, 6) the union of man and heaven 7) humanitarianism, and 8) a sense of proportion or moderation. The surveys were conducted on the basis of a four-level questionnaire system, asking how valuable each of these virtues will be in the nation's future.

The analysis shows that the two groups have remarkably different views on the hierarchical aspect of Confucianism, as <Table 1> reveals.

[Table-1] Attitudes Toward Hierarchical Culture

Unit: number(%)

| | Positive | Negative | Total |
|----------------|------------|-----------|-------------|
| 386 Generation | 268(44.2) | 338(55.8) | 606(100.0) |
| General Public | 1041(86.7) | 160(13.3) | 1201(100.0) |

As for humanistic culture, on the contrary, the 386 generation of SNU graduates were noticeably more in favour of it than the general public. If we combine these two different modes within Confucian culture, it turns out that 55.8 percent of the SNU graduates responded negatively to hierarchical culture but positively to humanistic culture. On the other hand, some 75.4 percent of the general public positively embraced both cultures.

In this context, the negative evaluation of hierarchical culture on the part of the 386 generation stands for a departure from the longstanding traditional norms and customs and hence indicates, to my way of thinking, a reflexive post-Confucian way of thinking. This is so

because a post-conventional morality implies the possibility to reject some taken-for-granted yet no longer justifiable conventions on the basis of reasoning and discursive testing, whilst at the same time making possible a reconstruction and renovation of some significant yet marginal traits with normative validity on a new basis. In this respect, we can say that the younger generations in Korea are neither totally against nor merely conventionally accepting of the Confucian cultural heritage as a whole, but are rather very selective in that they tend to evaluate tradition from a global perspective. This means that their way of thinking has already become quite globalized (or individualized) to a certain degree, so that they are most in favor of accepting those traits of tradition which are most compatible with what they consider to be universally acceptable.

The Impact of the Internet

The last condition for socio-cultural transformation concerns the technological infrastructure of communication. What attracts our attention in this regard is the explosive increase in the number of internet subscribers and its widespread use. Together with its technological advancement, the scope and range of the internet has spread far and wide across the nation. Its impact on society at large therefore cannot be under-estimated. In 1999, the number of internet subscribers was merely 3.7 million but this number had soared up to some 4 million by 2000, 7.8 million by 2001 and 10 million by October 2002. At the end of 2001, Korea stood at the world's top in terms of its internet subscription (with a rate of 17.2 per 100 people), followed by Canada (8.4%) and Sweden (5.0%). At present, Korean users spend longer time on the internet than their counterparts in other countries.

Next, we need to carefully examine the social background of these internet users, (or netizens). As table 2 shows, the rate of increase in Internet use from October 1999 to December 2001 is explosive. It has soared up from 33.6 percent to 93.3 percent in the age group between 7 to 19; from 41.9 percent to 84.6 percent among people in their twenties; and from 18.5 percent to 61.6 percent among people in their thirties. As of December 2001, 88.4 percent of elementary pupils, 99.8 percent of middle school students and 99.0 percent of high school students and 99.3 percent of college students are using the Internet.

[Table 3] Increasing Rates of Internet Use by Age Group

| age \ years | Rates(%) | | |
|--------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| | Oct. 1999 | Dec. 2000 | Dec. 2001 |
| 7 - 19 | 33.6 | 74.1 | 93.3 |
| Twenties | 41.9 | 74.6 | 84.6 |
| Thirties | 18.5 | 43.6 | 61.6 |
| Forties | 12.8 | 22.7 | 35.6 |
| Over fifties | 2.9 | 5.7 | 8.7 |

Source: Korea Internet White Paper, 2002

Who, then, is playing the leading role in net-activism? The largest group of internet users are in their teenage years. Those who are in their twenties may be said to be leading today's net culture. But the leadership in the ongoing online movement and online activism is taken by people in their thirties. In this regard we must closely examine the relationship between those in their thirties who facilitated the nation's democratization and established the powerful tradition of civil participation and the succeeding digital generation. One could define the former as a 'politicized, social-movement generation' and the latter as a 'relatively conservative depoliticized generation.' Another might say that the former experienced "political eruption through the June uprising in 1987" while the latter created "cultural eruption in the 2002 World Cup." Still others may raise the spectre of generational conflict between these two groups.

But we should not overlook the common nature underlying these two groups merely for the sake of emphasizing superficial differences. Despite so many empirical differences, these two generations have one important thing in common, that is the underlying motivation to escape from the constraint of the established order and its norms. In other words, those in their thirties had spearheaded the struggle against the military dictatorship while the succeeding digital generation is in the midst of attempting to verify through a critical stance, a variety of moral and cultural issues in their daily living. On the surface, the former seems to be collectivistic and ideologically-oriented, the latter highly individualized. But both of these two groups share a post-conventional reasoning and, in consequence, are strongly motivated to test the taken-for-granted conventions such as the Cold-War mentality and ideological polarization, and authoritarian and hierarchical value orientations. The World Cup street cheering in June 2002 as well as the recent candlelight marches in Seoul provide us with numerous examples that substantiate such an observation. Relying on the cultural power of the Internet, the digital generation attempts to break up the hierarchy of old authority and experience their new identities in the freedom of cyberspace (Yoon, 2001, 255).

Closing Remarks

Can we say clearly where the current cultural transformations in Korea are going to take us in the near future? Though there are some ambiguities involved and of course the path taken will depend upon many factors yet to be determined, it can be said with some certainty that the age of a hierarchical control of civil society is over. With the result of the presidential elections last December, one can predict with confidence that the attempt for dual democratization, namely the democratization of the authoritarian state and that of civil society, will be intensified in many respects.

In this context, I imagine that the linkage effects of the three factors mentioned above will likely be felt stronger as time goes by. Likewise, the conventional image of the United States as a big brother will likely face many more challenges to come. And yet, on the whole there seems to be good prospects and increasingly better opportunities for Koreans and Americans

to reconstruct their cultural relationship on the basis of mutually shared universal values, (neither ethnocentric/parochial self-interest nor conventionally given stereotypes). The proven fact that young Koreans with a higher educational background, as a rational core of the middling grassroots, are increasingly leaning toward universally acceptable global values instead of the old style of nationalism clearly point to the possibility of a better inter-cultural dialogue between Koreans and Americans and, hence, between the East and the West. I am very confident that we can develop this dialogue far better in Korea than in any Asian countries.

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How to study the individuals in the South? The Latin-American case

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The idea of society and the monopoly of the idea of Individual have functioned as hinge elements to differentiate modern Western societies from traditional societies. Tönnies's concepts of community and society, which were widely accepted by all the so called "classics" of sociology, fully illustrate this division. That is to say, that the idea of modern society has been for a long time the real framework for normative and comparative studies between countries and periods.

The conceptual monopoly of national experiences, which were frequently considered as equivalent to the idea of West or modernity in social sciences is nearing its end. The modernization of many "semi-peripheral" countries or countries of the "South", compelled sociology to open its historical narratives towards other national experiences – what sociologists have done so far, however, partially. Surely, efforts are not lacking to rethink contemporary social realities through notions like globalization or cosmopolitanism, multiple or alternative modernities, by a range of highly critical perspectives as postcolonial or subaltern studies, or by the proliferation of transnational indicators widely promoted by international organizations.

In this paper, I will try to explore how the notion of individuation could be a tool for non-Western sociology. Departing from the idea that Western experience of individuation is only one trajectory among others, I will develop my argument in five steps. Firstly, I will present the sociological notion of individuation. Secondly, I will analyze the most important axes of the sociological tradition of Western Institutional Individualism. Thirdly, I will argue the difficulty of this model to describe the individual in Latin-America. Fourthly, I will discuss the most important feature of Latin-American Individual: the relational hyper-actor. Finally, I will conclude with some reflections about the new challenges that comparative sociology must face.

I. The individuation process: a way to a new comparative sociology

My core aim here is to argue that the notion of individuation should be considered as key tool for a comparative sociology of a new kind. I will try to show that this notion allows a new dialogue between societies, periods and civilizations. Indeed, not every society had a national-State, social classes, democracy or a secularization process – as the normative conceptualization proposed by the modern idea of society posed. However, and despite the

multiple ways they named or defined them, all societies produced – and could not fail to produce – “individuals”. Insofar, even though individuation’s processes have to be understood as historically different, at the same time they might be considered as a common basis for comparative studies.

To develop this perspective, as I have already done for the case of Latin American societies, it is necessary to deconstruct some concepts (Martuccelli, 2010a). For long time sociology – and more broadly the humanities and social sciences – considered the individual as a unique product of Western modernity. Besides from these societies, or historical period in the case of Europe, there were no individuals. From this point of view, individuals in the South or in the West before modernity were often defined by their insufficiencies and shortcomings, as the disputes produced around individuality in the Middle Age showed (Morris, 1982; Le Goff, 1994; Gourevitch, 1997, Bedos-Rezak and Iogna-Prat, 2005). There were no individuals in the “community”.

In this regard, Louis Dumont’s (1985) analytical distinction between the two meanings of the individual is central. If individuals as empirical agents exist in all periods and societies, individuals as moral beings, defined by some particular cultural specificity, are modern. The distinction has the merit to clarify the discussion. If every society has individuals (as empirical agents), not all societies know individuals as moral beings - if they are considered, as does Dumont himself, from the perspective a particular representation: the Western dominant figure of the Sovereign Individual in modern times (Martuccelli, 2002). Certainly, in his genealogical studies Dumont (1983) takes into account various structural processes to explain the emergence of the individual, but to the extent that the analysis is constructed from a particular representation of the individual as a moral being, all other figures mentioned have no other function than to highlight the exemplary way of western Individual. The figures of Subject analytically precede the process of individuation. It is the reduction to this particular definition of individual, largely ideological, and many times questioned by history and anthropology, which is dramatically being challenged today.

The situation is quite similar in most cultural anthropology work. They often postulated a fairly monolithic arrangement between culture, society and personality (Kardiner, 1969), largely neglecting intra-group differences between individuals, and especially judging these forms of individuality from their distances and anomalies with the representation of the modern western individual (as evidenced for example in Ruth Benedict’s famous distinction between the culture of guilt peculiar to the West, and the culture of shame in Japan (1987). If these works had the merit to affirm that there are no individuals (as a moral being) without a Subject representation, too often, the unilateral use of this strategy conducted to obliterate the real study of other ways of individuation. As a result, the individual “before and outside” of Western modernity appears as an incomplete or truncated figure, a previous step or experience to overcome, or as a different kind of Subject taken in a community logic. In all cases, individuals “in flesh and bones” are not taken into account.

It is taking distance vis-à-vis this interpretation that we will try to outline an historical and comparative sociology of individuation. An analytical entry privileging the plurality of

structural processes of individuation invites to report otherwise the diversity of individual's profiles in different societies and periods. On the one hand, individuation is inseparable from a broad array of structural factors that are at the root of "empirical" individuals production, and on the other hand, this process is inseparable from the existence of large collective representations of the individual as moral being – a subject. The two levels are analytically different, and it is their different historic articulation which defines the specific traits of individuals in each society or period. The study of individuation, logically, precedes the analysis of Subject figures. The downturn may seem minor but it deeply reorients historical and sociological analysis. We must first study structural processes of individuation in a society before analyzing, but only in a second moment, the cultural figures of the subject to be found in this context.

But to make individuation a key-concept for a new comparative sociology it is also worth to distinguish the specific Western way of individuation – the institutional individualism – from other historical and sociological paths of individuation. In this regard, we will discuss the existence in Latin-America of another way of production of individuals. To argue this thesis I will rely upon some theoretical and historical reflections about Latin-American individualism (Martuccelli, 2010a) and upon the results of an empirical qualitative research on individuation process in Chile (Araujo and Martuccelli, 2012 and 2014).

II. The Western Institutional individualism thesis

The production of individuals has been related in modern occidental discussion to a particular cultural tradition and a group of specific institutional practices. In sociology, the thesis of institutional individualism has been without doubt a key concept in explaining this process (Parsons, 1951 and 1964). According this thesis, in modern societies the most important institutions (work, school, family, among others) compel each person to develop and constitute themselves as a subject according to pre-established institutional models.

Based upon this conceptualization, for a long time social sciences affirmed the inexistence or insufficiencies of individuals in semi peripheral or peripheral societies. Individuals from other societies – or from same Western societies before modernity and institutional individualism – where perceived from the point of view of their anomalies (Martuccelli, 2010a). The fact that canonic theoretical versions about the production of individuals hypostatized specific features of occidental modern societies obstructed comparative analysis and veiled the existence of other individuation modalities than those described by institutional individualism. It is true that classic sociology described the emergence of the individual in Occident associated to a great number of different structural factors (social differentiation, secularization, urbanization, industrialization, among others). Nevertheless, at the end all these features were subordinated to the institutional individualism model.

In Western tradition individualism (the idea of individuals as moral beings attached to a particular subject representation) supposes a particular modality of cultural representation and institutional work. The difference with traditional holistic societies was always pointed as enormous and was essential to Western tradition. During centuries in holistic societies the individual was mainly considered as an anomaly because it was seen as a particular deviance

of the common features of a social group. The general takes precedence over the particular so that the individual dimension is understood as a fairly contingent specialization of the “community” as Tönnies poses. Against this interpretation the thesis of Western Institutional Individualism meant a real revolution. Individual is not any more perceived as a singular deviance of a general model. It becomes itself the institutional model to be incarnated. The importance of this transition should by no means be overseen. Therefore, it is relevant to precisely define the sense of the transformation produced in occidental modernity by this notion.

Individuals as empirical agents have existed in every human collectivity. But, in holistic societies their actions and identities were conceived as strictly subordinated to tradition. In this societies ruled the tendency to define themselves in terms of the preservation of the past – “the essential social illusion”, so Georges Balandier (1974). This is to say, that in this universe, actors did not only existed as empirical agents but also had margins of initiative. Nevertheless, they were usually perceived as momentary anomalies, exceptional deviations or singular eccentricities (Lozerand, 2014). What Institutional individualism thoroughly changes is that the individual is regarded now as a result of a collective central imperative that impels him to become an individual-subject. This is to be seen at the economic sphere (as shown by the importance of possessive individualism), at the political sphere (under the prevalence of equality and individualism), or even at the sentimental sphere (with the cultural triumph of love and modernism).

The primacy of this thesis as the central and even solely way to individuation was never questioned in sociology. This was the case despite the existence of very clear national differences within modern occidental Individualism (Lukes, 1973; Dumont, 1991; Martuccelli and Singly, 2009); or the existence of diverse cultural and political modalities of individualism (Taylor, 1998; Bellah, 1985; Riesman at al., 1950; Sennett, 1977).

The contemporary individualization thesis, which was originally produced in Germany and then developed in England and France, is a good illustration of the former statement. This notion refers to two main meanings. Firstly it expresses the growing differentiation process of personal trajectories. In this sense the notion is descriptive and, therefore, empirically observable. Its argument is that there has been a shift from highly standardized trajectories (under a model of a three phased sequence: training, work, retirement) to trajectories that are increasingly different one from another. Secondly, in a more analytical perspective, the thesis closely associates the production of individuals with the emergence of new institutional models. This is to say that the growing individualization is an outcome of the shift to a society (“second modernity” or “late modernity”) in which institutions do not transmit harmonious prescriptive norms to the actors but impel them to give sense on their own to their social trajectories through reflexivity (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; Giddens, 1990 and 1991). This does not imply that individuals are freer. This means that they are subdue to a new historical process that produces them through other institutional commandments. However the idea that individuals are required and produced by a sum of institutions that oblige them to develop a personal biography remains untouched. Certainly, as Beck points out, individuals must give biographical solutions to systemic contradictions, but this must not veil the fact that

these personal solutions are answers induced by an institutional prescription (Martuccelli, 2010b; Araujo, 2012).

In other words, the individuation process in modern occident is related to a set of social representations and especially to institutional interpellations, a fact well expressed by the importance given to the relationship between Welfare State and individuation modalities (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Castel, 1995; Therborn, 2009). A very important number of empirical work in the last decades conducted specially in France, has approached to give a precise description of the work through which actors constitute themselves as individuals relying on institutional supplies and cultural models (Martuccelli and Singly, 2009). This discussion has underlined different outcomes but, although the acknowledgement given to personal work, the individual is always conceived as a result of an institutional prescription or interpellation.

In no society individual actors invent subject ideals. These ideals are offered and put at their disposal. They are part of the culture and society in which an individual is forged. The specificity of occidental modernity and institutional individualism is that the individual is interpellated to constitute itself as an individual-subject by institutions. Institutions are the ones that offer representations and supports.

III. Latin-American: the deficit thesis

The institutional individualism thesis has been scarcely explored in Latin America. Social sciences in this region concluded the inexistence of the individual due to many reasons including those related to critical and anti-occidental arguments. There has been a vivid contrast between the importance and richness of studies dedicated to modernization, and poverty – at least since some decades in this last case – and those devoted to modernity strictly speaking (García Canclini, 1989; Brunner, 1992). Such an interpretation may also be found in studies concerning other regions as Asia (Shayegan, 1996), and specially Sub-Saharan Africa (Copans, 1990) where has been insistently stated the existence of an economic modernization without modernity (that is, without the spirit of Enlightenment).

It is true that the situation has varied thanks to the inflexions produced in the debates about modernity with the contribution of multiple modernities theory (Eisenstadt, 2000), but specially due to the discussion about the role of culture to understand Latin America's specific path to modernity. It has been argued that the higher rates of school attendance and the strong presence of mass media (radio, TV and increasingly ICT's), should have given place to the emergence of a full modernity in the region (Martín-Barbero and Herlinghauss, 2000; García Canclini, 1990; Brunner, 1992). The originality and strength of these studies needs not to be once more underscored here. However, this works do not include new developments about the production of individuals. If these works admit some particular features of individuals in the region (for example, that they are meant to combine heterogeneous cultural elements), they mostly fail in paying consistent attention to the differences between these individuals and those produced in modern occidental societies by Institutional Individualism (Ortiz, 1988; Brunner, 1994; Domingues, 2009).

This theoretical *aggiornamento* is therefore not sufficient because it does not take into account the specificities of Latin America's individuation modality. To achieve this task it is necessary to dissociate the study of individuation processes from the historical experience of occidental modernity. It specially requires stopping to privilege the preeminence of a theory of the subject reduced to the analytical predominance of its institutional production. As already pointed out, for a long time this thesis has led to the conclusion of the insufficiency of the individual in Latin America. As Octavio Paz (1979) has stated, the individual in this region would have never reach the full exercise of autonomy, an important reason being the fact that pillar institutions as Church and Army would have imposed a tutelary order over individuals. As long as the study of the individual privileged the influence of institutions it was usually concluded that Individuals did not exist.

Briefly, my argument here is that Institutional Individualism is not a fruitful conceptual tool to approach the individual in Latin America (Martuccelli, 2010a). Why? Because a set of nuclear initiatives that actors perceive as constitutive of their individuality are to be seen as independent of every institutional prescription. Partially, this fact refers to the classic problem in the region of the gap between individual expectations and institutional possibilities (Sorj and Martuccelli, 2008), but this is not all and even not the most important fact. Actors do not only feel impelled to "fulfill" the insufficiency of institutions. What our empirical study evidences (Araujo and Martuccelli, 2012) is that the individual does not perceive himself mainly under the effects of an institutional interpellation. The individual sets himself up based much more on his intrinsic abilities to deal with social life than on his capacities to adhere a prescriptive institutional program. Each one is propelled to incarnate a *relational hyper-actor*. Before continuing and to avoid misunderstandings, I would like to underscore what is here understood by institution. Some authors give such a wide definition of this notion that every social phenomenon (ways of making, thinking or feeling) that reproduces itself is meant to be an institution (Mauss and Fauconnet, 1981; Descombes, 1996). In my research and in this paper, I use a more restrictive conception: institution defines a reduced number of legitimate principles usually incarnated in specific social organizations under the form of a recognizable and explicit institutional program (Dubet, 2002). It is departing from this definition that is possible to contest the importance of Institutional Individualism to understand individuation processes in Latin-America.

IV. Individuals in Latin-America: the relational hyper-actor

To further develop this point, I will rely upon an empirical research on Chilean society (Araujo and Martuccelli, 2012). This Latin-American society has undergone a set of important transformations related, on the one hand, with the turn to neoliberalism (Garretón, 2000; Tironi, 2005), and, on the other hand, with a revolution of the demands for equality which has led to increased exigencies of horizontality within interpersonal relationships as well as in the relationships with institutions.

In this context, new forms of regulation in the labor market appeared in Chile. Public protections and regulations decreased and workers responsibility for their work trajectories, health and pensions was emphasized. Salaries were thoroughly individualized. Principles of

social protection were modified: health services, education and social security privatized. Consume and credit became structural elements of social relationships and personal life (Moulian, 1997). As an effect, a new feeling of positional inconsistency spreads through society. This feeling refers to the perception that every social position, including upper middle class sectors, may suffer active processes of destabilization due to the transference made to individuals of the task related to the level and quality of their social integration (Araujo and Martuccelli, 2011). No one is free from this positional insecurity. In this context, individuals have the feeling that they must face constantly macro-sociological (inflation, political instabilities...) and micro-sociological (family events, health problems, dismissals...) challenges.

It might be correctly argued that these are transversal transformations that face many if not all contemporary societies. True. But it is important to acknowledge that there are specific ways of confronting this issue behind the apparent similitude of these situations. It is precisely this specificity which defines the different individuation models. In Chile, as in other Latin-American's societies, this situation produces an individual that must take himself in charge in a very different way as that referred by Institutional Individualism and ensured by Welfare State. Of course, in some respects, the strength of the representation of the individual at the institutional level is quite relevant in Latin-American. This is something well expressed by the predominance of individual Rights in the region (even though the strong debates in the last decades around the recognition of collective Rights in many countries – Sorj and Martuccelli, 2008). But despite this importance, individuals do not perceive themselves and they are not perceived primarily as a result of institutions.

In Latin-America, individuals face social life relying much more on their own skills as in other Central Western countries. They are obliged to seek answers by themselves to a series of deficiencies, like those of formal labor market. They are compelled to make temporary jobs, subcontracting or informal work a forced path of subsistence, a very different reality in comparison to many countries in the North. In the latter, it is possible to speak of an assisted auto-confrontation meanwhile in the South we find a deregulated auto-confrontation that increases ontological insecurities (Robles, 2000). Individual supports are not to be found primarily in institutions (Castel, 1995). They must be produced (or at least held or reenact) by individuals themselves: everyone has to develop strategies of personal social inclusion to reduce the effect of systemic exclusions, abuses or insufficiencies. This situation compels to a constitution of individuals based on the development of particular competences independently of any explicit institutional program.

In this sense, if recent neoliberalism (and his individualistic prescriptions) has ideologically accentuated this trend, notably in Chilean society, it is important to recognize that this structural situation exists *before* neoliberalism. Throughout Latin-American history, the individual sustains and built himself based upon his “doing” capacity. As long as they are constraint to confront a big number of social trials, to become an individual they must be hyper-actors. It is important to recognize the difference. Of course, every individual is an actor, that is, somebody that reacts and transforms its environment. Nevertheless in occidental tradition, this dimension of the individual was subordinated to the notion of an institutional

subject. The individual has been thought as an actor that had to become a subject. More precisely, the individual is an actor because he is a subject – an outcome of institutional interpellation.

This is not what our research shows for the case of Chile and other Latin-America societies – as Peruvian society (Martuccelli, 2015). In these cases, the individual presents and conceives himself fundamentally as a hyper-actor. To make our point clearer: the models of subject to which individuals appeal, when they do, are subordinated to the set of practical competences that individuals as actors must develop to deal with the challenges of social life. Individuals are not essentially actors that constitute themselves departing from a normative figure of the subject institutionally provided. Individuals constitute themselves as individuals because they perceive themselves as actors able of practically dealing with challenges. They have learned to confront the trials they face through the plurality of their social experiences. The historical reasons of this reality vary from one national society to the other, from neoliberalism to social crisis, but all of them have to be read as part of a common regional way of individuation.

But, and this is also very important, the individual is not only and hyper-actor; he is also propelled to constitute itself based on a specific *relational* management. An individual must take charge of itself counting on his interpersonal relationships. This dimension is experienced as a basic resource and a source of support, even though it is at the same time perceived as undergoing strong tensions and contradictions. The individual is to be conceived as a relational vertex and weaver of nets, loyalties, bonds. This allows understanding the reason why the individual is not allowed to disregard neither interpersonal relationships nor collectives.

Certainly, the relational nature of the individual has been actively described within the frame of institutional individualism. This has been made underscoring the importance of the “significant Others” and interactions, under the issue of recognition or, in a more instrumental perspective, through social capital. All these elements are to be found in Latin-American’s societies and in their individual’s experience. But what is essential in this case is something different. Individuals conceive themselves as intimately linked to some relationships. Their practical competences, and their capacity to be an individual, include a set of basic relationships that are not to be dissociated from their agency in society (“contacts”, “networks” or “favor chains”). Notwithstanding, if the individual recognizes this relational aptitude as a basic resource to existing and getting along as such in society, he does not perceive himself based upon his position within a lineage or an exclusive relational net as by the so called “traditional” societies. This is a fact that differentiates Latin-American path to individuation from the individuation modalities found in some contemporary Sub-Saharan African societies (Marie, 1997 and 2007). His personal conscience is not framed by communitarian obligations. However social life has its own legitimacy in Latin-America, as well as in African societies. This legitimacy is generally bigger than that of the State or the Law (Bayart, 1989): sometimes historically rooted, sometimes only as a personal knowledge, but, in any case, there is always a great suspicion in regard of the State and the institutions.

In Latin-America the relational realm has clear individual and even individualistic features. They should be understood as skills that the individual must have in order to deal with social

life's challenges. Relationships are a core component of the social resources that an individual possesses what brings him to temper his own interest with plural forms of commitment, responsibilities, reciprocities or gifts. This fact explains the double nature of many social relations: at the same time affective and instrumental. A new conceptual precision results from this feature of the process of individuation in Latin-American societies. The Individual is not based on his autonomy or independence, as contended by classical Western Thought (Renaut, 1989); and he is not a variant of the *Self Made Man*. The importance of social relationships evidences that we are confronted to a different process of individuation in which it is from the practical competences to deal with the vicissitudes of the social life and not from institutional prescriptions that individuals constitute their individuality. The solitude in front of institutions, even when this discourse omits the big number of supplies that each receives from them (rights, infrastructure, helps, etc.), is tinged by the conscience of being produced by the supports received from others, or at least some others.

V. Basis for a new comparative sociology

To summarize, in Latin-American individuals are not forged essentially by institutional mandates. Individuals do not constitute themselves primarily as individual-subjects that incorporate institutional prescriptions in the context of a strong disciplinary and control dispositive (although they do suffer coercions). They constitute themselves as actors that must face plural social challenges in the middle of a generalized feeling of institutional abandon. The individual-actor takes in charge on his own and by means of his social relationships a set of defies that in other societies tend to be assumed or mitigated by institutional programs. Is this situation which defines the individual as a relational hyper-actor. Certainly, the work of institutions is active and explicit in many realms of social life. However individuals are not forged basically in reference to institutional prescriptions. Individuals are forged confronting social life vicissitudes by means of their capacities and skills which include the mobilization of interpersonal relationships, and through a singular set of strategies and competences.

Within the frame of institutional individualism, the production of the individual is closely related to the work through which under an institutional prescription the individual achieves to constitute himself as a subject. Latin-American individuation process shows a different direction. Individuals as relational hyper-actors rise in societies in which individualism is a scarcely present, ambiguous and fragile cultural tradition. Notwithstanding, the absence or weakness of a cultural and political individualistic tradition and of a strong institutional program of individualization as in modern occidental societies does not impede the formation of individuals. The individual is produced upon other basis. The individual must face in a deep personal way social contingencies even when he does appeal to institutional resources, solidarities or group nets.

Here is the true heart of this path to individuation: practical modalities of individuation take precedence over subjectivation institutional interpellations. Obviously, subject models like spirituality (and the support that transmits faith), militancy (and the support obtained by participating in social struggles) are present in Latin-America. Some other subject

configurations have also been discussed in the region, like the agent of modernization or the sentimental subject (Larrain, 2001; Sarlo, 2004; Araujo, 2009). However, as I have extensively argued, this was not the way in which our interviewees gave account of their individuality.

Such a fact evidences the risk of interpreting individuals of this region departing from conceptualizations as those, for example, proposed by Robert Castel (1995). The author contends that it must be distinguished between positive individualism and “negative individualism” or individuals “by defect”. The last ones are actors that in absence of institutional supports or facing the disappearance of forms of wage protection are not able to respond effectively to institutional interpellations and assist to the corrosion of their characters (Sennett, 1998). In Latin America, the situation is almost inverse: actors do not only perceive themselves unprotected by institutions but also in many cases have the feeling that they have to protect themselves from the prescriptions that these institutions transmit them. This is clear in many societies: individuals feel that have to protect themselves from the excesses of consume, time expected to be spent at work or political discourses. This is also to be seen in the excessive high rates of mistrust in institutions present in the region. As a result, even when there are explicit institutional prescriptions, individuals tend to conceive their individuality construction upon personal capacities and non institutional supports.

Today it is necessary to transform conflictive and highly passionate ideological representations in dispassionate research. We must place at the origin of comparative work the possibility to put into perspective different experiences “without value judgment, without immediate target cluster” (Detienne, 2000: 64). Rather than dichotomous categories between the North and the South, West and non-West, modernity and tradition, the analysis has to focus on the plurality of historical modes of individuation. No more historical reality should receive a normative privilege. As a result, “individuals” may appear, in both North and South, or before modernity as it is increasingly the case in discussions about specific modes of individuation in the Middle Age. It may also occur that studying how individuation works inside the “community”, some actors might see their status as individuals weakened while others, for example those from the South, would acquire or strengthen it. Finally, why not?, it will be possible to perceive the paradoxical presence in the South of hyper-actor individuals that lacking institutional supports and being exposed to diverse and frequent constraints rely upon themselves far more than actors in the North.

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Family Risk and Individualization in East Asia: Variations and Contextualization

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This paper investigates family risks and individualization from the perspective of risk society and individualization theory. As to family risk, conceptual distinction is made between the first modern and the second modern type of family risk as well as between its objective and subjective dimensions. As to individualization, typology of individualization is made according to the axes of tradition/reflexivity and collective/ self-interests. The aim is, first, to find out what are the characteristics of family risk and individualization in East Asia, which is about variation of these two phenomena. Second, it is to find out what is the relationship between family risk and individualization. More specifically, what is the context of family risk? Here government policy and individualization will be considered as context.

The analytical framework of this research is typology of risks for East Asia and two types of family risk for East Asia which has been developed based on Beck's theory of risk society on the one hand, and typology of individualization for East Asia based on Beck theory of individualization on the other. In the following I will specify on theoretical background and analytical framework of this research.

1. Analytical Framework for Family Risk

Beck's Theory of Risk Society

Beck developed a theory of risk society (Beck 1997) and, later, second modernity (Beck and Grande 2010). These two are not clearly distinguished by Beck himself, but overlap in many ways. Risk society is a society that modern industrial society brings forth through its side-effects. Characteristic of risk society is not the distribution of wealth, but the distribution of risks as an organizing principle of a society. According to Beck, risk society presupposes the success of a modernization process that produces numerous side-effects causally linked to the accumulation of wealth and capitalist global development. In this context, the concept of second modernity serves to explain the logic of historical change involved and the overall direction of transformation. It explains historical change through the increasing radicalization of the principles of modernity and the destructive effect this has on modern institutions. Second modernity is neither a simple continuity nor a complete denial of first modernity but involves a rupture.⁴⁷ The national boundaries of labor markets, for instance, have become

⁴⁷ For a conceptualization and comparison of the first and the second modernity, the following Figure will of help. Please refer to Han and Shim (2010, pp. 470), particularly the following Figure.

<Figure F1> here

fluid and flexible not because of the failure of modernity, but because of the radicalization of such principles fundamental to modernity such as freedom, competition, and individual choices that result in economic globalization. The driving force of second modernity is already built into the logic of first modernity, as first modernity constantly renovates itself by destroying its institutions (Beck 1997). This *avant-garde* image of second-modern transformation is highly suggestive.

Typology of Risks for East Asia

Nevertheless, we need a typology of risks better suited to East Asia. An example is the conceptual framework developed by Han and Shim (2010) who tried to go beyond the thesis of radicalization to grasp the mode of risk production and mode of risk dispersion. Based on this, we proposed to distinguish two modes of risk production. On the one hand, radicalizing modernity produces certain risks affecting the globe as a whole. The exemplars may include climate change, ecological destruction, economic inequality, unemployment, and aging society. On the other hand, certain types of risk are produced as unintended consequences of a specific strategy of development taken for granted in East Asia, such as compressed modernity or rush-to modernization. The exemplars can be identified in such various symptoms of risks as large-scale accidents, violence, contamination of foods and tap water, fraudulent constructions, moral crises such as corruption, family disorganization and so on (Han and Shim 2010, pp. 470-471).

In a similar way, Han and Shim (2010, pp. 471) distinguish two modes of risk dispersion. Risks may be called ‘transnational’ if these can, in principle, happen anywhere in the world. In contrast, risks may be ‘regional’ if these tend to occur heavily, not everywhere, but in those countries in which this developmental strategy has taken place. This means that risk cannot be analyzed from a thesis of radicalization alone. Rather, deficiencies built into compressed modernity have to be fully recognized if we are to grasp the complexity of risks in East Asia.

The combination of these two axes is depicted in Table 1 and indicates three substantive areas of research. Category A refers to the type of risks generated as unintended consequences of the radicalization of principles of modernity. When radicalized free competition brings about the globalization of the economy, destabilizing the national institutions of labor markets and welfare systems. We may call this a systemic risk since its mode of production is inherent in a system’s self-innovation via destruction (Han and Shim 2010, pp. 471).

Category B refers to the type of risks deeply anchored in the very root of modernity, that is, within the paradigm of instrumental, calculable, and technical rationality. Modernity unfolds as a technocratic project of domination over the world - from the inner flows of emotion to the

ecological environment. The one-sided or one-dimensional pursuit of instrumental rationality has resulted in a technocratic civilization insensitive to differences and multiplicities (Han and Shim 2010, pp. 472). Here we find modernity as a world-dominating project in the fundamental sense.

The category C refers to the side effects of the super-speedy economic growth which are found in countries where rush-to modernization has been undertaken. Certain risks emerge due to the lack of responsible institutions as can be seen in the contamination of foods and fraudulent constructions. Other risks also emerge out of the deterioration of human relationships. A good example is the destruction of trust and the moral community (Han and Shim 2010, pp. 471).

Crucial for our discussion are type A and C. Table 1 may help us to see why the risk type C is no less serious than the type A in East Asia. It also helps us to explore flexible approaches to the management of risks since strategies may differ depending upon the type of risk under examination.

Table 1 Four Types of Risks

| | Risk Dispersion | |
|-----------------------------|-----------------|----------|
| Mode of Risk Production | Transnational | National |
| Radicalization of Modernity | A | - |
| Deficiencies of Modernity | B | C |

Source: Han and Shim, 2010, p.472.

Two Types of Family Risk for East Asia

Since this research is focused on family risk, the types of risk have to be redefined to fit the family context. In order to do this we rely on the concept of the family in first and second modernity. Among the various differences between the two, we pay attention to the difference in terms of the task of the family and the relationship between the couple. First, the task of the family in the first modernity is primarily, but not exclusively, material, while the task in second modernity is far more emotional than material (Shim 2011, pp. 26), as shown in Table 2. In the case of second modernity, most of the functions of the family such as economy, education, welfare have been moved to the social institutions out of the family, whereas this is not so in the case of first modernity. Consequently, the emotional task of the family has

become crucially important for second modernity while the principle of love becomes radicalized.

Table 2 Concept of the Family in the First and Second Modernity

| | The family in the first modernity | The family in the second modernity |
|-------------------------------------|--|---|
| Tasks of the Family | Material and emotional task | Emotional task |
| Characteristics of the relationship | Romantic love | Confluent love |
| Objective of the Relationship | Searching for a special person—living for others | Searching for a special relationship---living for oneself |
| Individual-Family Relationship | Family-centered, family-dependent | Self-centered, independent |
| Gender Relationship | Gender division of labor and gender inequality | Gender equality |
| Issue of Homosexuality | Assumption of heterosexuality | No distinction between heterosexuality and homosexuality |
| Issue of Nationality | Assumption of same nationality | No distinction between different nationality |

Source: Shim 2011, p.26 reconstructed from Giddens (2001), Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002)

Second, the relationship between the couple has also changed. To simplify, the first modern relationship is based on a sexual division of labor and gender inequality, while the second modern relationship is based on individualization and gender equality. In the former, the family functions as a strategic unit of community to survive, while in the latter we can find a specific relationship characterized by “I am me” (Beck 1997, p. 175), living “a life of one’s own” (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002, pp. 22).

In this paper we discuss the seven items of family risk. They are: (1) divorce, (2) low fertility, (3) isolation and suicide of the elderly, (4) individualist tendency, (5) decrease in the parent’s role in home education, (6) decrease in mutual help in the family, and (7) conflict in the property distribution. These seven items were selected to represent the changes in the tasks of the family and relationship in the family, and to represent two types of family risk, that is, the first modern type and the second modern type. First, we assume divorce, low fertility,

isolation and suicide of the elderly and individualist tendency to be deeply linked to the individualization, that is, the radicalization of the principle of love, freedom and equality. As for divorce, there were divorces in the industrial society too; however they were very few. As the society develops into a risk society or second modernity, women's education, employment, gender equality and the attitude of "I am me" was also heightened. Thus high divorce can be classified as the second modern type of family risk. Low fertility can be classified as the second modern type in a similar sense. In East Asia, welfare has not been well institutionalized and children have been regarded as a sort of asset which guarantees the welfare of the elderly life after retirement. However, in the second modernity the meaning of the children changed. Now the children became a source of emotional happiness and the parents should do their best to provide them with the best care and education. At the same time women who are more individualized want to pursue their own career and life. Thus the children became a burden because the parents should provide the best education and welfare until the children becomes an adult.

Second, as to family risks such as the decrease in the parent's role in home education, decrease in mutual help in the family, and conflict in property distribution, we classify these as the first-modern type of risks. For example, conflict in the property distribution may not frequently occur, if individual property rights are well developed and family members are fully individualized. The same can be said in the case of the decrease in mutual help in the family and the decrease of parent's role in home education that presuppose conventional functions of the family.

2) Analytical Framework for Individualization Individualization Theory

The concept of individualization indicates a categorical shift in relations between an individual and the society (Beck, 1992, p. 127). Here individualization means that individuals get unleashed from the previous frameworks of welfare financed by either the state or business firms or by the family and have to take care of their survival by their own means (Han and Shim, 2010; Shim and Han, 2010).

The individualization theorists give an account of the relationship between individuals and social determinants that is more complex than the "either/or" models of conventional social science. They see individualization as a form of emancipation from particular constraints. As Howard (2007, p. 9) aptly points out, these constraints revolve around several poles. The first is tradition, or the idea that people behave in certain ways and understand their experience on the basis of historically established forms of behavior and modes of interpretation. In this sense, individualization means the diminishing power of tradition to determine the specific

content of behaviors and to justify actions. In place of tradition, human behavior becomes increasingly “reflexive”, meaning that it is driven by deliberate human actions and choices and is shaped by self-awareness (Beck, Giddens and Lash 1994a; Giddens, 1994b).

The second constraint that is lifted in the process of individualization is the close tie between individual identity and membership of specific social collectives, such as social classes, ethnic groupings, and local and national communities (Howard, 2007, p. 9). The individualization thesis suggests that individuals decreasingly derive their identities from social groupings and no longer see their fates as being directly shared with other group members. According to individualization theorists, traditions and groups continue to play a role in individual experience; however, the meaning of tradition and group membership has shifted from an external imposition to a deliberate action or affiliation. Thus the act of conforming to a tradition or joining and submitting to a group is increasingly interpreted, queried, and challenged on the grounds that it is a reflexive choice, something done consciously and deliberately by individuals to inform self-identity and personal biography (Howard, 2007: 8-9).

While the individualization thesis assumes growing scope for personal choice and individual decision making, this does not mean that individuals are free to do whatever they like, unencumbered by social structures and norms (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002). The individualization thesis suggests that social structure is not receding in its influence; rather, it is changing the demands it places on individuals. Individualization, according to Beck, is ‘the social structure of the second modernity’ and as such, it implies a transformation of social structures, not the liberation of individuals from social processes (Beck and Willims, 2004, 101). Increasingly, social structures compel people to become individuals and take charge of their lives. Thus Bauman characterized the present era in terms of ‘compulsive and obligatory self-determination’ (Bauman, 2000, 32), and Beck suggests that today, individuals are compelled, “...for the sake of their own material survival—to make themselves the center of their own planning and conduct of life” (Beck, 1992, 88).

Typology of Individualization for East Asia

Individualization consists of two distinct dimensions of emancipation, that is, emancipation from tradition and emancipation from community. One dimension is whether one’s way of thinking is traditional or reflexive. The other dimension is whether one’s goal is oriented towards collective interests or self-interests. One is about mode of operation and the other is about the goal between collective and self-interests. Thus a typology made of these two dimensions will be useful in tracing not only the change of traditional versus reflexive way of thinking/acting, but also the change of the orientation toward collective interests versus self-

interests. By crossing these two dimensions of individualization as two main axes, we constructed the following four types of individualization (table 3) (Shim and Han, 2013).

Table 3 Type of Individualization for East Asia

| | | Goal of Orientation | |
|-----------------------------|-------------|--|--|
| | | Collective Interests | Self-Interests |
| Mode of Thinking/ Acting | Traditional | A Conventional Types of Collectivism | B Family-Oriented Striving Individualization |
| | Reflexive | C Public-Minded Participatory Individualization | D Self-Centered Libertarian Individualization |

Source: Shim and Han, 2013.

Type A is characterized by both strong collective interests and traditional way of thinking/acting, thus it can be called “conventional types of collectivism.” This type can typically be found among those who consider collective interests to be more important than self-interest grounded primarily on traditional conventions. Type B is characterized by traditional ways of thinking/acting (for example, family-oriented), but tries to pursue self-interests for survival. The self-interests here can be interpreted as private interests. Thus it can be called “family-oriented striving individualization.” This type tends to be frequently found among those who strive hard to get out of poverty for the welfare of the family rather than strictly for personal gain. The type labeled “family-oriented individualization” (Shim and Han, 2010) can be classified as a category of this type. Type C is characterized by reflexive way of thinking/acting closely associated with the mode of action pursuing and advocating public interests. A typical example is civil movements based on individual decision to join through either on-line or off-line deliberation in pursuit of certain values of public significance. Thus it can be called “public-minded participatory individualization.” Han’s study on the so-called the “386 generation” reveals this type of individualization (Han, 2007). Type D is characterized by both reflexive ways of thinking/acting and pursuit of self-centered individualizing tastes and preferences. This type can typically be found among the younger generations, namely teenagers or 20s. Libertarian individualization may fully develop when such conditions such as cultural democracy, welfare state, and classical individualism are met (Baumann, 2001; Beck, 1992; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002).

3) Major Findings

The research findings are as follows. First, as to the variation of family risk perception in the three cities, Seoul and Tokyo show higher family risk perception than Beijing does. More specifically, family risk perception of “the second modern” type turned out to be higher in Seoul and Tokyo, and family risk perception of “the first modern” type turned out to be higher in Beijing. Both “the first modern” type and “the second modern” type were shown to co-exist in the three cities, even though there were some variations. Thus we can say that East Asian cities share not only a high risk perception of “the second modern” type, but also of “the first modern” type of family risk, and that this is something which characterizes East Asian cities.

Second, as to the individualization, two dimensions were considered: individualization in general and individualization in the context of the family. As to individualization in general, self-centered libertarian individualization of the west turned out to be highest in Tokyo, next in Seoul, and lowest in Beijing. As to the individualization in the context of the family, two analyses were done, one with the attitude toward the family, and the other with the types of individualization in the context of the family. First, as to the attitude toward the family, familism was highest in Seoul (37.3%), followed by Beijing (31.8%) and lowest in Tokyo (12.0%). Second, as to the individualization in the context of the family, type 3, or the “community-oriented individual”, turned out to be highest among the four types with 49%. Beijing and Tokyo show a surprisingly high proportion of type 3 or “community-oriented individual”, with 71.0% in Tokyo and with 55.5% in Beijing, showing the characteristics of the family relationship in East Asia. Seoul, on the other hand, shows a different distribution, showing the highest type in type 4 with 43.6. A closer analysis shows that there is a change going on in individualization moving from type 1 through type 2 and type 3 to type 4.

Third, as to the contextualization, when we put the family risk perception of citizens in the context of the official statistics, with the specific examples of divorce rates and fertility rates, we found that the risk perception is higher when there has been a rapid recent change, and lower when there is no or very slow recent change in official statistics. Of course, there seem to be some mediating factors at work such as government policy and individualization. Particularly, the rise of “the second modern” type of family risk suggest that people are more sensitive to the “second modern” type, because society is more individualized in a self-centered libertarian sense, showing their concern, which implies its relationship with “community-oriented” individualization. The co-existence of “the first modern” type suggests that people are also worried about the weakening of the “first modern” type of risk, showing their concern and the relationship with “community-oriented” individualization.

The findings show that in East Asia people are very much individualized but at the same time very much family-oriented. It shows that the family is still very important. In this sense the path for individualization is different from the west. The implications of the findings for the

future of the family is that the family is still important in East Asia, and that even though the individualization is underway, it has special characteristics of family-orientation unique to East Asia, and thus the desirable future direction of the family in East Asia should consider that.

Ethnicity and individuation

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I will start with a question asked by the anthropologist Louis Dumont: “*who else but French people can imagine that it can be possible to be oneself and something else but French at the same time?*” I will answer in a quite provocative way: the second generations of immigrants, the inheritors of postcolonial immigration in France. But for those generations, it is not easy to have this plurality of identities recognized. And I will precisely talk about those difficulties, difficulties that I understand as being the ordeals of individuation of those young French who are children of immigration. So I come back to Dumont who underlines that contrary to the model of the ethnic nation, the French model claims that we are men by nature and French by accident. This is how French culture identified itself to a universal culture, with its great moments and its not so glorious moments as reflected in the current public dread of immigration.

This issue echoes a disregarded dimension of national History, a paradox of the Republic which is divided between human rights and citizen’s rights. The historian Gérard Noiriel underlines the fact that this paradox regularly comes back in French History. In fact, he stresses the permanent tension between a France that welcomes immigrants and a xenophobic France. The historian questions the accuracy and the timelessness of immigration, especially when we remember that History has long been a keeper of a national consciousness that tends to forget the violence of its own foundations.

I don’t have the time to detail this question and I will just refer to the post-colonial studies that have troubles developing in France. To sum up my thoughts I will just say that the nation has always protected its borders against “*peoples who are deemed to have no history*”.

There is, indeed, a dominating republican ethnocentrism that always developed following a binary representation, a line of naturalization of the differences between us and the others. Us, the recognized citizens against the others, the strangers or those who are forgotten by collective memory. Dumont helps us understand this cleavage when he wrote that every value is affirmed in a hierarchical perspective.

Individualism is, of course, one of the most important values of the Republic, a value that is being built on a site of the civic subject and that establishes that great narrative of emancipation. And when I talk about a “civic subject”, I think of this subject as being defined by a relationship to historicity and by a delimitation of epistemological and normative boundaries of individuation. In France, we know that the political citizenship that should have freed every subjects of the Republic has long stayed a formal citizenship for many people.

And beyond immigrants, we could talk more largely about the working class or about those who have been forgotten by History and who have, little by little, infiltrated themselves between the lines of the great narrative of modernity. The indigenous of the colonial empire and the immigrants don't have the historical monopole of social disregard, but we should recognize their exceptional situation. But why, you could ask. Well, just because they only have access to the crumbs of social citizenship that, according to Robert Castel, was built within the framework of wage society, or industrial society. According to Castel, it is this social citizenship that enabled the former proletarians to acquire some autonomy and that enabled the basis of a potential individuation.

Of course, I don't intend to generalize this status of pariah to every immigrant because immigration in France is, first of all and historically, the great European waves of immigration that found a place in the French ordeal. No one can deny that the French integration model worked for a long time but it is also well known that it now faces the experience of the immigration from Maghreb and its inheritors. With this experience of immigration from Maghreb, we face a new paradox of French history. Not only didn't the first generation disappear in the French ordeal but the second and third generations also seem to have a problem with integration. The second generations, considered as people who would still be perceived as immigrants, at least as those who are mostly concerned by a public visibility of immigration. In practical terms, immigrants are blamed for not playing the game of the Republic and for occupying public space on a communitarian mode that is inconsistent with French individualistic values. But it's primarily because immigrant communities don't really exist, because communities were crushed by French ordeal, that the inheritors of immigration are victims of the social and economic horror.

If, from one generation to another, they stay in a precarious situation, if they keep on being submitted to administrative arbitrary and if the press can say anything about them, it's precisely because they have no power as a community, no guarantee of representation and no resources accumulated generation after generation! It's also because of their precarious situation that the inheritors of immigration have so many individual difficulties to find a place in French society.

Those immigrants have the strange destiny to be lifelong immigrants while they are no longer strangers to French society and, as a consequence, stay invisible in spite of press coverage. When we talk about ethnic groups or communities of immigrants, we quickly forget that the inheritors of immigration are members of our individualized society.

We forget that uprootedness is the original experience of immigration, like Bourdieu and Sayad described it.

We also tend to forget that the original migrant is an adventurer who crosses the sea, a defector who wants to go from one world to another and to define himself in a different way. So he is a champion of modernity, an individualist even if he never forgets his family. It doesn't mean that there are not, in immigration, some collective processes of identification.

But the group logic must be understood as a contingent property, an emergent property and not as a basic data.

Otherwise, we take the risk of a misunderstanding that brings confusion in the French public debate about minorities. The public language with which these minorities are spoken is the language of a stereotype that submits them to a symbolic domination in the sense defined by Bourdieu. In fact, even when they are in the news headlines, they stay invisible, trapped into other people's sight. It's the reason why their first problem is to escape the tyrannies of assigned identity: how to become an individual? How to become someone? How to become oneself even when private life is invaded by public images?

So of course, in the context of a larger society, this question of the difficulty of being someone exceeds the framework of immigration. It's a global question. Did we not all become migrants of the spirit without any fixed destination like sociologist Zygmunt Bauman writes it? Whether we talk about the crisis of values, the end of great narratives or the area of postmodern narcissism, it's always the confinement of oneself, the despair of the possible and of the impossible, the impossibility to locate oneself, to find some fixed marks, it always describes the difficulty to distinguish oneself.

I would say that the notion of vagrancy is now central in a globalized world. Vagrancy as an absolute dispersion, as the absence of the origin *and* of any destination. The migratory vagrancy becomes a stationary vagrancy in a no man's land, a slum, a suburb or any other neighborhood of the citizen relegation. It evokes the figure of the nomad described by Arnold Thornbee and also used by Gilles Deleuze: *"the real nomads are those who don't move, those who hang on the steppe, motionless while taking great steps, following a vanishing line without moving"*.

The same perspective can help us understand the common weft of life histories from one generation to another in postcolonial immigration: we can understand it as a broken leakage path and as the hope to re-write a new history while confronting an impossible re-foundation. So in this perspective of immigration, if there is a singular experience of individuation, I would say that it is included in the construction of a tension between origin and destination.

It seems to me that even when status and rights are not granted, the foundations that can give a consistency to individuals are symbolic goods, an ability to refer to a memory, to an origin or to a shared experience. This is how I identify a perspective of symbolic ethnicity through forms of auto-identification that allow contesting public identifications. Resisting the injunctions of domination can be done by formulating an autonomous consecration of the identity. It's a re-appropriation of oneself, the need for a self-construction against the vision of global society. The need to be a subject that is "*capable*" in the meaning Paul Ricoeur gives to this word: capable to recognize himself as the author of his own acts.

It is a collective affirmation because ultimately, identity is always a common reference.

Identity is dialogical. It is dialogical even when we consider the interior monologue of the individual because this monologue is a constant dialogue with those that Georg Herbert Mead called “*the others who give meaning*”.

This being said, I want to stress the diversity of the forms of identification because any identity is a problem, any identity is not granted. It’s always a temporary answer that is in interaction with a certain social environment. And of course, the problem that the individual still represents stays relevant.

I would now like to evoke very quickly three figures of this tension between origin and destination, three figures that kind of embody the sociocultural breaks of individuation in the worlds of immigration, three figures of ethnicity that were inspired to me by three classical figures used to name oppressed people in American sociology: the victim, the schemer and the hero.

The first figure, the victim, is a figure of a refuge in nostalgia. Here, the drama of immigration overlaps the drama of “*the modernity of the metaphysical exiled that we all are, incapable to re-settle in the ground of our nostalgia*”, to quote writer Milan Kundera.

It’s a figure of individuality whose default trait is its own fragility. In a world which is harder and harder, we can choose to disengage and to stop playing the game. Then the resignation becomes a constituent of our identity as a victim.

But more generally, we could evoke here the attitude of the “inside emigration” which, according to Hannah Arendt, is the flight outside the world during dark times of powerlessness in favor of an imaginary world as it should be or as it used to be.

We could refer here to the “bricolages”, the combinations, the amalgamations of the identities of suburban youth thanks to the construction of territorial borders that define collective intimacies.

But the example of the pioneers of immigration from Maghreb is the most expressive one.

It’s in the name of the myth of the return to their homeland that they did adapt to segregation in France.

By staying stuck in transit in their nostalgia, they sacrificed their French History.

The second figure I’d like to evoke is a figure of flight and refusal, a figure that can be included in a perspective of an individual taken into the zapping of a multiple personality.

It’s also a figure of the post-modern individual, the figure of a cosmopolitanism that would intend to be emancipated from living conditions to the point of pretending that it only takes after itself. It’s true that we live in a society where mobility has proliferated to the point of generalizing the experience of uprootedness. In this context, social actors no longer seem to

recognize themselves into their roles or their attachments, *they consider that they are worth more than they seem, that they deserve more*. It's precisely in the worlds of immigration that we meet, more than anywhere else, this rejection of identity imposed by the outside, this rejection of the very idea of identity, to claim the right to be oneself, to become the only master of oneself, to escape the glances of parents and of French society and to establish oneself as an exceptional individual.

This position of the immigrant refers to the figure of the "exception Jews" described by Hannah Arendt. Thus, this position appears to be a position of individuation that we are more likely to find in the universe of the oppressed. In one of his novels, the American writer Chester Himes underlines the fact that black people often refer to a problem in relation to equality.

He says that because they are used to discrimination, they hardly understand equality without the acquisition of privileges that would allow them to be as equal as white people. Then equality would be defined by earning privileges which are, of course, individual privileges.

Here appears the imaginary of the schemer with questions that are always very interested: how to find the good deals that would allow finding a place under the sun?

The schemer is a stratagem for survival that uses every aspects of bluff while no moral barrier is an obstacle in his fools' game. So it's a figure of the defector that has the advantage of underlining the importance of circulations from one world to another.

Robert Park, the Chicago School sociologist, already said the same thing. He specified that segregation encourages those individual circulations between moral regions. But he added that it's a dangerous experience, certainly because it can lead to the denial and the loss of oneself.

I will quickly conclude with my last figure which is a figure of authenticity in the meaning Charles Taylor gives to this term: a freedom located into some horizons of signification. It's an activist, a figure that recognizes, at first, the impossibility to escape mixed contacts or to act as if others didn't exist. Immigration is always made of encounters and we can refer to a dialogic figure of individuation that Richard Sennet calls "*outside immigration*". It's a figure included in a dynamics of the gap. To understand this perspective we should consider the ability, for the actor, to go out of his little world to bet on the paths allowing him to pass through several fragmented universes. In this experimentation, the actor uses the ambiguity of his identity to turn towards the outside instead of shutting himself up. He turns towards the outside to look for a solution, a new path which questions and defies the others. I would say that we should consider the heritage of immigration in this perspective, as an ability to perpetuate a nomadism by using those borderline positions to dig some depth of field on the surface of social relationships. The experience of the inheritors of immigration testifies of an ability to build links between territorial attachment and mobility. Links that are used as a support to mobilize resources and create wealth by relying on borders that escape official spaces of integration. Links that allow opening new pathways towards citizenship.

There is a political history of immigration that we started to write with some too rare researchers.

It's a history that underlines that the borders between us and the others have always been the place of a war of positions, the place of a struggle for recognition, to assert new forms of solidarity and of subjectivity. It particularly raises the issue of what we call in French "vivre-ensemble" that could be literally translated by "living together" but that refers, here, to *the right to be there, to be a member of society without any conditions*.

It's linked to the claim of the right to have rights, but also with the claim to an individual right to ambivalence.

A right to be here *and* somewhere else without obligation to choose, which sends us back to the quote of Louis Dumont at the beginning of my intervention: "*who else but French people can imagine possible to be oneself and something else but French at the same time?*"

Le « dépassement de la modernité » et la sociologie japonaise

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« Fondamentalement, l'Orient n'a pas la capacité de comprendre l'Europe, ni même de se comprendre lui-même. C'est l'européanité de l'Europe qui appréhende et construit l'Orient »

Takeuchi Yoshimi⁴⁸

Soit, au hasard, un livre récent. Celui dirigé par le sociologue Ohsawa Masachi intitulé *Les penseurs après le 11 mars*, qui tente de suggérer des repères pour penser le monde qui suit les catastrophes que provoque au Japon le séisme de mars 2011⁴⁹. Vingt-cinq « penseurs » sont proposés, que l'on pourrait répartir comme suit : un groupe de six Japonais — trois philosophes (Kuki Shûzô, Karatani Kôjin, Imamura Hitoshi), un historien (Amino Yoshihiko), un scientifique spécialiste du nucléaire (Takagi Jinzaburô), un sociologue (Mita Munesuke) ; un second groupe de dix-neuf intellectuels d'autres pays, dont un Chinois (le philosophe Wang Hui) et trois auteurs francophones (Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Marcel Mauss et Jean-Pierre Dupuy). Outre Mita, trois autres sociologues figurent dans la liste : Ulrich Beck, Hans Jonas et Niklas Luhmann. Pour mémoire, citons également les autres auteurs de la liste : Immanuel Kant, Vladimir Lénine, Martin Heidegger, Günther Anders, Hannah Arendt, Rachel Carlson, John Rawls, Bernard Williams, Giorgio Agamben, Tim Ingold, Rebecca Solnit.

Peut-on tirer un enseignement d'une telle liste ? Il ne s'agit pas, bien entendu, de commenter ici la pertinence du choix proposé par Masachi Ohsawa dont le souci premier est de saisir le sens d'une catastrophe à l'ampleur inédite dont les répercussions ne se limitent pas

⁴⁸. TAKEUCHI Yoshimi, « Kindai to wa nanika (nihon to chûgoku no baai) [Qu'est-ce que la modernité ? (le cas du Japon et de la Chine) », dans *Takeuchi Yoshimi zenshû [Œuvres complètes de Yoshimi Takeuchi]*, volume 4, Tokyo, Chikumashobô, 1980, p. 135., texte initialement paru en 1948. Conformément à l'usage, je ferai précéder le nom de famille des auteurs japonais à leur prénom.

⁴⁹. OHSAWA Masachi (dir.), *3 : 11 go no shisôka [Les penseurs après le 11 mars]*, Tokyo, Sayûsha, 2012.

au seul Japon et de vérifier, en quelque sorte, les ressources intellectuelles qui permettraient de la surmonter. Quelle que soit la teneur de cette liste, il convient avant tout de noter qu'elle ne surgit pas de nulle part. Elle est obligatoirement en lien avec l'histoire, déjà longue, d'un dialogue serré que les intellectuels japonais entretiennent avec les idées en provenance d'Europe et des Etats-Unis, d'une part, des contrées non-occidentales, d'autre part, cette histoire s'inscrivant elle-même dans une histoire plus large, celle de l'affirmation d'un Etat-nation appelé Japon à partir de la seconde moitié du XIX^e siècle. La thématique qui va nous intéresser ici — la démarche de la sociologie japonaise et les types d'entendement sur lesquels elle s'appuie pour produire des savoirs — ne sauraient être comprises sans tenir compte de cette double histoire, intellectuelle et politique.

Il faut également rappeler que la question du dialogue — qui a supposé un immense travail de traduction de la part des Japonais — entre les mondes intellectuels occidentaux et japonais font l'objet de débats intenses au Japon même depuis cent cinquante ans ; les savoirs produits en découlent. Le mouvement qui consiste à importer des façons de faire et de penser occidentaux dans un terreau socio-culturel — un épistémè — supposé éloigné de l'univers occidental nourrit obligatoirement un sens de la réflexivité (dont l'existence peut être saisie comme un critère de l'inscription de la société japonaise dans la modernité⁵⁰), réflexivité qui alimente de façon continue les débats autour de l'opposition entre « Occident » et « Orient », « Occident » et « Japon », « modernité occidentale » et « modernité japonaise »⁵¹. Néanmoins, faire part ici de ces débats dépasse largement aussi bien mes compétences que mes connaissances. Je me contenterai de proposer un bref état des lieux, en prenant le parti d'organiser mon propos autour de deux idées, celle d'*oscillation pendulaire* d'une part, de « *dépassement* » de la modernité, d'autre part. Nous le verrons, il ne s'agit pas d'idées nouvelles. Mais sans doute faut-il passer par ces filtres pour saisir le positionnement de la sociologie japonaise face au monde qu'elle entend rendre intelligible et la nature des savoirs qu'elle produit.

Lorsqu'on adopte comme point de départ l'opposition entre Occident et société japonaise (ce qui n'est pas la seule démarche possible), cette opposition est à saisir tout d'abord comme le résultat d'une *réaction* japonaise de chaque instant à l'univers occidental ; contraint de *réagir*, le Japon s'est fatalement trouvé en décalage d'un temps par rapport aux modèles européens et/ou américains, même si, par ailleurs, il a développé tout au long de son histoire des dispositifs mental et institutionnel qui lui permettent de « coller » aux modèles, et notamment à l'économie capitaliste⁵². S'il est une constante, elle est à trouver dans le fait que jusqu'à une période relativement récente, les Japonais s'accordent, de façon consciente ou inconsciente, pour voir dans la modernité occidentale un univers supérieur au leur. Autrement

⁵⁰. Le terme utilisé en japonais pour « modernité » est *kindai* (« l'ère proche », littéralement) qui désigne une période plus ou moins proche (la période d'Edo 1603-1868 peut être comprise en fonction du contexte et des disciplines) et précède un autre temps, celui de *gendai*, la « période actuelle ».

⁵¹. Du côté occidental, Jack Goody a mis en question les démarches qui consistent à poser au préalable, sur les plans épistémologique et méthodologique, la distinction entre Occident et Orient. Voir Jack GOODY, *L'Orient en Occident*, Paris, Seuil, 1999.

⁵². De très nombreuses recherches ont été menées sur ce point par les historiens japonais. On trouvera un aperçu dans l'ouvrage de Jack Goody, *op. cit.*

dit, ils intériorisent la relation dominant/dominé en termes sinon politiques, du moins civilisationnels : l'idée de l'infériorité japonaise en matière de technique et de pensée traverse l'histoire de l'archipel de 1868, année de son ouverture, aux années 1970, décennie durant laquelle la modernité japonaise « rattrape » la modernité occidentale⁵³. Elle se traduira par une *oscillation pendulaire permanente*, qui est également celle des intellectuels, entre amour et haine, passion de l'Occident et exaltation de l'esprit japonais et/ou asiatique⁵⁴. Si ce sentiment d'infériorité empêche de poser un regard serein sur l'Occident, il sert à tout le moins de moteur pour l'acquisition du savoir-faire et du savoir-penser européens et américains : l'oscillation demeure sous-tendue de bout en bout par la volonté de connaître l'univers occidental.

Dans les lignes qui suivent, j'essaierai de repérer les enjeux inséparablement épistémologique et politique des sciences sociales en général et de la sociologie en particulier, enjeux qui évoluent au gré du jeu de balancier qu'impose le contexte national et international. Pour des raisons de place, seule la période qui va de la guerre du Pacifique à nos jours sera abordée. Mais pour saisir véritablement la portée de ces enjeux, il faut néanmoins rappeler ceci à propos des années qui la précèdent : l'instrumentalisation de la démarche sociologique, accaparée par la sociologie académique placée sous l'égide de l'Université impériale de Tokyo, à des fins de consolidation du pouvoir monarchique et de domination sur les peuples d'Asie. La question qui se pose dès lors est de savoir si, la guerre terminée, la sociologie japonaise est quitte avec l'histoire qui a été la sienne de 1868 à 1945. En tout état de cause, elle ne le serait que sous une condition : qu'il y ait *rupture* entre la période d'avant-guerre et celle qui suit, permettant de renvoyer à un passé révolu la collusion de la discipline avec le pouvoir impérial. Une des manières de vérifier l'existence d'une telle rupture est de passer par l'examen de la thématique du « dépassement de la modernité » lancée par les intellectuels durant la guerre. Je ferai dans un premier temps un détour en évoquant l'état de la scène des débats (*rondan*), celle au sein de laquelle prend place cette thématique, avant de revenir à la sociologie⁵⁵. Il sera question d'histoire — d'Asie également, l'angle mort sans lequel les enjeux politiques et intellectuels du Japon moderne ne sauraient être saisis.

1) « Le dépassement de la modernité » et ses enjeux (1942)

Conscience de l'infériorité de l'archipel et, en retour, intense effort d'assimilation de la modernité européenne : le Japon parvient à préserver et à renforcer son indépendance dans

⁵³. Sur ce point, voir le brillant ouvrage de ISHIDA Takeshi, *Nihon no shakaikagaku [Les sciences sociales japonaises]*, Tokyo, Tôkyô daigaku shuppankai, 1983.

⁵⁴. J'emprunte cette expression d'oscillation à Ishida Takeshi, *op. cit.*

⁵⁵. Depuis l'essor du monde de l'édition dans les dernières décennies du XIX^e siècle, il existe au Japon un champ discursif appelé *rondan*, ou, traduit mot-à-mot, « scène de débats ». Ce qui se trouve débattu dans cette arène est la « pensée » (*shisô*) qui, procédant d'une démarche intellectuelle et/ou artistique disant l'état du monde, traverse tous les savoirs tout en les subsumant. C'est donc une fois transposé en « pensée » qu'un savoir tel que le savoir sociologique devient audible par le public japonais, par revues et médias interposés.

la deuxième moitié du XIX^e siècle. Cette indépendance, pourtant, ne va pas sans contradictions. Vécues et pensées de façons diverses tout au long du XX^e siècle, elles structurent indissociablement, et les catégories d'entendement, et le positionnement de la modernité japonaise vis-à-vis de son espace intérieur (la société japonaise) et du monde extérieur (le monde occidental et l'Asie).

Ces contradictions ont été mises en évidence de la façon la plus acérée qui soit par une des figures intellectuelles les plus marquantes du Japon de l'après 1945, Takeuchi Yoshimi⁵⁶. A sa suite, je propose de résumer les données du problème de la manière suivante

De 1868 à 1945, l'indépendance du pays a été porteuse d'une double signification. D'une part, elle a consisté à obtenir des puissances européennes la reconnaissance de son statut de société moderne. Le fait que, dans les décennies qui suivent la Restauration de Meiji, l'essentiel de l'effort diplomatique déployé par l'Etat japonais ait porté sur la sortie du carcan des traités inégaux en est un des signes patents. Mais, d'autre part, l'indépendance, fruit de l'assimilation des normes occidentales, conduit à envisager la relation avec les peuples d'Asie en vertu de ces mêmes normes. Ainsi, à partir de 1876, soit huit ans à peine après l'ouverture du Japon, celui-ci n'hésitera pas à imposer une série de traités inégaux à la Corée, puis à la Chine, avant d'annexer Taiwan (1895) et la péninsule coréenne (1910) : l'évacuation mentale du monde asiatique conditionne l'autonomie. Les Japonais cessent d'être en phase avec les peuples d'Asie ; *ils ne sont plus du même bord*.

L'indépendance conquise par la modernité japonaise décline dès lors deux dispositions psychologiques qui se nourrissent l'une l'autre : fascination de l'Europe, mépris de l'Asie. Cette dualité pousse la nation japonaise hors de la sphère asiatique vers un entre-deux, à mi-chemin entre l'Occident et l'Asie, *sans pour autant que cette sortie ne soit véritablement rendue consciente*. En effet, fort du constat selon lequel leur pays s'impose peu à peu comme la seule nation moderne non-occidentale capable de contrer la supériorité occidentale, les

⁵⁶. Spécialiste de la littérature chinoise et en particulier du romancier Lu Xun, Takeuchi Yoshimi (1910-1977) fait partie de la génération des intellectuels japonais qui a participé à la guerre contre la Chine et les Etats-Unis. Critiqué après-guerre pour ses propos pro-impérialistes tenus durant le conflit, sa voix s'imposera néanmoins comme une des grandes consciences libérales du Japon de l'après 1945. Sa pensée fait l'objet d'un intérêt constant, reprise par la *New Left* japonaise durant les années soixante et les tenants des *colonial studies* plus récemment. En français, voir la lecture qu'en fait Emmanuel Lozerand (LOZERAND Emmanuel, « Dans le temps, après la défaite : Sakaguchi Ango, Takeda Taijun, Takeuchi Yoshimi (1946-1948) », dans *Le Japon après la guerre*, BAYARD-SAKAI Anne, LOZERAND Emmanuel, LUCKEN Michael (dir.), Paris, Ed. Philippe Pickier, 2007, pp. 109-126) ; voir également RIEU Alain-Marc, « Tokyo, 1994 ; Le Japon et la question de la modernité [Avant-propos au Dépassement de la modernité] » in *Ebisu*, Maison franco-japonaise, n°6, p.46-74 et ARAKI Tôru, « Tokyo 1942 : le colloque maudit [dépassement de la modernité] », *ibid.*, p.75-95. Pour une présentation en anglais, je renvoie le lecteur à l'introduction rédigée par Richard F. Calichman dans le recueil de textes intitulé *What is Modernity? Writings of Takeuchi Yoshimi*, New York, Columbia University Press, 2004, pp. 1-41.

Japonais obtiennent la possibilité de se penser en tant que leader naturel et légitime de l'univers asiatique — posture qui leur donne l'illusion de les arrimer du côté des pays d'Asie.

L'affirmation progressive du Japon en tant que puissance militaire conduisent à la formation d'un cadre épistémique que Takeuchi appellera en 1959 « la double structure de la guerre »⁵⁷. La guerre est double par ses visées inséparablement *anti-impérialiste* et *colonialiste* ; elle entend libérer là où elle ne fait qu'envahir⁵⁸. Un impérialisme peut tenter de soumettre d'autres impérialismes ; il ne saurait être question cependant de défaire, de l'intérieur de son cadre, le mode de domination qui le caractérise — à supposer toutefois qu'il en ait l'intention, ce qui, on le sait, n'a pas été le cas du militarisme japonais de 1931 à 1945. Or, souligne Takeuchi, s'il est *a posteriori* possible de distinguer analytiquement la duplicité de la guerre, les deux visées se présentent de façon consubstantielle aux individus qui vivent cette période. Raison pour laquelle les opposants à la mainmise du continent asiatique par les militaires japonais, de même que les sympathisants du régime soviétique, vont finir par entériner la guerre du Pacifique comme entreprise anti-impérialiste et libératrice⁵⁹. L'asiatisme de façade, cristallisation du sentiment de supériorité japonaise en Asie, a empêché le champ intellectuel de saisir cette double structure, dont les effets tragiques sont pourtant profondément vécus, à leur corps défendant, par les peuples du continent qui souffrent de l'invasion japonaise. La guerre du Pacifique a eu pour effet immédiat de rendre invisible le conflit sino-japonais initié en 1931 et son caractère invasif ; elle court-circuite les velléités d'opposition à l'expansion coloniale nipponne qui se donnaient encore à voir dans le paysage intellectuel durant la décennie qui va de 1931 à 1941.

Cécité du champ du savoir, donc. Une tentative est cependant menée pour faire le point sur le positionnement de ce champ face à la guerre. Elle prend la forme d'un symposium qui fait date, organisé durant l'été 1942, en réaction à l'attaque surprise de Pearl Harbour du 8 décembre 1941. Intitulé *Le dépassement de la modernité (Kindai no chōkoku)*, il réunit des intellectuels provenant de divers courants idéologiques. Résumé de façon abrupte, on peut saisir ce symposium comme une réponse du champ intellectuel face à un fait accompli, l'entrée en guerre du Japon contre les Alliées. Censée conceptualiser la nature du choc qu'elle provoque, la thématique du « dépassement de la modernité » est lancée par la revue *Bungakkai* comme une « incantation » selon l'expression de Takeuchi, comme un slogan en forme de plus petit dénominateur commun autour duquel les organisateurs vont espérer rallier les intellectuels dans un Japon en guerre.

Ce symposium laisse une curieuse impression. Son échec est à peine caché lors de la parution des débats sous forme d'ouvrage en 1943⁶⁰. En effet, aucun accord n'est trouvé quant

⁵⁷. TAKEUCHI Yoshimi, *Kindai no chōkoku [Le dépassement de la modernité]*, dans *Œuvres complètes de Yoshimi Takeuchi, op.cit.*, p. 35.

⁵⁸. *Ibid.*, pp. 33-34.

⁵⁹. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

⁶⁰. La revue *Bungakkai [Le monde littéraire]* publie sur deux numéros (septembre et octobre 1942) le débats et les textes rédigés par une partie des participants. Ils seront réunis sous forme d'ouvrage en 1943 (*Gendai no chōkoku [Le dépassement de la modernité]*, Tokyo, Sōgensha, 1943), ouvrage réédité en 1979 avec le texte éponyme de Takeuchi Yoshimi (pp 274-341) : Tôru KAWAKAMI, Teruko TAKEUCHU et al., *Kindai no chōkoku [Le dépassement la modernité]*, Tokyo, Fuzanbō, 1979.

à la définition de la modernité, préalable pourtant à toute discussion sur son « dépassement » — et les textes qui l’accompagnent, rédigés par les participants, n’aident en rien à l’éclaircir. Outre le positionnement idéologique des participants, leur inscription disciplinaire (qui va de l’histoire des sciences à la poésie et à la théologie catholique en passant par la physique, la critique littéraire, musicale, cinématographique) et leur démarche intellectuelle (certains prônent le volontarisme, alors que d’autres refusent d’abandonner l’intellectualisme et le rationalisme) rendait impossible toute conclusion. L’échec en soi n’a rien de surprenant et l’appréciation de Takeuchi est sans appel : au plan de ce qu’il appelle la « pensée » (*shisô*) — une philosophie qui donne des raisons d’agir aux individus —, le contenu de la notion de « dépassement de la modernité » en tant que tel est sans consistance (ce faisant, il refuse de lui accorder une quelconque capacité à mobiliser les individus dans le sens désiré par le pouvoir militariste). Le malaise que suscite, *aujourd’hui*, ce symposium est à trouver ailleurs : qu’il s’agisse de domination coloniale européenne, du matérialisme moderne, de l’emballement du temps propre à la modernité, des impasses de l’individualisme, du désenchantement causé par la rationalité, de la séparation entre nature et culture, des ravages du capitalisme, s’y trouvent en effet abordées des thématiques discutées aujourd’hui en lien avec les problématiques tournant autour de l’écologie, de la post-modernité ou encore des *post-colonial studies* et des *subaltern studies*. L’embarras, autrement dit, provient du fait qu’un événement dont on sait pertinemment qu’il prend acte du supra-nationalisme ait pour ainsi dire su anticiper les débats qui sont aujourd’hui d’actualité (à l’exception notable des *gender studies*...) : le sentiment de perplexité nous déstabilise car il témoigne de l’existence de *continuités impensées* dont nous pressentons confusément qu’elles nous lient au passé, alors même que nous assimilons la défaite de 1945, comme on le verra un peu plus loin, à un moment de rupture radicale.

Rendre visible les continuités sera donc la tâche que s’assigne Takeuchi Yohimi, dont l’intention se trouve clairement affichée dans la décision de reprendre à son compte, pour son essai de 1959, le titre *Le dépassement de la modernité*.

Continuité tout d’abord entre *ce qu’il a été en tant qu’individu* durant la guerre et ce qu’il est quinze ans plus tard. Sa préoccupation est ici d’ordre moral et rejoint sa conception de l’intellectuel responsable. Par la reprise du titre du symposium, il montre son intention de *ne pas nier* ses prises de position en faveur de l’entrée en guerre de son pays contre les puissances occidentales (au risque de se voir attribuer le qualificatif stigmatisant de nationaliste au sortir du conflit).

Autre continuité : celle, précisément, des schèmes de pensée qui sous-tendaient le slogan du dépassement de la modernité. Ici encore, on décèle chez Takeuchi le souci constant de contrer l’oscillation pendulaire comme mouvement dicté par des facteurs externes. Si critique de la modernité il y a, elle doit émerger d’une introspection, d’une repentance qui prend au sérieux, pour mieux la contrer, la force de la pensée supra-nationaliste qui fonde l’expérience japonaise de la guerre. L’imposition et l’incorporation de valeurs venant de l’extérieur (des Etats-Unis) sont ainsi saisies comme des moments, certes bienvenus et nécessaires (on pense notamment au Procès de Tokyo et à la promulgation de la Constitution), mais qui auront pour effet d’entraver les Japonais dans leur tentative de surmonter de

l'intérieur, par eux-mêmes, les contradictions de la modernité nipponne⁶¹. Et en particulier la double structure qui fait de l'Asie un angle mort. Avec Takeuchi, il faut de nouveau insister ici sur le point suivant, fondamental : ce que la mise en question de l'Occident opérée par le symposium de 1942 ne parviendra pas à appréhender ni même à voir est la *résistance* qu'oppose le peuple chinois aux envahisseurs nippons. Ces derniers, au nom de la décolonisation, colportent pourtant *en toute bonne foi* l'idée de coprosperité asiatique. La réalité de l'Asie demeure hors-champ. Le texte publié en 1959 se présente comme le constat de la permanence de cette incompréhension et de cet aveuglement, dans une période de l'après-guerre où des intellectuels avaient des prises de parole qui reprenaient la thématique du dépassement de la modernité, soit pour la dénoncer, soit pour en exprimer une forme de nostalgie⁶². Au-delà, ou plus précisément, en deçà des polémiques politiques et idéologiques, Takeuchi y voit le déploiement d'un épistémè de la modernité japonaise qui ne varie pas : on a beau vouloir critiquer les impasses de la modernité occidentale, la critique n'en reste pas une dans la mesure où le cadre de la perception du monde persiste à postuler le peuple japonais, parce que japonais, comme dépositaire légitime de tout ce qui fait l'Asie (qu'il méconnaît) et à lui octroyer la possibilité de critiquer la modernité occidentale (qui demeure pourtant son unique modèle de référence). Impensée, la double structure continue de fonctionner à l'insu du champ du savoir ; la cécité demeure.

2) L'intériorisation de l'Occident (1945-1970)

Si l'on suit la pensée de Takeuchi Yoshimi, appréhender 1945 en terme de rupture revient donc nécessairement à rater l'occasion d'atteindre la lucidité, condition pour la conquête d'un épistémè japonais autonome affranchi du jeu des oscillations. Cette conviction présente une dimension normative, mais elle se déploie sur la base d'une réflexion épistémologique sur la nature de la modernité en tant que telle dont la pertinence n'a jamais été prise en défaut lorsqu'on se penche sur les évolutions ultérieures de la société japonaise. De quelque manière que l'on s'y prenne et quelle que soit la période considérée, il a été possible depuis de vérifier l'existence des continuités impensées⁶³.

Car après 1945, la défaite s'est précisément pensée comme un moment de rupture fondamentale. Hiroshima et Nagasaki⁶⁴, le rétrécissement drastique du territoire national, la dévastation de l'archipel et l'occupation américaine y contribuent nécessairement. Tant que le projet collectif de remodernisation initié en 1868 n'est pas réalisé, l'unique préoccupation des Japonais aura été d'épouser au plus près les valeurs occidentales, à dominante américaine

⁶¹. Fidèle à son raisonnement, Takeuchi s'interroge, à propos du Procès de Tôkyô, sur la portée d'une démarche où des impérialismes (les pays alliés) condamnent un autre impérialisme (le Japon), de la même façon qu'il avait souligné l'incongruité d'un Japon colonialiste qui, sans quitter le cadre occidental, se propose de libérer l'Asie.

⁶². Pour un aperçu en français des prises de position des intellectuels, voir BAYARD-SAKAI Anne, LOZERAND Emmanuel, LUCKEN Michael (dir.), *Le Japon après la guerre*, Paris, Ed. Philippe Pickier, 2007, en particulier la partie II.

⁶³. Les tensions actuelles entre le Japon et la Chine, d'une part, la Corée du sud, d'autre part, en découlent.

⁶⁴. Par leur caractère incommensurable, les deux bombes atomiques auront pour effet de permettre aux Japonais de se considérer, non comme des agresseurs, mais comme les victimes de la guerre.

cette fois-ci. L'oscillation pendulaire, toujours à l'œuvre, voit le balancier passer de la haine à l'amour : le supra-nationalisme (réaction négative à la modernité impérialiste occidentale) s'efface au profit de la démocratie (réaction à la fois positive et contrainte, face à la domination américaine), avec toujours pour point d'appui des cadres épistémiques exogènes. C'est à cette condition que les valeurs universelles portées par la démocratie font leur entrée dans la société. En tout état de cause, l'incorporation de ces valeurs est révélatrice d'une tendance de fond, l'intériorisation progressive des cadres cognitifs occidentaux. La modernité occidentale se dédouble peu à peu : elle présente deux dimensions, la première, interne à l'univers japonais, la seconde, externe. Cette tendance aura pour effet de rendre problématique la critique de la modernité occidentale à partir d'un fond supposé proprement japonais, l'identité japonaise se trouvant sans cesse travaillée et modifiée par cette même modernité (laquelle, faut-il le préciser, relève d'un ordre, celui de la guerre froide qui, par-delà ses tensions, repose sur une vision commune du monde, la séparation nette entre les vainqueurs et les vaincus de la Seconde guerre mondiale⁶⁵).

Mais avec l'occidentalisation, en toute logique, l'autre invisible persiste à demeurer invisible. C'est la raison pour laquelle le processus de modernisation, celui qui lui permet d'accéder au statut de puissance économique à la fin des années soixante, procède d'un nationalisme économique qui se donne pour objectif de concurrencer les Etats-Unis sur leur propre terrain, l'industrie : de sorte qu'à l'instar de l'ultra-nationalisme d'antan, ce qui est visé reste le monde occidental. L'autre invisible demeure encore et toujours l'Asie, renvoyé dans un univers perçu comme foncièrement étranger, le Tiers-Monde, auquel le Japon ne saurait en aucun cas appartenir — tandis que d'autres espaces, compris aujourd'hui au sein du territoire national, auront à subir une situation post-coloniale qui ne dit pas son nom⁶⁶.

Les sciences sociales se déploient au sein de ce cadre général. Si dans l'immédiat après-guerre, les intellectuels forment un groupe solidaire que le politologue Maruyama Masao a qualifié de « communauté du repentir » (*kaikon kyôdôtai*), les dissensions idéologiques qui portent notamment sur la définition de la démocratie auront tôt fait de les séparer. Concrètement, des années qui suivent 1945 au début des années 1980, deux grandes matrices théoriques y coexistent et s'affrontent : le marxisme (en particulier chez les historiens) et les théories de la modernisation représentées par la sociologie de Parsons. A ces deux références vient se greffer dans les années soixante le behaviorisme américain, qui contribue à l'essor des études empiriques dont la scientificité traduit néanmoins un conservatisme larvé. En lien avec cet intérêt pour les faits qui tranche avec la propension à la spéculation déductive d'avant-guerre d'obédience allemande, on observe parallèlement une forte tendance à la spécialisation et au cloisonnement disciplinaire. Le dernier événement qui voit une mobilisation massive des chercheurs autour d'une cause commune date de 1960, dans le cadre du mouvement politique (1959-1960) initié par la gauche japonaise afin de contrer la reconduction du Traité de sécurité nippo-américain (signé à San Francisco en 1951). Maruyama Masao et Takeuchi Yoshimi certes impriment fortement leur marque à ce

⁶⁵. Vision que reflète fidèlement la composition des membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU.

⁶⁶. Je pense particulièrement à la situation de l'île d'Okinawa, dans le sud du Japon.

mouvement (rappelons que *Le dépassement de la modernité* date de 1959) et « leurs prises de parole auront des conséquences durables, mais le mouvement s’est avéré trop bref pour influencer directement les sciences sociales. (...) On assiste à la spécialisation dans chaque domaine des sciences sociales durant la période de haute croissance des années soixante. Par conséquent, à tout point de vue, il est devenu impossible pour les périodes qui suivent d’évoquer un centre d’intérêt commun aux sciences sociales. En guise de tendance dominante, tout ce que l’on peut constater comme phénomène transversal est la transformation des chercheurs en sciences sociales et des sciences tout court en “spécialistes sans âme (Fachmenschen ohne Geist)” de Weber »⁶⁷. La situation de la sociologie est à l’avenant. L’effectif des membres de la *Société japonaise de sociologie* dépasse le millier de chercheurs en 1965 (et se situe à 2160 en 1988, répartis en 31 sous-champs, pour atteindre plus de 3000 en 2000)⁶⁸. Ici encore, on assiste dans un premier temps au partage entre ceux qui participent de la pensée marxiste et les modernistes parsoniens. Mais avec l’apport de la sociologie empirique américaine, celle de Lazarsfeld entre autres, la technicité se trouve renforcée ; la sophistication poussée des méthodes statistiques y contribue largement⁶⁹. De sorte qu’à l’image des autres domaines des sciences sociales, le travail du sociologue s’apparentera de plus en plus à l’expertise et à l’ingénierie sociale.

Afin de combler le vide que provoque l’ancrage des cadres occidentaux de perception du monde au coeur même de l’identité japonaise, un fort courant de pensée cependant émerge et investit la scène des débats comme le milieu de l’édition. Il s’agit du courant appelé *nihonjin-ron* (« nippologie »), qui s’inspire de l’anthropologie culturelle américaine. Bien qu’ils ne se soient pas regroupés en une discipline académique en tant que telle, ceux qui participent de la mouvance (qu’ils soient anthropologues, psychologues, psychanalystes, sociologues ou linguistes) proposeront, à travers la publication d’un nombre impressionnant d’ouvrages, l’idée de la spécificité *non comparable*, et par conséquent non saisissable de l’extérieur, de la personnalité de base nipponne⁷⁰. Ce faisant, ils contribuent à construire, dans un pays confronté à la menace anémique en raison de l’expansion exponentielle de l’univers urbain qui est la sienne dans les années soixante, *un espace commun mythifié appelé Japon* auquel tout Japonais, en sa qualité de Japonais peut prétendre appartenir. Il met en place un raisonnement tautologique — le Japonais est japonais car il est japonais (ou, pour prendre les choses à l’envers, « le Japonais *n’est pas* un Chinois ou un Occidental, lesquels *ne sont pas* japonais »⁷¹) — qui, venant conforter le sens commun, apporte des ressources cognitives pour assurer l’intégration sociale. Le procédé adopté par la nippologie a été d’opérer un glissement, transformant le relativisme culturel défendu par Ruth Benedict et Margaret Mead en un outil de mise en valeur d’une entité considérée, dans l’absolu, comme non occidentale. Ce courant

⁶⁷. ISHIDA Takeshi, *op.cit.* p. 208 [je traduis].

⁶⁸. KAWAI Takao, *Kindai nihon shakaigaku no tenkai [Le déploiement de la sociologie japonaise moderne]*, Tokyo, Kôseisha, 2003, p. 406-408.

⁶⁹. *Ibid.*, p. 414.

⁷⁰. Parmi les publications disponibles en français de ce courant, citons *La société japonaise*, de l’anthropologue Nakane Chie (Paris, Armand Colin, 1974, texte paru en japonais en 1967), et *Le Jeu de l’indulgence*, du psychanalyste Doi Takeo (Paris, le Sycomore/l’Asiathèque, 1988, texte japonais 1971).

⁷¹ SAKAI Naoki, *op.cit.*, p. 171 (souligné par l’auteur).

holiste, qui relève de ce que l'on pourrait appeler le *monoculturalisme*, s'impose de la sorte comme le pendant, en sciences sociales, du nationalisme économique⁷². De la déification de la figure de l'empereur des années de la guerre, on passe, par l'intermédiaire du discours anthropologique, à la sacralisation de la culture japonaise. Si elle a participé au maintien de la cohésion sociale en apportant les raisons de croire en l'autre anonyme, nécessairement japonais, la nippologie est l'exemple même d'une pensée qui s'appuie sur l'invisibilité de l'Asie. L'invisibilité se trouve inscrite dans la démarche même : si elle fait recours à la méthode comparative, celle-ci consiste avant tout en une mise en rapport des cultures judéo-chrétiennes et japonaises⁷³. L'affirmation de l'unicité de l'identité japonaise qui en découle inévitablement aura ainsi pour effet de maintenir voire de créer, non seulement à l'extérieur, mais *au sein même de la société, des altérités irréductibles* — les Coréens et les Chinois du Japon, notamment : désormais, l'autre invisible s'installe aussi dans l'archipel.

On s'aperçoit ainsi de la difficulté des sciences sociales à s'engager dans la voie désirée par Takeuchi Yoshimi. Aucun dépassement de la modernité occidentale et/ou japonaise n'est effectué durant les premières décennies qui suivent la défaite de 1945 et les continuités impensées demeurent. S'attacher à appliquer à la réalité japonaise les théories à portée générale en provenance de l'Europe et des Etats-Unis ou, à l'inverse, partir du terrain japonais pour insister sur son originalité, tels sont les deux termes d'une alternative d'où les sciences sociales peinent à s'extirper. Dans le premier cas, il s'agit d'évaluer l'état de la société japonaise à partir des critères de la modernité occidentale. Dans le second cas, on refuse de s'y soumettre, au risque de s'enfermer dans un récit mythique de l'identité japonaise qu'on a soi-même créé. La première démarche permet de vérifier que l'orientation prise par la société japonaise est bien celle de l'occidentalisation (de la démocratisation) et d'en signaler les dérives ; la seconde réinjecte du sens à un archipel en pleine mutation, en prenant soin d'éviter toute interférence avec le monde asiatique. Elles sont donc complémentaires en ce qu'elles soutiennent toutes deux le projet collectif général de remodelisation du pays. D'où l'absence, dans les savoirs produits, d'une dimension universelle susceptible de servir de ressources dans des contextes sociaux autres que japonais. On peut le déplorer. Mais là n'était pas le principal souci des sciences sociales. L'enjeu n'était pas d'adopter une position d'extériorité mais bien de s'inscrire au cœur d'un ordre social entièrement tourné vers la quête de l'Occident.

3) Une société qui se dépasse elle-même (1970-1995)

Cet état de choses change cependant à partir des années soixante-dix, au moment où la société japonaise s'impose en tant que puissance industrielle. L'arrivée à terme du projet collectif débouche sur un double effacement : disparition de modèles extérieurs et dissolution

⁷². Sur l'histoire intellectuelle de la formation de ce monoculturalisme, voir OGUMA Eiji, *Tan.itsuminzoku shinwa no kigen (The Myth of the Homegeneous Nation)*, Tôkyô, Shinyôsha, 1995.

⁷³. Est caricatural à cet égard le best-seller vendu à plus de trois millions d'exemplaires intitulé *Nihonjin to yudayajin [Les Japonais et les Juifs]* (Tokyo, Yamamoto-shoten, 1970), présenté comme rédigé par un auteur juif, Isaiah Ben-Dasan. On saura par la suite qu'il a été écrit par le critique conservateur Yamamoto Shichihei.

de la société industrielle « *par la petite porte des effets qu'elle induit* »⁷⁴. Parmi ces effets, le moindre n'est pas la cassure qui rompt la nécessaire relation qu'entretient la réalité avec le système de références qui la construit et lui donne sens. Le processus de modernisation de l'après 1945 peut être distingué, pour reprendre l'analyse du sociologue Mita Munesuke, en deux phases, l'une qui va de 1945 à 1960, l'autre de 1960 à 1970, durant lesquels les individus font appel aux idées, respectivement, de l'idéal (démocratique) et du rêve (américain) pour faire en sorte que le quotidien qui est le leur devienne conforme à leur aspiration⁷⁵. Dans cette configuration, ce sont bien des valeurs en surplomb, en provenance de l'Occident, qui sont convoquées pour construire la réalité. La référence à un au-delà du social est à saisir comme un moment où l'individu se projette dans le futur : par le bond effectué, ce dernier demeure fermement arrimé à une vision linéaire du temps qui l'autorise à envisager l'avenir comme la concrétisation future de l'idéal et/ou du rêve que le présent n'est pas en mesure d'offrir. Encadré de la sorte, la réalité se confond avec l'expérience ordinaire d'un monde-qui-va-de-soi : elle est synonyme de complétude. Elle se donne simplement à vivre, quelles que soient par ailleurs les vicissitudes ou les moments de joie qui la jalonnent. Tout une série d'institutions (l'école, le couple, la famille, l'entreprise) et de schèmes cognitifs (avec au premier chef le monoculturalisme) garantissent la sécurité ontologique des individus tant que, respectueux des normes, ils se considèrent être à la fois dans la moyenne (tout Japonais est censé être moyen, en vertu de sa qualité de japonais), et dans la classe moyenne.

Or c'est bien cette complétude que vient miner peu à peu la modernité industrielle, alors que le processus d'occidentalisation arrive à son terme. Divers facteurs bien connus — l'augmentation du revenu, l'accès massif à l'enseignement supérieur, l'émergence de la figure du consommateur, etc. — renforcent très fortement la dimension réflexive de la société. Inutile de reprendre ici les analyses de Lyotard, Baudrillard ou de Lipovetsky. On se contentera de souligner avec Mita Munesuke que *l'irréalité de la réalité* s'impose durant cette décennie, dans un moment où l'unité de base de la société passant de la famille nucléaire à l'individu, celui-ci, en raison des facteurs énumérés plus haut, pourra se poser la question du « qui suis-je ? ». La quête de l'authenticité du sujet met à l'épreuve la réalité telle qu'elle se déployait, pour ainsi dire, tranquillement, encadrée fermement dans le processus de modernisation ; dans un même mouvement, elle met à l'épreuve le corps, sans lequel toute appréhension du réel demeure bien sûr impossible. A travers la mise en question de la réalité et du corps, c'est à la fois la modernité occidentale (désormais inséparablement japonaise) et le monoculturalisme identitaire qui se trouvent interrogés de l'intérieur même de la société japonaise.

Mise à distance et non mise en question, faudrait-il dire. La transition vers la seconde modernité et le relativisme caractéristique de la période « post-moderne » des années 1970 et 1980 empêchent toute référence à des systèmes de valeurs stables, rendant la critique peu aisée. Dans le contexte japonais, alors que se met en place une spirale réflexive qui voit la

⁷⁴. BECK Ulrich, *La société du risque*, Paris, Aubier, 2001, p. 23 (souligné par l'auteur).

⁷⁵. Je renvoie le lecteur à l'analyse de MITA Munesuke, « Yume no jidai to kyokô no jidai [Le temps du rêve et le temps du simulacre] », dans *Mita Munesuke chosakushû [Œuvres complètes de Mita Munesuke]*, Tokyo, Iwanami-shoten, vol. VI, 2011, pp. 98-121.

société et la philosophie (fortement inspirée par les auteurs français tels que Foucault, Deleuze, Guattari, Derrida, Kristeva, Lacan, Lévinas, Ricœur) se nourrir l'une l'autre, cette mise en question prend au plan social, psychologique et politique la forme du *retrait*. L'échec dramatique de la contestation estudiantine des années soixante⁷⁶ ne laisse plus aucune place en effet aux mouvements sociaux, dans un archipel où s'installe par ailleurs un individualisme de masse qui progressivement fragilise l'espace public entendu comme espace rassemblant les nationaux. Du côté des individus, en particulier chez les jeunes en milieu urbain, on tente de se retrancher de la modernité industrielle, pour en prendre congé⁷⁷. La question qui se pose dès lors est la suivante : *où donc se replient-ils ?*

Répondre à cette interrogation n'est pas une préoccupation prioritaire tant que le pays jouit d'une prospérité économique inégalée. L'arrivée à maturité du capitalisme japonais aidant, le repli se comprend comme une forme parmi d'autres de la quête de soi. Quête de soi qui se traduit, au niveau des sciences sociales et de la pensée en général, par l'émergence de thématiques liées à l'ethnicité, au genre, aux minorités dont se saisit une nouvelle génération d'intellectuels afin de défaire le cloisonnement disciplinaire qui caractérise le monde académique. Comme ailleurs, la tendance générale est à la déconstruction des évidences. Pour dire les choses brutalement, le champ intellectuel s'engage *de façon insouciant*e dans la voie du multiculturalisme — la parution de la revue *La gaya scienza* en 1984 est révélatrice à cet égard — et diffuse, en étroite collaboration avec les médias et la publicité, des façons de faire et de dire qui contestent la vision univoque de la modernité japonaise⁷⁸. Partant de la périphérie des courants dominants du monde universitaire axés sur l'idée de modernité, cette démarche débouche sur un colloque international organisé en 1996 par le sociologue Yoshimi Sun.ya autour des *cultural studies* qui rassemble une centaine de chercheurs venant de toutes les disciplines des sciences humaines et sociales. Il s'agit d'un moment où la scène des débats reconnaît la constitution en pensée (au sens de Takeuchi) de la démarche relativiste. Cependant, celle-ci doit faire très vite face à deux difficultés complémentaires. D'une part, comme le fait remarquer Ohsawa Masachi, au fur et à mesure que la mise à distance avance dans les années 1980, « la déconstruction de l'évident devient elle-même une évidence » et montre une tendance à s'enfermer dans la course à l'interprétation des discours⁷⁹. D'autre part se pose très précisément la question de savoir *à partir d'où, ou au nom de quoi*, s'opère la mise à distance. Citons encore Ohsawa Masachi : « (...) les jeunes chercheurs de l'époque tentaient de relativiser toute chose qu'ils considéraient alors comme étant dominante. Mais la nouvelle vision du monde que l'on faisait surgir au bout du

⁷⁶. Le militantisme de gauche a débouché sur l'activisme terroriste de l'Armée rouge japonaise.

⁷⁷. Au moyen notamment d'objets produits par cette même modernité, dont le baladeur, (le Walkman) commercialisé en 1979 par Sony.

⁷⁸. La revue a été animée par Asada Akira (philosophe et économiste), Itô Toshiharu (spécialiste de l'esthétique) et Yomota Inuhiko (critique de cinéma). Les dossiers traités dans les trois premiers numéros sont les suivants : *Han-yutopia* [l'anti-utopie] (juin 1984), *Polysexual* (novembre 1984), *Sen no ajia* [mille Asie] (octobre 1985).

⁷⁹. NARITA Ryûchi et OHSAWA Masachi, « Fuhen to riaru [L'universel et le réel] », in *Gendai shisô no tenkai 2014. Posuto posuto kôzôshugi he [Le tournant de la pensée contemporaine 1014. Vers le post poststructuralisme]*, *Gendai shisô – Revue de la pensée d'aujourd'hui*, 2014, vol. 42-1, p. 236.

processus de relativisation a été donnée à voir sous une forme caricaturale par Aum — telle est du moins l'impression que nous en avons eue alors »⁸⁰.

Le 20 mars 1995, la secte Aum, qui appelle de ses vœux la survenue d'une société post-apocalyptique, perpète une série d'attentats au gaz sarin dans le métro de Tokyo. Cet événement qui marque profondément et durablement la société japonaise — il y a un avant et après 1995 — présente une caractéristique majeure : de même que le 11 mars 2011, mais contrairement aux attentats du 11 septembre 2001 et sans doute à ceux du 11 janvier 2015, il ne permet en aucune façon de renvoyer la cause du « mal » à des facteurs extérieurs. L'événement ne peut être que le *pur produit* de l'effacement de la modernité japonaise industrielle. « On critiquait ceux qui occupent des positions majoritaires en partant cependant du postulat selon lequel *cela* ne pouvait advenir. Aum est alors apparu pour nous interpeller comme suit : “Non, *cela* est réalisable. *Cela*, c'est ce qu'on obtient lorsqu'on donne véritablement forme à ce que vous dites [vous, les intellectuels] ”»⁸¹. Avec les attentats de 1995, il devient patent que constater l'effacement de la société sous les effets qu'elle induit ne suffit plus ; le constat ne suffit d'autant moins qu'ils pointent la défaillance du champ de la pensée, dont la frange la plus consciente des transformations de la modernité japonaise industrielle était loin d'être insensible, avant 1995, à la vision apocalyptique d'Asahara Shôkô, le gourou d'Aum, pour avoir elle-même eu recours à une telle vision⁸². Dit autrement, le champ sociologique avait postulé le *cela* comme conséquence ultime du retrait, sans pour autant prendre le soin de comprendre les fondements sociaux qui le rendent possible⁸³. Entretemps, le processus de dépassement de la modernité japonaise industrielle par elle-même avait créé des espaces innommés que vient occuper, à sa manière, la secte Aum.

Par le dévoilement de ses intentions qui ne peuvent pas être simplement qualifiées de pathologiques ou de déviantes (sauf à réintroduire les catégories de jugement propres à la modernité industrielle), Aum impose ainsi à ceux qui participent du multiculturalisme une réaction qui prend la forme de *la mise à distance de la mise à distance*⁸⁴. Il s'agit bien ici d'une mise à distance du relativisme post-moderne, et non pas d'un renoncement. En effet, il n'était pas envisageable d'abandonner la réflexion sur les pouvoirs menée par les *cultural studies* et de revenir à la nation et au monoculturalisme, à un moment où, en réaction à la fin de l'ordre de la guerre froide et à la crise économique qui suit l'éclatement de bulle financière de 1990, le néo-nationalisme — un autre espace libéré par l'effacement de la modernité industrielle — commence à occuper le devant de la scène politique et des débats. L'opération

⁸⁰. *Ibid.*, p. 238.

⁸¹. *Ibid.*, p. 238.

⁸². Vision qui, par œuvres artistiques des années 1980 interposées, découlerait du militantisme d'extrême-gauche des années soixante. Voir sur ce point AZUMA Hiroki et KASAI Kiyoshi, *Dôbutsuka suru shakai no naka de [Dans une société qui s'animalise]*, Tokyo, Shûeisha-shinsho, 2003, en particulier p. 112-113.

⁸³. Les dérives de la post-modernité ont été d'abord captées et rendues conscientes par le travail des artistes. Je pense, entre autres, à ces deux chefs-d'œuvre que sont *Chroniques de l'oiseau à ressort* (Tokyo, Kodansha, 1994-1995 ; Paris, Seuil, 2001) du romancier Murakami Haruki et *River's Edge* (Cutie, 1993-1994 ; Takarajima-sha, 2000 ; Paris, Casterman, 2007) de l'auteure de manga Okazaki Kyôko.

⁸⁴. OHSAWA Masachi, *op.cit.*, p. 238.

de mise à distance du relativisme consiste bien plutôt à prendre au sérieux la réalité japonaise, cette réalité irréaliste qui, en raison de la disparition des catégories d'entendement qui coordonnaient l'expérience conformément aux attentes de la modernité occidentale/japonaise, empêche les individus — en particulier donc les jeunes générations, pour lesquelles, la crise aidant, la quête de l'authenticité s'apparente de plus à un décrochage social — d'atteindre la plénitude de l'être.

L'affaire Aum de 1995 marque donc symboliquement l'arrêt de l'oscillation pendulaire. Echappant aux cadres épistémiques de la modernité occidentale comme du holisme ethnocentrique, elle montre en creux, mais néanmoins de façon incontestable, la transition de la modernité industrielle japonaise vers quelque chose d'autre. Une autre chose dont la pensée d'Asahara Shôkô — qualifiée de *junk* par l'écrivain Murakami Haruki — est nécessairement un des marqueurs. Mais si *junk* soit-elle, elle accompagne l'émergence de réalités inédites : les attentats de 1995 est ce moment où la société japonaise se révèle à elle-même, dans toute sa solitude. Elle est là, *quelque part* — elle manque désormais de coordonnées pour se situer —, mais à tout le moins, *elle cesse d'être ce rien* évoqué par Takeuchi Yoshimi. Si bien qu'il est sans doute possible d'avancer ceci : 1995 indique non pas tant la mutation vers une seconde modernité, mais *l'émergence de la société japonaise en tant que modernité non-occidentale*. La société est moderne *au sens sociologique*, tel que l'entend la tradition sociologique de Durkheim à Giddens et à Beck comme processus de délocalisation et de relocalisation⁸⁵ ; non-occidentale dans la mesure où la référence aux catégories d'entendement européen et/ou américain (retravaillés également de l'intérieur du monde occidental) n'est plus de mise. Mais cette modernité-là surgit dans les années 1990 dans sa dimension fondamentalement problématique.

Où en est la réalité japonaise ? Décrypter et interroger les espaces où se sont repliés les individus deviennent désormais une préoccupation vitale. Pour résumer à l'extrême, le défi qui se pose aux Japonais se présente sous la forme d'une alternative qui décline deux difficultés : accepter de vivre un monde dénué de significations (s'installer dans la réalité irréaliste) ou partir à la recherche de sens (mû par un élan romantique qui transporte l'individu dans un lieu autre que le sien). Et c'est au moment précis où le champ du savoir va devoir faire face à ce défi que la sociologie japonaise entre véritablement dans la scène des débats et mue en *pensée*. Pour ce faire, elle a eu, en tout état de cause, à éviter les deux culs-de-sacs épistémiques que sont l'occidentalisme et le monoculturalisme — préalable indispensable pour la production de savoirs sociologiques aptes à servir de ressources pour une meilleure intelligibilité, non de la modernité occidentale, mais de *la modernité tout court*. Mais demeure une seconde condition : dans le prolongement du cadre d'analyse proposé par Takeuchi Yoshimi, *introduire l'autre invisible dans le champ de vision des sciences sociales*.

En sociologie, ce travail est mené de façon exemplaire par Mita Munesuke (né en 1937), plusieurs fois cités en ces pages. Fait rare dans le milieu académique, nous avons affaire à un

⁸⁵. Je reprends les termes de Giddens (GIDDENS Anthony, *Les conséquences de la modernité*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 1994).

auteur qui écrit également sous un second nom, celui de Maki Yûsuke. Le dédoublement est bien entendu voulu et correspond au caractère dual de son approche : Mita Munesuke désigne le sociologue qui s'attache à prendre pour objet la société telle qu'elle se déploie dans le cadre de la modernité japonaise depuis 1868 ; Maki Yûsuke est cet intellectuel qui, par delà la société, explore les conditions de possibilité de la *communauté* — d'un être-ensemble autre que ce que recouvre la notion de société dans son acception moderne. Alors qu'il était déjà l'auteur d'analyses pénétrantes qui font aujourd'hui figure de classiques de la sociologie japonaise⁸⁶, il est amené, suite à un séjour au Mexique, à publier en 1976 sous le nom de Maki Yûsuke un texte intitulé *Kiryû no naru oto [Le son du courant aérien]* placé sous les auspices de Castaneda et de don Juan⁸⁷. Non pas pour « acquérir, à la lecture d'un carnet de terrain, des connaissances en anthropologie culturelle, mais pour partir à la rencontre du monde de ces indiens et faire de cette rencontre l'occasion d'imaginer et de libérer notre *façon de vivre* »⁸⁸. C'est ainsi que Mita Munesuke, par pseudonyme interposé, intègre dans sa sociologie l'angle mort que Takeuchi Yoshimi a appelé Asie. Mais cette Asie, ombre portée de la modernité japonaise, est vaste. Avec Mita Munesuke et d'autres, l'Asie, cet autre enfin rendu visible, s'étend aux mondes non-occidentaux, non-modernes, prémodernes, préhistoriques — à l'humanité tout entière. La réflexion sur la catastrophe de la centrale nucléaire de Fukushima-daiichi qui suit le séisme du 11 mars 2011 est à ce prix.

Reste à présenter les savoirs produits au sein de la discipline par les sociologues qui suivent Mita Munesuke : Miyadai Shinji, Ohsawa Masachi, Yoshimi Shun.ya, Kang Sang-jung, Kitada Akihiro, Yamada Masahiro, Ueno Chizuko, Suzuki Kensuke, Genda Yûji, Furuichi Noritoshi, pour ne citer qu'eux. Mais là n'est sans doute pas mon rôle, si tant est, bien entendu, que je puisse l'assumer. Il revient au champ intellectuel occidental, et notamment français, d'initier une politique de la traduction, cette fois-ci en sens inverse.

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⁸⁶. Familier de la méthode statistique, il se démarque cependant très nettement des « spécialistes sans âme » des années soixante, par l'attention qu'il porte au corps, au sentiment, à l'élan vital, au style d'écriture également.

⁸⁷. Dans MAKI Yûsuke, *Maki Yûsuke chosakushû [Œuvres complètes de Maki Yûsuke]*, Tokyo, Iwanami-shoten, vol. I, 2012, pp. 4-161 (texte paru initialement en 1976).

⁸⁸. *Ibid.*, p. 32 (souligné par l'auteur).

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Affects and political subjectivation

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Jacques Rancière has proposed the concept of « political subjectivation » (Rancière 1995) as a way to account for the emergence of new political claims in societies. A political subject emerges out of a claim for political recognition in the context of a dominant definition of the political community from which this subject is excluded. Understanding “political subjectivation” is thus a necessary conceptual step in order to explain the emergence of dissensus and contestations in societies. However, the concept is mute on the social processes which make possible the emergence of individuals and collectives ready to *make a claim* and challenge a current state of affairs, whatever it is. Understanding “political subjectivation” is thus critical if we are to propose a sociology of social change rather than a sociology of social reproduction.

My purpose in this paper is to propose a sociological conceptualization of this process of “political subjectivation”, which sheds light on this silent part of theory. To do that, I will uphold that the translation of concept from philosophy to sociology requires that we widen our conception of subjectivity, by considering *affects* along its more classical discursive contents. In turn, this opening will make visible more subtle forms of “political subjectivation”, which remain invisible when focusing only on language and discourse. My main hypothesis is thus that considering affects allows describing and understanding the emergence of new political claims, in a particular political space.

However, the claim to “sociologize” a concept originating from philosophy can only be sustained by a firm shift toward the empirical. In order to operate this translation, I will draw on the case of Indonesian migrant women working in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur.

These women are part of Indonesia’s growing labor exports, driven by the State⁸⁹. As is true at a global level, these population flows have been increasingly feminized, in part because of the transnationalization of domestic labor (Sassen 2004; Ehrenreich et Hochschild 2004) and the emergence of the “global care chain” (Hochschild 2000). Within this dynamic, feminine and masculine experiences of migration have diverged. First, obviously because of women and men’s assignation to different types of jobs, linked to different living conditions. But also, importantly, because women have used these new migrations as a means of (re)negotiating

⁸⁹ This research was realized in the context of my Phd in Sociology, supervised by Laurence Roulleau-Berger. It aimed to analyze labor migrations from Indonesia to Malaysia and Singapore. These migration flows are related to the rapid development of labor migrations across Southeast-Asia and beyond since the 1990’s. These migrations have given place to big, transnational “migration industries” (Castles et Miller 2009) and to the rise of Indonesia as a major labor exporter in Asia, along the Philippines, Vietnam or Bangladesh, with more than 6 million workers abroad in 2010.

their subaltern position within a masculine social order, in their home communities (Robinson 2009; Bastide 2015a). While for men migration has emerged and consolidated as a temporary moment of accumulation abroad aimed at producing social and economic mobility *back home*, for many women it has rather become a way of escaping social determinations related to gender. To this extent, their migration can be read as the speechless expression of a *dissensus* (Rancière 1995), thereby indicating the emergence of a process of “political subjectivation”. However, these practical defections do not open onto the elaboration of a critical discourse aimed at the organization of social relationships within their home communities, even though this very organization seems to be a root cause of their circulation practices.

This case raises important theoretical issues, which will be useful to our conceptualization of “political subjectivation”: How indeed can we make sense of the coexistence between increasingly subversive feminine practices abroad and the absence of a critical discourse aimed at a social order wherein these same practices are marginalized? Can we speak of “political subjectivation” in the absence of discursive political claims? Is it possible to make sense of the relationship between practical dissidences and the absence of a critical discourse without falling back into old notions of “false consciousness”?

The text will be organized as follow: a first section will discuss the specificities of women’s experience in the context of these new migrations, in order to justify the choice of the case. I will then advance Luc Boltanski’s concept of *critique* (Boltanski 2011), as a means of explaining the emergence of dissensus in the social world. I will propose to link *critique* to the affective part of social experiences. In doing that, I will be able to conceptualize, in the last section, the relationship between affects and “political subjectivation”.

Women’s migrations: a split experience

Indonesian migrant women always present their migration projects as motivated by a collective economic necessity, understood at the scale of the nuclear family. However, these consensual motives often cover an unspeakable drive to escape gendered social assignments back home. Migrating can thus be a means of delaying or escaping an early engagement in an orderly feminine life trajectory, by local standards, at a time when “social imagination” (Appadurai 1996) is increasingly at odds with locally available repertoires of social positions and roles. Leaving thus often becomes an “exit” strategy in a context where expressing an explicit dissensus – “voice” – (Hirschman 1970) against the inherited social order is a cause of social exclusion within home communities, in Indonesia. Moreover, even for those whose migration does not conceal this kind of hidden motives, migration experiences often cause subjective readjustments which make women unable to cope with the social expectations they have to deal with when they return, be it on holidays or for good. Among those who did not conceive of their departure as a form of distancing, some indeed have the possibility to evade usually very coercive work conditions, in Malaysia and Singapore, and to escape the spatial confinement which they usually include. In both metropolises exposure to urban lifestyles then often drives women into developing new practices, *practices of the self* and sociabilities. Women take advantage of their available free time to follow training courses in different

subject matters; others engage in advocacy in NGOs, or in religious activities; many engage in loving and sexual practices subversive of local norms of gender, class, and racial relations, in Indonesia as in local societies. In the process, they enter double deviance pathways, regarding dominant social norms in Indonesia *as in* destination countries. Through these new practices and practices of the self, many among these women develop new identifications which are very discordant with available social roles and positions, back in Indonesia (Bastide 2015a; 2015b). In other words, we thus witness new types of feminine *practical contestation* of social assignments and social injunctions, back in Indonesia as in urban settings, in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore.

We are thus faced with new forms of practical subversions linked to gendered processes of individuation which are specific of these new migration experiences.

When these subversions touch on feminine sexual practices, they reveal particularly corrosive. And these practices, along other, less contentious subversions of social norms, are stigmatized in Indonesia as in both neighboring countries. In Malaysia and Singapore, they only add to a widespread social contempt among autochthonous populations for foreign migrant workers, thus reinforcing the social stereotypes which depict migrants as endowed with an exuberant and insalubrious sexuality, ready to infect the national body. In Indonesia, the disclosure of these sexual and loving practices abroad usually leads to the severing of social recognition ties which sustain the recognition of women as members of their home communities. As such, they can lead to violent processes of eviction. Thus it comes as no surprise if this situation pushes women to develop strategies to manage the circulation of information between the different places along their transnational circulations. Transnational spaces then also become “spaces of symbolic reversibility” (Petitat 1998) where social and spatial disjuncture between different places is used to control information about oneself disclosed in different locations. For instance, women often draw a feeling of social recognition from their ability to move seamlessly among the crowds of the globalized and cosmopolitan Singapore. On the contrary, each of their coming home sees them endorse traditional social roles, often painfully, and control carefully what which, from their life abroad, is susceptible to undermine their position, here, if it was disclosed. Their practices and identities abroad are thus silenced.

In the Javanese village where the Indonesian fieldwork was located, it is thus not surprising if women are very reluctant to speak of their experiences abroad. As a consequence, it is hard for the researcher to get beyond very conventional talks, aimed at preserving their social position locally, where they claim their attachment to the traditional way of living. On the contrary, when I met women abroad, they were much keener than men to narrate their experiences of migration. And I was often faced with expressions of a feeling of emancipation, directly related to their experiences as migrant women. Answering to the question of how migration changed her, Tina, a young women in her late 20s, who had been working in Singapore as a domestic worker for about 10 years, could thus say: “*Yes, it has changed me a lot! Today I am more... trendy (...) Singaporeans approach us and even hail “Hi sexy girl! I have money, I can show that... that I am independent. I am self-confident. I am very self-confident. I am not scared, that’s it. The difference is really huge.”*”

It is easy to understand that for women engaged in this type of experience, homecomings often reveal very painful, as they are then forced into reinvesting old social roles which are a negation of these processes of subjectivation in migration (Bastide 2013). It is less easy to understand, however, that this tension does not give place to discourses critical of home societies, in Indonesia. Indeed, their social patterns generate moral wounds by preventing women from being recognized in what they perceive as their new identities, and by calling for claims of loyalty toward the collective order and afferent social constraints. As a result, women's discourses split between what they express about their current experience, while located in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, and expressions of a deep attachment to social patterns and traditions, back in Indonesia.

It is true that we can identify the emergence of a political subject in women's voluntary distancing from social norms, in Indonesia. This can be expressed through a departure which aims at least partially at loosening the hold of social assignments or through a progressive distancing with traditional forms of living in the course of migration experiences. Women's *exits*, be they expressed through the act of leaving or through the spacing of their returns, allows inferring the emergence of a dissent toward the organization of collective life, the distribution of positions and relational norms, in Indonesia. This dissent can be inferred also through the aspirations of these women, expressed abroad, as they testify of an increasing distancing with regard to available positions at home. In this sense, it can be understood as a way of claiming a share in a "distribution of the sensible" (Rancière 1995) where they feel marginalized. In other words, we see a form of practical critic, which hints at the emergence of incipient "political subjectivation" processes. Yet and importantly, the claim on which this subjectivation process it is based can only be outlined through a reconstitution operated by the researcher, they are never expressed by women themselves.

Therefore we are faced with an internal split of discourse: women oscillate between expressions of deeply rearranged identifications, on the one hand, and expressions of nostalgia for their old life back home and claims of loyalty toward their home communities, on the other hand. Thus I have repeatedly witnessed elusive expressions of personal anger directed at abusive parents who pushed their daughters to migrate against their own will. This type of migration project usually aims at financing education or the entry into civil service of a sibling. This anger is nevertheless *always* restrained by an allegiance to a cultural discourse on filiation ties which links the gift of life, given by parents, to a *debt on life* which commands submission and respect from their children. So the expression of a revolt against parents is usually immediately negated by the reaffirmation of an acknowledgment of a debt, which commands respect and affection on the part of children. In other words, anger and revolt against parents cause a feeling of guilt, which tempers their expression.

Moreover, this feeling actually has a much wider reach and impact on migration experiences. It seems indeed that the development of new practices and new identifications in migration always come to the price of a feeling of culpability directed toward communal affiliations, in Indonesia. The felt satisfaction of living abroad is experienced as a betrayal of family allegiances, in a context where migration is usually collectively defined in the terms of a personal sacrifice to the benefit of the wider family. Feeling pleasure instead of (or in addition

to) the expected pain, fearing returns instead of expecting them cause and modulate a haunting feeling of guilt. Rani, a domestic worker in Singapore, testifies of the strength of this family ideology: whereas her parents tried to force her into marrying a man thirty-five years older than her, although, at the time, she went at war with them on this issue, she is nevertheless haunted by a deep guilt. She says:

“ *In the evening when... when my employer was sleeping, I would go to the bathroom and cry. I was sad, so sad. What is important is that I was sad. (...) How difficult it has been for my parents to raise me and give me... since I was little until I was an adult. But I never respected them! One could describe me as a useless child! I always remembered all that [in her difficult moments]* ”.

In the same spirit, when Ria and Evi in Kuala Lumpur describe their ongoing conflicts with their parents, which revolve around the life choices their families wanted to impose upon them, they describe themselves as *jahat* and *galak* – mean, savage – or *bandel* – stubborn -. We are thus faced with the issue of *affects*. More accurately, we have to deal with the issue of the relationship between affects and discourse: affects which underpin the deeply rooted rejection of a situation resented as unbearable, when secret aspirations clash with the patterns of family relationships, are never translated into an articulated utterance of revolt. This impossible expression frames the entrance on migration routes as a gesture of survival, never as a positive challenge to social patterns even though they are the root-cause of this agonizing situation. And if physical distance does suspend these social obligations for a given time, it never suppresses the strength of family ties which bring these women back continually toward these old dependencies even if they are increasingly discrepant with the lives they live in migration.

This raises a load of issues regarding the topic of “political subjectivation”: how indeed do we qualify this tension which splits social experiences *within* discourse and *between* discourse and practices? If we consider that “political subjectivation” relates to the formulation of a wrong – *tort* – and a claim to a “re-distribution of the sensible”, can we posit that it can take place also *outside* of language? And can we speak of “political subjectivation” at all in this case? My hypothesis is that there is a positive answer to this question. But it requires a conceptual work, in order to clarify the relation between discourse and affects.

Affects and the emergence of *critique*

For Rancière “political subjectivation” is tied to the emergence of a claim for political transformation. This claim is based on the expression of a “wrong”, and a demand for political recognition emanating from subaltern social groups. Fundamentally, “political subjectivation” is thus related to the emergence of a new *critical* discourse. Considering *critic* as an analytical category is thus a good starting point if we are to re-work Rancière’s concept toward a more sociological formulation. I will do that by drawing on Luc Boltanski’s pragmatist theory of *critique* (Boltanski 2011), which offers useful tools in this endeavor.

In his attempt to propose a social ontology of critique, Boltanski locates the principles of critique, as a fundamental social practice, in a property of reality. In a pragmatist spirit, he operates a foundational distinction between the “world”, understood as the raw flow of things, and “reality”, conceived of as the ways humans frame the “world” in order to make it intelligible, through systems of categorization. To this extent, “reality” shares common characteristics with Rancière’s notion of the “distribution of the sensible”: it describes the institution of a *human* reality. This tempered constructionism, which postulates *both* the social and communicational ontology of reality, and the existence of a material subtract which we cannot access without the mediation of language, allows accounting for emergences which continuously disrupt the established state of affairs. *Critique* arises precisely when the “world”, through singular events, irrupts and imposes itself upon social subjects, thus troubling the mechanisms of institution of “reality” by affecting the credibility of the common categories of meaning which structure it. Boltanski thus builds an ontology of *critique* which somehow prolongs the Gramscian theory of cultural hegemony by specifying the practical modalities of emergence of a dissensus in the social.

In this definition, critique presupposes the existence of a pre-linguistic level of perception. Indeed, if the “world” is a deep and non-mediated level of the real, it cannot manifest itself as immediately semantic. However, if we admit that critique emerges out of this pre-linguistic perception, it is nevertheless true that it always manifest as a verbal contestation of current semantic categories (that is of “reality”, in Boltanski’s terminology): for the “world” to emerge in “reality”, it needs to be captured by consciousness and in language in order to open onto the utterance of a critical position, backed by one form or another of argumentative justification. Understood in this way, *critique* is thus absent of migrant women’s discourses. Rather than signifying a stance against oppressive social patterns, their discourse splits between claims of loyalty toward their home societies and narrations of new, transgressive identifications in migration. No critical discourse arise, which could produce continuities between these two disjunctive dimensions of their experience. Experience is thus lived in the tension between identification with new practices, and the perpetuation of inherited normative discourses which assign them to depreciative moral judgments. In this context, I postulate that accounting for the affective contents of experience allows understanding and making sense of these split discourses. *Affects*, I will sustain, are the missing link which knits together the “world” and “reality”, as a “non-representational” (Thrift 2007) type of perceptions.

Raymond William’s concept of “structures of feeling” (1977) allows taking a step in that direction.

For Williams, “structures of feelings” are precipitates of affects and meanings which organize the relationship between a social subject and the emergent, the contingent. In other words, between her and all that which, in her current experience, continuously surges, displacing consolidated realities without yet pertaining to the semantic. In short, “structures of feeling” are at the foundation of a pre-semantic “practical consciousness”. In this view, orientation in the course of experience owes less to the mobilization of socially stabilized semantic categories than to shifting assemblages between fragments of semantic and affective material, upon which the relationship to reality is based. However, if they evolve somehow underneath

language, “structures of feeling” must nevertheless be considered as social and historicized, as the product of sited collective experiences and individual socialization. By speaking of “structures of feeling” we thus open up a sort of intermediate space between “the world” and “reality”, understood as in Boltanski’s discussion. This definition accounts for the pre-semantic and *social* aspects of affects. In this respect, it allows bringing back affects on the side of a social rather than psychological subject. Affects can be understood as composing a non-representational dimension of experience (Thrift 2007) which allows perceiving non-semantic manifestations of “the world” and which determines the positioning of a subject regarding its emergences, *before* they are articulated in language. Yet, the concept says little on the *processes of articulation* between the fragments of meanings and affects which they are composed of.

In this sense, Vincent Crapanzano (2007) allows going a step further. He proposes a useful distinction, which articulates well with Boltanski’s concept of *critique*. Drawing on a fragile tradition which dates back to William James’ (1884) and Silvan Tomkins’ (Tomkins 1995) works, he suggests that affects are properties of the body: in this perspective, social experience is underpinned by a constant flux of states and sensations – of *affections* -, non-discursive in nature, involved in framing the situational engagements of social subjects. However, Crapanzano then distinguishes another level of elaboration of affects. What he terms *emotional experience* (in contrast with *affective experience*) is built from the discursive elaboration of these bodily modulations, which are thus translated at a linguistic level. This way of understanding affects is close enough to William Reddy’s formulations (1997; 2001) when he suggests to distinguish between affects as bodily affections, and their linguistic framing. His concept of *emotive* thus aims at describing the discursive framing of affects (subjects’ descriptions of affective states), and its articulation with affects as a non-discursive phenomenon. Speaking of *emotives* therefore allow three important things: first, it makes a useful analytical distinction between affects and *discourses on affects*. Secondly, it offers a mediation between the non-representational dimension of experience (under the form of affects) and its semantic side. Third, it recognizes the performative character of emotional expression, as their elaboration in language have a feedback effects on the affects which they attempt to express (qualifying an affect as “guilt” or “anger”, for instance, carries a broad range of cultural implications which, in turn, transforms the original affect, as a bodily phenomenon). Affective experience thus includes three levels, all equally social in their nature: 1. Affects, as affections of the body, emerge out of a *social relationship* to the “world” (we are socialized into feeling what to fear and what to love); 2. The expression of emotions elaborates semantic formulations of pre-discursive experiences, thus making the missing link between pre-semantic and semantic experience; 3. Finally, these expressions have recursive effects on the underlying affects they attempt to characterize.

Affects and political subjectivation

We now have at our hand conceptual tools which allow accounting for the emergence of critique and for the modality of inscription of the “world” in “reality”, through several

identified steps. The “world” can indeed manifest itself under the form of a feeling of unease and malaise, or excitement and attraction, without yet being caught in language. In this spirit feelings of culpability or shame toward parents, longing for life in Indonesia, pride related to new, more urban identities, excitement toward new practices and practices of the self in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore can be analyzed in terms of tensions within and between spatially distributed “structures of feeling” (Bastide 2013). It thus appears that, much like discourse splits between disjunctive or even contradictory semantic assemblages, “structures” of feeling are often composed of opposing affects: the same course of action can cause a feeling of shame and unease toward one’s home society whereas, at the same time, it provides a feeling of pride related to one’s inscription in other social groups, in migration. Shame toward “significant others” back home can thus combine, *in the same situation*, with a feeling of self-esteem based on current interactions with other “significant others” in Singapore or Kuala Lumpur, tied to the *very same* sets of attitudes.

To the same extent that departures and the spacing of homecomings express a type of practical contestation of social patterns in Indonesia, I posit that we can also see here a form of “political subjectivation”. However, one preliminary condition must be met in order to advance this hypothesis: subjectivity must be considered as being made of both semantic components *and* affects. If we accept this premise, then a new domain of inquiry opens up: *malaise* tied to the continuous oscillation between social spaces where contradictory identifications and loyalties are territorialized can then be seen as an incipient form of “political subjectivation”, preliminary to the emergence of critique as a speech act, an intermediate experience linking the “world” and its surge in the realm of “reality”. Indeed, as I have shown, this persisting feeling of unease, rooted in successive and spatially distributed processes of social disadjustment/readjustments is not framed as a discursive claim (or as series of claims). Women’s experiences thus split along several lines: between concurring representations, as I have shown; between their representational (or discursive) dimension and affects when, for instance, women are teared apart between the joy and excitement provided by new practices abroad, and persistent discourses of loyalty toward their home communities; finally, it splits at the level of affects when affective “attachments” (Latour 2000; Bastide 2013) draw multipolar transnational geographies, structured by diverse sets of affective tensions both within different localities (at home, on migration routes and in destination countries), and between localities (affects tied to home communities and to the metropolis). In other words, affects draw complex patterns of spatial attractions/repulsions. Nostalgia vs. impossibility to settle back in Indonesia, as women are not ready to comply with the social expectations they would have to adhere to in order to fully re-integrate their home communities; attraction for their current lives vs. impossibility to settle in destination countries, as migration politics aim at excluding them from any form of perennial citizenship (Bastide 2011).

In this regard, observations in a shelters for runaway maids ran by an NGO in Singapore offer an interesting clue as they allow clarifying these processes of subjectivation. In this place, women resist the framing of their ordeals by NGO personnel in a critical feminist narrative. Critic of paternalism and gender inequalities in Indonesia and suggestions that transnational

domestic work is undignified do not seem to echo in their own experiences. Indeed, these critics rightly target unequal social relationships which are *de facto* important determinants of their bad experiences. However, they also bring women into re-interpreting their “attachments” to their home places, including family patterns, in terms of alienation. Therefore these critics tarnish the value of the affective intensities attached to these social ties. And yet, these very same affects are continuously recollected and invested in the present in order to make often harsh work situations bearable by fantasizing a joyful homecoming. The calling into question of social arrangements in Indonesia, in feminist discourses of emancipation, is thus often resented as a violence. To be sure it undermines the value of important affects, including filial deference toward parents; and if they participate in structuring power relationships within home societies, these affects also sustain one’s relation to oneself and, more specifically, one’s “affective security” (Honneth 2002).

This issue is rendered even more acute by the fact that these women are faced with violent forms of social contempt, in Malaysia and Singapore, making the need for persisting affective ties in Indonesia more vital. This is why if these affects (such as love for the parents or nostalgia about collective life in Indonesia and longing for a successful homecoming) reconfigure in the course of migration experiences (Bastide 2013), they never seem to decay completely. Their persistence is shown by the widespread feeling among these women of having to struggle continuously for their own recognition as fully entitled family and community members, which they would not need to do would they have severed these ties, and by the impossibility for them to imagine their definite rupture. These “attachments” thus produce two things in relation to Indonesian women’s migration experiences. On the one hand, they make their present bearable by evoking warm feelings attached to their home communities, and by fantasizing a future homecoming; On the other hand, they also contribute to transnationalize the reproduction of their subaltern position, by making them “affectively tied” to an organization of society which assigns them to marginal power positions.

Where this “affective recognition” lacks, this absence causes deep moral wounds. Rani, in Kuala Lumpur, thus expresses her craving for her parents’ love, which she feels that she has compromised by leaving against their will in order to reunite with her lover. Puspa, another young woman, in Singapore, was coerced into leaving by her father. She feels that she has been sacrificed in order to provide for her younger brother’s education. She is nevertheless still tirelessly seeking the smallest manifestation of recognition or pride on their part. She expresses grief at the failure of her migration, as she was prevented to work by the Ministry of Manpower who discovered that her employer had abused the law, while she is waiting in a NGO shelter for a trial to settle her case. This grief combines with shame, disorientation (what to do?) and anger at her parents for their disregard toward her own feelings, as they forbid her to come back without money. Her situation shows at the same time the coercive power of affective ties, and an incipient sense of justice (manifested through anger) which nevertheless quickly vanishes and transforms into its own negation, as this expression of anger immediately modulates into a feeling of shame for opposing her parents.

Humanitarian and feminist Critical NGO discourses are met with resistance because they deny this dimension of women's experiences. Women, rather than severing these emotional "attachments", struggle to *negotiate* them. A way of doing that is by spacing their homecomings, thus avoiding the difficult experience of disadjustment which they go through during these returns (the discrepancy between affective attachments to their home places and the reality of social relations when they come back: Bastide, 2013). Yet, this reluctance to go back often causes a feeling of betrayal towards their families and communities. This negative affect is then often dealt with by the importance of their remittances: providing for the livelihood of their relatives justifies their stay abroad. Moreover, it is a way to renegotiate their position, and to seek recognition of their new selves. By endorsing the role of breadwinner, they somehow display the *value* of their current identities. Rather than severing these old ties which keep them in subaltern positions, women thus try to renegotiate them *in practice*. And their concern with affective recognition by their relatives prevents them from forming a *critique* which would deprive these ties of any value. Activist's *critique* thus cannot be endorsed by these women.

To date, many Indonesian migrant women in Singapore and in Kuala Lumpur thus find themselves in this in-between social space where they suffer from cumulative, internal and relational splits between practices, discourses and affects. Escaping this painful situation is not easy. And many keep on repeating migration rounds in order to delay a much feared final return, when they will need to fit again in their home communities, thus renouncing to the practices and identifications they have developed away. Very few opt for a rupture and never come back to their old lives, choosing to settle elsewhere in Indonesia.

Conclusion: a hypothesis and a case

Migrant Voices, in Singapore, let us envision another possible following to this rather pessimistic appraisal. A Singaporean NGO, its mission was to "celebrate the artistic talent of migrants" and to promote their social integration within local society. Interestingly, esthetic experience tends to amplify and intensify the traits of ordinary experience (Dewey 1958); moreover, artistic practices tend to support and to value the narration of individual stories expressed at the closest of lived experience. Authenticity, as a pregnant ideology in arts (Heinich 1999; Boltanski and Chiapello 1999), and the consequent quest for a certain type of « truth » of being and experience, seems to ease the outpouring of an expression which is both new –emergent in situation –, anchored in and respectful of migrant women's lived experiences – contrary to activists' emancipatory discourses –. Through artistic expressions, the ambiguities of individual experiences teared apart between disjunctive spaces, affects, practices and discourses can be figured. These art experiences might open up a different normative space for expression, structured by forms of interpersonal recognition tied to a preoccupation with *authenticity*, where the shared feeling of *malaise* felt by many women, due to their in-between position, might develop into a discursive *critique*. As a matter of fact, the few women involved in these artistic activities seem to develop a more distant relationship

to their older lives, back in Indonesia. However, it would require a specific research program in order to confirm or infirm this intuition.

What can be said is that, by getting involved in this artistic milieu, women find a legitimate form of social recognition without having to endorse dominant normative discourses on the self, be it a critical discourse carried by NGOs and international organizations, or a conservative discourse tied to local social patterns of gender relations, in Indonesia or in the two metropolises. And here is an interesting clue. Because the only other place where they find a similar type of social recognition is within peer groups of migrant women, in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore. However, the “grammars of recognitions” (Rouilleau-Berger 2007) tied to these groups are constructed as deviant within local societies, back home as in destination countries; as such, they do not sustain processes of social recognition, in the wider society, but rather cause stigmatization. In other words, they are *minoritary* or marginal forms of social recognition.

As I have written, we can consider that the development of silent claims, expressed through the expansion of subversive practices, is an incipient form of “political subjectivation”. This experience, in turns, gives place to a critical discourse aimed at women’s form of inclusion within host societies, as they work in Kuala Lumpur or Singapore. Thus, they utter strong claims against their misrecognition and exploitation in both countries. Yet, as I have shown, their unease with social patterns back home never translates into a fully articulated *critique* against them. I have attributed this impossibility to speak to sets of tensions within and between affects, practices and discourse: these strong affective ties with their relatives and home communities cannot be denied any value by a critical discourse that would expose the negative content of the feeling of love and caring. This brings us back to the issue of recognition: these women do not find anywhere else the forms of *legitimate* rather than *minoritary* social recognition which they enjoy in their home places, even if these patterns of recognition are attached to social roles they come to find diminishing. As a hypothesis, we can suppose that if they could find other spaces of *legitimate social recognition* which would validate their new practices and identifications, practical forms of “political subjectivation” could turn into a full-fledged *critique* of social patterns back home, in Indonesia. Arts, as a legitimate practice, could serve just that.

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