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Post-Western Sociologies and Methodological Cosmopolitanism

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We are in the midst of a "global change" which is distinct from previous changes and their ephemeral nature and which appears to be a turning point in the history of the social sciences (Caillé, Dufoix, 2013). We have entered a period of de-Westernization of knowledge and co-production of the construction of situated knowledge. This is a "global change" in sociology which imposes theoretical and methodological detours, displacements, reversals and conversions. After Post-Colonial Studies, we could develop a *transnational intermediate space* that is both local and global to draw conjunctive and disjunctive theoretical spaces where *the Post-Western sociology* could emerge in this context of globalization and circulation of ideas, concepts and paradigms (Roulleau-Berger, 2011). Through the confrontation of new tendencies of French sociology and Chinese sociology (Roulleau-Berger, Li Peilin, 2012) and of the symmetries and dissymmetries between different sociological fields, we will investigate the ways in which dialogues, exchanges, connections and disjunctions are formed between seats of sociological knowledge located in France and in China. *Post-Western Sociology* is first and foremost rhizomatous in that it is constructed from connections between points located in knowledge spaces governed by very different regimes of signs and the non-correspondence of different types of situated knowledge. Instead of conceiving the plurality of provinces of knowledge and considering methodological cosmopolitanism, **continuities** and **discontinuities** between European and Chinese sociologies have to be taken into account so that transnational knowledge may emerge in social sciences, free from all forms of Orientalism. Sociological thinking, like all thinking in the social sciences, is linked to the evolution of the Western society from which it emerged [Kilani, 2009]. While the growing pluralization of contemporary societies calls into question the very idea of society as a narrative linked to the narrative of modernity, particularly European modernity, Western thought has continued to perceive itself as the universal mediator for all other histories (Chinese, Indian, Arab, African, Brazilian, etc.) (Laplantine, 2009).

1. Post-Western Sociology and Global Knowledge

The boundaries between the former centres of knowledge production and the former peripheries are fading, a phenomenon which favours the appearance of a plurality of centres. Post-Western Sociology means working towards displacement and the construction of planes of epistemic equivalence between the conjunctive and disjunctive borders of knowledge to struggle against any form of "epistemic injustice" to quote Rajev Bhargava (2013) who considers that there are three forms of epistemic injustice: 1)The imposition of a change affecting the content of the epistemic frameworks 2)The alteration of fundamental epistemic frameworks 3) The damaging or loss of the capacity of individuals to maintain or develop their own epistemic frameworks.

Most Chinese, Japanese, Korean and Indian sociologists consider that the imposition of Western epistemic frameworks has prevented them from accessing their own systems of meaning and interpretation and from understanding their own societies (Nishihara, 2010). An epistemic autonomy is asserted today, one which has been constructed differently according to societal contexts (Xie Lizhong, 2013). In China, the assertion of an epistemic autonomy among sociologists means the re-establishment of continuities with epistemic frameworks which had been constructed before 1949, then forgotten and which are completely unknown in the West. It also means, however, the creation of specific paradigms freed from Western presuppositions. Today, certain Chinese intellectuals think that their categories are still over-derived from Western theories.

So new centres of knowledge production are born out of: 1) the refusal to imitate Western epistemic frameworks; 2) a concern to control hybridizations of Western and non-Western knowledge based on the dynamics of the de-territorialization and re-territorialization of non indigenous knowledge; 3) the recognition and validation of places of conjunction and disjunction between Western and non-Western knowledge; and 4) the existence of "epistemic white zones", that is, zones in which the epistemic frameworks constructed in different societal contexts cannot come into contact.

The most pressing task, however, is to investigate the ways in which continuities and discontinuities, connections and disjunctions are formed between seats of knowledge located at different places in the world and potentially capable of bringing to light a *transnational intermediate space* that is both local and global.

If, in the 1960s, the "Post-Colonial" discourse expressed struggles for the recognition of non-Western human and social sciences within the international space, here we are talking of a "Post-Western" era which comes after the "Post-Colonial" and recognizes the end of the hegemony of the principal intellectual traditions of the West in order to apprehend the plurality of hegemonies of different intellectual traditions between which relationships of exchange, conflict, competition, accommodation and indifference are developed. Before precisely stating what we mean by "Post-Western" it is worth devoting a few words to Post-Colonialism. Post-Colonial studies continue to produce a binary vision of the world experienced whereas Post-Westernism can produce a plural and dynamic vision of the world experienced. Talking of Post-Western Sociology means producing a space for thinking which is based upon European, Chinese, Japanese, Indian, Brazilian… sociologies and which has them exchange and influence each other. Whereas Post-Colonialism has been widely criticized for its ambivalence in the way it blurs the distinction between the colonized and the colonizer, its universalizing displacements and its "depoliticizing implications" (Shohat, 2002), Post-Westernism relies on "vernacular cosmopolitanisms" (Homi Bhabha, 1994) and intellectual, moral and political resources which produce new knowledge.

We define *Post-Western Sociology* as first and foremost rhizomatous in that it is constructed from connections between points located in knowledge spaces governed by very different regimes of signs and the non-correspondence of different types of situated knowledge. The knowledge produced in each context is conceived for its intrinsic value, but the eye is focused on lines of segmentation, stratification, escape or de-territorialization (Deleuze, 1980). This is the unmaking of these pairs – East-West, centre-periphery, local-global – in order to no longer conceive relationships between entities, worlds, pre-constituted cultures, nor a clear and

contrasted heterogeneity between them but rather to work on the variations of degree and intensity, the continuities and discontinuities.

Post-Western Sociology is constructed from similarities and differences which cannot be conceived according to a binary mode. It relies on different knowledge processes:

- "Knowledge niches" which appear to be specifically European or Asian and do not signify a transferability of knowledge
- Intermediary epistemological processes which encourage the partial transfer of sociological knowledge from Europe to Asia and from Asia to Europe
- Transnational epistemological spaces in which European knowledge and Asian knowledge are placed in equivalence

2. Pluralization of societies and methodological cosmopolitanism

In Post-Western Sociology, that one should combat methodological nationalism as Ulrich Beck (2006) proposed is self-evident yet insufficient in this day and age. Methodological thinking in sociology is linked to the evolution of western society which witnessed its birth. If the process of the pluralization of contemporary societies questions the very idea of society as a narrative attached to modernity, particularly European modernity, then here we shall use Eisenstadt's theory of multiple modernities to ask the question of access to the plurality of the narratives of contemporary societies. Here the method will be defined in all its scope as a theory emancipated from the forms of scientific colonialism or Orientalism, forms representing a "western style of domination, restructuring and authority over the East" (Saïd, 1997). Philosophers like Spivak (2009) and historians like Chakrabarty, (2000) had already made propositions within the framework of *subaltern studies* (Bhabba, 1994) to "provincialize Europe" and to consider "subaltern histories" within their own specific dynamic systems and to envisage the different societal contexts without recourse to the mediation of Europe. *Post colonial studies* developed around the idea of escaping from the confines of the great narratives of modernity and the major paradigms of the social sciences by conceiving the (post) colonial as international (Kilani, 2009). In the wake of these approaches, it appears less relevant to produce methods for reflection about the plurality of the "provinces of knowledge" than to conceive the ways of forming continuities and discontinuities between the different societal spaces (Roulleau-Berger, 2011).

Marcus (1995) had proposed *multi-sited ethnography* to account for these connections, assemblies and superpositions of a plurality of local situations. To this end, he turned the world-system into a frame of reference rather than a historical macro-context and advocated an alternation between "thin" and "dense" descriptions (Falzon, 2009). Although this author initially focused on subaltern subjects as objects of dominations linked to capitalist and colonialist economics, he later proposed a broadening of the field of investigation. Lila Abu-Lughod (1991) also proposed "ethnographies of the particular" as strategies for the fight against culturalist approaches. Although the experience of sociologists can be built up according to the displacements, circulation and movements of the individuals and groups with which they work, sociologists no longer confine themselves to "bounded fields" but navigate between several "shifting locations" (Gupta, Ferguson, 1997). Sociologists can conceive structural processes, situations and actions with sociological methods which are partially

based upon *multi-sited ethnography*. Although this theoretical and methodological advance is important, these new methods cannot completely replace older methods of investigation elaborated in other historical contexts. Indeed if connections, deterritorializations and assemblies are envisaged in the construction of field procedures, the same is true of captivities, sedentarities, segregations and disqualifications.

Nowadays *methodological cosmopolitanism* is the choice which tends to impose itself. This signifies the implementation of multi-situated and contextualized tools to account for <u>assemblies and disjunctions</u> between the narratives of societies which are all legitimate as well as to describe what Ulf Hannerz (2009) calls a "continuum creolization". In this instance *methodological cosmopolitanism* pertains to a conceptual space of interaction between pragmatic sociology and critical sociology – as Luc Boltanski (2009) purposed – here federated around dynamic and non-hierarchical combinations of societal contexts, structural processes, individual and collective actions and situational orders. The conceptual space is relayed by a methodological space in which sociologists conceive a plurality of temporalities, places, contexts and situations in the construction of tools for field investigation in order to access the plurality of the narratives of society and the multivocality or polyphony which they contain via a "pluralistic discourse analysis" (Xie Lizhong, 2009). Just as multi-situated analysis is in no way to be confused with multi-local analysis (Falzon, 2009), *methodological cosmopolitanism* leads to a multi-situated approach which does not necessarily mean fields of investigation in several countries but rather in several differentiated places, an approach which is conceived within a single problematic. *Multi-sited ethnography* thus becomes necessary but in no way excludes the implementation of a short- or medium-term investigative procedure in a single place at certain times (Weisskoppel, 2009).

With *methodological cosmopolitanism* we could analyse how complex societies produce multiple collective narratives which co-exist in relative autonomy or, on the contrary, interact or interlock. The narratives of contemporary societies have been increasingly conceived in their dynamics and complexity as have the narratives of individual lives. Life narratives have revealed the juxtapositions and interweaving of societal and civilizational contexts (Marcus, 1995) and provide access to the plurality of collective narratives. For example, it is known that the processes of individuation, which are highly active in European societies and which seem to be emerging in Asian societies, are characterized by a multiplication and a reversibility of situations. Indeed, individual biographies are constructed from bifurcations which correspond to changes in social and spatial regimes in the shape of geographical mobilities as well as to changes in economic regimes in the shape of professional mobilities (Roulleau-Berger, 2010). "Biographical bifurcations" (Bessin, Bidart, Grossetti, 2010) repeatedly appear in the itineraries of populations subjected to precariousness, discrimination, segregation and migration. At each bifurcation places and events (wars, unemployment…) influence the repertories of individual resources which re-combine to re-compose the statuses, positions and social identities of individuals. The succession of bifurcations and the shaping of biographical crossroads result from the structural processes at work in societies as well as from the dispositions and capacities for action, mobilization and circulation of the different categories of social groups and individuals.

In methodological cosmopolitanism to produce collective narratives it is increasingly difficult to apprehend the biographical narrative with relative linearity. Instead it is apprehended using

unconnected sequences linked to various spaces and temporalities. For sociologists, the all-embracing issue is the apprehension – with the actors concerned – of the meaning of the biographical conjunctions and discontinuities in the differentiated contexts.

Obviously, this means conceiving itineraries and contexts without reducing the contextualization of itineraries to distant forms of determinism (Demazière, Samuel, 2010). The entire in methodological cosmopotlitanim issue becomes: What creates a discontinuity? What creates a conjunction? To answer these questions, sociologists have to take into consideration the way in which structural processes act upon the construction of discontinuities and conjunctions and the meaning which is attributed to them by individuals. Researchers are therefore also invited to produce a biographical method which enables the restitution of the dynamics of individual and collective experiences while remaining aware of the difficulty and cost of accessing "multi-situated biographies" to acess to the narratives of contemporary society.

3. Traditions and controversies in French Sociology since 1980

In French sociology controversies arose around the modes of explanation of what individuals are capable of doing, saying and thinking and thus how scientific interpretation is produced in discontinuity or continuity with the shared meaning. In the early 1980s, the competition between sociological trends was such that it forced researchers to be in a process of discontinuity regarding certain paradigms and a process of acculturation regarding others. If, previously, sociology was presented as a succession and a juxtaposition of competing partially secant paradigms, today sociologists explore theoretical universes which arise out of partial secants between different paradigms and are wary of what appears to be "normal science" at any given moment or the history of sciences at another.

In the 1970s and 1980s, neither Pierre Bourdieu's[1] structuralist constructivism, which continued to grant a certain primacy to objective structures by means of the concepts of the field and the habitus, nor the competences of individuals relative to their knowledge of the social world received much recognition, since they required researchers to position themselves within a situation of epistemological discontinuity. In France, in 1979, Yves Grafmeyer and Isaac Joseph (1979) translated the fundamental texts of the Chicago School and, shortly after, Isaac Joseph introduced the interactionist theories which triggered great controversies and conflicts within sociology. At that time, interactionist theories were presented as "machines of war" against structuralisms and structuro-functionalisms; compared to structuralism these theories are based upon an inverse progression from interactions towards structures – especially in the work of Erving Goffman – but also for Howard Becker, Anselm Strauss and Shibutani who have tended to work more upon establishing equivalences between interactions and structures while bearing in mind that the stable equilibrium never exists. The relationships between the individual and society are conceived as a process of reciprocal production. In the situations in which, according to Durkheimian thinking, the social order was defined as stable, it is defined as a negotiated interactional order supposing a non-determinist vision of social life which replaces the central

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[1] "Espace social et pouvoir symbolique ", in *Choses dites*, Paris, Minuit, 1987.

concept of "structure" or "system" with the concept of collective interactions. In his *Les ficelles du métier*[2], Howard Becker recognized that individuals possess interpretative capacities regarding the social world as a universe of meanings. The liveliest controversies in French sociology revolved and still revolve around the recognition of the competences of individuals regarding the knowledge of the social world.

The scientific controversies linked to the introduction of interactionist and pragmatist sociologies weakened with the mobilization of the theories of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman, a departure which opened a theoretical space in which "*the symmetry between objective reality and subjective reality is never static nor defined once and for all*". In reaction to critical sociology and under the influence of interactionist and pragmatist sociologies, social constructivism – as distinct from Pierre Bourdieu's structuralist constructivism – would develop in France by unmaking the fatal couples of sociology, namely, individualism/holism, objectivism/subjectivism, micro-sociological/macro-sociological. This way of posing the issue of the non-stability of the symmetry between objective reality and subjective reality disrupts dualist reasoning in sociology and opens a space for the scientific pluralism of realities and identities with reference to structural dynamics. In the 1990s, a certain consensus among French sociologists took shape around the idea of a non-separation of the individual and structural areas contrary to the separation inherent in structuralist thinking. The interpretative capacity of actors began to be conceived as being a genuine structural property of any society which could be called reflexive.

From 1990 the constructivist and hermeneutic poles became the most visible (Berthelot, 2001). The opposition between the objectivist poles and the constructivist and hermeneutic poles diversified and broadened. Constructivist and hermeneutic poles moved towards convergence opening a space for a sociology of the individual. Other areas of controversy formed between the Touraine-inspired sociology of action and critical and interactionist sociologies. There was already tension – associated with various variants of structuralism – between critical sociology and the sociology of action over the issue of the Subject, an issue which was denied in critical sociology. Critical sociology had attacked power, domination and alienation denouncing the illusions of the reference to the Subject, an error which consists in believing in the Subject's autonomy, the ignorance of mechanisms, authorities and other structures which regulate and determine the existence of the dominated. Then, in the first decade of this century, we witnessed the return of the Subject to the sociological stage, the Subject which had been denied in the Marxist and Bourdieu-school theories in which, according to the theory of the habitus, individuals were conceived as unconsciously determined in their perceptions, thoughts and conduct by the effects of incorporated dispositions. The Subject was defined by her/his capacity to be an autonomous actor and to construct her/his experience (Wieviorka, 2008).

Although from 1980 to 1995 strong controversies divided French sociologists, by the end of the 1990s weak controversies arose around a sociology of the individual and the Subject. Indeed, François Dubet (1994), in his sociology of experience, explained how the individual was challenged when the idea of society as an organized whole declined along with the steady autonomization of social hierarchies and class, the crumbling of collective forms of action and

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[2] H.S. Becker (2002): *Les ficelles du métier,* La Découverte, Paris.

representation and the weakening of institutions. Following also Alain Touraine and Fahrad Khosrokhavar (2000), Michel Wieviorka (2007) also questions the Subject as what is left out of or resists the logics of system. Within a sociology of identities, Claude Dubar (2001) takes as a starting point the idea that "*to be a Subject is first to refuse, for oneself as for others, the relationships of domination, subjection, arbitrarily imposed authority, scorn and personal subordination*". Bernard Lahire (1998) proposed a dispositionalist and contextualist sociology based upon the taking into consideration of the incorporated past and individuals' previous socializing experiences which crystallize into dispositions while considering the different present contexts of action. Jean-Claude Kaufmann (2004) showed that, in the past, social structures had supported the individual and that this was consistent with the reflexivity level, whereas, now, identity production is a condition for action and the individuation process is mediated through access to self-governance. Marco Martuccelli (2006) then considers that ordeals enable the researcher to apprehend the tensions which are instrumental in the constitution of this specific historical mode of individuation in which the structural processes of the creation of the individual are constituted. Autonomy then becomes a widely shared desirable goal and simultaneously a very demanding and severe norm (Kokoreff, 2003) before which individuals are not equals. Alain Ehrenberg (1995) detailed how, in European societies, in which subjectivity rose in parallel with collective questioning, an "uncertain individual" had bloomed. Facing many undetermined situations that produce discomfort in her/his social lives, this individual drifts between social respect and social disrespect as well as between self respect and self disrespect, able to produce moral economies of resistance (Roulleau-Berger 1999). And the moral and ethic question becomes more and more central in public space and discussed on the French sociological scene (Fassin, Lézé, 2013).

Alongside these sociologies of the individual, Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot developed a sociology of justification based upon economies of scale inspired by American pragmatism while Bruno Latour and Michel Callon engendered a sociology of sciences and controversies. However, the publication in 2009 of Luc Boltanski's "*De la critique*" constitutes a very important moment in the evolution of French sociology and the history of scientific controversies since, after much work for the development of critical sociology, Luc Boltanski had turned to pragmatism in the 1990s. He then proposed to reconcile critical sociology and the sociology of criticism: on the one hand, he retained from the program of critical sociology the revealing of forms of domination within a certain social order and made it evolve towards a theory of the political regimes of domination and, on the other hand, he retained from the program of pragmatism the attention directed at the activities and critical competences of actors as well as the recognition of the pluralist expectations within contemporary democratic societies. This fundamental moment in the synthesis of the two scientific programs which, in the 1980s, had been seen as mutually exclusive outlined a new space of agreement between French sociologists, especially young researchers, who needed highly elaborated conceptual frameworks to conceive the complexity of their objects of research.

This space could resemble a mosaic of differentiated constructivisms (Loriol, 2012) in which structuralist constructivism, interactionist constructivism, sociologies of action, interpretive constructivism, subjectivist constructivism and more could cohabit. If, in the 1980s, what made scientific controversies in France corresponded to radically different positions on the

status granted to social structures, individual and collective action, dispositions for action and subjectivities, then, today, controversies are expressed in a more complex intellectual space in which sociologists are conscious of the need to avoid granting a "superior" status to any one dimension of social reality and in which they are borne along by a movement of the globalization and circulation of sociological theories, a movement which easily erases certain scientific controversies which appear to be over-situated in a globalized context.

4. The identity of Chinese sociology as seen from France

After a blank page lasting some thirty years, Chinese sociology has reconstituted itself since 1980 Li Peilin, Ma Rong, Li Qiang, 2008; L.Roulleau-Berger, Guo Yuhua, Li Peilin, Liu Shiding, 2008; Merle, 2008 ; Li Peilin, Roulleau-Berger, 2012). This process has encouraged a sort of epistemological unpredictability which has produced a form of scientific pluralism. Seen from France, over a period of twenty years the Weberian point of view of the polytheism of values founded on the idea that we attempt to reconstruct reality from fragments has been widely adopted by Chinese sociologists. Indeed, there has been a strong presence of the idea that social reality is infinite, that our knowledge of reality cannot exhaust it, that no concept, no theory can suffice to account for the complexity, dynamics and diversity of the forms of social organization.

Firstly, it should be said that Chinese sociologists are linked by a sort of intellectual consensus concerning the following points:
- The idea of producing paradigms freed from any form of cultural hegemony or from the West's overbearing gaze on Chinese society
- The recognition of the unicity and singularity of the Chinese experience and transformation during the last 30 years
- The consideration of the effect of Chinese civilization, both past and present
- The rise of the notion of "the production of society", through the analysis of structural processes

Contemporary Chinese sociologies constructed from conceptions of the process therefore appear to be placed within a sort of mosaic of situated and contextualized constructivisms often against backgrounds of historical or civilizational contexts in which objective constructivism, critical constructivism, sociologies of action, interpretative constructivism, organizational or strategic constructivism, interactionist constructivism, subjective constructivism and more cohabit.

Within a form of revised social constructivism, knowledge is produced out of the analysis of the construction of relationships between social structures and institutions, between the State and society by raising the issue of social polarization within a historical perspective. From a socio-historical perspective, Li Peilin (2012, 2013) proposes a sociology of the China Experience by raising the issue of social change in contemporary Chinese society taking as a starting point the characteristics of traditional Chinese society; Zhou Xiaohong (2012) would consider Chinese Experience and micro Change of the Chinese people's social values and mentality. Chinese sociology of social classes and social mobility also produces this form of constructivism based upon the analysis of social and historical processes of the transformation of Chinese society (Li Chunling, 2013; Li Qiang, 2012, 2012; Li Lulu, 2012; Tong Xin, 2008;

Chen Guangjin, 2013). Research into economic sociology (Liu Shiding, 2006, 2012 ; Liu Yuzhao, 2009 a,b ; Liu Aiyu, 2012 ; Tong Xin, 2012) also contributes to producing this type of social constructivism.

A form of critical constructivism appears with the work of Sun Liping (2002) who describes his work as a "sociology of practice", or with the Chinese public sociology produced by Shen Yuan (2012) or with Guo Yuhua (2012) who has developed theory focused on the production of dominated groups's voice. They all showed how dominated individuals' are deploying reflexive and action capacity in different social situations.

We also could identify a form of interactionist constructivism with the sociology of networks in which various theories of the *guanxi* have been developed and in which the concepts of interaction and identity play an important role (Yang Yiyin, 2012) but this interactionist constructivism is linked to a historical perspective.

Another form of strategic constructivism could be illustrated, for example, by Li Youmei (, 2007, 2012) who raises the question of the governance of communities and neighbourhoods as the bases of Chinese civil society.

Sociologies of action give more space to the actor, an actor constrained by the State and the market against a background of transition but capable of reflexivity and forming herself/himself into a Subject, for example, in studies on new collective action (Shen Yuan, 2009; Liu Neng, 2006, 2009).

Finally Xie Lizhong (2009, 2012) purposed in a epistemological way a « Post-sociology » which considered the « reality » as a « discursive reality » constructed by people under constraints of discourse system and change wiht the chnage of pople's discourse system. So Post-sociology means a pluralistic discourse analysis.

Today Chinese society is more conceptualized here as an objective and subjective reality, never as being static or defined once and for all. This raises the question of the construction of the individual. Subjectivity is conceived completely differently here, and is linked to the construction of "them" and "us" in a context of social stratification, an increase in social conflicts and a crisis of confidence in the Other. Studies of social movements and collective actions clearly show how the Chinese context, here a context characterized by transition, produces interactions and collective actions among various categories of populations which, in turn, produce specific demands for recognition in Chinese society.

Chinese sociologists address structural processes, subjectivities and interactions from a civilizational perspective. Having developed their own original approaches and sociological reasoning, they have revealed conceptual spaces that are unforeseen in Western sociological thinking. Some of these sociologies have a label, others do not. If, over the last thirty years, the constructivist and hermeneutic poles have become visible in French sociology by opening a space for a sociology of the individual, in Chinese sociology, the objectivist and constructivist poles are the ones to have expanded.

5. Continuities between Chinese and French sociologies

So Post-Western Sociology and methodological cosmopolitanism invites us to shed light upon the continuities of Chinese and French sociologies while allowing the specific spaces and

shared spaces in the elaboration of knowledge to appear. We will use for example the issue of inequalities and social differentiation to present some *discontinuous continuities* and the issue of demand for recognition and collective action to present some *continuous continuities*.

Multiplied inequalities and social differentiation

The question of social differentiation has always been central to sociology. For Chinese sociologists, it cannot be dissociated from the change of social class structure before and after the Reform. Since the economic reforms, Chinese society has become increasingly stratified and is becoming more and more diversified in terms of the constitution of socio-occupational categories. Li Peilin considers (2012) differentiation of social class structures and diversification of groups have brought multiple levels of interest requirements and values leading to social conflicts. Zhou Xiaohong (2012) would consider Chinese Experience and micro Change of the Chinese people's social values and mentality. The social structure has become more complex, social groups more differentiated, social trajectories more diverse and access to social mobility unequal. Income inequalities between the various social classes are widening. In 2003 Sun Liping advanced the notion of the 'fractured society', emphasising the speed of the process of social polarisation that has developed over the last ten years. Shen Yuan (2013) is focused in a transition's period on the process of an new working class's – with migrants's workers- process, her destiny and their capabilities to provoke historical transformations and to organize collective actions. Li Chunling (2012) shows how economic capital played a crucial role in social mobility prior to 1949 but became a negative factor between 1949 and 1980 and how cultural and economic capital have come to play a decisive role in contemporary modes of constructing social mobility. She explains the paradox of the reforms, which have increased the opportunities for mobility and at the same time made the boundaries between the social groups clearer. Li Lulu (2008) advanced the hypothesis that social heritage is a determining factor in the restructuring of social relations, in the development of the market economy and in the weakening of the state through the construction of redistributive systems that produce highly active and permanent processes of social reproduction in labour markets and in the wider society. The emergence of the middle class reflects how the middle classes have very quickly become stratified in Chinese society and how an awareness of belonging to the middle classes is developing.

Where are the *discontinuous continuities* between French and Chinese sociology on social inequalities and differentiation? About inequalities and social frontiers the analyses of the production of several registers of inequalities in contemporary societies produced by Li Peilin and Lu Xueyi converge with those on multiple inequalities developed by François Dubet (2009)The circumstances under which the middle classes emerged in China induce us to examine once again the nature of the social and symbolic boundaries between the classes. For example research on the middle classes in France reveals that it is not so much the homogenisation of lifestyles that explains the process leading to the constitution of a much expanded middle class, but rather the proliferation of and changes in modes of differentiations and the consequent strengthening of the position of the elites and dominant classes in French society (Bidou, 2003; Chauvel, 2006). But in the two cases the middle classes developed 'usurpation' strategies to reinforce the collective, social and institutional barriers in order to maintain their own position... Integration and social disaffiliation issues are raised in very

similar terms in the work of Sun Liping (2009) and Robert Castel who considered that inclusion and exclusion do not exist but instead there is a continuum between the opposing poles of social disaffiliation and professional integration. As Robert Castel (1995 defined the zone of integration (characterized by the association of stability and strong relational insertion), the zone of disaffiliation (characterized by the combination of the absence of any proactive activity and relational isolation) and the increasingly extended zone of vulnerability (characterized by the association of precarious access to employment and the fragility of close local support), more and more Chinese sociologists have identified zones of vulnerability with less-qualified migrants workers and zones of disaffiliation with unemployed young people.

Demand for recognition and collective action.
Liu Neng (2006, 2009) associated in his theoretical approach moral economy, "institutional vulnerability" and "situational ethics" to describe the three waves of industrial of Chinese Industrial Collective action. Other researchers such as Tong Xin (2008) have focused on the analysis of new forms of workers' collective action in Chinese society in the context of the privatization of State firms. The reforms shattered this and the workers felt that they had been tricked and were the victims of inequalities and injustice. Out of a shared socialist culture a class consciousness was shaped, a consciousness which provoked working-class struggles expressing demands for the recognition of situations of inequality experienced by the workers. Zhao Dingxin (2005) has defined a social movement using the criteria of change, social and State structures, the discourse of political consciousness, forms of identification with the movement and the discursive tactics and slogans employed. Using research into citizen movements linked to the right to property ownership, Shen Yuan (2008), raises the issue of the production of a civil society to analyze the situations of tension and social conflict which produce the increasingly organized mobilizations of city-dwellers linked to the emerging middle class.
In France, in a context of the erosion of collective regulation bodies, sociologists analyze conflicts in social, economic and political spaces which are situated in different places. The social conflicts produce different forms of collective action such as trade-unionism, strikes, the occupation of premises, urban riots… (Béroud, Bouffartigue, 2009). For some thirty years, French sociologists have analyzed the diversification of forms of collective action, particularly in spaces of unequal political legitimacy. If Western European democracies increasingly generate situations of inequality and injustice, they also engender the production of social movements such as the fight against precariousness, demonstrations to defend retirement pensions and conditions, to demand the regularization of the situation of migrants without documents, to protect minorities such as the Roma… Over the last thirty years, Western European and particularly French sociologists have been lead to envisage collective action, social movements and riots as constituting a whole within the present societal context. The analysis of riots has been at the centre of research into urban sociology (Deboulet, Nez, 2013.) Riots in French working-class suburbs are analyzed as constituting a "place for the actualization of the political" in which there is a re-configuration of the forms of collective action at the margins of the conventional political sphere and a crystallization of the feeling of injustice and demands for respect (Boubeker, 2003; Kokoreff, 2008; Kokoreff, Lapeyronnie, 2013) as well as suffering, inequalities and injustice.

We also have to consider discrete and interstitial societal spaces like *intermediate spaces* (Roulleau-Berger,1999, 2007), 'moral regions' –in the sense of Robert Park- in which collective and individual actors in the same time are facing to situation of domination and stigmatization, and developing societal capabilities, moral economies and grammars of social recognition. In Europe, the production of intermediate spaces has gone hand in hand with the restructuring of democratic institutions against a background of globalized capitalism. Over the last 20 years, as the situation of wage earners has become ever more precarious, institutions have declined, inequalities have increased and discrimination against ethnic groups has intensified, so intermediate spaces have proliferated, reflecting forms of citizenship characterised by defiance and protest. In mainland China, against a background of massive change, these intermediate spaces are proliferating in the megalopolises where the young unemployed and migrant workers mobilise to create their own strategies for survival and set up micro-organisations of an economic, cultural or artistic nature. Other intermediate spaces exist in greater proximity to the apparatuses of domination and give rise to negotiated forms of cooperation with institutions in order to become spaces for social restructuring (Li Youmei, 2007)

So it is that research into social movements, collective action and intermediate space in China and in France interact and produce *continuous continuities* between Chinese and French Sociology. Chinese and French sociologists clearly demonstrate that forms of domination are diversifying and simultaneously producing new moral economies which express demands for meaning and recognition. If, in France, the problematic of the fight for recognition, as defined by Axel Honneth, mobilized a proportion of sociologists in the first decade of this century, in present-day China, the issue of the perception of inequalities (Li Lulu *et al*, 2012;Li Qing, 2012) and the feeling of social injustice (Li Peilin, 2012) has been introduced. As for Chinese sociologists, they refer at present to the theory of justice of the American philosopher, John Rawls, and to the theories of economists such as Sen on the issue of social inequalities.

6. Discontinuities between Chinese and French sociologies

Using the intersection of viewpoints on some issues which have meaning for both Chinese and French sociologists, we shall shed light upon the discontinuities of Chinese and French sociologies while allowing the specific spaces and shared spaces in the elaboration of knowledge to appear. We will show for example some *weak discontinuities* through the issue of the Individual, self and identity, and *strong discontinuities* through the issue of economic institutions and societal experiences.

Individual, self and identity

Whereas in Western theories, the *me*, the *I* and the *others* are seen as distinct moments in a discontinuous process of the *self*, in Chinese thinking, these separate steps are not so clearly delineated as the process itself is much more continuous.

Amongst French authors, the work of Paul Ricoeur (1990, 2004) on the narrative identity has been and still is a major influence in the definition of what enables a plurality of *selves* to co-habit within the story of a life which is *"incessantly reconfigured by all the true and fictitious stories which a subject tells about himself"*. In the interactionist theories employed in French sociologies, each individual possesses as many social *selves* as there are other individuals to recognize and create an image of her/him. The concept of identity and identificatory forms has been widely employed through the concepts of identity reshuffle and identity conversion (Strauss, 1959) as well as alternation (Berger, Luckmann, 1986). In the theories of Goffman (1975), following on from Mead (1963), much attention has been paid to identity discrepancies. These discrepancies concern social and personal identities situated in objective reality and identities for the *self*, that is the subjective feeling of the individual's own situation which this individual acquires during her/his various social experiences. The work of Pollak (1990) on unspeakable identities and wounded identities has also been a major contribution to reflexion about *selves* from a dynamic and reversible perspective.

In Chinese sociology, the *self* has not appeared dissociated from the *We*. In French sociology, the place of the *self* is first situated within a process of individuation before being linked to the *We*. The concept of subjectivity may be less common in Chinese sociology, but the subjectivity of the *Other* is not ignored. Through the question of *guanxis*, which is fundamental in the whole Chinese sociological field, the concept of the *self* is handled according to interactionist and pragmatist traditions. Yang Yiyin (2008, 2012), for instance, posits the hypothesis that a "double we" is made through the construction of interaction orders. She explains how, to define interpersonal *guanxi*, we have to take into account the legacy of the parenting regime as well as trust and mutual duty relationships. *We* is produced, on the one hand, by some *guanxis* which draw the specific boundaries of the *self* (or, precisely speaking, of what Fei Xiao Tong called *chaxu geju*) and, on the other hand, by social categorizations, identifications and affiliations. It could be said that self-identity and identity towards others (Goffman, 1975) would be based on this "double we", whereas, in Western societies, identities would be based firstly upon *myself* and *me* as stepping stones in the process of the construction of the *self*.

Finally, in Chinese sociology, the *narrative self* has a superior status to the *reflexive self* whereas in French sociological theory the *reflexive self* is superior in status to the *narrative self*. With regards the issue of the Individual and Society, we may therefore speak of **continuous discontinuities** between Chinese sociology and French sociology even if historical and philosophical inheritances mark the ways in which the *narrative self* and the *reflexive self* are conceived, experienced, represented and arranged differently according to societal contexts as well as historical and political trajectories.

Economic Institutions and societal experiences

In French sociology, the traditional wage relationship has become fragmented as a result of fluctuating but persistent unemployment, the increased vulnerability of jobs in those sectors exposed to competition and the development of atypical employment forms. Changes in industrial relations are reflected in a weakening of trade union power, the spread of forms of work organization requiring flexibility and employee involvement and the decentralization of

productive structures (Lallement, 2007). The normalization of flexibility appears to be fundamental to the construction of social Europe; but evidently contemporary economies do not follow the same guiding principles and models as they develop and change. Thus what we are witnessing is not so much pure and simple deregulation but a proliferation of new rules and, above all, new sources of regulation. At national and international levels, procedural rules are negotiated or even imposed; at the same time, however, local actors adapt these normative models in order to coordinate different forms of local regulation in response to demands for flexibility. Deregulation and privatization in the European Union have considerably reduced the role of the state. However, the contractual form (employed or self-employed) is the result of choices made by workers and employers (Marsden, 2012). The process of constructing the wage-labour nexus also had its origins in disputes linked to inequalities in rights and status and in the trade union movement and its struggles. According to Robert Castel (2009), for the last three decades a new capitalist regime has deployed and we have witnessed the dynamics of de-collectivization or re-individualization, as the increasingly individualized right to employment. The norms for the use of the workforce have been de-standardized and full-time salaried employment has been increased. The production of ethnic and gender discriminations is constructing new segmentations on labour markets (Séhili, 2012; Roulleau-Berger, 2010).

If we are really to understand how the process of economic transformation works in China, we should first be aware that, for Chinese sociologists, there is a fundamental distinction to be made between local and national markets and between different rural and urban markets. Liu Shiding (2006) has shown how, from the second half of the 1990s onwards, the construction of local markets took place through the transformation of the various regimes of collective and state ownership, which then evolved towards private ownership; this looks like a Chinese singularity. The construction of local markets took place through the transformation of the various regimes of collective and state ownership in the socialist context and then an evolution towards private ownership. The conception of economic institutions is rooted in the socialist experience of industrialization of China the origins of which are to be found partially in the rural small towns and villages (Liu Yuzhao, 2009, 2012). From the beginning of the 1990s onwards, Chinese sociologists have shown that a new economic situation has also lead to the creation of massive numbers of jobs in the informal sector, occupied mainly by migrants, who can also be described as "semi-unemployed" (Tong Xin, 2008). This in turn leads to the formation of a stratum at the bottom of society in which unemployed individuals and families without work develop resistance strategies in order to cope with the effects of the transition and to survive by relying on family solidarity.

Finally we can understand how the societal context, the socialist and capitalist economic experience could influence in certain place the construction of economic institutions, and we can clearly detect **strong discontinuities** between Chinese sociology and European sociology.

Conclusion

Where splits and divisions could be expected between Chinese sociology and French sociology, there appear *discontinuous continuities* or *continuous discontinuites* which result from a history of thought as well as from a history of the social production of knowledge

based upon practical tools of knowledge acquisition. Taking local research situations as a starting point, we are invited to consider both the local and trans-national dimensions of the work of sociologists. The modes of producing sociological knowledge are under investigation. There remains to be undertaken the analysis of the places in which the epistemological "blanks" between these sociologies in context are formed. We are thus invited to reflect upon the movements, displacements and transfers imposed by dealing with sociological objects in order to return to the issue of the "nomadism" of concepts and to define the *trans-national intermediate spaces*. Here, the norms of sociologists' practices appear to be trans-national and favour the circulation of knowledge and open up transversal work spaces which do not respect the symbolic boundaries linked to the history of scientific colonialisms.

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"Postsociology" (or "Pluralistic Discourse Analysis"): An new exploration of Social Research

Xie Lizhong

1. Question: Whether China Is a "Class Society"?

In 1926, an important article was written by Mao Zedong, which made a "general analysis" on the "economic positions and attitudes towards revolution of all the classes of Chinese society". In this analysis, there were at least such "classes" in Chinese society as "landlord class and comprador class", "middle bourgeoisie", "petty bourgeoisie", "semi-proletariat", "the proletariat", "lumpen-proletariat", etc. In turn, "landlord class and comprador class are purely appendages to international bourgeoisie", "represent the most outmoded and the most reactionary relation of production in China", and "are completely incompatible with the goal of Chinese revolution"; "middle bourgeoisie" mainly referred to national bourgeoisie, represented "capitalist relation of production in Chinese urban and rural area", "with a contrary attitude to Chinese revolution"; "petty bourgeoisie" included "owner-peasants, the master handicraftsmen, the lower levels of the intellectuals -- students, primary and secondary school teachers, lower government functionaries, office clerks, small lawyers, the small traders, etc", and they could be divided into three parts, "left", "middle", "right", according their economic positions, with different attitudes to revolution in normal times; "semi-proletariat" consisted of " the overwhelming majority of the semi-owner peasants", "the poor peasants", "the small handicraftsmen", "the shop assistants", "the peddlers", etc, and they might be further divided into three smaller categories, upper, middle and lower, according to their economic condition, consequently with different attitude to revolution; "the proletariat" had two parts, industrial proletariat and rural proletariat, and "though not very numerous, the industrial proletariat represents China's new productive forces, is the most progressive class in modern China and has become the leading force in the revolutionary movement"; as to "lumpen-proletariat", "they lead the most precarious existence of all", and "brave fighters but apt to be destructive, they can become a revolutionary force if given proper guidance"; etc.[4] The article had since been one of the programmatic documents for Chinese revolution in a long time, and was collected into Selected Works of Mao Zedong as the first piece titled "Analysis of All Classes of Chinese Society".

We are here reviewing this article in order not to discuss Mao's theory of class analysis, but to deduce such a historical fact from above sketching as that, for many advanced Chinese intellectuals at the beginning of 20th century represented by Mao Zedong among others, it was an undisputable "fact" that China was a Marxist "class" society. Only presupposing this could Mao's classic work have been created.

But the idea that "China is a class society" was not a consensus of all the Chinese advanced intellectuals of the day. A considerable proportion of them denied it, among which Liang Shuming was an important representative. Liang elaborated his idea in Theory of Rural Construction. He said, "If we can say modern western society is an individual-based society, a society with class antagonism, then traditional Chinese society can be said to be ethic-based and professionally divided."[5] "Ethic-based" was called against "group-based" or "individual-based" of western society. Western people either emphasize group over individual, or conversely, but Chinese were short of either side. What Chinese emphasized was between

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4 Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, solo-volume version, the people's publishing house, 1964, p. 9.
5 Liang, Shuming. Theory of Rural Construction, Shanghai century publishing group, 2006, p. 24.

group and individual, and that was ethical relationship. Ethical relationship originates from family but is not confined in it. "Ethic means pairing, namely people are in reciprocal relations." "People develop friendship now that they are living in relations." "An ethical relationship equals a friendship, as well as a relationship of mutual obligations."[6] People in ethical relationship "take others to heart mutually; it seems that a person is not living for himself, but for others". "Professionally divided" was called against class antagonism of western society. At least since Middle Ages has western society been characterized by class division, "in Western society, there was antagonism between serfs and nobles during the Middle Ages. In modern times, serfs have been liberated because of the rise of urban industrial and commercial development, but the antagonism has been transferred into one between the capitalists and the labor. Therefore, western society has always been a class society".[7] But Chinese society was different from either of these phases at all. China had only professional division and no call division, which had been shown in such facts that, economically China "had only all kinds of different professions, but no two opposite classes", and politically Chinese sovereignty had not been occupied by nobles but open to all the people (so-called "a person who is a peasant in the morning can become an emperor by the evening"), so "compared with western Middle Ages, China had professions but no classes".[8] Liang said, "the several words 'ethic-based, professionally divided' have given an perfect description of the old Chinese social structure." And this special social structure made it possible for Chinese society to have "periodic cycle of order and disorder" but impossible for it to create revolution, because "all revolutions originate from class struggle and a country of class domination", but China was not a class society. "There is no revolution where there is no struggle. All we had was only 'a completely disorder'."[9]

So, was China a class society before the middle of 20th century? Or, whose view was more corresponding with the reality between Mao and Liang? This is an interesting question, not because it was a thesis full of political implication, nor because it was disputed by such important historic figures as Mao and Liang, but because a question like this consists of an important subject, namely the methodological problem in China research. By inspecting this problem we could see an important methodological trap that probably exist in the past, now and future China research.

2. The Traditional Realism: Fundamental Theory Assumptions

Let us first have a look at how people usually settle the above dispute. Normally, most people searching after the answer start from traditional realism which is the theory and methodology people used to hold in modern philosophy and social science areas. In order to explain it, we need to illustrate that what the stand point the text calld "traditional realism" takes.
This "traditional realism" is a theory and methodology position composed of the following five arguments.

1) Given realism
The so-called "given realism"is such a theoretical perspective: various "things" as the objects of our perception, consciousness and speech are purely autonomic given reality; they exsit prior to our subject consciousness and the symbol system(discourse/text/theory)we used; they are independent of our subject cousciousness and symbol system and waiting for our

6 Liang, Shuming. Theory of Rural Construction, p. 25.
7 Liang, Shuming. Theory of Rural Construction, p. 27.
8 Liang, Shuming. Theory of Rural Construction, p. 28-29.
9 Liang, Shuming. Theory of Rural Construction, p. 33. Liang's idea was so different from the theory of Mao and Mao's comrades that he received severe criticism and rebukes from the latter, see Mao, Tse-Tung, "A criticism on Liang Shuming's reactionary idea" (Selected Works of Mao Zedong, volume 5, the people's publishing house, 1977) and so on.

cognition with our subjective consciousness and depiction with our symbol system. Speak more specifically, to the connections among "reality", our subjective consciousness and the symbol system we used, the general opinon of "given realism" is that "reality" exists independently prior to our subjective consciousness and the symbol system we used as well as our subjective consciousness exsit independently prior to our symbol system.

2) Representationalism.
The so-called representationalism, refers to such a claim that our knowledge is a representation of all kinds of pure, independent given realities. The relation between our knowledge (discourse, text, theory) and "reality" is a "represent" and "being represented". The ultimate goal of all cognition is precisely representing kinds of given objective realities by some of the best means and methods. Specifically, coinciding with the aforementioned Modernmism views about the sequence relationship among reality, subjective consciousness and symbol system, the general opinion of representationalism about this relationship is: symbol is the representation of consciousness and Consciousness is the representation of the reality.

3) Correspondence Theory of truth.
Since knowledge is the representation or reproduction of the objective world, then, the only standard to determine whether the results of a perception can acceptable is to see whether the results of the perception correspond with the objective reality people attempt to represent. Only the knowledge correspond with the objective reality which they attempt to represent can be called "truth", or it is fallacy. Modernists generally think that the truth is unique, that is to say, each particular cognitive object has only one cognitive result.object (the most corresponding with the object) that can be called truth. Therefore, "correspondence theory of truth" is also a kind of "unitary truth theory. " Modernists are generally believed that by contrasting "theory" and "fact", we also entirely have the ability to carry on an effective inspection and judgements to the right and wrong of the cognitive results. By means of such test of truth, we can keep the "fallacy" composition out our cognitive outcomes and accumulate the "truth" compostion. Thus, our cognition of the objective reality will be more comprehensive, more profound.

4)Essentialism.
Modernism divide the "objective reality" into two aspects as "essence" and "phenomenon": the "essence" is the fundamental nature of things according to which one theing is distinguished from the other; "phenomenon" is the surface characteristics of things;."nature" is fixed and is shared by many "phenomena"; "phenomenon" is diverse, and varying. "essence" hides deeply behind phenomenon and can only be grasped through abstract thinking; "phenomenon" is exposed on the surface of things; we can sense it directly. "Essence" is the provision of "phenomenon" and "phenomenon" exists according; "phenomenon" is just the expressive forms of "essence", etc..Everything has a fixed essence; this is one of the basic point of view of modernism (the definition of a concept actually reveals the the essential characteristics of things which referred by the concept and the basic difference between this one thing and other. On the other hand, only when the concept accurately reveals the nature of things is the concept a truly appropriate one.) According to this basic point of view, the goal of our cognition of "objective reality" is not only to grasp its phenomenon but also to understand those fundamental characteristics which shared by these phenomena exist behind many phenomena, and formulate the beings of phenomena. Therefore we can understand the "objective reality" better. (of course, the means and methods through which modernist arrive at essece by permeating phenomena are different). For

example, when we study the social phenomenon of "prostitution", we are supposed to get the essence of prostitution by ways of comparation (compare the specific phenomena which we called "prostitution" in different time and different scope and also compare them with those phenomena which are not called "prostitution", such as "sexual relations within marriage," "adultery," "one-night stand", etc.) we must proceed the further observation and study under the direction of the knowledge of the essential characteristics about "prostitution" and not stop at the descriptions and analysis of specific "prostitution" phenomena in different tim and different scopes. The study of the "family", "organization", "class", "deviant" and all other kinds social phenomen should be proceed in the same way.

5) Foundationalism.
Including the positivism sociology, the hermeneutic sociology and critical social theory, all modernism in varying degrees recognized the following arguments which have been prevalent in west intellectual circle ever since Plato. They believe that the variety of common characteristics or identities (essence?) between real things have hierarchical relationship and genus in their generalized and abstract extent. Therefore the variety knowledge on our study objects are also has this relationship and genus:the higher extent the knowledge was generalized and abstracted, the fundamental position it has in the whole knowledge system (the philosophical task of exploring the "first principle" or "epistemological principle" is the highest degree of generalized or abstract knowledge, it is the base of all other human knowledge); the lower extent the knowledge was generalized and abstracted, the subordinate position it has in the whole knowledge system. There is a logic implication relation between the higher levels of universal knowledge and lower universal knowledge: the former includes the latter and can be deduced from the former. Grasping the former is to some extent means grasping the latter. Our knowledge about the objective world as a whole constitutes a tree structure composed of a small number of basic knowledge and many kinds of derivative knowlege . This hierarchal knowlege system of "fundamentalism" promotes people continuous pursuing the more general similarities between objects. Thus many "holistic theory" or "grand narrative" which hold the fundamental status take shape.
The first three of the foregoing five basic ideas in constitute what the Richard Rorty and other people called "mirror metaphor" tradition in Western thought; the last two constitute what the Druze, Guattari and other people called"tree metaphor " tradition. They together form the basic doctrines of philosophy and scientifical intellectual currents including modern sociology, "traditional realism" or "modernism" philosophy.
Under normal circumstances, most people deal with all kinds of controversies including the dispute between Mao and Liang Shuming from the standpoint of such a theory. Then, can we acquire effective answers to the above questions form such a traditional standpoint of realism?

3. Finding the Answer From the Traditional Realism

As mentioned above, the first principles of traditional realism is the "given realism". In relation to the areas of Chinese studies, the given realism is that it has one absolutely impersonal "China Society" which is not according to our subjective consciousness and discourse systems to shift but completely independent of them; the purpose of all the about the studies of "China Society" is that it should represent this given objective reality accurately and truly; so only the researches that are consistent with the given objective reality by examining can be accepted. According to the standpoint of this theory and methodology, if we want to answer the question that which viewpoint between Mao and Liang is better to describe the actual situation of China Society; we must observe and study fully and

systematically the China Society at least the society before their views were published, and then compare the real data which we observe and their views; decide which view is more close to the objectivity. The view which is more close to the objectivity is accepted by us.

 Specifically, after observeing fully the history and reality of China Society, we may find that the China Society from past to that time is either (1) always the class society, or (2) always the non-class society, or (3) in the past was the non-class society, but is now a class society, or (4) in the past was the non-class society, but now is becoming the class society; or (5) always in some places are the the non-class society, while in other places are the class society; or (6) in the past was the non-class society generally, while now in some places are the class society… When we have some find, we can compare the find with the views of Mao and Liang, and then dicide which one can be accepted according the standpoint of given realism above. If we get the result which is (1) always the class society through practice, then after comparing we may and must accept the viewpoint of Mao; if we get the result which is (2) always the non-class society, we must accept the viewpoint of Liang; if the result is one of the other items, we must say that the views of Mao and Liang are both inappropriate, and we need to correct and harmonize their views so as to get one view which is more comprehensive and appropriate than their views.

 However, if we want to do works above, we need an indispensable logical premise; it means that we must have an accepted and uniform definition about the most central concepts like as "class". If we lack the accepted and uniform definition about central concepts, and the meanings of the same concept are different and even totally different, we not only can't compare these results normally, also can't compare normally these veiws of theories and can't compare the views of theory with the result which we observe and study.

 If we observe and study the discourse between Mao and Liang, we can find there is one situation like this: though both Mao and Liang study the situation of Chinese class, and both they use the concept of "class", there are considerable differences in the usage and definition of "class" between Mao and Liang. According to the viewpoint of Mao, the "class" means the difference of economic status and plitical status, and the occupancy of capital goods and the source of income make the difference. Hence, as long as the difference in the occupancy of capital goods and the source of income will be to a certain extent, we can say the different "class" have becomed in the society. For example, in the articals of "ANALYSIS OF THE CLASSES IN CHINESE SOCIETY" and "HOW TO DIFFERENTIATE THE CLASSES IN THE RURAL AREAS", Mao differentiate the class according to the criteria above. Mao puts forward definitely "a landlord is a person who owns land, does not engage in labour himself, or does so only to a very small extent, and lives by exploiting the peasants"; "the rich peasant generally has rather more and better instruments of production and more liquid capital than the average and engages in labour himself, but always relies on exploitation for part or even the major part of his income"; "the middle peasant have a fair number of farm implements and derive his income wholly or mainly from his own labour"; "the poor peasants some own part of their land and have a few odd farm implements, others own no land at all but only a few odd farm implements and both have to rent the land"; "the worker and the farm labourer as a rule owns no land or farm implements, though some do own a very samll amout of land and very few farm implements but they make their living wholly or mainly by selling their labour power".[10] However, the meaning of "class" in the view of Liang is very different. "what is the class", Liang writes that the class is not the difference in the social status and uneven distribution of wealth, "the class" in this place is specific. In the viewpoint of Liang, the formation of "class" of course relates to the difference in the seizeding of the capital goods, but not all the difference in the social status which is caused by the seizeding of the

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10 Mao, Tse-Tung, "How To Differentiate The Classes In The Rural areas ", Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung: Vol. I, People's Publishing House, 1964, pp.113-115.

capital goods can be called "class"; only that (1) the extent of difference is so big that some people can monopolize the production tools and can let other people do the whole or the most work; and only that (2) this monopolization is the status of difference which is relative fixed existence in a long time; only the two conditions are met, we can call the difference "class". Liang considers that in the west some people (like noble or capitalist) monopolize the production tools and other people take on the production in long time whether the time is the middle ages or modern times; so western society is the society of "class" indeed.[11] But the society of China is different from the society of west. In China, though there is difference in the possession of the means of production, the extent of difference is not enough to make some people can monopolize the production tools and let other people do the whole or the most work in a long time; because there are three reasons to make it. "the first reason is that the land can be buy and sell freely and all the people have the chance to own lands; the sencond reason is that the legacy can be shared out equally and the society of China is not the primogeniture; the third reason is that China has no large machinery like as steam engine and electric engine". (The first two points make the society of China can't become monopoly to land, so there is the situation which is that the same lands are belonged to lots of different person in a hundred thousand years and high-low competes with the same general in ten years; and the final two points make the society of China can't have the monopolization to the capital.) As a result, the "China society " can't be called "class society". Liang writes in the book that though China society has the difference in the distribution of wealth and the social status, this situation changes constantly and so the opposite trend can't form and we can't call the socity "class".[12]

It is thus clear that, the usage about the concept of "class" is very different between Mao and Liang. The different answers to the question whether China society is one class society are most based on the different usuage about "class" rather than that based on the difference in the observation to China society. So we can't make out exactly which viewpoint is right by observing the history and reality of China society wholly and carefully, because the "class" to Mao and Liang is not the same meaning. So we can't decide which viewpoint is appropriate to China society according to given realism, and even though we get some result, the result may be not accepted by people generally.

Facing this the concept of "class" occupied by these two people, is it possible that we arrive at a distinct conclusion about their righteousness? Or, asked in a more abstract way, is it possible that we arrive at a standard definition of this concept which both would accept? If it is possible, we could look deep into the history and present of the Chinese society using this standard definition of class, and then base the conclusion of righteousness on this observation. For instance, if we arrive at a conclusion that the definition of class of Mao (or Liang, or others) is more righteous, then we would compare the reality with that definition, and testify it. If this definition accords with the reality, we would accept the judgment of Mao (or Liang, or others) on the Chinese society, which is, the Chinese society is a class society, vice versa.

In the standpoints of various realists, it is possible that we could have a standard definition about class. According to them, class is not only a given fact independent of our discourse system, as a given fact that could be nominated independently; it possesses certain essential attributes which could distinguish itself from other phenomena or things of the "real" world (otherwise it would be attributed to other phenomena or things, and couldn't be named

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11 "In the society, it has one situation which is the means of production and the job of production are belonged two types of people; some people take possession of the means of production, while other people do the work; that's called the society of class antagonism. For example in the middle ages of west, the whole lands are belonged nobles and landowners; and to modern times the machines are belonged capitalist; while all the labourers like as the serf and the worker have no the means of production; so it becomes one situation which has the exploiter and the exploited." Liang Shuming, Theory of Rural Construction, Shanghai Century Publishing Group, 2006, p.27.
12 Liang Shuming, Theory of Rural Construction, Shanghai Century Publishing Group, 2006, p.28.

independently). As a means to present the essential differences of the "class" comparing with other social phenomena (for instance, the family, the country , the enterprise and the village), the concept of the "class" could be only accepted when it precisely reveal the essential attributes of the phenomenon of "class". So when faced with various definitions of "class", we have to examine that whether they reveal these essential attributes, and the one testified to present these attributes would be our "standard definition" of the phenomenon of "class" in later observation, description and analysis.

However, as soon as we start this work, we will see that this is an impossible mission. If we simply start with the "objective reality", we couldn't find out which one of these various definitions of "class" precisely and truly reveals the essential attributes of the phenomenon. We could take the concepts of "class" occupied by Mao and Liang as examples: according to Mao, when the possession of the production goods and income has arrived at a certain level of difference among people, we could label them with different "classes", no matter whether this difference renders long-term and solid monopoly of production goods. According to Liang, by contrast, only when the monopoly of production goods is long-termed and solid, and other people are forced to do the whole or great part of the job, we could label them as different "classes". Which of these concepts, Mao's or Liang's, has revealed the essential attributes of the phenomenon of "class"?

Some would say that it is absolutely the concept of Mao that has revealed the essential attributes of the phenomenon of the "class", for this very concept of "class" itself has its utility to depict the most essential and significant differences between people, and this differences in the domain of income and social status are caused by the occupation of production goods. The reason that the differences caused by occupation of production goods are taken as the most important, is that these differences could cause deprivation, and the deprivation of people doesn't accord with the social justice, and the suing acute antagonism would compromise the wholeness of the society. So the "class" is a phenomenon that should be eliminated (the concept of "class" was raised to indicate the justification of its very elimination). Therefore, in the first place, only the social differences caused by the occupation of production goods could be counted as "class"(other differences concerning ethnics, physics, gender, jobs or knowledge don't result in deprivation, thus couldn't be labeled as "class"). Secondly, as soon as differences exist in the occupation of production goods and in the domain of income, and lead to the phenomenon of deprivation, we could call these social groups "classes", without considering whether these differences are bigger enough to cause monopoly and force others to carry on the whole or the most part of the production work. For whether the "classes" exist among people and whether these "classes" are solid and occupied by certain people, these are two distinct questions, and we couldn't deny the former with the latter.

But others would say that, the concept of Liang has truly revealed the essential attributes of the phenomenon of "class", as Liang has said, if the differences of the occupation of production goods have not reached at the point where certain part of the people could monopolize the production goods and force the others to carry on the whole or most part of the work, these differences would have little practical meanings. As the proverbs say: "in the thousand years, the master of the land has changed hundreds of times, and in ten years the poor and the rich would be same"; "a man lives in the village this morning would be the guest of the emperor in the evening", one's situation of occupation of production goods as well as his source of income could change in a short time.

In these two contrary views, which has better logics? Indeed, we could not get a concrete answer for this question. We have no sufficient proves to attest that the occupation of production goods and income have to be of a certain level to be named as "class", neither could we prove that the situation not so serious could be given the name of "class". All in all,

it is highly difficult to decide which of the two concepts of "class" the standard one is, and if we assume that the quarrels between Mao and Liang could be settled this way, this solution would barely reach the agreement among people.

4. Criticisms of the Traditional Realism by the Post-modernists

From the above analysis we can see that from the standpoint of the traditional realism, we can not make a fair judgment on the controversy between Mao and Liang. To make a fair judgment, we have to find another way.

In fact, the reason why our former efforts were in vain is not lacking effective means to achieve a fair judgment, but the goal what we wanted to achieve is problematic in itself. With respect to this, the post-modernists' view can show a way for us.

As we all know, post-modernists not only waged a sharp critique of traditional realism, but also proposed a view of reality which is very different from traditional realism.

First, they stick to a view which we can call discourse realism or discourse constructionism. In this view, any object we study as a reality (the objective reality or the subjective reality) is constructed of some specific symbols, discourses, and it is not purely given, but a discursive reality. One might think that this view is idealistic, as if all the things are subjective realities, all are discourses, and there is nothing except the subjective reality. In particular, Derrida said, "There is nothing outside of the text." Many people think that this sentence is ridiculous, how could it be that there is nothing outside of the text? Obviously there are many other real things. However, this understanding is over simplistic. Derrida can not be so stupid that he did not know there was Derrida himself who existed outside the text. Of course, he knew. "There is nothing outside of the text" "There is nothing outside of the discourse" does not say that there is nothing other than the text, but rather that if we human beings like the animals who have no discourse, no sign, then the reality exists outside of our mind is a chaos for us. Or more appropriately speaking, the reality is not as we see now at least. The reality and the world we human beings can feel, think of, and talk about are filtered by our symbolic systems and discourse systems, and so they are constructed by our specific discourse systems, which are no longer completely pure and natural. We do not know what the pure nature itself is. What we feel and understand of the nature is given by our discourses.

As long as we agree that the reality is not given, as long as it can be understood as a reality which is constructed by our discourse systems, and it is a discursive reality, the followings are easily understood. Thus, the second important view of the post-modernists is anti-representationalism. In this view, every knowledge or discourse isn't a representation of a given reality, but a discourse construction which is restrained by some special discourse systems and their rules. For example, our discourse about "the disabled" is not a representation of some purely natural and objective reality of "the disabled". There is no purely natural phenomenon of "the disabled", as if we can represent the features and the relationship between them by following a purely objective procedure. This is not the case. Our description and interpretation of them depend entirely on how we name and define them. All our discourses about "the disabled" depend on and subject to the discourse systems what we have about "the disabled", which are not representations of some purely natural thing, but just discourse constructions which are restrained by some special discourse systems and their rules.

The third important view of the post-modernists is: people who are under different discourse systems could make completely different discourse constructions of the same "object", and we cannot judge absolutely true or false between these constructions. It does not say that we cannot judge; we can judge, but it is difficult for us to discern what is absolutely true or false, and what is absolutely right or wrong. For example, according to the definition of "the

disabled" a few years ago, we can make a description of the current status of the disabled in China, or propose a set of policy analysis. But if we according to a new definition of "the disabled", we will get another description of the current status of "the disabled" in China. So, which is true and which is false? Both are true! Both are right! Is that right? Well, it depends on which set of discourse system you choose, the previous or the present. If you think the previous definition of "the disabled" is more appropriate, you should follow it, and vice versa. You may ask which is true? It is hard to say, and it is very difficult to make an absolute judgment, because each of them may have some reasonable parts and also some limitations. At last, how to judge the two definitions of "the disabled" of different times depends on the value position you take, or even depends on your political position, or depends on the factors outside of the so-called "true" and "false". Therefore, our results should be plural; we should not say that only a certain result is true or false. We may have relative judgments. If I think this definition is better, so I'm probably more inclined to it, and the description according to it is more preferable. If I stand in another position, I would think this definition need to change, for it is improper, so we must propose a new understanding, and the description according to this new definition is more proper. So the standpoint of judgment which you take is not in the academic but outside of the academic.

The fourth important view of the post-modernists is anti-essentialism. In this view, things do not have one purely given essence. The essence of things is constructed by our discourse systems, and therefore changes along with the latter. The modernism thinks that any definition reveals the essential property of the object. For example, what is "the disabled"? We must take the most important property or difference between the disabled and the normal, and then according to it we make a definition, and this definition is the essence of "the disabled". In the view of the post-modernists, the essence of "the disabled" is defined according to the discourse systems we have, which is not a natural property of the disabled. Of course, it is an attribute of the disabled, but regarding it as the most important and most essential property of the disabled is a result of our own definition, which is not a purely natural result. People of different ages, different cultures will have different understandings of what the most important property of "the disabled" is. Different intensions and extensions in definition of "the disabled" give different descriptions of it; the issues proposed will be different, and the solutions and policies according to it will be different too. So the "essence" of the things is also changing along with the discourse systems.

The fifth important view of the post-modernists which is against the modernism is anti-foundationalism. The modernism thinks that the universal knowledge is more important than the particular (or more local) knowledge of things. But the post-modernism insists that the particular or local knowledge is more important for us to understand these things, and the universal knowledge summarized from them is neither superior nor more valuable nor meaningful than the particular or local knowledge. Because many details are abstracted out and filtered out during our inductive process, while the knowledge of these details may have a key importance on our understanding of things.

These are criticisms and challenges of traditional realism which are given by the post-modernists, who propose a new point of view, i.e. discourse constructionism. Except the fifth view which I have some reservations, in my opinion, these views are reasonable, and the traditional realism's view is indeed a bit over simplistic.

5. Chinese Society: A Discursive Reality

I consider that from the standpoint of post-modernism, we may resolve the dispute between Mao Zedong and Liang Shuming in a new way.

Actually, as Saussure, whose perspective is the starting point of many post-modernists' treatises, has pointed out, there isn't a certain connection between the phrase people use and its signifie. It's occasional to a great extent. To the concept of "class" we have touched upon, it's not inevitable to define a phenomenon as "class", but not as some other names. And so is it to define a specific phenomenon as class, but not some other phenomenon. We don't have an absolute criterion to judge which different usages of the concept of "class" is better. Therefore, we admit that both Mao and Liang used the concept of "class" appropriately in this case. Merely they used different discourses to construct Chinese society. If we accept the "class" used by Mao Zedong we have to agree that Chinese society is a class society. Conversely, if we approve Liang Shuming's explanation to "class", we may have to accept that Chinese society is not a class society as well. In different understanding of "class", it's insignificant to debate whose perspective about the structure of Chinese society is better.

The reason why I use such a large space to describe the divarication between Mao Zedong and Liang Shuming to the question that whether Chinese society is a class society is to indicate that the so-called Chinese Society and many other stories about China are constructed in different discourses actually. An objective and self-existent Chinese Society which is independent of and separated from a discursive system doesn't exist. It's not as what people comprehend. The proposition that "nothing else exists out of text" means that out of our subjective consciousness and discursive system, there's nothing else. What exist are some texts constructed in Chinese, English, Arabic Latin and so on. It is that (1) All our experiences, thoughts and sayings about the world and existence have to be realized and accomplished by some discourses. If the world out of our subjective consciousness and discursive system really exists, it is chaos and can't be experienced, thought and said in the specific ways of human beings. It is only through the incision by some specific phrases that chaos can become the specific object experienced, thought and said by us. It is only by the specific mode of representation and rhetoric that these specific "objects" can be connected into a colorful world further. And it is as some tactics constructed by the specific theme that this "world" can be transformed into the unique horizon which is experienced, thought and said in some specific time and spatial field. Nevertheless,(2)as Saussure once said, the correspondence between the specific discourses, based upon which we experience, think and say the existence and the objects which we experience, think and say is not inevitable, but occasional and variable. For instance, we incise the chaos with a specific phrase such as "class", the incision may not be what's pre-given and inevitable, but occasional to a large extent. Therefore, (3) to a chaos, we may construct different "discursive system". Among these discursive systems, not only the phrases which have the same figures and meanings superficially, such as the "class" used by Mao Zedong and Liang Shuming, but also the phrases have different figures but close meanings, such as "class" in Chinese and English, their connotation and extension are not the same, or even different greatly. And because of these differences of phrase-net, mode of representation and rhetoric, theme and tactics, people in different discursive system form different experiences, thoughts and saying to the chaos. Particularly, for the research of "Chinese society", when people in different discursive systems experience, think and say "Chinese society" or some more specific theme, it's inevitable to form different experiences, thoughts and sayings in the nature, structure, pattern, history, current situation and trend of "Chinese society".

Undoubtedly, as what we have demonstrated, we can't determine which of these different experiences, thoughts and sayings in different discursive system is right ultimately. We can just analyze the underlying discursive system and interrelated rules and try to understand the interrelated discourses derived from a discursive system.

In Chinese research field quite a few of disputes belong to the disputes between discourses. However, they are regarded as dispute about interrelated reality. For instance, is traditional

China a feudal society since Qin Shihuang? Is traditional Chinese Society stagnant long? Is contemporary China a modern society? Has contemporary Chinese society been a market economy society? Is contemporary Chinese society a Unity society? Or is Unit system a unique phenomenon only in China? Does class exist in contemporary China? If it does, which classes exist? Has a middle class formed in contemporary China? If it has, how is its condition on earth? What's the extent of urbanization? Is contemporary China a rifted society? Are there clans in rural China? Do Chinese have religious belief? Is Confucianism a religion? Few people facing the divarication and dispute can be aware of that some of them belong to the dispute discussed above, since kinds of given-realism affects. Therefore they always persist to find an answer most correctly and appropriately. However, what we analyze above has proved the persistence is in vain.

6. "Postsociology" and Traditional Sociology: Breaking and Continuous

In fact, the conclusion mention above is not only can be applied to the study of "Chinese society", but can be applied to any research of social phenomena. Once we realize this, then we can conceive a kind of sociology which will be very different from traditional sociology . Modeled on the"postsocial history", a new phrase used by Cabrera in his book Postsocial History:An Introduction, 13we can call this new sociology as "Postsociology".
As the name suggests, the new sociology of the so-called "post-sociology", is a sociology after traditional sociology. Therefore, in order to understand the meaning of the new phrase "post-sociology", We need to explain our understanding of traditional sociology.
 The so-called "traditional sociology" is not a unified discourse system . It contains "Positivism sociology", "Hermeneutical sociology" or "phenomenological sociology", "Critical Theory" and various comprehensive sociological perspectives that attempt to integrate these different theoretical paradigms of sociology. But no matter how much differences between those perspectives or paradigms, they have a common characteristic, that is: considered the social phenomena, the object of our observing, thinking and speaking, as a "given reality" which independent of our discourse system, and will not changes in line with the changes of our discourse system. The so-called "sociology", was also identified as a presentation of such "given reality". Stressing the social phenomena that we taking as our object of observing, thinking and speaking is a "given reality", like those "traditional realists" we outlined earlier, stressing that the aim of sociology is present such a "given reality" as accurately as possible, stressing that the sole criterion to determine whether a sociological statement can be accepted is that it presented "social reality" accurately, are basic features of the traditional sociology. As a new "sociology" after the "traditional sociology", The postsociology is based on the inquiring about "Given Realism" which "traditional sociology" implicited.
 Different With the traditional sociology, the "postsociology" inspired by postmodernism (but is not a simple copy on postmodernism). Its basic point is: "social reality", as the object of our observing, thinking and speaking, is not a "given reality" which completely independent of people's discourse system, and failing to change in line with the change of people 's discourse system. On the contrary, any "social reality" we are able to feel, think, and speech is just a discursive reality constructed by actors, under the guidance and constraints of specific discourse system; All of our feelings, thoughts and speech of "social reality" are also not representation of such "given reality", but only certain discourse constructions completed by some actors under the constraints and guidelines of discourse system and their rules; Actors under constraints and guidelines of different discourse system would make different

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[13] Cabrera, M., *Post-Social History: An Introduction*, Lexington Books, 2004.

discourse construction of the "same object"; It will be difficult for us to make a absolute judgment for which one is true or false among those discursive constructions. So, with this, the task of sociology is also not representing of "given reality" as accurately as possible, but describe and analyze the process of discursive construction through which a "social reality" constructed by some persons under the guidance and constraints of specific discourse system. Starting from such a thinking, the "postsociology" calls for a transformation in the objects and methods of social research : On one hand, transform the object of study from the so-called "itself" of social reality to the discourse construction process of "social reality"; On the other hand, transform the research method from the traditional positivist approach, hermeneutics method and critical approach to a kind of discourse analysis modified by pluralism (so I called it as "pluralistic discourse analysis"). In the words of C. Lemert, an American sociologist, a new paradigm of social studies shall be conceived to "make discourse both the subject matter and the medium of sociological analysis".[14] With this new paradigm of social research, our understandings of the social world will be enhanced, and our sights will be broadened.

Understanding the "postsociology" as above, the core ideas of postsociology will including "Discourse constructivism" and "pluralism" two points. The so-called "discourse constructivism", is not only means that, as we said above, stressing the discursive nature of social reality, emphasizing that any social phenomena which we can perceiving, thinking and speaking is only a "discursive reality" constructed by actors under the guidelines and constraints of some particular discourse systems, but also stressed the absolutely autonomy nature of "discourse system" guiding and restraining people construct social reality, deny that they are some representations of a given social reality that independent and external to our "discourse system". In this sense, "Discourse constructivism", as long as thorough, it will inevitably implies an equally thorough position of "pluralism". A thorough position of "discourse constructivism" and a thorough position of "pluralism" is mutual implied logically: A thorough position of "discourse constructivism" means deny the pure natural essential of "social reality" completely, denied the determinant role of social reality in the formation of discourses, recognize the absolute autonomy of discourses, therefore, denied completely the possibilities to judge the "authenticity" of a discourse according it is or is not to match the "social reality", thus had to accept such a pluralist conclusion that different "discourse system" has the same "authenticity". In other words, A thorough position of "discourse constructivism" inevitably led out a thorough position of "pluralism", a thorough position of "pluralism" must take a thorough position of "discourse constructivism" as own basis or precondition. it is impossible, from a viewpoint of logic, to take a position of "discourse constructivism" without "pluralism", or to take a position of "pluralism" without "discourse constructivism", unless our position do not have the thoroughness.

Therefore, the so-called "post-sociology", is a new social research path after traditional sociology (so it can be called as "post-sociology") , but it can also be understood as a kind of "postsocial-logy", because the main reason that it could become a different research path from the traditional "sociology" is that it has a new understanding which is different from the traditional sociological understanding of "social reality": it is no longer take the "social reality" as a given reality which completely independent of people's discourse system, failing to change with the change of our discourse system, but take this social world, the object of our feeling, thinking, and speaking, as a discursive construction. In other words, although it still take the "social reality" as its object of study, but it did not still understand the "social reality" as a "given reality", like people understood usually, but as a "discursive reality" constructed by people under the constraints and guidance of specific discourse system.

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14 Lemert, C., "Poststructuralism and Sociology", in Seidman, S. , The Postmodern Turn: New Perspectives on Social Theory, Cambridge University Press, 269.

Therefore, the "social reality" which as the object of postsociology is not that "social reality" which as the object of traditional sociology. The former is an object with some new meanings. However, despite this, we should not think that there is just a broken relationship between the "postsociology" and the traditional sociology. Despite our earlier discussion does give people such a impression of "breaking", but before the end of this paper, I think it is important to note that although this impression (if people had got that impression) has it's evidence in my article, but it should be changed. It is not difficult to understand why reader would had such a impression: In order to deepen the reader the impression of a idea expressed in a article, the authors of this article always tend to emphasize the differences between their idea and conventional ideas. In fact, the relationship between the "postsociology" and the traditional sociology is not the only differences without any continuities. On this point, I am have done some very brief tips in a few places of my book Towards a Pluralistic Discourse Analysis: the Implications of Postmodernism theory for Sociology. Here I will make a review briefly. This review will show that the "postsociology", did not like people will worry about, would abandon recklessly every valuable things in traditional sociology.

   The basic idea of "postsociology" (or "Pluralistic Discourse Analysis") is to insist that so call "social reality", as the object of our experience, thinking and speech, is really a discursive reality that constructed by people under the guidance and constraints of specific discourse system, and would change with tha change of our discourse system; The basic task of social research is to described and analyzed how social reality be constructed up by people under the guidance and constraints of some particular discourse systems, not just make a simply representation of a given and natural social reality; Concepts and propositions of sociology are not some simple representations of a given reality, but have absolute autonomy of their own; People under different discourse systems might construct different social reality, and we do not have the ability to make a final and absolute judgment on which one is true or false between these different discourse systems; social phenomenon has also not any "essence" that completely out of our discourse system, any "essence" that we identified to a social phenomenon is just a discursive construction; etc.. In many articles, we often summarized these ideas with "anti-realism", "anti-representationalism", "anti-correspondence theory of truth", "anti-essentialism" and other labels.

 However, as I mentioned in the articles about it, this does not mean the "reality", "truth", "objectivity", "representation", "truth ", "fallacy", "essence" and other concepts and related ideas should be completely negated, but simply means the negation of traditional interpretation of these concepts and ideas, means a need if reinterpretation of them.
For example, "post-sociology" (or "pluralistic discourse analysis") really deny that "social reality" as the object of our experience, thinking and speech, is a kind of given reality which can be completely divorced from people's discourse systems, but as mentioned above, this does not mean "post-sociology" (or "pluralistic discourse analysis") totally negative "social reality" as a "reality", but only considered this "reality" as a "discursive reality" constructed up by people under the guidance and constraints of some particular discourse systems, and change with the change of people 's discourse system. With the changing of discourse system, the specific status of this kind of "reality" (such as the Internet addiction, suicide, crime, class structure, occupational structure, social Differentiation, etc.) will change. So it is a "discursive reality" constructed within a specific discourse system, and vary in line with change of the discourse system. But within the established discourse system, it is a "objective reality" with certainty, not vary in line with change of anyone 's will.[15]
Thus, "postsociologist" does not believe that all the controversy occurred in a field of social research (such as the research on "Chinese society" we described above) are only some

15 Xie, L., Towards a Pluralistic Discourse Analysis: The implications of postmodern theory for sociology. P.33-34. Chinese Renmin University Press, 2009.

discursive deputes and there is not any dispute on the objective reality itself. It might be more appropriate to say that although all social realities are constructed by people under the led and restricted of some specific discursive systems, within each discursive system, but to the individual belonging to this discursive system, these "realities" have their own objectivity, independent of individual subjective consciousness. Thus, we can still use the term of "objective reality" to describe the object we're speaking, as long as we do not forget that the objective nature it has isn't an unmixed natural attribute which is independent of our discursive system, as what a given realists understand, but is an attribute belongs to our discursive system and vary in line with them.[16] On this premise, we can go on discussing the objectivity of the world, such as that of Chinese society, regarding the world or Chinese society as an objective reality for us to observe, describe and analyze and debate the nature, condition, history and trend of the objective reality or some part of it. So , it's possible to get a only correct answer relatively in some controversy, since the two contending sides belong to the same discursive system, using the same concept and follow the same rules of discourse. But it is still important to remember that the only correct answer is only a discursive construction, not a presentation on some given realities. Therefore, when facing the divarication and dispute in a social research process, we need distinguish which is dispute between discourses and which is within a discourse and deal with them in different ways and attitude.

Similarly, "post-sociology" (or "pluralistic discourse analysis") emphasizes the absolute autonomy of discourse, emphasizing that discourse is not the simple representation of some "thing in itself" which is completely independent of our discourse system, but some constructions completed by people under the guidance and restraint of some particular discourse systems. But it also does not mean that the word "representation" and associated terminology "representationalism" will be no longer useful, they should be abandoned completely. It only means that every sentence (eg, "the rate of internet addiction of Beijing middle school's Students have raised up to 20% in 2011") or every piece of text made by people in our everyday life should be seen at first as a particular discursive construction by people under the guidance and restraint of some discourse systems around the topic "internet addiction", and should not be seen as a direct reflection of a disease outside our discourse system. In other words, under the guidance and restraint of a differential discourse system, a key component of this sentence could be changed (such as the percentage "20%" will be changed to "30%") . However, if the discourse system guiding and constraining our experience, thinking and speech is established, then the "real" situation (such as the "the rate of internet addiction of Beijing middle school's Students in 2011") that can be constructed within this discourse system should be given relatively, every sentence, every piece of text we made under the guide and constraints of this discourse system should be seen a representation on the "given reality", and can not be cut the crap out of thin air.[17]

In relation to this, it is also only effective on the relationship between the different discourse systems, when "post-sociology" (or "pluralistic discourse analysis") emphasizes a pluralism theory of truth, negative the "correspondence theory of truth". When the discourse system established, the true and false values (at a specific time and spatial extent) of a sentence or a

16 Husserl has discussed how people constructed "objectivity" in their subjective conscious process precisely.(referring to Husserl，2002: "construction of interactive body", Phanomenologie der lebenswelt, translated by Ni Kangliang and Zhang Yanguo, Shanghai Yiwen Press; Husserl，1988: Die krisis der europsischen wissenschaften und die transzendetale phanomenologie, translated by Zhang Qingxiong. The difference between Husserl's opinion and mine is that I don't only admit that the objectivity is constructed by subjective consciousness, but also wish to discuss 1)the underlying discoursive systems, leading and restricting the subjective conscious process and saying;2)the effect of specific discoursive system and its rule in the construction process.

17 Xie, L., Towards a Pluralistic Discourse Analysis: The implications of postmodern theory for sociology. P.34, 169-170. Chinese Renmin University Press, 2009.

text constructed by people under this discourse system also should be determined, and is only one instead of Diverse, and the way used to judge of the true or false of these statements is make a contrast between them and the "reality" stated by them, to see whether they are correspondence each other: If they are correspondence each other, then we can call this statement as a "truth"; if not, then we should call this statement as "fallacy". [18]

Finally, the "post-sociology" (or "pluralistic discourse analysis") negative social phenomena have the "essence" which can be completely independent of our discourse system, believe all of what identified by us as "essence" of a social phenomenon is just actually some discursive constructions, which also not to say that the term "essence" will not be used. Tt is only to say that the concept can only be used within a given discourse system. "within a discourse system, we can still use the word 'essence' to indicate some basic features of a thing when we define it. But in doing so, we should remember that these so-called 'essential characteristics' neither inherent the things (but a discourse construction of us) are non-unique (there are some different construction within other discourse systems)". [19]

    All in all, as I points out in the end Towards a Pluralistic Discourse Analysis: The implications of postmodern theory for sociology: different from what many people usually think, in a sense, we can say that "post-sociology" (or "pluralistic discourse analysis") need not actually completely abandoned the contents, concepts and methods of the traditional sociology, but can inclusion those contents, concepts and methods in their own in a new way, in order to give those contents, concepts and methods a new meaning and value. For example, we can abandon "Given realism" position of traditional sociology, but it does not have to abandon any concept like "reality" and some methods associated with this position. We can make a new understanding and a new interpretation of them, and re-inclusion them into the "post-sociology" (or "pluralistic discourse analysis"). For some other contents, concepts and methods of traditional sociology, it is also true. "Thus, what abandoned by postsociology are only those 'Given realism', 'representationalism', 'correspondence theory of truth', 'essentialism', 'Fundamentalism' associated with traditional sociology, not concepts and methods connected with it." [20] From this perspective, "postsociology" (or "pluralistic discourse analysis") is not as radical and incomprehensible as people imagined, it only provide us with a new opportunity to understand and improve our work in aspects of objects , procedures, methods, tasks and goals of social study.

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18 Xie, L., Towards a Pluralistic Discourse Analysis: The implications of postmodern theory for sociology. P.37. Chinese Renmin University Press, 2009.

19 Xie, L., Towards a Pluralistic Discourse Analysis: The implications of postmodern theory for sociology. P.39. Chinese Renmin University Press, 2009.

20 Xie, L., Towards a Pluralistic Discourse Analysis: The implications of postmodern theory for sociology. P.42. Chinese Renmin University Press, 2009.

The Chinese Public Sociology

Shen Yuan

La sociologie présente un caractère double : elle est à la fois une science et une force morale et politique. Au cours du siècle écoulé, pour se faire une place dans la forêt des sciences sociales, la sociologie a développé son caractère scientifique, son caractère moral et politique étant dissimulé ou réprimé. Il fallait en effet se débarrasser de la morale et de la politique considérées comme la « préhistoire » de la sociologie. Pourtant, à l'aube du nouveau siècle, ce caractère moral et politique de la sociologie est en train de ressusciter et se propage rapidement dans le monde entier sous le nom de « sociologie publique ». La traduction en 2007 des « onze thèses pour la sociologie publique » de Michael Burawoy n'est qu'un aspect de cette diffusion[1].

Car la sociologie publique chinoise n'a pas commencé en 2007. Si, selon la définition de Burawoy, on entend par « sociologie publique » le fait que la sociologie sorte de l'enceinte de l'université afin de dialoguer avec toutes sortes de publics et produise des savoirs sociologiques dans un processus d'apprentissage mutuel, alors on peut affirmer que dès la première période de développement de la sociologie en Chine, des années 1920 au début des années 1950, les premiers sociologues chinois en avaient déjà initié l'expérimentation. Liang Shuming et Yan Yangchu, promoteurs du « mouvement de reconstruction rurale », à Zouping dans le Shandong pour le premier et à Dingzhou dans le Hebei pour le second, en sont les deux meilleurs exemples[2]. Et même le travail idéologique de l'intelligentsia du Parti communiste a pu, au tout début, se développer à l'université de Shanghai sous le nom d'éducation sociologique.

La « réorganisation des universités » effectuée dans les années 1950 a réduit en cendres cette première phase de croissance de la sociologie chinoise. Tant la sociologie professionnelle qui avait atteint une certaine maturité que la sociologie publique bourgeonnante ont été balayées sans pitié. « Ne pas laisser de semences » fut le jugement final des dirigeants de l'État-Parti à l'égard de la sociologie[3]. La réforme et l'ouverture des années 1980 ont donné une vie nouvelle à la discipline, favorisant jusqu'à aujourd'hui ce que l'on peut qualifier de seconde phase de croissance de la sociologie. Durant cette période, la sociologie a pris pour modèle les États-Unis, étudiant et introduisant un grand nombre de théories et surtout de méthodes. Avec l'afflux important dans les rangs de la sociologie de diplômés de l'étranger revenus au pays (les « tortues de mer »), de nombreux aspects de cette discipline, de son orientation à ses normes en passant par ses goûts, ses théories et ses méthodes, se sont rapidement américanisés, cette « américanisation » étant toutefois repeinte d'une couche

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1 Michael Burawoy, Gonggong shehuixue (Sociologie publique), traduit par Shen Yuan, Pékin, Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe (Social File Publishing House), 2007 (1ère édition).

2 Le mouvement de reconstruction rurale est un mouvement de réforme sociale initié dans les années 1920-1930 par un groupe d'intellectuels qui visait à reconstruire et faire renaître les campagnes chinoises ainsi qu'à résoudre les problèmes des paysans chinois. Plus de 600 associations participèrent au mouvement, parmi lesquelles les plus importantes furent le mouvement de Liang Shuming à Zouping dans le Shandong et celui de Yan Yangchu à Dingzhou dans le Hebei. Ces deux mouvements insistaient sur la mobilisation des paysans et considéraient que le développement des campagnes était un facteur décisif dans la modernisation de la Chine. Ils prirent durablement racine dans les villages, développant des relations très étroites avec les paysans. Ces mouvements ont donné lieu à la publication d'ouvrages sociologiques majeurs, comme l'Enquête sociale dans le district de Ding du sociologue Li Jinghan. Ils furent ensuite interrompus par le déclenchement de la guerre de résistance contre le Japon.

3 En 1952, lors de la réorganisation des universités, le sociologue Fei Xiaotong avait suggéré à Mao Zedong qu'il espérait que la sociologie ne serait pas entièrement supprimée, que « quelques semences seraient épargnées ». Il est dit que Mao Zedong rejeta la demande de Fei avec une extrême fermeté, exigeant que « rien ne soit épargné ».

d'« internationalisation ». Il faut rappeler que le moment au cours duquel les sociologues chinois se sont efforcés d'apprendre auprès de la sociologie américaine fut précisément la période où les savoirs spécialisés de celle-ci avaient atteint leur maturité et entraient dans une ère de production de masse. Et à cette époque, la sociologie publique était encore en état d'hibernation aux États-Unis, il n'était même pas question d'une diffusion à l'extérieur.

C'est le processus pratique de transition sociale de la Chine, et non pas uniquement la circulation des savoirs, qui a véritablement promu la germination rapide de la sociologie publique chinoise au cours de cette seconde phase de croissance. La Chine en transition vit actuellement une époque de mouvements sociaux : la tempête néo-libérale drapée d'un discours réformiste a anéanti presque toutes les digues de protection sociale ; face à la marée déferlante de la commercialisation promue par l'alliance de l'État et du marché, la société, pourtant très affaiblie et fragmentée, ne pouvait pas ne pas se dresser et résister. Des « contre-mouvements », au sens de Polanyi, ont émergé séparément en fonction des intérêts et des demandes des trois grandes classes sociales de la société moderne : pour protéger respectivement leurs « droits du travail », leurs « droits fonciers » et leurs « droits de propriété », travailleurs, paysans et classes moyennes ont développé un large éventail de formes de protestation. Parfois au sommet de la vague, parfois au creux, ces mouvements n'ont jamais cessé au cours des dernières années.

Face à ces mouvements sociaux en plein essor, la sociologie pouvait-elle rester à observer les bras croisés ? Évidemment non. Surtout lorsque l'on considère que les sociologues font eux-mêmes partie du public, qu'à l'intérieur des universités, la sociologie ne s'est jamais cantonnée à la production de titres universitaires et que la discipline sociologique a un destin lié à celui de la société et des mouvements sociaux. Un groupe de sociologues a par conséquent commencé à s'engager dans ces mouvements, offrant une aube nouvelle à la sociologie publique dans la Chine contemporaine. À Pékin par exemple, confrontés aux mouvements ouvriers, notamment aux luttes continues des travailleurs migrants, une partie des sociologues de l'université de Pékin et de l'université Tsinghua se sont profondément engagés dans ces mouvements : avec leurs élèves, ils n'ont pas seulement fondé des écoles du soir pour diffuser les « trois droits des ouvriers », ils ont également organisé des ONG du travail et ont été directement impliqués dans les mouvements de défense des ouvriers victimes d'accidents du travail et dans ceux portant sur les négociations salariales[4] ; les sociologues de l'université Renmin ont perpétué la tradition de la première sociologie chinoise en fondant d'abord un institut pour la reconstruction rurale au nom de Yan Yangchu qui s'est établi dans un premier temps dans le Hebei puis après avoir été contraint de fermer a déménagé à Pékin et en recherchant ensuite avec persévérance à organiser les paysans[5] ; suivant l'expansion urbaine, les départements de sociologie de ces trois universités ont tous participé activement aux mouvements de lutte contre les destructions et les expropriations ainsi qu'à ceux visant à défendre les droits des propriétaires dans les résidences de logements marchands nouvellement construites : ils se sont investis dans la construction institutionnelle des comités de propriétaires et dans l'association visant à créer une fédération des comités (le

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4 Parmi les exemples les plus célèbres, on peut citer l'école du soir pour paysans migrants fondée par le département de sociologie de Tsinghua dans la zone de production de maroquinerie de Baigou dans la province du Hebei ainsi que les formations dispensées sur le long terme aux ONG du travail ; l'organisation de travailleurs « Xing zai ren jian » fondée à Pékin par le département de sociologie de l'université de Pékin qui aide les travailleurs des chantiers à défendre leurs droits. Par ailleurs, ces dernières années, les actions communes lancées par des professeurs et étudiants des deux universités, en interaction avec les travailleurs, comme l'attention portée aux accidents du travail et aux maladies professionnelles des paysans migrants ou le « Rapport Foxconn » réalisé par des étudiants de Chine, de Taiwan et de Hong Kong, ont toutes eu une grande influence.

5 La Faculté de développement des campagnes de l'université Renmin est une force académique majeure qui vise à promouvoir l'organisation des paysans. Ils réalisent un travail important dans ce domaine depuis longtemps.

yeshenwei)[6] ; ils se sont également engagés dans de nombreux mouvements de résistance contre les démolitions et les expropriations comme le « procès des 10 000 »[7]. Autre événement important récent en lien avec la sociologie publique : les sociologues de l'université de Pékin, de Tsinghua et de l'École des relations du travail ont joint leurs forces à la fédération des syndicats de la ville industrielle la plus ouverte, Shenzhen, pour promouvoir la tenue d'élections directes démocratiques dans les syndicats. Partout dans le monde, les syndicats sont évidemment les organisations des ouvriers et ce sont naturellement les ouvriers qui en élisent les représentants. Mais dans notre pays, pour des raisons bien connues, l'élection démocratique des représentants syndicaux est devenue le point de départ indispensable permettant une autonomie des syndicats.

Dans tous les domaines que nous venons d'évoquer, la sociologie interagit étroitement et dans une parfaite harmonie avec les ouvriers, les paysans et les propriétaires. Elle épaule les mouvements, révélant de plus en plus complètement son caractère public.

Si la sociologie publique en Chine ne fait que renaître, les exemples relatés ci-dessus révèlent déjà trois de ses caractéristiques essentielles. Premièrement, depuis le début, la sociologie publique en Chine contemporaine présente un caractère « organique » essentiel[8]. Le contrôle étroit que l'État exerce sur les médias empêche la « sociologie publique traditionnelle » d'afficher ses compétences : sans même parler des journaux et des revues, les formats électroniques les plus nouveaux des médias, c'est-à-dire les blogs et les micro-blogs comme *weibo*, sont également devenus un domaine épineux où la mort et la réincarnation [des identités des internautes] sont désormais la norme. Cela a contraint la sociologie publique à un changement substantiel : s'engager dans la pratique et la vie quotidienne, s'orienter vers le dialogue, l'organisation et l'interaction directs avec toutes sortes de publics. Deuxièmement, l'engagement dans les mouvements sociaux n'est pas simplement un moyen de produire des savoirs mais répond plutôt à l'objectif principal de l'intervention qui est de promouvoir la formation et le développement de la société à laquelle appartiennent les sociologues et de transformer l'environnement présent. Ou pour le formuler autrement, la formation et la transformation de la société sont plus importantes que la production de savoirs sociologiques. La troisième caractéristique est plus facilement observable : il s'agit de la persistance des interactions développées avec les publics. Comme l'objectif essentiel de l'engagement des sociologues n'est pas de récolter des matériaux empiriques pour écrire des articles académiques, celui-ci n'est pas soumis aux contraintes périodiques de la production académique. Il ne s'agit pas de prendre contact brièvement et dans l'urgence avec des groupes et des publics puis de se retirer tout aussi rapidement pour retourner dans son bureau. Les organisations des publics vont exister dans la longue durée, la sociologie publique ne saurait par conséquent être fugace. Ainsi, le « *yeshenwei* », organisation de défense des droits des propriétaires créée par l'alliance des propriétaires et des sociologues de Tsinghua, a-t-il déjà une existence de huit années ; ainsi le « *xing zai ren jian* », organisation d'aide à la défense

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6 Depuis la fin du vingtième siècle, la ville de Pékin a construit à grande échelle des résidences de logements marchands. Selon les estimations, il y aurait aujourd'hui plus de 4400 résidences de ce type. Pour protéger leurs droits de propriété, les propriétaires de ces résidences ont entamé une lutte de long terme avec les promoteurs immobiliers, les syndics et les gouvernements locaux de base. Au cours de ce processus, ils ont formé une alliance horizontale regroupant différentes résidences, qui demande depuis 2007 la création d'une « fédération des comités de propriétaires ». Si cette fédération n'a pas reçu d'autorisation officielle à ce jour, elle a néanmoins effectué un important travail sous l'impulsion de plusieurs leaders militants de comités de propriétaires, comme le mouvement de « pétition citoyenne » lancé en 2007 qui visait à modifier des articles de la Loi sur la propriété privée et recueillit plus de 160 000 signatures.

7 Le « procès des 10 000 » est un mouvement de procès collectif de grande ampleur lancé par les résidents de Pékin pour s'opposer aux destructions et aux expropriations. Plus de 22 000 personnes participèrent au mouvement, utilisant principalement la forme du procès pour lutter contre les destructions forcées exercées par les gouvernements locaux.

8 Michael Burawoy distingue deux formes de sociologie publique : l'une, qualifiée de « traditionnelle », a essentiellement recours aux médias, tandis que l'autre, appelée « organique », participe davantage aux actions de différents publics, promouvant toutes sortes de dialogues avec ces derniers.

des droits des ouvriers du bâtiment fondée par les sociologues de l'université de Pékin a-t-il également presque 6 ans. Il semble que ces organisations résisteront dans la durée.

Quelles sont les perspectives de la sociologie publique en Chine ? Il faut reconnaître qu'elle fait face à un avenir extrêmement incertain. Les fortes pressions qu'endure la sociologie publique ne viennent pas uniquement de l'État et du marché, le plus grand danger provient en fait de l'intérieur du champ sociologique, de cette tension entre la prétention de la sociologie à être une science et la force morale et politique qu'elle incarne. Le développement important du caractère scientifique de la discipline a conduit à une forte spécialisation, à un « fétichisme de la méthode » et à un « culte du GSS » (*General Social Survey*), cette expansion excessive de la spécialisation risquant d'opprimer le caractère public de la sociologie et de la priver de légitimité. Ces nuages assombrissent aujourd'hui l'horizon autrefois ensoleillé de la sociologie. Les rayons de la sociologie publique pourront-ils percer ces sombres nuages et faire jaillir leur lumière ? L'avenir le dira.

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中国的公共社会学

社会学内在地就具有双重的性格：它是一门科学，同时也是一种道义和政治的力量。在以往近百年的学科发展中，社会学为了自立于社会科学之林而着力发展了科学性格，它的道义和政治性格却被遮蔽和压抑了。道义与政治被视为社会学的"史前史"，是早该翻过去的一页。然而，随着新世纪曙光的降临，社会学的道义和政治性格正在复苏，并以"公共社会学"的名义在全世界迅速传播。麦克．布洛维的"关于公共社会学的十一条论纲"于2007年被移译入中国，只是此种转播的一个侧面而已[1]。

但是中国的公共社会学却并非自2007年始。如果按照布洛维的界定，把"公共社会学"理解为使社会学穿透大学的院墙，使之与各种各样的公众对话并且在相互教育中生产社会学的知识，那么早在中国社会学的第一个成长期即1920年代到1950年代初，老社会学家们就已经开创了公共社会学的第一波实验。梁漱溟和晏阳初分别在山东邹平和河北定州推展的"乡村建设运动"就是两个最好的案例[2]。甚至早期共产党教育知识阶层的某些意识形态工作也是在上海大学社会学教育的名义下开展的。

中国社会学的第一个成长期随着1950年代的"院系调整"而灰飞烟灭。无论是以臻成熟的专业社会学，还是初露头角的公共社会学都被无情地一扫而光，"不留种子"是党国领袖对社会学的终审判决[3]。1980年代开始的改革开放为社会学注入了新的生命。从那时起到现在可以被称为社会学的第二个成长期。在这个时期内，社会学"以美为师"，学习和引入了大量的美国社会学理论，特别是方法。随着大量在美国学成的"海龟"涌入社会学队伍，社会学从取向、品味、理论、方法和规范诸方面都迅速地美国化了，虽然这种"美国化"被涂抹上一层"国际化"的色彩。不能不提到的是，当中国的社会学努力向美国社会学学习之际，正是美国社会学的专业知识业已成熟并进入批量生产的年代。公共社会学在那个时期的美国还处于蛰伏状态，遑论向外传播。

是中国社会转型的实践过程，而不仅仅是知识的传播，才推动了中国公共社会学在第二个成长期的迅速萌发。转型期的中国正处于一个社会运动时代：改革话语包裹着新自由主义风暴几乎荡平了一切社会保护屏障；在国家与市场联袂推动的商品化的汹涌大潮面前，社会本身尽管十分弱小，只留下些许残片，也不得不起而反抗。波拉尼意义上的"对冲运动"沿着现

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[1] 布洛维著，沈原等译：《公共社会学》，2007年第一版，社会科学文献出版社（Social File Publishing House）,北京

[2] 乡村建设运动是20世纪20～30年代由一批知识分子倡导并参加的以建设和复兴中国农村和解决中国农民问题为主旨的社会改良运动，参加运动的先后有

600多个团体，其中以梁漱溟在山东邹平和晏阳初在河北定州推动的运动最为重要。两个运动都强调动员农民，强调农村的发展是实现中国现代化的关键。他们长期扎根乡村，与农民建立了非常紧密的互动关系。从这些运动中还形成了若干有重大影响的社会学著作，如李景汉的《定县社会调查》等。这些运动后被抗日战争的爆发所打断

[3] 1952年院系调整时，费孝通曾向毛泽东建言，希望不要把社会学连根拔掉，而是要给社会学"留下一点种子"，据说毛泽东非常坚决地拒绝了费的请求，要求对社会学"一点不留"。

代社会三大阶级各自的利益和诉求分别展开：劳工为维护自己的"劳权"、农民为维护自己的"地权"、中产阶级为维护自己的"产权"，开展着各式各样的抗议运动。这些运动时而进入高潮，时而陷于低谷，但是多年来从未止息。

当社会运动兴起时，难道社会学能够袖手旁观吗？显然不能，因为社会学家自己就是公众的一部分，因为大学里的社会学从来就不仅仅囿于对学位证书的追求，因为社会学这个学科与社会和社会运动生死与共。一批社会学家开始投身于这些运动，为中国当代的公共社会学带来新的曙光。以北京为例，面对工人、特别是农民工连绵不断的抗争，清华和北大的部分社会学家已深深地参与其中，他们和他们的学生不仅办起夜校来宣讲"劳工三权"，还组织起劳工NGO，直接参与工伤救助和讨薪维权；[4] 人民大学的社会学家则接续中国老社会学的传统，创办起以晏阳初命名的乡村建设学院，先是在河北，被查封后又转移到北京，孜孜以求于农民的再组织[5]；随着城市扩张而引发的反拆迁运动和新建商品住宅小区业主维权运动的勃兴，这三个主要大学的社会学系对这些运动都有高度参与，介入业主委员会及其联合会的制度建设[6]，以及介入反拆迁的各种抗争运动如"万人诉讼"[7]。与公共社会学有关的一个最近的重要事件是北大、清华和劳动关系学院的社会学家与中国最开放的工业城市——

深圳的总工会联起手来，推动基层工会的民主直选。在世界各地，工会当然是工人的组织而且自然由工人自己选举产生。但是在我们的国度里，由于众所周知的原因，民主选举工会代表却成为促使工会走向自治的开端。在上述所有这些领域里，社会学与劳工、农民和业主们紧密互动，水乳交融，并肩运动，使社会学越来越充分地展示出其公共性的性格。

当代中国的公共社会学虽然尚处于再出发的阶段，但是借助于上述行动，已经能够大体勾描出它的二个基本特点。第一个特点是中国当代的公共社会学从一开始就具有"有机的"的主要特征[8]。国家对媒体的严密掌控使得"传统的公共社会学"难以施展身手，不要说报刊杂志，就是媒体的最新电子形态即博客和微博也成为荆棘丛生的领域，封杀和转世成为这里的常

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4 比较著名的有清华社会学系在河北白沟箱包生产地区建立的农民工夜校、长期开展的劳工NGO培训等，以及北大社会学系在北京建立的"行在人间"劳工组织，帮助建筑工维权。此外，近年来由两校社会学系部分师生发动的关注农民工工伤和职业病活动、两岸三地大学生"富士康"调查等，也都是颇有影响力的与劳工互动的活动。

5 人民大学的农村发展学院是推动农民再组织的重要学术力量。他们长期以来在该领域做了大量工作。

6 自20世纪末期开始，北京市大规模建设商品住宅小区，据估计现有各类商品住宅小区4400多个。小区的业主们为保护自己房屋产权，与开发商、物业管理公司和基层地方政府开展了长期斗争，并且在此过程中走向跨小区的横向联合，自2007年起每年申请成立"业主委员会联合会"。该会虽然迄今未获批准，但实际上在若干激进的业主委员会领导人的主持下开展了大量工作，包括发动16万公民对修正《物权法》若干条例的"公民联署"运动。

7 "万人诉讼"是发生在北京的市民大规模反对拆迁的集体诉讼运动，参加者达两万两千余人，主要是利用诉讼形式，抗议地方政府的强拆行为。

8 布洛维将公共社会学区分为"传统的"和"有机的"两种形态。"传统的"公共社会学主要是诉诸于媒体，而"有机的"公共社会学则更多地参与公众的实践，与公众开展各式各样的对话。

态。这就逼迫中国的公共社会学大幅度地转向介入实践和日常生活，转向与各种公众的直接对话、组织和互动；第三个特点在于，介入社会运动并非被当成知识生产的单纯手段，毋宁说，介入的主旨更多的是推动社会学家身处其中的社会的生产和成长，以及改造现存的生存环境，换言之，生产和改造社会比社会学知识的生产更为重要。第三个特点更为一眼可察：这就是此种与公众互动的持久性。既然介入主要地不是为了获取经验材料以撰写学术论文，所以也就不受学术生产周期的约束，不是短促突击式地联系公众群体而后又迅速撤回到书房。公众组织会长期存在，所以公共社会学的介入也就不是转瞬即逝的。清华社会学与业主联合建立的业主维权组织"业申委"迄今已经有8年之久，而北大社会学建立的协助建筑工维权的组织"行在人间"也差不多已有6年的寿。看来它们都还会长期地坚持下去。

中国的公共社会学的前景如何？应当说，它面对一个充满不确定性的未来。公共社会学所承受的沉重压力不仅来自国家和市场，更大的危险其实来自社会学内部，来自社会学作为一门科学和作为一种道义和政治力量之间的张力。社会学的科学性格的高度发展导致它走向高度专业化，走向"方法拜物教"和"GSS崇拜"，专业化的过度膨胀会压抑社会学的公共性格并剥夺其合法性。在社会学本来洒满希望之光的天空正在堆积乌云。公共社会学的光芒能否穿透乌云，喷薄而出，尚需拭目以待。

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Critical Sociology and Sociology of Critique

Luc Boltanski

French sociology, having lost after the Second World War the prominence it claimed during the Durkheimian era, regained international recognition by taking up a program of critical sociology which had been, until then, associated with the Frankfurt School. This reimplementation of a critical orientation, launched in the French context of May '68, has taken a different path, however, from the one followed by the German heirs of the Frankfurt School, notably Jurgen Habermas and, more recently, Axel Honneth.

Specific to the *French style* of critical sociology is the attempt to build a synthesis between Marxist and Durkheimian traditions, centered on the notion of institution. This synthesis entailed elements borrowed from Weberian sociology as well as approaches rooted in the phenomological tradition, very influential in post second world war France, particularly through the works of Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. One can say without reservation that Pierre Bourdieu's sociology presented the most visible aspect, both in France and abroad, of this diverse and proliferating archipelago constituted by the new French critical sociology of the seventies.

This new critical sociology became, in turn, the target of numerous critiques. Some were inspired by political considerations that amounted, briefly, to a purely conservative dismissal of critical sociology for targeting the established political and social order. Other critiques, however, were grounded not in political but instead in basic theoretical disagreements. These internal critiques were sometimes developed by sociologists who had been – as was my case – close collaborators of Pierre Bourdieu, but were at odds with some of the theoretical postulates underlying the Bourdieusan conceptual system.

Assuming such theoretically inspired critical stances did not imply, however, giving up the project of associating sociology and social critique. Such critiques recognized, at least implicitly, the legitimacy of such a project, as old as sociology itself. Despite the inner tensions and perhaps internal contradictions of such a project, it has defined what is unique to the sociological discipline. Arguably, sociology has always been caught, as in a pincer, between, on the one hand, the requirement for scientific description from an objective distance and, on the other, the need to adopt a normative stance allowing judgment of the prevailing social order. This paradoxical association between an orientation both neutral and a normative, descriptive and critical, has made it possible for sociology to justify its social utility in the eyes of political actors and the wider public. How could a sociology that did not display an interest in the social implications of its research hope to be taken seriously?

It is in this context of debates about the relations between sociology and social critique that another program – in which I was involved – took form during the eighties, namely, the pragmatic turn to *a sociology of critical practice*. This program was not oriented against critique – contrary to what has often been said, either in reproach or praise. On the contrary, one of its main aims was to renew the possibility of a critical sociology, and this by focusing on the critical capacities of ordinary actors and by taking as the subject of empirical research those situations, abounding in ordinary life, in which actors put into play these capacities, especially in the course of disputes.

1. Problematic aspects of Bourdieusian sociology

Before outlining this alternative program, I will rapidly recall some of our objections towards the Bourdieusian critical sociology. The main objection targeted the excessive and overarching reliance, in Bourdieusian sociology, on the notion of domination. The way domination was addressed in this work had the effect of describing nearly all relationships among actors as vertical. Not only relations that were explicitly hierarchical, but also those that were personal or intimate – as in the case of friendship and, even, of love – were all understood through the dynamic of power and control. Of course, any relationship can be seen as including relations of power. But the main problem from our perspective was that this kind of analysis was undertaken even when actors themselves considered their state of affairs very differently. The way actors experienced their relationships was, then, not taken sufficiently into account.

In order to explain how and why people are dominated without knowing it, the theoretical approach of Pierre Bourdieu places great weight on the blinding delusions sustained by actors, relying extensively on the notion of the unconscious. The actors are frequently described as if they were "cultural dopes" - to quote an expression used by Harold Garfinkel in another context. (not cultural dupes?) Their critical capacities are particularly underestimated or ignored. Another consequence is to give too much importance to the dispositional properties of the actors, to the detriment, on one side, of their normative preferences and, on the other side, of the characteristics embedded in the situations in which they are involved.

Finally, a third consequence is to create a deep asymmetry between deluded actors and the clear minded sociologist who seems to be – at least if we take some formulations literally – the only subject capable of gaining access to a hidden truth and, consequently, of making the actors aware of the reality of their social condition. Such a stance overestimates the power of sociology as a scientific device. This Science (with a big S) constitutes the sole foundation on which the social scientist can rest his or her claims to a knowledge superior to the self-knowledge claimed by the subjects of sociological research. Consequently, on these grounds, the sociologist can aspire to a major political role. In such a framework, sociology pretends to be the principle *subject* of history, since it is only through the sociological apparatus that actors can access the very truth of their conditions (a stance partly inherited from the Enlightenment, and which Durkheim would not likely have disavowed).

Such a paradigm, moreover, precludes the possibility of taking into account the logic of social action, and, thereby analyzing and understanding the disputes in which actors become engaged. By stressing a circular relationship between, on one side, underlying structures and, on the other, embedded dispositions, it tends to ignore or underestimate the state of uncertainty that persons frequently face when they are acting. Yet the notion of action derives sense only if considered against the background of uncertainty. If situations are assumed to be essentially predetermined, then the very concept of action loses any incisive capacity. This problem is particularly patent when the analyst is confronted by disputes. In the course of extensive disputes, turned into public debates, not only resolution of the conflict, but, also, the very facts of the case as presented by the different parties through incompatible stories and interpretations remain profoundly uncertain. For these same reasons, social change itself, and, the role played by critique in the process of social change (including critique stemming from a sociological stance), becomes difficult to address.

Finally, it seemed to us that the relation between the conceptual tools informing empirical description and the normative stance underlying critique were not sufficiently clarified in Bourdieu's work. As I already suggested, what marks sociology unique as a discipline is the need to negotiate the dual requirement - difficult to render theoretically coherent - of producing descriptions of the social world aspiring to neutrality on the one hand, and, on the

other, offering critical judgments of the state of social reality thus described. These kinds of constructs, however difficult to uphold, are nevertheless epistemologically justifiable, on the condition that one specify the normative principles underlying the critique, and secondly, clarify the relation between these principles and the conceptual framework within which a description of social reality was generated. But, in many works produced by the Bourdieusian school, the objective character of the description is, indeed, conspicuously displayed, but the normative sources of the critique remain, most often, implicit.

2. The program of a sociology of critical practices

The main orientation of the program of a sociology of critical practices was to take up again the question of critique in a way that addressed the kind of problems I have just reviewed. What was particularly rejected was the asymmetry between the clear minded social scientist and the deluded ordinary person.

We wanted to pursue and enhance a critical sociology grounded in rigorous empirical fieldwork by offering fine-grained accounts of actors engaged in situations. To this end we considered it necessary to put into brackets any causal apparatus whose mechanical (or unthinking) implementation risked preempting the data (so that the social scientist would in a sense anticipate the results of his research). We wanted to assume a kind of naïve posture so as to observe, without any preconceived idea, the actors' movements, their arguments, the way they interpreted their partners' and opponents' moves, etc.

The strategy implemented consisted of a *return to the things themselves*, as phenomenology used to say. In the case of criticism, it meant taking as one's main object of research those situations in which people are producing criticisms and justifications, in other words, studying *disputes*. We thus launched a series of ethnographic fieldwork, implementing methods of direct observation borrowed from the anthropological tradition. The ethnographic field sites were deliberately chosen to provide access to a wide array of disputes emanating from domains as diverse as possible, such as firms, media, schools and Universities, town councils, trade unions, commissions for health or welfare etc.

Another part of the program was devoted to the study of "affairs". By this term, we mean, in France, a big public debate, triggered by a case entailing uncertain features and involving a question of justice, of which the famous Dreyfus affair remains, up to our time, the paradigm. In the course of these affairs, a conflict, which is originally local, spreads and takes on a general significance. The conflicting parties seek then, to mobilize as large a group of actors possible in support of their cause. Different incompatible accounts are publicly advocated, resulting in a persisting uncertainty about "what really happened."

The *actors* revealed by these inquiries were very different from the *agents* to which the critical sociology of domination had accustomed us. They were always active, not passive. They were openly critical, almost in the style of critical sociologists, continuously unmasking the hidden foibles and intentions of their opponents, and, furthermore, not hesitating to adopt, when it suited them, the schemata of critical sociology that could have been popularized by education (often by post-school education) and by the media. They pressed home their demands, condemned injustices, produced evidence to support their complaints or developed arguments to defend themselves against criticisms leveled against them. From this alternative standpoint, the social world no longer seemed a place of passively accepted domination, or even of domination suffered unconsciously, but instead a site full of disputes, critiques, disagreements, and attempts to restore local, always contestable, harmony, i.e. a scene more in line with a lawsuit.

On methodological and theoretical grounds, this program has drawn resources from different trends more or less inspired by the pragmatist tradition. These trends, taking different paths,

were united in directing sociological attention towards actors in situations, and in viewing them as the principle agencies performing the social. Inversely, they discouraged sociology from producing quasi-cartographic descriptions of the social world viewed from an overhanging point of view and described as an already formed solidified entity. Some of the trends informing our approach were inspired by American pragmatism, such as interactionism or, less directly, ethnomethodology. But one must also mention other variants that were rooted in the French intellectual context. These approaches reprocessed a part of the pragmatist legacy frequently via tortuous paths by way of the work of Gilles Deleuze (as, for example, in Bruno Latour's effort). One must mention also other orientations which, although not directly connected to pragmatism, nonetheless directed sociological attention towards language and the interpretative work implemented by actors in situation, as, for example, analytical philosophy, the second Wittgenstein, or the attempts, developed in France by Paul Ricoeur, at merging analytical philosophy and phenomenology.

Among this disparate array, we made particular use of linguistics. We first drew elements from pragmatic linguistics aiming at analyzing indexicality and the process of making sense within situations. But we also drew upon generative linguistics, from which we borrowed (in a somewhat unorthodox manner) the notion of *competencies*. This notion allowed us to infer the presence of underlying cognitive schemes displayed in the capacity of actors to produce criticisms and justifications within situations as well as their ability to discriminate between those that were appropriate to the situation or not. We started then to build models of the manifested sense of justice, or moral sense. One can also attribute to pragmatist influence the tendency of the sociology of critical practices to describe the social world as if it were the *scene* of a *trial*, in the course of which actors, plunged in *uncertain* situations, implement *inquiries*, develop *experiments*, formalize their interpretations of the state of affairs into *reports*, determine *qualifications*, and subject one another to *tests*.

I would add that the program of a sociology of critical practices maintained an objectivistic orientation, and even remained, in some aspects, rooted in the structuralist tradition. Such structuralist orientation, however, was redirected, by shifting the focus from the mapping of a social morphology, to modeling the cognitive resources and *normative* tools available to actors. Relying upon these models, we tried to understand the way in which actors succeed in reaching a loose coordination of their actions and making their interpretations more or less converge, in the course of the disputing process. The main task of sociology, considered from this epistemological position, is, then, to make explicit the methods implemented by actors themselves by which they select a meaning among a large array of possible interpretations and, by this same operation, to create or sever social ties. From this perspective, the object of sociological research lay in rendering explicit and delineating the generative grammar yielding the operations implemented by actors in the process of making and unmaking social ties and associations. Thus, the kind of truth that such analysis sought to reach can be compared to the notion of acceptability as it is used in linguistics.

In terms of advancing a critical orientation, our intention was to make normative stances emerge from the description itself. We thought that analyzing disputes and clarifying the moral sense and the sense of justice practiced by actors would, in the long run, provide a firm ground on which sociology could base its claim to participate in social change. This participation would take the form of rendering generally accessible the frustrations and aspirations expressed by actors by translating such local claims into formulations whose general meaning could be recognized and validated and hence have warranted political significance.

I will illustrate this last point by taking, as an example, the analysis of the sense of justice presented in *On justification*, a book written twenty years ago by Laurent Thevenot and myself. The angle chosen to examine critique and justification was to study disputes about the

distribution of material and/or symbolic goods. In order to criticize or to justify such distributions, actors must share cognitive tools that make possible the comparison and evaluation of specified aspects of the different beings – human and things - involved in the situation, and to address the question of their relative value or greatness.

On the basis of the findings of our surveys, we identified six principles of equivalence at work in different everyday situations. We then delineated these principles in the light of classical political philosophy. Taking each of these principles as a generative input, we explored how each was elaborated in different philosophical traditions to yield a specific form of the common good. We used the term *Cité* to name these models of the common good. The various principles of greatness share an underlying structure or, one might say, a *grammar* which rests on a logic that dissolves the tension between two basic constraints, namely the constraint of *equality* (which we call a requirement of *common humanity*) and the constraint of *ordering*. Thus, in any given situation, people who are essentially equal, because of their basic humanity, find themselves ordered hierarchically. The underlying grammar distinctive of a Cite specifies generative rules that serve to resolve this tension. Among these, notably, is the particular requirement that no person be considered as having a priori, as if by essence, a definitive state of greatness.

These models seek not only to describe the principles of argumentation used by people in disputes but also the resources they draw on to end the dispute and restore harmony without recourse to violence. This requires taking into account the objects and things that hold in the situation. We refer to these procedures as *reality tests*. During the course of a reality test, persons must display their capacity to accomplish what they claim, and they must do so following specific procedures that confront their claims with particular objects (both material and symbolic) that are present within the situation. Hence, associated with each *Cité,* are listed repertoires of objects.

For example, associated with greatness in industry – characterized by efficiency – are, in particular, measuring tools and productive devices which allow the efficiency of an object or person to be assessed (such as standards, tests, accountancy forms, etc.). Similarly associated with greatness in the domestic sphere, where people are judged not only in terms of their relationships, but more generally in terms of their positions in a chain of personal dependences (which was particularly important in Europe under the Ancien Régime), are corresponding devices, values and items such as family celebrations, marks of respect, bequests, etc.

But these different *Cité* are largely incompatible. Even though they are all to be found in a complex society, they cannot be engaged simultaneously in one and the same situation without some kind of more or less fragile compromise. Accordingly, the criticisms developed in the course of disputes often challenge the types of judgment brought to bear in a given situation. This questioning of the state of affairs might take the form of attempts to bring into play a principle of greatness other than one normally called upon in such a situation. Or it might consist in showing that an assessment, in fact, was not based on the officially accepted rules of equivalences, but on other covert rules.

Take for example the case of school exams, contested for outcomes influenced, it is said, in an indirect and hidden way by social class background, 'good behavior' or 'a good background'. This was an important element of critical sociology in France in the 1960s-1970s. Using standardized procedures, an exam is supposed to test pupils' abilities in relation to a certain type of problem. However, in terms of the model that I have briefly outlined, such hidden influences could be regarded as having a *distorting* or *corrupting* effect by exposing the test, valid in the industrial sphere, to measures of greatness more appropriate to the domestic sphere. One possible way of addressing such a challenge would be to try and

refine the test by eliminating any elements pertaining to domestic greatness, for instance by making the exam anonymous.

Using such a frame, one can analyze the criticisms developed by the actors in the course of their disputes. The criticisms might question the validity of judgments pronounced in a certain situation, arguing on the basis of a different modality. They can, for example, advocate that the principle of evaluation at use is not relevant to the situation at hand. Or they can try to show that the judgment has been perverted by hidden motives.

Tests are to varying degrees *institutionalized*. Some tests are local and occasional, making it difficult to pinpoint their unfairness, so that complaints may be easily rejected. But other tests, because of the significance of the matters they address and their likelihood of coming under strong criticism, are subject to a whole process of institutionalization, being regulated by law and other forms of regulation that fix procedures and establish a *testing format*. This is what happens especially in modern Western societies with tests of consequence for the appointment of political representatives and politicians and for the attainment of sought-after positions and privileges (for instance school exams, job selection processes, tests of qualification to social entitlements, etc.). It follows that a critique can take two different directions. It may challenge the specific way in which the test is implemented by showing that it does not conformed to the approved correct format. Or it can question the test format itself, arguing that the way it has been constructed does not prevent inclined candidates from, as it were, smuggling in extraneous resources not strictly included in the official definition of the test.

3. Can a critical sociology be developed on the basis of a sociology of critical practice?

This research program has undoubtedly enabled a better description of the various critical practices evident in everyday life. It has encouraged giving careful attention to the details of disputes and to the way they unfold in particular situations, although sometimes proliferating to ensnare the whole society. Moreover, it facilitated the spelling out and modeling of the collective resources available to disputants. One can say, then, that the program obtained its objectives, at least on the ground of descriptive adequacy. But, can we say the same thing, with regard to our second objective, which was to renew the contribution of sociology to social critique by relying directly upon the criticism formulated by the actors?

In terms of this second aim, one can say that the results seem rather feeble. The program of a pragmatist sociology of critique makes it possible to rely on the actor's criticisms such as might be directed, for example, against selection tests in school or work which fail to conform to their correct format or ideal type. But, unlike a critical sociology of domination, it does not permit mounting a wider critique encompassing social reality regarded in its *totality,* with different components systematically linked one to another, a critique that would consequently advocate for a drastic change of the political order. Using an old and perhaps outmoded dichotomy, one can say that our program seems to fit with a "reformist" critique but not with a "revolutionary" one.

We have then to face a kind of paradox. We reproached critical sociology for presenting people as subjected to almighty structures and of ignoring their critical capacities as agents. But it seems that this critical sociology did open the way to a radical critique, which could be appropriated by ordinary actors in order to support their own bluntly critical claims, and implemented, in certain political contexts, so as to put forward new demands. (I am thinking, for example, of the demands for a more democratic school or for joint worker-management control at work, as initiated during the seventies).

Inversely, the sociology of critical practices wanted to really listen to the critical activity developed by ordinary actors. But, it seems that it did not succeed in fostering a form of critique of more salient potency that could supply actors with resources needed to reinforce their critical will and their critical efficiency.

This outcome is rather easy to understand and can be attributed to the fact that, in ordinary times as opposed to exceptional periods of uprising or revolution, the critical stances formulated by social actors and collected by the social scientist tend to be relatively limited and directed towards local settings. Must we conclude from this then that critical sociology was right when it considered social actors to be plunged in a world of illusion, blinded by dominant ideologies, and not capable of gaining an awareness of their subjected state?

Our interpretation is different. As frequently demonstrated by the sociology and anthropology of resistance, actors can be aware of the general forms of injustice they suffer, without expressing strong claims, as individuals and in face-to-face interactions. And this can be noticed even when they are not paralyzed by fear, enjoying political contexts where free speech is a right. And the reason for this, we would argue, is that actors are r*ealistic*. They do not ask for the impossible. Their sense of reality is constantly reinforced by their ordinary experiences. They can appreciate to what extent their condition can be said to be just or unjust, privileged or disadvantaged, by referring to the situations of other actors they regard as comparable in various respects, whether it be a colleague at work, a student who obtained the same university degree but who obtained a much better job, their parents' status or their own situation at an earlier date, etc.

Ordinary persons, at least in daily life, are rarely driven to question the general frame which informs the particular state of affairs leading to protest or indignation. They can judge unjust the way such or such a test was performed in a certain situation, but without questioning, for all that, the *institut*ionalized formats of tests and qualifications, taken as a whole. A first reason why is that they do not have access to the kind of tools necessary to totalize, and hence, the outlines and effects of different types of tests implemented in different contexts and how they yield a general pattern, escapes them. But the primary reason is, more probably, that actors implicitly know that the tests and their institutionalized formats are stronger than they are as individuals, and, hence, that it would be irrational to demand, on their own behalf, effective changes that would require a drastic transformation of this wider frame. The actors, considered in the course of their ordinary life, seem to take seriously the mere fact that what we call *reality tests* are grounded upon reality. A waiter in a café knows implicitly that it would make no sense to consider unjust the fact of not being an university professor, because he realizes that, if tested, he would not, for instance, be able to cope with trigonometry. Although, of course, it would be another matter if he took a correspondence course and obtained a diploma. In such a case, his denial of opportunities normally opened up by the professional exam would be a matter of discrimination, e.g. for being a Jew in Vichy France, an Afro-American person in a racist state, or else a woman or a homosexual, etc.

Granting that actors are realistic does not mean, however, that reality, as such, will always hold them prisoners as in an iron cage. As demonstrated by the literature on revolt and uprising (or, for example, the use of these studies made by Jean-Paul Sartre in its *Critique de la raison dialectique*), the pressure that reality imposes upon the aspirations and claims of actors is variable in different historical contexts. One can suggest that it depends, mainly, on the degree to which reality appears robust or, seems to *hold*. Reality is robust when the very existence of each of its components is symbolically and practically sustained and, consequently, confirmed by others. Inversely it becomes fragile when, this solidarity weakened, the necessity of existing reality is no longer constantly auto-confirmed. Reality seems, then, to break up. Such contexts are favorable to the development of critique, seen as a

questioning of *the reality of reality*. Similarly, what actors could only have considered, up to that moment, as pure dreams, can be transformed into aspirations and then, into claims.

Up to this point, I have used the word *reality* to mean what sociology has referred to for nearly forty years as the "construction of social reality". By reality, I designate the social context in which actors are involved. But I must point out that, by context, I mean a network of qualifications, definitions, standards, tests formats, rules, selecting procedures, etc. In contemporary societies, these different formats rely mainly upon a juridical logic, which is not reducible to the laws of the State.

However, my position is that this constructed reality does not determine in a mechanical way all of an actor's experiences. Certain experiences can be authentically lived, even if they cannot be formulated in terms of, or given a place within, the web of constructed reality. The construction of social reality - a process that involves symbolic operations of qualification and agency - makes it necessary to select, in the continuous flow of events, some elements treated as if they were the only relevant ones. In consequence, one can say that reality is far from incorporating all that is happening, namely, the *world*. The experiences of persons are, thus, at the same time, rooted in *reality* and in the *world,* regarded – in Wittgenstein's terms - as "all that is happening". Thus, against *social reality*, which can be mapped in a quasi-cartographic way, I oppose the *world*, which no one can conceivably totalize. If the project of building a representation of reality, as it unfolds in a certain historical context, does not seem absurd, all attempts to delineate the contents of the world are doomed.

It seems to me that the distinction between reality and world would make it possible to bypass some of the difficulties surrounding the idea of a socially constructed reality, and, particularly, to get away from the alternative between "realism" and "constructivism" which has occupied the core epistemological debates surrounding the constructivist approaches in the social sciences.

Concerning more precisely the questions addressed in this paper, I think that this distinction can be used in order to get a better understanding of the role played by critical activity in the processes of social change. One would not be able to understand how, in certain situations, actors manage to access desires which seem the least realizable, consider them seriously and. on this basis, launch a radical critique of a reality that denies the satisfaction of these desires if the experience of actors were entirely restricted within the shackles of reality. But these border situations become understandable if one acknowledges that the field of experience is also rooted in the world. Actors, relying upon their experiences, reveal themselves capable of drawing from the world arguments and examples that do not fit in with the qualifications, definitions, and test formats on which current social reality is based. They would, then, be able to question its necessity, to expose its arbitrary nature, and, finally, to propose other kinds of social arrangements.

4.   The model proposed in On critique

In order to develop this idea, I will outline now, very schematically, a theoretical frame (sketched in one of my recent books, *On critique*). This frame is rather different from the one presented, twenty years ago, in *On justification*, but not contradictory. It aims at designing a larger scheme that would make it possible to integrate elements drawn, on the one hand, from the critical sociology of the seventies and, on the other, from the more recently developed sociology of critical practices. It represents, by some of its aspects, an attempt at giving a theoretical basis to the analysis of the recent change of capitalism presented in a book (*The new spirit of capitalism*) published ten years ago with Eve Chiapello, in which these two kinds of perspectives were implemented, but loosely integrated on theoretical grounds.

This framework starts from the question of institutions. Institutions, seen mainly, from the point of view of critical sociology, as a source of symbolic violence, have been largely ignored by the sociology of critical practices. In the frame I will outline now, institutions are two-sided. Their negative aspects, namely, as sources of *symbolic violence*, are maintained. But, on the other side, we recognize their positive functions, which are to provide beings, and, particularly, persons, with *semantic security*. One can say, briefly, that beings enjoy semantic security when their social identity, and the social properties attached to it, are maintained whatever the context in which they are plunged. For example, a slave has no semantic security in the sense that his identity, and hence his fate, are completely dependent on the decisions of other people with whom he interacts: he can be loved, and considered as a full person, in one context, but sold, and treated as a thing, in another.

My argument will be that the pre-eminence given, in any specific context, to either negative or positive aspect of institutions, will depend on the place given to the critical practices in the social setting. The research would then be centered on the relations between institutions and critique. Institutions have the task of maintaining in working order the current formats and rules and, hence, the task of *confirmation* of the *reality of the reality*. But critique, drawing new resources from the world, questions this socially constructed reality and, when it succeeds in gaining a listening, transforms it.

The frame outlined in *De la critique,* starts from a statement, which has the status of a postulate. This statement lays stress on a radical uncertainty concerning "*the what is it of what is*". This uncertainty is seen as continuously besieging the course of social life. Such a statement challenges numerous positions which take as granted that social life relies on a kind of tacit agreement and/or solidarity which could be seen as original, even as quasi natural, and consubstantial to sociality. It puts into brackets, first, the approaches that consider *meaning* as relying on the presupposition of a *common sense* (borrowed from phenomenology and/or from analytical philosophy). Secondly it puts aside the approaches that focus on the *links* seen as consubstantial to social life (the conception of community, as developed in social anthropology). This postulate of uncertainty must be seen as a thought experiment (rather like the state of nature in contractualist political philosophy). Refusing the idea of a natural sociality, we presuppose a social world originally made of separated individuals, but this uniquely for problematizing the making of arrangements that must be built in order to create a common social world. It could be labeled "constructionist individualism."

This postulate of uncertainty does not lay stress on the competition of interests but, instead, on the incapability of human beings to reach spontaneously an agreement on a determinate way of fixing a relationship between *symbolic forms* and *state of affairs* – to use a distinction borrowed – once more - from Wittgenstein. Given such uncertainty, these differences of interpretations and, consequently, of usages, always involve the risk of dispute which can lead to violence. A consequence of this postulate is that different registers framing action -- which I will examine later -- will be regarded as tools aiming at reducing the effects of this uncertainty.

5. Practical and metapragmatical registers of action

The first register considered is *practice*. The concept emerges both from the analysis presented by Pierre Bourdieu in *Outline of a theory of practice,* and from the results of fieldwork carried out from the pragmatic sociology approach. It implies, more or less, physical proximity and is particularly activated in the course of interactions and encounters. During these practical moments, persons cooperate actively in order to reduce the anxiety about the *what is it of what is* which, constantly, jeopardizes interaction. Interacting persons actively strive to ignore possible differences of interpretation about what is really happening

and, above all, shut their eyes on the misbehaviors that might increase uncertainty. *Tolerance*, which is one of the main characteristics of this register, is linked to a low level of reflexivity. One can say that, during such moments, actors collaborate tacitly so as to reduce the level of reflexivity or, at least, its public expression.

In this register, language of course is made use of, but rather in an indexical way combining naming and pointing towards what is referred to. The discourse includes few reports from a general point of view, either to recall past actions, or to describe the current course of action, or, still more, to evoke future plans of action. Finally, the relation between symbolic forms and states of affairs is not explicitly addressed, so as to avoid questioning the connection between, on the one hand, the objects and, on the other, the terms used to qualify them.

This way of averting the possibility of a dispute and of maintaining the appearance of an agreement is rather efficient. However, it cannot be sustained when there is too great a divergence in the interpretations given by actors of what is really happening, and the way they make use of the common surroundings.

A dispute, or the threat of one, enforces, therefore, a shift towards other registers, which I call *metapragmatic* (a term borrowed from linguistic anthropology). These moments can be characterized, in particular, by a change in the way language is used: its meta properties are activated, i.e., the possibility of referring, at the same time, to an object and to language itself (as, for example, when one speaks of "a poet in the full sense of the term"). During these metapragmatic moments, the level of reflexivity tends to increase and to take public forms. One witnesses, then, a reshuffling of the dispute which amounts to questioning the way in which the relation between symbolic forms and states of affairs must be recalibrated to be judged acceptable.

Two opposite modalities of metapragmatic interventions are proposed. The first ones are forms devoted to the establishing of *what is*, and to the maintaining of what has been established as really being, through time. I will call these forms *confirmative agencies* because they reduce uncertainty by continuously confirming what is. *Is* must be taken here in the sense of "really" or "essentially" is, with a kind of absolute connotation. These forms make a great use of quasi-tautologies. Epidictic discourses, which, according to Aristotelian Poetics, serve to announce publicly statements that everybody already knows, are typical instances of this form.

The second are forms that enhance factors of uncertainty present in the setting in order to contest the reality of what is given as really being. In these cases, I will speak of forms oriented towards *critique*.

These two opposite modalities, confirmation and critique, are interdependent, and, thus, must be considered in their dialogic relationship. The main task of confirmation is to prevent critique. As for critique, it would lose its orientation and turn into a kind of nihilism if it could not target confirmed statements.

Confirming and maintaining reality can be seen as constituting the main task of *institutions*. In our framework, institutions are thus considered, above all – as in John Searle's work - from the point of view of their *semantic functions*. They have to establish and constantly confirm the relationship between symbolic forms and states of affairs, and to make it acceptable.

Why are institutions necessary to social life? The argument developed in this frame starts from the question of the body. No individual has the authority and perhaps even the power, to state on behalf of others the *what is it of what is*, and this for a very simple reason: because he/she has a body. Having a body, each person is necessarily situated, in external time and space, but also, in a way, relative to his own interiority, his desires, tastes, dislikes, etc. In ordinary situations of interaction, the only thing that an individual can do is to present one's "point of view". But, especially when a dispute is becoming explicit and threatens to lead to violence, confronting views is not sufficient to reach an agreement. I think that the rationalist

hypothesis, that relies on the mere power of discussion as a device capable of selecting among different views, or of reaching a synthesis, is too strong and hardly realistic.

The main characteristic of an institution, seen as such, is to be *a bodiless being*. And it is because institutions are bodiless beings that mere human beings – that is all of us – delegate to them the task of stipulating the *what is it of what is*. It follows that institutions must be seen, above all, as operators implementing semantic functions, for example when they set references or control qualifications. Allocating this role to institutions prevents us from confusing them with two other types of entities with which they are often associated, but from which they must be analytically differentiated. First, *organizations*, which carry out functions of coordination and, secondly, *administrations*, which carry out police functions.

It is because institutions are bodiless beings, that, frequently, the phenomenological approach to institutions attaches to them the capacity of settling long-lasting, and even eternal, entities. Unlike the individual bodies of those who speak on their behalf – their spokespersons – institutions are supposed, at least ideally, to escape from the corruption of time. We will add that institutions, being bodiless beings, are the only ones capable of making real those *non existing beings* which sociology cannot afford to ignore, namely nations, social classes, ethnic groups, etc. Institutions give to these beings (much contested by the approaches stemming from positivist logic) an opportunity to reach modes of existence far from being purely illusory.

6. The hermeneutical contradiction

The problem with institutions is that they are, at the same time, both necessary and fragile, useful and always prone to abuse. Being bodiless, institutions cannot speak, except through their spokespersons, persons made of flesh and blood like you and me – such as judges, priests, deputies, professors, etc. These persons, even when delegated and legally authorized are, nevertheless, nothing but ordinary bodily people and, hence, situated and equipped with a libido, interests, tastes, etc. They are, for this very reason, doomed to express nothing more than a point of view, at least when they are not supposed to speak on behalf of the institution. It is for this reason that they generally assume specific symbolic marks (such as uniforms, turns of phrase, tones of voice, etc.) so as to make manifest the case that they do not speak personally but instead on behalf of an institution. Institutional delegation is supposed to invest their earthly frame with the properties of a bodiless being (according to the twin bodies logic made famous by the work of Ernst Kantorowicz). Nonetheless, the appearance of these spokespersons cannot be thoroughly transformed. No sign can possibly give direct access to their interiority and intentionality and, hence, assure the absence of deception. How can we know if the one who is speaking is an incarnation of the bodiless institution or if he is nothing more than a "nobody" like you and me carrying on in a perishable body?

From this follows a profound ambivalence with regard to institutions, which is inherent to all social life. Moreover, this ambivalence increases when the size of the settings considered are larger, so that anxiety can no longer be soothed by local arrangement as in the case of an interactive context. On the one hand, hence, we trust the institutions, we "believe" in them. How could we do otherwise, given that without their intervention our concern about *what is* could only increase, with all the risks of discord or dissipation into private language that this would entail. But, on the other hand, we know all too well that they are fictions and that the only real beings are the humans they are made of, who speak for them and who, having bodies, desires, impulses, etc. do not have any robust property that would allow us to trust them.

I propose to see in this tension a kind of contradiction which lies at the very core of common social life and that we must tackle, at this moment of our analysis, as impassable. I will call it

the *hermeneutical contradiction*. By this term, I do not merely mean the divergence between different interpretations, which becomes evident in the course of disputes. I mean, rather, a problem inherent to the interpretation process, posing the following dilemma:

On the one side, we can renounce the task of saying the *what is it of what is* (essentially, for everybody, from nowhere, etc.) in favor of a mere exchange of points of views, with the risk of never reaching closure, even, a temporary one. Here the danger is, above all, of awakening uncertainty about the *what is it of what is*, whose effect would be to trigger an anxiety of fragmentation, the outcome of which could be the use of violence to impose an interpretation. The alternative side is – as we have seen – to delegate the task of saying the what it is of what is to disincarnated beings, namely, to institutions, but, then, running the risk of another kind of anxiety no less disturbing. This anxiety regards the question of not knowing if the spokespersons are really expressing the will of the bodiless being or if they are doing nothing more, actually, than manifesting their proper will so as to satisfy their selfish desires.

We must also note that the hermeneutical contradiction is not extraneous to the relation between semantic and pragmatic dimensions of meaning. Instead, institutional operations, when involved in the circumstances of ordinary life, come into tension -- given their basically semantic nature -- with the pragmatic dimensions of interpretation and action. The way people grasp qualifications in the course of action has a pragmatic character. It follows that the tension between semantic qualifications and situated usages plays an important role in the uncertainties of social life. Against a conception of social activity completely based upon pragmatics, I have advocated being attentive as well to the semantic dimensions of social life, which are necessary to fix qualifications, formats, etc. rendering them transportable, without distortion, through time and space.

Still, it is impossible to conceive a social world, in which the manufacture of meaning could be thoroughly stabilized by semantic devices. Qualifications, definitions, test formats, rules, etc., generated by the institutions are not, as such, susceptible of being processed in real situations. Their implementation requires a process of interpretation that relies upon context. It follows that maintenance of reality, particularly when it is jeopardized by critique, entails the dilemma of having determinate but unenforceable formats imposed or of opening the stream of interpretation. But given the interminable character of the latter, there is a risk of constant distortion of semantic marks.

7. Critique and emancipation

This tension, embedded in institutions, opens a breach within which critique can develop. In the absence of the hermeneutical contradiction, persons would continuously be under the regime of formats generated by institutions and, consequently, completely immersed in a social reality taken as granted. It would be impossible for them to consider these formats from an exteriority, i.e. to make it relative and call it into question. Critique can then be seen as the only defense against the kind of domination that institutions would, in its absence, necessarily exert. Critique is then the main tool making possible, not only the contestation of institutional authority, but, also, the weakening of the administrative or organizational devices that enable institutional authority to be concretely enforced.

Emancipation – in the sense given it in our work – ensues from the defense and extension of the critical practices that contest and unsettle those formats on which reality relies. The implementation of these formats has, for the most part, asymmetrical outcomes, in the form of uneven distribution and recognition, and thus, in many cases, strengthens exploitation. Critique is thus the main weapon that can be used by exploited or scorned people or groups so as to change the outlines of reality.

In its more radical forms, critical practices draw from experiences of the world heterodox elements that do not conform to the existing formats. This process can, in the beginning, have an individual character and, for example, be triggered by works of art. Art, probably because it is not limited by argumentative constraints, offers the possibility of outlining forms of life that are not yet encapsulated in the web of reality. But this process takes a political expression when, through the mediation of inter-subjectivity, personal experiences are shared and associated with principles of equivalence which inform them and make possible their circulation in the public sphere.

8. Emancipation and hermeneutical contradiction

We will argue now that different kinds of asymmetries (between social classes, gender, ethnic groups, etc.) are linked to a more general one regarding institutions considered as the main sources of qualifications, test formats and rules. The analysis of that asymmetry could, perhaps, shed light on the rather obscure notion of "symbolic violence". The basic assumption is that the relationship people have with institutional rules is utterly unequal according to the position they occupy in power relationships. A way of giving sense to the notion of "domination" and of clarifying a label such as "dominant classes" (or dominant gender or dominant ethnic group, etc.) consists of examining the practical relations persons have with rules. Inequality in terms of rules is something evident in societies where a different and unequal status is attached to different categories of agents, allowing different degrees of autonomy, even threatening thereby the idea of a common humanity (as, for example, in a caste system). But the asymmetry regarding rules, supposedly common to all, is particularly thorny in the formally egalitarian and, even more, democratic societies, where important asymmetries towards rules can be observed. Such tacit asymmetries rely, particularly, upon the distinction between the *letter of the rules* and the *spirit of the rules*. and for this reason involves the question of interpretation.

In these societies, the institutional rules constraining their members' actions are supposed to be the same for everybody. But one can argue, on the one hand, that a control of the relation between the pragmatics of action and the semantics of rules is operated on different scales. And, on the other hand, that the distance between the prescribed rules and the actions effectively implemented, is very differently evaluated.

The activities of actors occupying a dominant position, as well as the actions of the dominated actors, are supposed to be framed by rules. But, with regard to those in a dominant position, the net of the regulatory frame is loose enough to tolerate a very large range of actions, implemented according to diverse modalities. One reason for this, perhaps, is that each elementary action can be interpreted differently according to the collection of activities with which it is related; and that these packages of activities can, themselves, be interpreted in relation with packages of rules differently engaged. This state of affairs, when criticized, is generally justified by arguing that actors in a position of power must be evaluated according to their ability to attain large objectives in uncertain situations. One of the outcomes is that the success or failure of a series of moves depends, largely, on a global appraisal effected at the game's end.

It is not unusual that actors, who have occupied dominant positions, come to confide, in private encounters (or, for example, in Memoirs written at the end of one's life) the way in which they manage to perform great things. Doing so, they frequently disclose information that they could not publicly reveal during the course of action. They describe, for example, how they were compelled to circumvent some rules, or to overstep them, in order to reach their objectives (but, of course, priding themselves in having done such things only when these have been judged successful). Nevertheless, they can justify afterwards these

infringements of the rules by arguing that they would never have succeeded in realizing such efficacious deeds - so useful, not only for themselves but, above all, for the common good - if they had remained trapped in the cage of rules. But frequently, they also seem eager to mark the difference between these mere "arrangements" and what could be seen as clear transgressions, arguing that they had to withdraw from the "letter of the rule" but did so with the intention of remaining as close as possible to the "spirit of the rule".

This fuzzy appreciation of the rules echoes the relation, not cynical but just, instrumental and devoid of any sacred aura, that the dominant ones adopt towards institutions -- at least when they are not within sight of the dominated. They can then, rather easily, recognize that institutions are nothing more than *artifacts*. And this disillusioned knowledge comes out from one of their very specific experiences, consisting in producing and imposing rules and in manufacturing institutions. They do not ignore that institutions are human devices, which can be built, transformed or abolished. Their mode of relation to reality places them in connivance with the hermeneutical contradiction. This contradiction is not, altogether, abolished nor, even, disclosed, but – so to speak – tamed. And, as to the distinction between the letter of the rule and the spirit of the rule, it endows them with a kind of moral plasticity, which is very convenient in order to cope with the tension between uncertainty and rules.

If we turn, now, towards the dominated, we have to face a very different situation. In this case, the network of rules surrounding actions is tighter and the control to which they are subjected is operated on a narrower scale. They are supposed to "obey", which means to respect the letter of the rules imposed from above, and they are also supposed to believe that the institutions supporting these rules are something similar to real beings, immutable and inviolable.

It is, of course, evident that the dominated can, no more than the dominating, pursue actions and remain in strict conformity with the rules, something well described by the anthropology of resistance or by the sociology of Taylorism. No human being can compel himself or herself to follow rules strictly and remain practically efficient or even, obey orders mechanically without being deprived, at least temporarily, of his or her humanity (as demonstrated, for example, by military parades). But, in this case, the distance they must necessarily take with rules, if they want truly to act, is socially labeled as transgressing, and must, therefore, be masked so as to escape sanction.

These asymmetries regarding rules and institutions must be connected with the capabilities of intervening upon reality. The mere fact of enjoying the possibility of modifying rules and institutions is the basis of the subjective and objective autonomy characterizing the dominants. But, *vice versa*, it is because they take liberties with the rules than they can effectively intervene upon reality, modifying not only the course of their own life but, also, the life of a more or less important number of other persons.

9. Emancipation in a pragmatic meaning

These brief remarks help us see how emancipation must be understood in this frame. It does not call for an appeal against the dominants requiring them to respect, *in fact*, the rules they recognize as valid, *in principle*. Such exigencies, marked by moral indignation, are, nowadays, very frequent, at least verbally. It is the case, for example, when one demands a strengthening of the power of the State in order to compel the persons in charge to respect the common rules and to give more transparency to their actions. These proclamations are doomed either to remain wishful thinking, or to lead to authoritarianism.

The direction we suggest is the opposite. A move towards emancipation would consist in establishing a political context in which the dominated could demand and acquire the same kind of freedom with regard to rules that characterizes that enjoyed by the dominants. Such a

conception of emancipation, which can be called libertarian - the term being taken in its French sense, which means "anarchist" - does not imply a radical contestation of institutions, the necessity of which we stressed as devices fixing qualifications, formats, and even – why not ? - rules.

But the process of emancipation, considered at least since the Enlightenment as a path towards equality, supposes that everyone equally can establish the same kind of relationship with the hermeneutic contradiction and its outcomes. In other words, it means that those who are now dominated would be recognized as having the same capacities of action, and, thus, of interpretation, which currently constitute the privilege of the dominants. A move in this direction requires two things: first everyone would be entitled to criticize the rules and, even more, to interpret and to adjust them, as the dominant actually do. Secondly, institutions, without being abolished, would be denuded of their intangible and quasi sacred aura so that everyone could regard them from the same posture of distance and flexibility already assumed by those who have control and power.

Such a decrease of asymmetry regarding the hermeneutic contradiction would not suppress, all at once, all the different kinds of asymmetries and, particularly, the ones that derive from a very unequal distribution of the property rights. But one can surmise that it would constitute, at least partly, a sort of pre-condition in this direction, by releasing capacities of acting that could serve the struggles aimed at decreasing such inequalities. If one admits that the relation to rules and institutions is closely linked to the power of acting, one must recognize that the development of the capabilities of action of ordinary people would be, both, the condition and the result of such a turn.

One of the consequences of the process of emancipation, expressed in these terms, would be, probably, to modify the outlines of the sovereign nation state. This last form, is still conceived as the institution of institutions or, if one prefers, as the legitimate foundation of the administrative and organizing powers which ensure, *de facto*, the maintenance of reality and the perpetuation of social asymmetries. A policy aimed at equalizing the relation toward rules, and at establishing a dialogical relationship between institutional forms of confirmation and devices devoted to critique, would, perhaps, contribute to a weakening of State violence, thereby maintaining the peacemaking and unifying functions fulfilled by institutions -- functions that only institutions can ensure.

Chinese Society: Change and Transformation. A Perspective of Social Structure

Chen GuangJin

The adjustment of social structure is one of the most important connotation of social development(Midgley, 2009). The social structure is the basic skeleton of the society, People's political, economic, cultural and social activities are essentially carried out on the basis of certain social structure, while they would have an impact on the social structure and make a change to the original social structure. From 1978 to now, the reform and opening up policies in china mainland have been lasted for 30 years. During this period, the social structure of Chinese mainland as well as the implication of social relations, especially interest relationship have undergone the profound changes, These changes can be describe as the term of transformation, and they constitute the prominent features and important connotation at the present stage of social development in China. This article will make a general study and discussion about china's the transformation of social structure and social development in 30 years.

1. **Part One: the meaning and significance of the social structure and the change of modernization.**

Social structure is a comprehensive concept. In sociology, two approaches to examine the social structure exist in a long time, An idea focuses on the so-called institutional structure, It thinks that a variety of cultural or normative patterns constitute social structure, the patterns define the actors'expectations to their mutual behavior and organize a lasting and mutual relationship between the actors; Another idea concerns the relational social structure, It thinks that social structure consists of a variety of social relationships, these relationships are understood to be the causal interconnections and interdependent patterns between actors themselves and between their actions, and also are regarded as the social position they have occupied (Lopez and Scott, 2000). These two understandings of the social structure all make sense, and are not mutually exclusive. From the theoretical origins, the former is from the scope of collective representation by Durkheim, the latter is from the scope of collective relations by Durkheim. The component of social structure diverse. Analogy with construction, it can probably be divided into two elements, one is substantive element, the other one is the relational element that connect these substantive element- which contains the rules and regulations that combines the substantive elements (Elder-Vass, 2010). Thus, starting from such theoretical considerations, this article will simplify the understanding of the social structure as the general term of the group collectively composition and the composition of the relationship between members of society.

A broad system of the social structure contains a internal structured relationship between the four subsystems which are economic, political, social and cultural. (Parsons,1971). And from a more narrow perspective, at least we can examine the social structural conditions of society in ten dimensions such as demographic, family structure, urban structure, regional structure, employment structure, occupational structure, organizational structure, ownership structure, class structure, income distribution structure. Among them, the population structure and family structure is the infrastructure of society, urban structure and regional structure compose the social spatial structure, the structure of employment, occupational and organizational structures compose the social and economic activities structure, ownership

structure, class structure, income distribution form the structure of social (benefit) relationship. They are very important social connotations structure, meaning the existence of different forms and properties of social groups, meaning the formation of structural constraints of resource allocation, meaning the configuration of social roles and the status system and finally meaning the formation of the overall interest relationship of a society. It is not difficult to understand, a variety of major social problems and social conflicts, have its deep roots in social structure. Accordingly, the harmony, stability, development of a society, or in sociological terminology, the integration, unity, order and evolution of a society have its deep-seated social structure foundation.

A variety of important social theories pay a great attention on problems of social structure. As one of the most important social structure, population structure is widely attentioned for a long time. Sex structure, age structure and cultural structure of a population have a basic meaning to the sustainable development of society, which have been the underlying theme of the study on population sociology. Family is regarded as social tissue. When discussing the theory of community and society Classical sociologists Tonnis pays a great attention on the basic role of the family on the social solidarity. He believed that social groups such as family is an important carrier of the value of social stability (Tênnes,1955). In modern times, communitarian theory also believe that the family is an important basis for the so-called good society (Sandel,1998). Durkheim's theory of social solidarity is particular emphasis on the division of labor and occupational structures formed thereby. It thinks that the formation of the modern career structure is the basic condition for social integration, in this structure people in the same occupation form professional community, people in different professional community interdependence, which laid the foundation for social solidarity (Durkheim,2000). Of course, to play this role to the modern occupational structure, a relatively stable career position and the formation of related professional community is a prerequisite(Li Qiang,2006).

Marxism, structural functionalism, social conflict theory, Rawlsian, classical and neo-classical liberalism have focused on the structure of allocation of resources and relationship between interest allocation. Marx highly value the ownership structure of production, he thinks that privately owned means of production causes social injustice and social conflicts, social class structure or hierarchical structure formed on this basis, is the root of social conflict, but also the driving force of social development. Clash of modern society affected by Marxist also see class structure of the society and the interests which is formed on the basis of class structure of the society as the source of social conflict. For example, Corser believes that the reasons for any conflict already exist in the social structure among. Any society is constructed of its various components as a whole, the relationship between the various components is always on the state of uncoordinated and imbalance, and this imbalance is one of the causes of social conflict(Corser,1989). Dahrendorf believes that the power structure between different social classes or Level groups is different, this difference makes social conflict Inevitable(Dahrendorf,1996).And Rex who is concerned about the relationship between the distribution of benefits thinks subsistence allocation of a society prior to integration which is the result of allocation; the hierarchical of distribution and huge inequality is bound to bring a huge conflict of interest rather than integration to society(Rex,1961).Generally, sociological structural functionalism always deliberately ignored the social problems of conflict, it is not. Parsons who is a structure and function theorists once made a through analysis of sense of social integration of resource allocation structure, he think that whether the allocation of resources is appropriate, whether the allocation of resources is able to meet people's requirements, whether the allocation process these resources is coordinate will affect the social integration.

Classical liberalism and neo-classical liberalism emphasizes the inviolability of private property rights and its role in safeguarding the efficiency of economic development and political democracy, so firmly opposed to any public intervention in private property rights, even so, this theory tradition as well as the right to a fair distribution of income and wealth structure formation process in a fair and equitable starting point is very important to see(See Nozick, 1991). With classical and neo-classical liberalism different, Rawls' theory of social justice doctrine special attention to the interests of the bottom of society, Believe that their interests can be enhanced to improve their self-responsibility, self-respect capability, Thus enhancing social stability; Conversely, if neglecting the bottom of society, will inevitably lead to their grievances, and thus lead to social unrest and undermine social order. In other words, a measure of social justice is a citizen or not socially desirable standard, the political bottom line is that they live in peace. Rawls further pointed out that the object of social justice is the basic structure of society, that is used to allocate the basic rights and duties of citizens, divided by the main system of social cooperation produces benefits and burdens. Different people's life prospects are limited and the impact of political institutions and the general economic and social conditions, but also by people born in the beginning of unequal social status and natural endowments has profound and lasting impact, but this inequality is individual not self-selected.Thus, social justice by adjusting the angle of the whole society to deal with major social institutions from the initial inequality, unfair to exclude possible effects of social and historical aspects of the natural and accidental factors on people's outlook of life (Rawls, 1988). In addition, political sociologist Huntington in the 1950s after nearly 30 years of study of the 20th century trends in economic and social development in China home also found that the main development objectives of the fifties and sixties is economic growth, to the late 1960s and early 1970s distribution or equity issues began widespread concern, reducing absolute poverty and the unequal distribution of income and property fair desire to become the focus of both social (Huntington, 1993).

Modern theories of the modern transformation of civil society, social structure of the community as an important foundation of modern social integration, order and harmony. The theoretical context of the macro-organizational structure of the system of modern society is divided into state, market and civil society organizations in three parts (Habermas, 1999; Cohen and Arato, 1992). From the ideal function-based national organization to enforce the pursuit of social welfare, market-driven organization with voluntary pursuit of personal private interest, And civil society organizations as a precondition to pursue volunteer places different levels of social welfare; From the ideal relationship, the three parts of the division of labor, positive interaction, interdependence and mutual checks and balances in, carry out their duties, fulfill their responsibilities and work together to promote a country's political democracy, economic prosperity, and social harmony and people's welfare stable. Since the 1990s, civil society, with particular emphasis on the theory of expression and civil society organizations in the maintenance of civil rights, the balance of market forces as well as through participation in political life to promoting political democratization and other aspects of the positive rôle (Seligman, 1992).

Structure and regional structure of urban and rural areas are foreign to explore the integration of modern social theory and social transformation of society, rarely mentioned when the order and harmony, because these two structures - especially in urban and rural structure - a typical characteristic of the Chinese mainland. Of course, in Marxist theoretical system of socialism, the problem is also an important theme of urban and rural construction, the traditional narrow pursuit of socialism "three differences" targets, including the narrowing urban-rural divide on demand. In addition, changes in urban and rural structure connotation to some extent also in the process of urbanization, more precisely, in the modern sense of the structure of urban and rural urbanization and modern urban-rural relations transformation process continues to

unfold. Structure and regional structure of the Chinese mainland and rural population in China involving a major component. Therefore, in the analysis of social structure in China, and their importance is unquestioned, not only because of their condition has a significant impact on the formation of the occupational structure and the class structure of Chinese society, but also because they are directly related to China integration of the continent of society, order and harmony. In short, the analysis of the structure and regional structure of urban and rural issues in China has become one of the most important aspects of understanding the social structure of mainland China at the present stage changes.

Since 1978, mainland China's reform and opening to the impact of changes in social structure is very huge, not just because of the reform and opening to changes in social structure provides a system of expanding space, but also because it is directly involved in the changes of social structure, changes in the previously mentioned social structure itself unite all Chinese Continental reform and opening up and changing imprinted with related systems. Therefore, institutional change is explained in mainland China, one (Xueyi editor, 2004) important changes in social structure of the basic variables. On the other hand, we should also be looking for the cause of social structure changes from changes in the economic structure. This is a classic basic Marxist principles. In fact, the modern social theory does not deny this. For example, in Parsons's theory of social systems, as an economic system with adaptive subsystem basic significance. Parsons believes that changes in the economic system, especially the structural changes will certainly promote changes in the social structure of the system (Parsons, 1971). A worldwide trend in modern times, the economic system changes, that is, from the industrial revolution began in the use of technology and economic changes of abiotic resources and high efficiency power tools, the so-called industrialization. And they often effectively promote industrialization rely on a specific economic power mechanism, the so-called market-oriented, although in some cases this is not the only mechanism, for example, is well known that the industrialized East Asian countries and regions with a strong Government to promote the traces of the era of the planned economy in China rely on state forces also established a national industrial system, but they eventually return to the varying degrees of market system. In the market and the process of industrialization, urbanization, socio-economic process will usually become an accompanying happen, and have a role in promoting the commercialization and industrialization. In general, you can put the market, industrialization and urbanization considered three basic processes called modern (see Ding Jianhong editor, 1999).

Economic and social development in China since 1978, also contains these three processes. Breakthrough in the reform of the rural economic system is the implementation of the household contract responsibility system that is innovative, then after the sudden emergence of the development of rural industries, reform of the urban economy, the non-public economy, initially established a socialist market economy, the Chinese mainland's economy the initial realization of market-oriented transition; economic structure also will be major changes into the middle stage of industrialization, some areas have entered the second half of the medium-term (Chen Jiagui et al, 2007); On this basis, the town became the main platform for national economic and social development, economic and demographic urbanization rapidly advancing. In this process, the Chinese mainland's social infrastructure, social activity structure, social structure and social interests of the spatial structure has also undergone a significant change. Thus, although there are a lot of people questioned modernization itself, although the Chinese mainland market, industrialization and urbanization has its own characteristics, but in essence still belong irrefutable modern category, even if the system changes the sense of reform and opening up, from the National will the orientation point of view, the goal has been to modernize. Accordingly, the 30-year evolution of the structure of Chinese society, in essence, is a kind of modern nature of the process of social transformation.

Of course, the social structure is not always as changes in economic structure and change, because the former is more likely to be subject to restrictive system systems; But changes in social structure and economic structural change in turn will result in inconsistent uncoordinated macro-structure of the economy further development and integration, social order and harmony obstruct, and thus adjust the social structure through institutional reforms put forward new demands (Xue-Yi Lu, 2005; Li Qiang, 2005; Li Peilin, 2006). In other words, the degree of modernization of the social structure, economic structural change and adapt to the situation, and the mutual coordination between them, have fundamental implications for the structure of economic and social development in China.

2. **the arrival of demographic change and the era of the elderly**

At present, the demographic changes in China is mainly show in the population reproduction pattern transition from high birth rate, low death rate and high growth rate to the combination of low birth rate, low death rate and low growth rate in 30 years. From 1978 to 2010, the birth rate in China had dropped from18.25 ‰ to 11.90 ‰; the mortality rate had been up and down 6.5 ‰, with a change in the range of -0.25‰ to 0.6‰; the natural population growth rate had experienced a reduction from 12.00 ‰ in 1978 to 4.79 ‰ in2010 (see Figure 1).

Figure1 The trend of changes in population reproduction pattern in China since 1950
Source: "China Statistical Yearbook" (2011)

From Figure 1, in the case of a roughly stable mortality, the change of population reproduction pattern in China is mainly determined by changes in the birth rate. After 1987, the birth rate had a steady decline, the death rate is almost stable (went up to 7 ‰ after 2008), and the natural population growth rate declined steadily. In other words, the natural population growth rate in China was mainly affected by the birth rate. Well, what are the main factors in the birth rate change? The general idea is that the economic development and family planning policy in the continent are the major factor leading to declining birth rate (Li Jianmin, Yuan Xin etc, 2007). In addition, the modern population of sociology believes that industrialization and urbanization of the population are also the important variables affecting reproductive behavior. In order to test the effect of these factors on the birth rate in China, we have collected the GDP data per capita, education data, data industrialization and urbanization data in China between 1952 and 2010. In education, the best indicator is the levels of school enrollment (enrollment rate), but the statistics can only provide complete data at all levels of school students in the school. Since the development of secondary education has place an important role in the prominent social significance, students in the school population of

ordinary schools (including middle and high school) are regarded as a proportion of the total number of educational development indicators to replace enrollment (enrollment rate). In China, the vigorous promotion of industrialization has been the basic strategy since the 1950s. Yet, in a long period of time, the industrialization is mainly for industrial gross domestic product (GDP) in the non-agricultural industrial structure, rather than the non-agricultural in the employment structure. The impact of this industrialization on people's social behavior (fertility is primarily a social behavior) is not directly or not significant. From sociology, the non-agricultural in employment structure has an important sense; therefore, we consider the proportion of the non-farm employment in all employment as a measure of the industrial employment structure indicators. The proportion of urban resident population urbanization is the official statistical yearbook published as the measuring indicator. Finally, China started to perform a relatively strict family planning policy in 1979, set a policy whereby the virtual variable (1978 and previous years = 0; 1979 and later years = 1). After setting these variables, with birth rate as the dependent variable, the annual per capita GDP, the proportion of students in regular schools, the proportion of non-agricultural employment, the urban proportion of the resident population and family planning policy virtual variables as independent variables, and the linear regression analysis found that the proportion of the resident population of the urban influence is not only significant, but also reduces the explanatory power of the regression analysis. We excluded the analysis of the indicators from the model to obtain the results shown in Table 1. In the model, R = 0.934, R2 = 0.872 (corrected R2 = 0.862).

From Table 1, the four independent variables, the family planning policy virtual variable is not statistically significant, which is different from regular views. In fact, this is not difficult to understand, in the 30 years since 1979, the stringent implementation family planning policy in China is not very long. The whole continent performed relatively severe is mainly in the late 1980s and the late 1990s; and relatively speaking, the urban workers is performed much server than in rural, in rural areas, one-child policy is actually a failure. Changes in the structure of the education and employment had a significant negative impact on the mainland birth rate, from the standardized coefficient; the impact of non-agricultural employment structure is more than the impact of educational development.

Table 1   The analysis of factors affecting the birth rate in China régression

	Non-standardized coefficients		Standard Coefficient beta	t	Sig.
	B	Standard error			
Constant	4.580	0.202		22.681	0.000
Per Capita Gross Domestic Product	0.035	0.019	0.162	1.817	0.075
Family Planning Policy Virtual Variable	0.099	0.168	0.058	0.589	0.559
Ordinary high school students for the proportion of total population (%)	-0.219	0.030	-0.514	-7.210	0.000
Rate of non-agricultural Employment Structure (%)	-0.045	0.009	-0.688	-5.302	0.000

As for the measurement of GDP per capita economic development itself, its impact is having statistical significance in the 0.1 significance level, and the strange thing is that the direction of impact is to increase the birth rate. This is worthy of further pursued, initially, this is related to the inconsistence of change in the industrial structure in China's GDP and employees in the employment structure, the level of non-agricultural GDP has been much higher than the level of non-farm employment, so its impact on social behavior had been weakened. In fact, if the non-agricultural variable is removed from employment structure in the model, the impact of per capita GDP becomes negative, and its remarkable degree also increased to 0.061, yet the explanatory power of the model has a significant decrease (R^2 corrected from 0.862 down to 0.789).

Changes in fertility and natural growth rate of population in China promote the rapid transformation of the age structure of the population, namely, the proportion of youth population declined, the proportion of the elderly population rises (see table 2). The change in structure is conducive to economic and social development in China in a period of time. Due to the size of the contraction of births per year, the size of the working age population in China is still relatively large, generally speaking, labor resources in China is still relatively abundant, and the burden of labor population dependency will be reduced accordingly, the reduce rate in 2010 reached 54.6 percent over 1982. Usually, conducive to the economic development of the population dependency ratio is called the "demographic dividend".

Table 2   Previous Censuses of Population Age Structure   Unit: %, age

	1953	1964	1982	1990	2000	2010
0.14	36.28	40.69	33.59	27.69	22.89	16.60
15.64	59.31	55.75	61.50	66.74	70.15	74.5
65^+	4.41	3.56	4.91	5.57	6.96	8.9
The Total Dependency Ratio			62.6	49.8	42.6	34.2
The Average Life Expectancy			67.77*	68.55	71.40	73

1. 1981 data.

Some scholars have suggested that total dependency ratio less than 50% is the border "demographic dividend" period (Yu Xuejun, 2003); some scholars made 1957 Sweden life table data as a benchmark, when the total population dependency ratio is less than 53% (65 years old when used as the starting age) or less than 67% (to 60 years for older starting age), economic development is in the so-called "demographic dividend" period (Chen Youhua, 2005). According to Cai Fang, demographers estimated that since the reform and opening up, this "demographic dividend" to the China's mainland's economic growth has a contribution rate of 26.5% (Liu Huang, 2006). On the duration of this demographic dividend period, most related studies suggest that the demographic dividend starting in the late 1980s or early 1990s would continue for 40 years or so (Yu Xuejun, 2003 ; Chen Youhua, 2005 ; Chen Wei, 2006 ; Population and Family Planning Commission of Development and Planning, 2007) . Our

population according to the 2005 National Sample Survey data of 1% and assuming no change in current national population policy, the use of "China Population Trends Forecast System Software (CPPS)" to changes in the age structure of the population in the Chinese mainland to predict trends in 2006-2050, a similar result is concluded: 60-year-old as starting age for the older, the total dependency ratio to reach 50% by 2020; 65-year-old as starting age for the older, the total dependency ratio to nearly 50% by 2030, to 2033 in nearly 53%. However, some scholars believe that the demographic dividend in mainland China are being rapidly depleted, probably in 2013 will end (Cai Fang, 2006).

However, the so-called "demographic dividend" also means to provide employment for a large labor force, which is a major challenge for economic and social development in China. Here, we first faced with a near mid-structural contradiction, which is the huge size of the population of the labor force continues to expand, while the employment elasticity of economic growth has declined (Figure 2). 1980s, the GDP growth by one percentage point in China, increase in employment would over 100 million people, up to 262.3 million, with an average of 162.04 million; By 1990s, without consideration of the special circumstances in 1990, the vast majority is under 100 million in the following year, with an average of 74 million people ; in the 21st century, especially after 2001, the employment elasticity of economic growth continued to decline, and only 45.4 million in 2007, yet this figure has gone up after 2008, but still around 50 million people . Visible, the contradiction exists between the structural changes in China's economic development and the change in the age structure of the population. Negative thing to say, this conflict is likely to continue until the end of the "demographic dividend" period, before that, the main feature of the labor supply in China will continue to be the total excess supply.

Figure 2 1978-2009 Employment Elasticity in China's Economic Growth
Source: According to "China Statistical Yearbook" (calendar year) data processing

Life expectancy in the population continues to increase, and the decline in fertility also necessarily implies an increase of the proportion of the elderly population. In fact, the Chinese mainland across the middle-aged population from a young model type and entered the stage with a population of elderly patients less than 30 years. From Table 2, the 21st century, population aging in China is in a greatly accelerated pace, 65 years old and over population aging index measuring the proportion of improvement during 1982-1990 is only 0.66 percentage points, 1.39 percentage points in the period 1990-2000, and in 2000-2010 decade has increased by nearly 2 points[1]. To note that the total population aged 65 or older increased

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1 If aged 60 and older as a measure of the proportion of the population aging index, based on national census data, in 2000

from 7% to 14%, developed country mostly used more than 45 years, in which, 130 years for France, 85 years for Sweden, about 79 years for Australia and the United States, yet it may just 27 years for China (Office for National Committee on Aging, 2006). In addition, developed countries entered the aging population stage, its per capita GDP was U.S. $ 5000-10000 (Yu Xuejun, 2003) ; while China 's per capita GDP in 2000 was only 7857.68 yuan, according to the official exchange rate at that time, is only $ 850, is only more than 1500 U.S. dollars at purchasing power parity (Yufang Dong, 2005). "Old before getting rich" is a widely popular way of saying the Chinese mainland population aging condition. However, we cannot straightly think that mainland China has entered the aging society, after all, the proportion of the elderly population aging has just crossed the starting point, and the so-called "demographic dividend" is far from the end of the period, perhaps it would be reasonable to regard the end of the day the "demographic dividend" period (2030 front and rear) as China really entered the aging society (Gao Sheng, 2006; Li Jianmin, 2006). Nevertheless, you can still say that the demographic change in China is ahead of the level of economic and social development in China to some extent. So we have felt the pressure of demographic aging, increasing burden of old-age security, elderly healthcare increasing the pressure on health spending, a serious shortage of supply of social services to meet the continuously expanded needs of older persons. Pension problem in rural area is particularly prominent, due to the massive rural labor into urban employment, and the degree of aging in rural population is now higher than the level of the town's population aging, but most of the rural areas have not establish a social pension insurance system yet, farmers' pension and health care are lack of the necessary social security (Office for National Committee on Aging, 2006).

Please note that not only the entire population enters into the old type development stage, and age structure of the working-age population also began to appear a certain degree of "aging" trend. We use 2000 1 ‰ fifth sample data and the 2005 census the population of 1% sample survey data, the working-age population were calculated 15-59 years old and 15-64 years old (excluding students) mean age, median age and the proportion of working population in 35 years old and below, the results are shown in Table 3. Visible to five years, the average age of the working-age population had increased 1.5-1.6 years old, the median age increased by 2 years old, the proportion of the labor population in 35 years old and below declined 2.2-2.4 percentage points. At this rate, the average age of the working age population will reach 40 years old, the median age will reach 42 years old, the proportion of the labor force aged 35 years and below will drop to below 45% by 2015; 2020, the working-age the average age of the population will reach 42 years old, the median age will reach 44 years old, while the proportion of the labor force aged 35 and below will be reduced to about 42%.

Table 3 Several important structural features in China working-age population change 2000-2005

		The average age (age)	The median age (age)	The proportion aged 35 and below (%)
2000 Census (1 ‰ sample)	Age 15-59	36.1	35	51.3
	age 15-64	37.5	36	48.5
2005 1% population sample survey	Age 15-59	37.7	37	48.9
	age 15-64	39.0	38	46.3

the index was 10.33%, while in 2010 was 13.26 percent, 2.93 percentage points from a decade to improve.

Undoubtedly, the basic strategy to deal with this "aging" trend in labor force age structure is to increase the development of education, improve the quality of the population, to achieve with more intelligence and skill to make up for the labor population loss of physical strength and fitness resulting from the age structure of "aging" trends. It should be said that since the reform and opening up, China has won a tremendous development in education, and made unprecedented achievements (see Table 4), especially the development of university education, with college and higher education share of the population more than tripled. According to statistics, mainland gross enrollment rate of college-age youth has reached about 25%.

Table 4   The proportion of the various educational level of the total population

	College and above	High School and Technical Secondary School	Junior School	Primary School	Illiteracy *
1982	0.615	6.779	17.892	35.237	22.81
1990	1.422	8.039	23.344	37.057	15.88
2000	3.611	11.146	33.961	35.701	6.72
2010	8.729	13.716	37.917	26.177	4.08

Aged 15 and over cannot read or read very little.
Source: According to the "mainland China Statistical Yearbook" (calendar year) data calculation.

Nevertheless, the supply of labor market in recent years has a significant structural contradictions, low quality - an oversupply of skilled labor, high quality - skilled labor is in short supply (see Table 5) .

table 5 Continental part of the urban labor market trends and job vacancies ratio of job seekers since 2005

	2005	2006	2007*	2008**	2009	2010	2011
Overall	0.96	0.96	0.98	0.97	0.91	1.01	1.06
Junior workers	1.52	1.37	1.42	1.4	1.38	1.47	1.45
Intermediate workers	1.57	1.55	1.49	1.28	1.39	1.48	1.54
Senior workers	2.1	1.76	1.71	1.69	1.57	1.63	1.71
Senior workers	1.85	1.96	2.38	2.02	1.84	1.87	1.88
Technician	2.08	2.03	2.47	1.86	1.86	1.89	1.76
Senior Technician	1.31	1.41	1.48	1.55	1.42	1.53	1.53
Engineer	1.51	1.65	1.62	1.62	1.44	1.59	1.6
Senior Engineer	2.06	2.21	3.21	4.05	1.9	1.87	2.34
No technical level or title proportion of job seekers	54.4	50.4	50.1	51	52.9	51.4	45.9
Number of Cities	116	121		104	115	116	117

Note: * The author is based on four quarterly monitoring data calculation. * The first quarterly monitoring data.
Source: China Labor Market Information Network Monitoring Center: "section of the urban labor market supply and demand analysis" (related to annual and quarterly).

See from the data in Table 5, in recent years, with a certain level or vocational and technical titles labor is always in short supply, the market demand is 1.4 times more than the supply, some reach three or four times. Without any vocational or technical skill level of the labor force is a serious surplus title. China human resources market information monitoring center did not give such seekers of supply and demand data when reporting monitoring results, but provides the proportion of persons in job seekers in the labor market of all such persons, usually around 50%. Accordingly know that it he case of the total number of job vacancies and job seekers ratio of 1 (or slightly less than / slightly larger than 1), if the market demand and the number of job-seekers ratio is far higher than 1 for to job seekers with certain skills, then the ratios would be far lower than 1 for those job seekers without skill qualifications. Visible, China still needs significant improvement in the quality of the labor force - the skills structure.

3. **The miniaturization of the family size and the core tendency of the family structure**

Family is the most basic social group, it is an organization of social life between the relatives that is based on the marital relationship、 the relationship between blood relatives or adoptive relationship, so it is also known as the cell of society. The so-called family structure contains

the connotation of family size, the combination of family members and the main relationship of family members (such as the power relationship within the family、intergenerational relations). In sociology, the family structure can be divided into three sorts according to the number of the couples and the number of generations, the first one is the nuclear family, which consists of a couple and their unmarried children (if it exits) ; the second one is the stem family, also known as the linear family, which consists of more than two generations, and each one could exit one couple; the third one is the united family, consisting of more than two generations, and at least one of the generations is composed of more than two pairs of the couples. With the change of time, all these basic family structures will be changed into some sub-types of the family structure, for example, the grandparents family, the single-parent family, the empty-nest (the single-parent family and the empty-nest can be classified as the nuclear family), etc. Since the reform and opening up, and with the development of Chinese society and economy, the family structure has changed, these changes not only reflect the general trend of the process of social modernization, but also have the characteristics of Chinese society.

The family size is shrinking, but the speed of the reducing of the extended family and the shrinking of the family size of the rural area seem more rapidly. Table 6 reflects the changing trend of China's household population size since 1982.

Table 6　　　　　　The analysis of the changing trend of the family size　　　　unit: %, people

		one people	two people	three people	four people	≥five people	total	average
The whole country	1982							4.41
	1990	6.27	11.05	23.73	25.82	33.13	100.0	3.96
	2000	8.30	17.04	29.95	22.97	21.73	100.0	3.44
	2005	10.73	24.49	29.83	19.18	15.77	100.0	3.13
	(2005 1990) 1990	71.1	121.6	25.7	23.2	52.4		21.0
city	1990	7.06	13.94	34.81	22.90	21.29	100.0	3.53
	2000	10.68	21.60	40.22	15.75	11.74	100.0	3.03
	2005	11.95	26.33	37.09	14.06	10.56	100.0	2.90
	(2005 1990) 1990	69.3	88.9	6.5	38.6	50.4		17.8
town	1990	7.88	14.60	32.03	23.47	22.02	100.0	3.55
	2000	10.16	18.62	33.89	20.39	16.93	100.0	3.26
	2005	10.79	24.68	31.51	18.60	14.42	100.0	3.09
	(2005 1990) 1990	36.9	69.0	1.6	20.7	34.5		13.0
Countryside	1990	5.87	9.87	19.75	26.89	37.62	100.0	4.13
	2000	6.93	14.85	24.90	26.47	26.85	100.0	3.68
	2005	10.06	23.43	25.39	22.13	18.99	100.0	3.27
	(2005 1990) 1990	71.4	137.4	28.6	17.7	49.5		20.8

data sources : The overall data of year 1982, 2002 and 2005 comes from the *China Statistical Yearbook* (the related years); the data of year 1990 is based on *China Population Statistics Yearbook*(1992); the data about the national cities, towns and countrysides in the year 2000 is calculated according to the fifth census data (2000) from National Bureau of Statistics; the

data about the national cities, towns and countrysides in the year 2005 is calculated according to *the data of the sample surveys in 1% of the national population at 2005*. By the way, the average population of each household in two national census at 1953 and 1964 was 4.33 and 4.43.

In general, the average population of the family continued to decrease, from 1982 to 2005, a decrease of 29.02%. From 1990 to 2005, the average population of the family in the city has decreased 17.8%, the decrease in the town is 13.0%, the countryside is 20.8%, although the family size in the countryside is still larger than the urban so far, its decreasing speed is faster than the urban. From the constitution of different families, the overall trend is the proportion of the families that are composed of one people, two people or three people continues to rise, but the proportion of four people, five people or more than five people households continues to decline. Among them, the proportion of two people family has the largest increase, compared with 1990, an increase of 121.6% in 2005; the proportion of five people family or more than five family has the largest decline, a decrease of 52.4%. That is to say, the whole proportion of one people family, two people family and three people family has increased by 24 percentage points in fifteen years, from 41.05% in 1990 to 65.05% in 2005. From the perspective of the distinction between urban and rural areas, the whole proportion of one people family, two people family and three people family has the most outstanding increase in the countrysides, the weakest in the towns, a moderate increase in the cities; the proportion of four people family has the strongest decline in the cities, the weakest in the countrysides; the proportion of five people family has the strongest decline in the cities, a moderate falling in the countrysides, and the weakest in the towns. Over the past two thousand years, the family size of the china had not changed much, generally maintained at between 5 - 6 people, the so-called "a family of five" had been considered to be the typical family size in traditional China, the family size even up to 8.79 people per household in the first year of the Tang Dynasty in GuangDe(the year of 756). The model of "a family of five"had been broken after the 20 centry, in 1911, there was a research of the whole population, the researcher today had made a modification to it, the data showed that the average population of the family was 4.75(Ge, 2005). In the most time of the 20th century, Chinese family size always remained at the level of 4 people, after the 1990, the family size had a big change for the second time, the average population of the family had declined, less than 4 people. The family size of the cities had a big breakthrough, the average number had declined to 3 or less than 3 people after the 21th century.

The generation of family is few, and the intergenerational structure of family is relatively simple. As to the generation structure of family of traditional society in China, an idea is that the nuclear family is the main form in Han dynasty and the backbone family is the main form in Tang dynasty (Du Zhengsheng, 1982). True it is that the nuclear family is relatively more in history, but we cannot ignore the family over three generations and with a total membership of fiscal (Yi Zaishuo, 2000; Li Genpan, 2006). More importantly, we must see the differences of social class when recognizing the generation structure of household in ancient society. In Han dynasty, according to some researches, the nuclear family is the main form among the bottom families, simultaneously, the backbone family also account for certain proportion, but in social strata above homesteaders and semi-homesteaders, the nuclear is not sufficient, the backbone is the main form and the joint family is not uncommon; at the same time in Han dynasty, the nuclear family of bottom society is also closely around the backbone family, and the form of the nuclear family is in the condition of the parents died, but the formed nuclear family after parents died often form a new backbone family, As long as the parents is alive, the backbone of the family is the basic model of family structure (Li Pangen, 2006). This phenomenon has been extended to the Qing Dynasty (Wang Yuesheng, 2000).

After twenty century, this pattern has been greatly changed. The table seven has revealed the tendency of distribution of generation since the Chinese family household of 1980s. The general pattern is that the range of fluctuation is always between 80% and 83% for the total proportion of the family of the two-generation and below, the proportion of the household of these families is 82.74%, in 1994 the proportion has decreased to 80.04, after 1994, the proportion begins to increase, then in 2005 it returns 82.04%, but it decrease a little in 2008; the proportion of family of three-generation is always no more than 20%.

Table 7   the distribution of household of family according to division of generation from 1991 to 2005 (%)

	Single household	Household of a pair of couple	One-generation and other household	Two-generation	Three-generation	Four-generation	Five-generation and above	total
1989	7.580	5.616	0.796	68.746	18.455	0.704	0.0018	100.0
1991	6.043	6.582	0.755	67.064	18.833	0.722	0.000	100.0
1994	5.696	7.678	0.791	65.874	19.225	0.735	0.002	100.0
1996	5.932	9.271	0.855	64.085	19.092	0.764	0.0018	100.0
2000	21.702			59.316	18.245	0.737	0.001	100.0
2002	7.700	13.262	1.193	59.255	17.876	0.713		100.0
2004	7.83	14.42	1.22	57.39	19.14			100.0
2005	29.35			52.69	17.33	0.63	0.0005	100.0
2006	28.48			53.69	17.24	0.59		100.0
2007	28.64			53.26	17.51	0.59		100.0
2008	28.87			52.94	17.58	0.61		100.0

Sources : the calculation is in accordance with statistical yearbook of China (1995), population statistics yearbook of China (1990,1992,1997,2003,2005), 1% of the national population sample survey (2005), population and employment statistics yearbook of China (2007,2008,2009).

However, according to the changing tendency of various families, the one-generation household and its change have a increasing tendency, roughly speaking, its total proportion has increased from 13.09% in 1989 to 29.35% in 2005, a little decreasing in 2006, then a little returning after 2007. Here, it is worth noticing that the proportion of family of a pair of couple is increasing, compared with 1989, it has increased by 156.8%, without doubt, this is a very prominent change. Prior to 2005, the proportion of two-generation household is ongoing decreasing by 23.4% from 1989 to 2005, but after 2006, there is slight fluctuation. The proportion of three-generation household has slightly increased by 4.2% from 1989 to 1994, but from 1994 to 2006, it has decreased by 10%. The proportion of four-generation household itself is very few, and it also has experienced the same changing process with the three-generation household, it has increased by 8.5% from 189 to 1996, yet, from 1996 to 2005, it has decreased by 17.8%. The proportion of five-generation household and above is extreme few, it fluctuates between hundred thousandth to two hundred thousandths in many years, in 2005, it has decreased to five millionths.
The nuclear family is in the domination, the empty nesters have remarkably increased. As we know, the family which is consisted of a pair of couple is a kind of the nuclear family, but, if

these families are consisted of the couples whose children have their own lives, work and families, it will form so-called empty nesters. In the case of households of two-generation, the majority of families should belong to the nuclear family (but not all, because we cannot exclude the kind of backbone family that is consisted of parents and their married children who have no children), so the distribution that contains different households of generation, has showed by table seven that the nuclear should be in the domination in Chinese structure of family. According to the analysis based on the data of population census in 2000, some scholars has found that the proportion of nuclear family reached 68.15% then, compared with the result of the census in 1990, it has decreased by 7.66% (Wang Yuesheng, 2006). The table eight is the result of 1% of national population survey in 2005, through the table we can see that the second-generation household is in the absolute domination in the three households, but only 2.3% belongs to three-generation household; in the four households, the two-generation household account for approximate three-quarters; in the five households, there approximate one third is the two-generation households. If we sum the two households of all the one-generation household and two-generation household, the households will account for 72.32% among all the sample households. Considering that there exist some backbone families in the two-generation household, the backbone families of the two-generation account for 2.37% among all the families (Wang Yuesheng, 2006). If the proportion remains to be unchanged in 2005, the proportion of all the nuclear families will be 69.95%, which is near 70% and is higher 2.64% than that of all the nuclear families in 2000, so it can prove that the decreasing trend of the nuclear family has already been turned.

Table 8   the distribution of population size of family which is consisted of different generations (2005) : Unit : % household

	one-generation household	two-generation household	three-generation household	four-generation household	five-generation and above household	total	household
Household of one people	100.0	0	0	0	0	100.0	444376
Household of two people	82.56	17.44	0	0	0	100.0	1159826
Household of three people	1.39	96.31	2.3	0	0	100.0	1479218
Household of four people	0.56	73.95	25.43	0.06	0	100.0	975887
Household of five people	0.4	32.58	65.89	1.13	0	100.0	526912
Household of six and above people	0.47	17.1	74.15	8.27	0.01	100.0	291384
total	29.35	52.69	17.33	0.63	0.0005	100.0	4877603

source   The calculation is in accordance with 1% of the national population sample survey in 2005.

The changes of relationship of family power have made the position of power for females' decision in family rise. From the view of sex distribution of acting as a head of a household, although the proportion of female-headed remains to be very low, for example, according to the result from 1% of the national population sample survey in 2005, female-headed only accounts for 13.78% in the whole country, and the female-headed from cities, towns and villages respectively accounts for 23.08%, 15.31% and 7.80%, in most cases, a head of a household is only a symbolic authority of a family, the really index, reflecting the relationship of a family power, is the participation level of important decisions of a family. It is an

important mark of modernization changes of relationship in family power for turning traditional parent-child axis to couples axis. Based on the fieldwork in rural areas of Shang Hai, He Nan and Si Chuang provinces from 1987 to 1988, the researchers have found that the structure of inner-relationship in rural families at 1980s took place several significant changes, namely, the economic relationship of family has been transferring from traditional pattern –husband as a pillar to couples as a pillar, with the shape of the retiring system of patriarchy which means that aging parents whose economic distribution has declined hand over their powers to next generations; the pattern of family power has been transferring from the patrilineal patriarchy to the democratic equity which means the rights of male are decreasing; the division of family has been transferring from the traditional pattern-- Men's work centers is around outside, women's work centers is around the home, to the division pattern of no difference between couples, and the proportion that couples govern the family life together is higher. These changes are one of important features in the development of modern society (Lei Jieqiong, 1994). A research from 1996 to 1998 has showed, in terms of decisions on daily household expenses, that the decisions made by husbands, wives, couples, parents and others respectively account for 30.76%, 36.95%, 23.92%,3.28% and 5.09%; yet, in the subjective evaluation to the more real power in a family, husbands, wives, couples, parents and others respectively account for 32.66%, 21.26%, 36.75%, 1.9% and 7.43% (Shen Chonglin, 1994). A research investigated by women's federation in China has showed that more than half of rural women think that they or other female members control their families' economic rights (Cui Qingxin Li Weiwei, 2007). Many relevant researches have also come to similar conclusions. In addition to the evolution trend, of course, there are various differences. (Tang Can, 2007).

The changes of scale and structure of families in Chinese mainland are both the reflection to the evolution of relevant national policies and the result of economic and social developments since reform and opening up. The birth control policy is a nation policy which has the most prominent influence on families, and this is especially reflected in the changes of family scale. That cities strictly carry out one-child policy and qualified rural areas are allowed to give birth to second child directly determine the narrowing of family scale and indirectly affect the structure features of families. Policies cannot give a complete explanation to the changes of scale and structure of family, however, the economic and social development still plays a negligible impact. For example, when using two basic indexes —GDP of per capital and urbanization rate of population from each provinces, as the economic and social development, to carry out the correlation analysis, we have found that the family size has the statistically significant correlation with them (Table 9), the proportion of households with 1-3 people is proportional to GDP of per capital of each provinces and urbanization rate of population, yet the proportion of household with four and over four people is inversely proportional to them, and in generally, the two relationships will be more prominent with time going on.

Table 9   The Pearson correlation analysis of the proportion to different population size of family households in each provinces from 1990 to 2009.

		One-person households	Two-person HH	Three-person HH	Four-person HH	Five-person and more HH
1990	GDP of per capital	0.705**	0.845**	0.031	0.292	0.596**
	Urbanization rate of population	0.237	0.475**	0.027	0.282	0.416*
1995	GDP of per capital	0.397*	0.671**	0.629**	0.554**	0.539**
	Urbanization rate of population	0.063	0.484**	0.713**	0.501**	0.493**
2000	GDP of per capital	0.521**	0.804**	0.535**	0.732**	0.582**
	Urbanization rate of population	0.344	0.801**	0.690**	0.726**	0.667**
2005	GDP of per capital	0.725**	0.553**	0.503**	0.777**	0.517**
	Urbanization rate of population	0.663**	0.618**	0.609**	0.834**	0.574**
2009	GDP of per capital	0.644**	0.614**	0.551**	0.807**	0.611**
	Urbanization rate of population	0.651**	0.685**	0.633**	0.846**	0.698**

* P : 0.05** P : 0.01

source : The calculation is in accordance with statistical yearbook of China (relevant years), population statistics yearbook of China (1992), 1% of the national population sample survey in 2005, population and employment statistics yearbook of China (2010)》 .

The generation within the family is also related to the level of socio-economic development. For example, if we consider, from rural areas to cities and from the west to the centre, that the level of socio-economic development changes from low to high, the areas which are the lower level of development will have more multi-generational families, and the areas which are the higher level of development will have less multi-generational families. According to the result from the data analysis based on 1% of the national population sample survey in 2005, showing that this trend really exists (Table 10). From the table 10, this trend is most prominently reflected in the changes of geographical distribution of proportion of one household, three households and four households. The proportional distribution of one household remarkably reflects the trend that rural areas are lower than cities and the west are lower than the east, but that of three households and four households reflects the opposite tendency. Only do the two households not reflect the trend in the two aspects. As to five

households and over five households, they themselves are rarely, so their proportional distribution cannot reflect any trends.

The changes of power relations within the family give more reflection to the economic and social development (Tang Can, 2007). Some scholars point out, of course, that globalization probably is an important factor that affects the change of the family structure in Chinese mainland, and at least, it affects people's family values and relevant family ethics (Hu Liang, 2004).

Chart 10   the distribution of the family in urban and rural areas at 2005(%)

		HH of One Generation	HH of two generations	HH of three generations	HH of four generations	HH of five generations and more	In total
Rural and Urban	Urban	33.441	52.731	13.493	0.335	0.00007	100.0
	Township	30.376	53.186	15.874	0.563	0	100.0
	Rural	26.590	52.498	20.089	0.823	0.001	100.0
regions	The east	35.102	49.319	15.018	0.560	0.0005	100.0
	The central	26.266	55.056	18.032	0.646	0.0005	100.0
	The west	26.219	53.731	19.357	0.693	0.0003	100.0

Resource : the data is calculated according to *the data of the sample surveys in 1% of the national population at 2005*。

Undoubtedly, the above changes of family structure in Chinese mainland are connected with the process of social and economic modernization development in Chinese mainland. However, we must also notice that the changes also bring in a challenge for further economic-social development in Chinese mainland. We are faced with many severe challenges in endowment functions and Socialization functions of a family (relating to the development of children), for example, the decreasing of family generations, the narrowing of population scale, the increasing of Single-parent families, Incomplete families and empty nesters , the increasing of so-called Inter-generational families owing to the mobilization of labors and the change of pattern of power relationship in families (Wang Yuesheng ,2006; Tang Can, 2007). When combining the aging changes in family structure with the aging of age structure of whole population, the formed negative impact will be more prominent, especially on the problem of endowment. While on the macro it probably does not form the situation that is old before getting rich, the family endowment on the micro is certainly forming some difficulties, resulting to increasing social conflicts, so all the society must give a high priority on them.

4. **The structural changes in space society and the enlargement in regional disparity between urban and rural areas**

Since the implementation of reform and opening-up policy, the changes taking place in spatial structure of Chinese mainland society are significant. Meanwhile, the disharmonies in the interior of social spatial structure and the deviations with the changes of economic structure are also relatively large.

In the urban and rural structure, cities and towns of Chinese mainland developed rapidly and got hitherto unknown expansion. According to the statistics, in less than 30 years, the total area of urban built-up area expanded more than 36000 square kilometers in Mainland China, which is equivalent to the total area formed in the previous 2000 years. At the same time, some changes also occurred in the urban and rural population structure of Chinese mainland. It is statisticed that from 1983 to 2010, the proportion of urban resident population had risen from 21.6% to 49.95%. It was a positive outcome in the change of urban and rural structure of Mainland China.

However, compared with the industrialization of economic structure, the urbanization level was lagging behind on the whole. Regarding to the statistics, from 1983 to 2010, the ratio of the non-agricultural rate (i.e. the proportion of industrial added value accounted for GDP) of economy structure in Mainland China to the urbanization rate of the resident population had changed from 3.1:1 to 1.80:1, the deviation between the above two shrunk a lot, but it was still considerable. If we calculated urbanization rate on the basis of the household registration, the urbanization rate of household registered population over the same period had increased from 18.9% to 31.7%,[2] while the ratio of the non-agricultural rate of economy structure to the non-agricultural rate of household registered population only had changed from 3.55:1 to 2.84:1, the scope of decreasing in structure deviation was very small, which indicated that the hysteresis in the system urbanization was more prominent.

Compared to the level of economic development, how far behind is the current urbanization of Chinese mainland? There are different kinds of analytical methods, and the results also have great variations. In accordance with the Chenery model, some scholars proposed the level of urbanization which matched the intermediate stage of economy industrialization was 50% 60% (Chen, Huang, Zhong, 2006). Nowadays, the industrialization of Chinese mainland has entered into the final half of intermediate stage, which means the flag value of urbanization level in Mainland China should be close to 60% and the median value of about 55% is advisable. Some scholars put forward a log-linear model on the basis of per capital GNP (Xu, Zhou, Ning, 1997), according to this model, the estimated urbanization rate of Chinese mainland' population in 2010 should be above 72%, which should also reach about 52% when adjusted to the actual situation. Besides, some scholars proposed a "big country model" (Yu, 1995) on account of per capital GNP calculated in accordance with purchasing power parity, in light of the model, the urbanization rate of Chinese mainland' population should be above 67% in 2010. The chart 11 summarized the urbanization deviation estimated according to the above three methods in Mainland China. It was clear that the degree of deviation had a minimum of 20%, and a maximum of 60%. The urbanization deviation indicated that the changes in urban-rural spatial structure of Chinese mainland were incompatible with economic development and structural alteration, which was a kind of structural contradictions in itself. On the other hand, the urbanization deviation also brought apparent hindering effect on the structural adjustment in other aspects of Chinese mainland society, especially exerted significant influence on the adjustment of social interest structure in Mainland China. We will make further analysis in the following.

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2 According to population statistics from the Public Security Department of mainland, in 2010, the total population of countryside registrations is 0.916 billion and the total urban and rural population is 1.341 billion over the same period.

Table 11 Estimation about the deviation between the urbanization rate of Chinese mainland and the level of economic development in 2010 （%）

Model	Flag value	The urbanization deviation of resident population		The urbanization deviation of household registered population	
		Urbanization rate counted	Deviation (%	Urbanization rate counted	Deviation (%
log-linear model	52		2.05		20.3
big country model	67	49.95	17.05	31.7*	35.3
Chen jiagui etc	55		5..5		23.3

Another important aspect worth noting in the process of investigating urban and rural structure is the gap between the urbanization rate calculated by resident population and the one calculated by household registered population presented a tendency of obvious expansion over the past thirty years (Chart 3). As you can see from Chart 3, urbanization rate based on resident population was basically rising year by year, while the urbanization rate on the basis of household registered population rarely rose, especially after 1997, almost did not rise. As a result, in addition to individual year, the gap in urbanization rate of population between the two kinds of apertures indicated a basic trend of gradual widening, especially after 1997, became more obvious. In 2010, the gap reached 18.25%, which means a total of nearly 0.25 billion people without the status of urban household registration are counted as urban population because of living in cities and towns more than half a year. However, as we all know, the migrant rural population faced a variety of constraints due to the failure to address the identity issues, and it was difficult for them to obtain many of the social rights as urban population do. Because of this disparity, the unique changes in urban and rural structure of Chinese mainland, in other words, the special process of urbanization triggered a lot of social contradictions.

Chart 3   The urbanization rate of two kinds of apertures and the changing trend of the gap between them from 1983 to 2010
Data sources: Calculated on the basis of "China Statistical Yearbook", "China Rural Statistical Yearbook" (about the relevant year).

 The regional structure is another important kind of space structure appearing in the economic and social development of Mainland China. Since the implementation of reform and opening-up policy, the development strategy of regional economy and society of Chinese mainland has entered into the non-balanced development model from the previous equilibrium model, the eastern areas obtained more preferential treatments from national policies. Under the influence of other factors, the regional spatial structure of the economic and social development of Chinese mainland appeared differentiated pattern and it showed the formation of three different development regions, which comprises the eastern region, the central region and the western one. We took nine provinces (or cities) into the so-called eastern region, that is Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Liaoning, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong, then we classified another ten provinces into the central region, which contains Heilongjiang, Jilin, Shanxi, Hebei, Henan, Anhui, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi and Hainan. At last, we included a total of twelve provinces (cities, areas) into the western region, which comprises Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Guizhou, Sichuan, Chongqing, Yunnan, Tibet, Shaanxi, Qinghai, Gansu, Ningxia and Xinjiang. Over the past thirty years, the three regions of Chinese mainland have gained significant progresses and remarkable achievements respectively. However, when talking about the regional structure, the focus of attention lies in the divergence among the above regions, so we won not make more description about the development of each region.
There is no doubt that the non-balanced development strategy over thirty years has made remarkable positive significance to the overall economic and social development of Chinese mainland, and it also created favorable conditions for the return of balanced development strategy in theory. This point cannot be denied. Meanwhile, as the influence of non-balanced development strategy and the resource endowment and historical constraints of each region, the development gap among different regions should not be ignored either. (See Chart 12)

Chart 12　　The changes of social economic structure among regions from 1978 to 2010
Unit: %, yuan

		The east	The central region	The west	The east: the central region: the west
The distribution of population*	1978	32.6	40.6	26.8	1.22 : 1.51 : 1
	2000	32.5	38.8	28.1	1.16 : 1.38 : 1
	2010	35.0	37.5	26.9	1.30 : 1.39 : 1
The share of GDP	1978	45.6	35.1	19.3	2.36 : 1.82 : 1
	2000	46.8	34.4	18.8	2.49 : 1.83 : 1
	2010	52.2	29.2	18.6	2.81 : 1.57 : 1
GDP per capita	1978	508.3	314.6	261.4	1.94 : 1.20 : 1
	2010	10076.9	6201.6	4673.7	2.16 : 1.33 : 1
	2000	48579.6	25367.3	22591.1	2.17 : 1.12 : 1
The non-agricultural rate of economic structure	1978	79.0	61.9	62.9	1.26 : 0.98 : 1
	2000	90.2	81.0	77.7	1.16 : 1.04 : 1
	2010	94.2	86.9	86.9	1.08 : 1.00 : 1
The urbanization rate of population	1978	17.6	17.9	13.6	1.29 : 1.32 : 1
	2000	31.7	25.6	22.8	1.39 : 1.12 : 1
	2010	58.0	46.1	37.2	1.56 : 1.24 : 1

Data sources: Calculated on the basis of "China Statistical Yearbook" of relevant year and statistical yearbook data of various provinces.

N.B: * The sum of the population proportion from three regions is less than 100% because there is a part of the population (military and police personnel) from the total population uncounted in the provinces' population.

According to Chart 12, the overall trend of structural changes in Mainland China is no big changes have taken place in the spatial distribution of population, the proportion of the central region population to the national total population has reduced by 3.1%, the east and the west have risen by 2.4% and 0.1% respectively from 1978 to 2010. However, the structural differences existed in economic and social development of various regions was very significant. During this period, the gap of GDP share between the east and west expanded prominently, the gap between the central region and the west narrowed, which had expanded before 2000 but reduced in 2010. Therefore we can conclude that the changing trend of regional economic development in future mainland is mainly the widening gap between the eastern region and the central and western regions. The changing trend of the gap on per capita GDP among the three regions acted the same. The non-agricultural rate of economic structure refers to the proportion of non-agricultural industry value-added in GDP, generally speaking, the gap on this index among the three regions showed a tendency to shrink, which indicated the process of industrialization in central and western regions tended to accelerate. In general, the changing situation of the gap on population urbanization level among regions also showed a continued expansion of the gap between the east and the west, however, the gap between the central region and the west dwindled first and enlarged afterward. To sum

up, the overall tendency of these indexes is the gap between the central region and the west is narrowing, while the gap between the east and the west is widening.

The divergences of economic development among the regions are accompanied by differences in social development. For example, the social development differences among regions can be analyzed from the two most important quotas of social development, which contains the population educational status and the average life expectancy. As for educational status, the differences among regions are significant (Chart 13). In accordance with Chart 13, in 2000, the proportion of population with primary school education and below and the illiterate rate of population over the age of 15 showed a rising trend from east to west, while the proportion of population with high school and junior college education and above showed the opposite. According to the changes in the population educational level of various regions, from 2000 to 2010, the gap between the proportion of population with junior college education and above in the central and western regions and the corresponding proportion in the eastern region has increased from less than 2% to more than 3%. The regional disparity in the proportion of population with other cultural degree should not be ignored even though it has narrowed, especially, although the proportion of population with primary school education and below has declined in three regions, there was still an expansion in the relative gap among regions because of the smallest rate of decline occurred in the western region.

Chart 13 The educational status distribution of population at or above the age of 6 in three regions of Chinese mainland in 2000 and 2001 (%)

	Primary school education and below		Junior middle school		Senior high school		Junior college education and above		Illiteracy	
	2000	2010	2000	2010	2000	2010	2000	2010	2000	2010
The overall	35.70	26.78	33.96	38.79	11.15	14.03	3.61	8.93	6.72	4.08
The east	32.18	23.48	36.22	39.82	13.05	15.86	4.62	11.14	6.13	3.37
The central	35.01	25.18	36.52	41.45	10.98	13.99	3.15	7.70	6.20	3.78
The west	40.38	33.48	27.83	34.09	8.96	11.44	2.82	7.50	9.03	5.42

Data sources: Calculated on the basis of "China statistical yearbook 2011". The illiteracy rate means the proportion of population who is illiterate or reads a few to the total population over the age of 15.

The average life expectancy can be said as the overall reflection of economic and social development level. According to the fifth census in 2000, the average life expectancy of the nine provinces (city) from eastern regions topped at 78.14 years old (Shanghai) and reached 71.51 years old as the minimum; in the central region, the highest was 73.10 years old (Jilin) and the lowest was 68.95 years old (Jiangxi), in addition to Jiangxi, other provinces all reached 70 years old; however, in the western region, the maximum was 71.73 years old (Chongqing) and the minimum was 64.37 years old (Tibet), five provinces (city, area) in the

west reached 70 years old while the average life expectations in the other 7 provinces (area) were under 70 years old.("2007China Statistical Yearbook").

There are the problems of unbalanced regional development in all countries, but at the same time, every country should be committed to reducing the imbalance level of regional development, because the imbalance often finally manifests as the unbalanced spatial structure of social development and counts against a country's overall social integration and harmony. Factually, the expansion in the structural differences of Chinese regional developments has displayed as contradictions among regions in a certain degree, and it produced certain pressure on the social integration among regions.

5. **the progress and problems of structure of social and economic activities**

The structures of employment, profession and organization are consisted of structure of social and economic activities that what we are called, they mean social members' departmental distribution and locations composition in main activities of our society and economy. On one hand, the structure of employment and the structure of profession decide the way to gaining benefits and the relatively social and economic status for social members; on the other hand, to some extent, social organization, as a structure of social and economic activities, has an influence on what organized way social members can realize and uphold their own rights and interests.

2. **The change of employment structure: agricultural employment proportion declines, but comparing to its production rate, its deviation has been continually widening.**

What we called structures is mainly industrial distribution of labors employment. With the promotion of China's industrialization and urbanization, the non-agricultural industries sustainably and rapidly develop so that the employment structure has been changed in Chinese mainland. That Agricultural employment has been decreasing and non-agricultural employment has been increasing is the most prominent tendency (chart 4). From 1978 to 2010, the employment structure ratio of China's first, second and third industries changes from 70.5 : 17.3 : 12.2 to 36.7 : 28.7 : 34.6.From the perspective of the sociology, this change can be regarded as a indication of modernization of employment structure in Chinese mainland, and it means that more population participate in industrialization and economic development and more population can share the development fruits, simultaneously, their status in economy and society rise up and mobile.

However, we should notice that the change of employment structure in Chinese mainland does not keep up with that of production structure, moreover, there is remarkable structure deviation in agricultural and non-agricultural fields, and the deviation appear to be expansive tendency (chart 5). From 1978 to 2010, the ratio of employment proportion to production proportion in agriculture undergoes a decline with a small margin in early 1980s, after that, it undergoes a vibrating rise, and from 2001, it has fluctuated over 3.5 times. Causing the deviation has a lot of reasons; one important reason is regional difference of agricultural employment proportion. In 1985, the agricultural employment proportion in the east ,central and west of Chinese mainland is respectively 52.8%,64.0% and 73.5%;in 2005, the agricultural employment proportion in the three areas has respectively declined to 30.9%,49.6% and 54.9%, and the decline margin is respectively 41.5%,22.5% and 25.3%; compared with 2005,it has respectively declined to 23.8%,40.9% and 47.7% in2010,and the decline margin is respectively 23.0%,17.5% and 13.1%. Compared with 20 years ago, during the five years, the speed of the agricultural employment proportion has accelerated, yet the gap among areas is still big. Totally speaking, the declining speed of the agricultural employment proportion of labors in the east and west areas is obviously slower than that of

the east, so it represents the influence of gaps of areas industrial process, which is mentioned above.


Chart 4 1978-2006 The tendency of employment structure(%) in Chinese mainland
Source : China Statistical Yearbook (2011).

Chart 5 1978 : 2010 The tendency of deviation changes of proportion of agricultural employment and proportion of agricultural production in Chinese mainland

Source : China Statistical Yearbook (2011).

3. The profession structure upgrades with a general prominence, yet its instability is prominent.

With the change of employment structure, more precise statement, with the development of marketization, industrialization and urbanization, the employment structure in Chinese mainland has also undergone significant changes. The non-agriculture and marketization of economy are increasing demand for various non-agriculture occupations, and a variety of cultural quality and technical skills have required higher occupations to expand, so lots of new occupations have been continually produced. All of these factors have promoted the ongoing upgrade in Chinese mainland's profession structure, namely, among the whole

occupation structure, the proportion of occupation at a higher level is gradually increasing, but that of occupation at a lower level is gradually decreasing. Some scholar calls this tendency as "high-class career structure trend", which is also a common tendency in world's modernization (editor-in-chief Lu Xueyi, 2004). For example, according to the result of the third National Population Census in 1982 and 1% of National Population Survey in 2005, the proportion declines by 24.4% in the occupation of manual labors and semi-manual labors in Chinese mainland, but the occupation of non-manual labors increases by 18.8%. In 2011, the institute of sociology of CASS has organized the third National General Social Survey, the result of the report shows that 45% of employees received the investigation look themselves as manual or semi-manual labors, and that the rest is non-manual labors who acquire specialized skills in different degrees. With the ongoing upgrade of profession structure, there is an increasingly space for social members to promote. Based on that upgrade, not only does individual consolidated income increase, but the country has maintained the social and political situation which is basically steady in the whole transformation period of modernization, as well as promotion of social development.

However, the problem of profession structure in Chinese mainland today lies in its prominent unsteadily (Li Qiang, 2006). The unsteadily does not mean the profession structure in Chinese mainland is in the process of upgrading, but mainly mean the existing two situations below. First, the profession position of the group of migrant workers is not steady and has a slight protection for their rights and interests. The migrant workers in mainland are emergence almost with reform and opening up, and its primary meaning is the migrant farmers from areas of township firms. Since 1990s, the labors from rural areas enter into towns to work because of gradually loosing administration in towns, and the scale of migrant workers has been expanding. According to the supervision from statistical department in mainland (National statistical, 2012), the total number of migrant workers is established 254,200,000 in 2008, but in 2011, the total number of them has increased to 252,780,000. Although the union of mainland has proclaimed the migrant workers is also a part of the proletariat, their occupation position is extreme unsteadily, because they have to back to their own rural areas when they are a certain age. The monitoring result mentioned above also reveals that the problem of protecting their rights and interests remains to be extremely serious even under the promotion of the government in mainland. In 2011, among all the investigated migrant workers, those who does not sign the labor contract account for 56.2%, of which migrant workers in the construction industry ,who does not sign a labor contract, are the highest proportion, accounting for 73.6%, of which migrant workers in the manufacturing account for 49.6%, of which those in the service industry account for 61.4%, and of which migrant workers in the accommodating and catering industry and the wholesale and retail industry are respectively account for 64.9% and 60.9%. Simultaneously, the social insurance system covers few migrant workers, the rate that employers or firms contribute the pension insurance, industrial injury insurance, medical insurance, unemployment insurance and maternity insurance for migrant workers is only respectively 13.9%, 23.6%, 16.7%, 8% and 5.6%.

The wage earners are forced to constantly change their jobs because of the employment patterns of many enterprises. According to a sample survey in private companies of eight provinces, investigated by the author in 2004, we have found that 58% in the 2059 employees investigated in this survey claim they do not sign contracts with their firms; during the employees who have signed contracts with their own firms, the contract period of one year accounts for 49.8%, that of two years accounts for 13.4%, that of three years accounts for 22.8%, and that of four years and over four years accounts for 14%. In other words, the employees who do not sign and that their contract period is just one year account for 71.2%. In addition, many firms often hire young workforces, for example, during the survey, the young employees who are thirty-five years old and below account for 69.7%, who are thirty-

six to forty-five years old account for 20.7%, and who are forty-six years old and above only account for 9.6%. This is not only a basic employment patterns in private companies, but broadly exists in other forms of ownerships. The phenomenon has been widespread existing.

In both cases described above, the profession community that Durkheim desires for hardly take shape, if we would like to promote social integrity through the form of professional community and its professional ethics, the opportunity will, if possible, be uncertain. People will generally take shape a sense of wander, and they are uncertain where they can live and work in peace, not to speaking of setting down and pursuing their own lives.

## 4. Macro-organization structure: three departments pattern is taking shape

The social organization structure in Chinese mainland has experienced prominent changes in the process of reform and opening up. What we called the structure here contains state organization, market organization and social organization. Many researchers have showed, before China's reform and opening up, that the system of organization structure in Chinese mainland is simplification, that country control the majority of resources of production and most of life resources, and that a variety of public institution, collective organization of urban community and collective organization in rural areas manage all the economic activities and people's life. There are some scholars looking the governing structure as "totality" social structure (Sun Liping, etc 1994). In this social structure, various economy structures (such as stated-own enterprise) and social structures (such as social group), are almost the executors of the state plans and the tasks, and these structures' existence and operation depend on allocation of the state's plan, so they are also, in essence, the undertakers of the function of the state organization, of course, they are different manifestations of the state organization. Since the reform in 1978, it has breaks the pattern of the organization structure from three aspects.

First, the market-oriented reform of economic system has gradually formed a relatively dependent organization system of market economy. Especially since 1990s, non-public economy sectors get the unprecedented development, individually-owned businesses, private enterprises and non-public economy sectors of other forms emerge in large numbers and grow rapidly. According to the statistics from industrial and commercial administration department in mainland, the private enterprises increase from 430,000 households to 9,035,000 households between 1994 and first half year of 2011, during the same period, the investment businesses from foreign, Hong Kong, Marco and Taiwan increase from 206,000 households to 446,000 households, and the individually-owned businesses increase from 21,870,000 households to 36,010,000 households. From the angle of amount, the non-public economy sectors that follow the market law are the main part of economy structure in mainland. Up to the first half year of 2011, the ratio of private enterprises to all the domestic companies is 78.8%. At the same time, the economic structure of public sectors has happened two significant changes. On one hand, the number of organization has decreased rapidly. In accordance with the result of the national economic census in 2008, the total number of stated-own enterprises, stated-own joint ventures and solely stated-own companies is 158,000, which accounts for only 3.2% in all the companies of enterprise legal person; compared with the result of the national economic census in 2004, it decreases by 340,00, the rate decreasing 7.8%. On the other hand, the management mechanism has a great changes, namely, the plan mechanism is almost taken over by market mechanism. Although stated-own enterprises have continually represented the national will and have owned monopoly position in relative fields, they have almost established their market players' attribution after many years' reform of system and mechanism. Collective enterprises are necessary to survive in the market competition, and their amount will be certain increasing.

Second, state organization has been reforming in recent 30 years, lessening institutions and personnel and transforming functions has been always the underlying issue in the reform of state organization. Taking state council as a example, there are one hundred departments in the state council at 1982, those of which have more than sixty economy and management departments; after lots of reforms, the departments in the state council has decreased to twenty-eight at present, those of which have no more than ten economy and management departments that mainly undertake macro-regulation management of national economy. Local governments, in accordance with the reform mode of the state council, carry out the transformation of organization and function. From the view of sociology, the great significance of this reform lies in the state organizations returning public departments, this, on one hand, represents that national organizations has gradually withdrawn from the direct organizers and undertakers role of micro-economy life, leaving some economic organization room for market departments. On the other hand, this shows that national organizations has gradually withdrawn from the direct organizers and undertakers role of micro-society life, leaving some social organization room for social departments.

Third, social organization has primarily developed. Not only does state organization have been transforming and restructuring some previous economy and management departments into social organization, continually defining its attributions of various social groups and constantly promoting the development and improvement of autonomic organizations of grass-roots community in urban and rural area; but society itself in the process of economic market-oriented and country that withdraws from the organizers and undertakers role of micro-society life have been strongly demanding for self-organizations of self-service. According to statistics of Ministry of Civil Affairs in mainland (chart six), there are 2,000 social groups registered in mainland in the early period of reform and opening up, increasing to 4,446 in 1988, moreover, in the end of 2010 those social groups increasing to more than 445,000, including 245,256 social groups, 198,175 private non-enterprises and 2,200 foundations. These phenomena indicated that it is remarkable for growth and development of social organization in Chinese mainland during nearly 30 years of reform and opening up. And we should notice that, owing to the restrains of management system of social organization, the total number of non-enrolled civil society organizations in Chinese mainland is more than two million, which is far more than the registered organizations

Chart 6   1988-2010 Development trends of social organization in Chinese Mainland : Ten Thousands

Source : China Statistical Yearbook (2011)》。

In summary, the reform and opening up over thirty years has remarkably changed the system of organization structure in Chinese mainland, and the pattern only existing in the state organizations has gradually transformed, it is different now. A new system of organization structure that three departments including state organization, market organization and social organization are carrying on common development is taking shape; also, it is an important part of modernization in Chinese mainland. Of course, the new one need further development and improvement, and organization structures are differentiating with the complication of economic, social and political relationship, so it puts forward a new requirement for the management, coordination and integration of this relationship.

We must give a high priority on the growth and development problems of social organizations. Currently, among the three departments, the power of state organization is the most strong, the power of market is the second, and that of social is the weakest, this is their basic relationship. The weaknesses of social organization in Chinese mainland can be mainly represented in three aspects. First, its quantity is too small and its destiny is too low in total population. In the case of registered social organizations, there are only thirty-three per one hundred thousand in Chinese mainland at 2010. In contrast, per 100,000 populations in western countries have hundreds various social organizations, [3]even though not compared with western countries, the situation in Indian is that per 100,000 populations have one hundred and ten various social organizations (Jia Xijin, 2006). Second, social organizations in Chinese mainland, especially civil social organizations, because of the lagged reform of relevant existing management systems, has been subjected to many kinds of restrains in the aspects of participating in social management, expressing people's appeals and serving people's interests. Compared with another two departments, the power of social organizations is too weak to shape a strong power to balance them, so it is hardly to play a role expected by some scholars in social organizations of modern citizen. Third, social organizations in Chinese mainland, especially civil social organizations, owing to insufficient institution supply that promotes development of social organizations, are faced with various resources plights in the course of growth and development. So far, Chinese mainland has not issued the basic law on the social organization, while only producing three management regulations and some department regulations. From the aspect of resources allocation, more than twenty national social organizations equipped with officious background can have access to various resources including getting public resources support from government finance and raising resources from the folk, but, other social organization (including almost all civil social organizations and partly organizations equipped with officious background), seldom can have access to resource supports from public finances, nor allowed to receive folk donations (this kind of social organizations are generally not so-called private equity fund, but civil society organizations depending on social organizations of officious background). Overall, the management systems of social organization in Chinese mainland are not beneficial for the development of social organization, especially civil society organization.

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3 In 2001, there are more than 1.6million non-profit organization in American (Jiang Xijin, 2006), per 100,000 population have six hundred and seventy or so; in 2005, there are 80,000 social organizations allowed to enroll by Canadian government (Tai Wei, 2005), per 100,000 population have two hundred and fifty or so; there are 500,000 to700,000 civil organizations in Great Britain now (the group of NGO research of CASS in Chinese mainland, 2007), per 100,000 have 830 to 1160 civil organizations.

6. Social interests structure is undergoing a significant transition with in-depth contradictions

Significant changes in the structure of social interests have a substantive significance to the future evolution of Mainland China. The changes manifest in three major structural change, namely the ownership structure, the class and stratum structure and the structure of interest relationship. They are the result of structural changes above, and may bring those changes into a new system of social integration.

5. The ownership structure: the rise of non-public economy and the marketization of the labor relations

Changes in the ownership structure of Mainland China are the breakthrough points to the transitions of social relations. An important result of economic reform in Mainland China is the significant changes in the ownership structure. On the one hand, for the economic organizations, according to the industrial and commercial administrations in Chinese mainland, non-public economic organizations have an absolute majority share in all the corporate bodies, additionally there are more than 30 million self-employed industrial and commercial households. On the other hand, for the ownership of assets, without considering the nature of property rights of the land and the other natural resources, the non-public economy has occupied an absolute share. For example, according to the data from *China Statistical Yearbook* (2011), in 2010, in the so-called "industrial enterprises above designated size" (including various types of state-owned enterprises, state-owned enterprises, state-owned joint ventures, state-controlled enterprises and a small number of collective enterprises) , the total assets of public-owned enterprises is less than 43% of the proportion; in construction industry, the proportion of fixed assets are less than 25% in this kind of enterprises; in the "wholesale industry enterprises above designated size", the proportion was 26.1%; in the "retail industry enterprises above designated size", the proportion was 8.9%. There is no doubt that the share of assets of public-owned enterprises will be smaller if the industrial and commercial enterprises below designated size are taken into account.

The changes in the ownership structure is a major achievement in China's reform and opening up, also an important source of economic and social development of Mainland China. These changes are of far-reaching significance of social restructuring in its profound impact on the structure of labor relations in China. The economic census in 2008 shows that, in the non-agricultural industries, more than 80% of the employees were employed in non-public enterprises and institutions, the proportion of employees in public-owned enterprises and institutions was less than 1/5. This structural change in the non-public economy formed a new kind of labor relations, namely, the labor relations of employment. In the field of public economy, the reform of the enterprise employment system also gradually make the government-arranged labor relationships turn into the market-based labor relationships, and this new type of labor relationships has been extending to other fields of employment. According to the statistics of relevant departments, without considering the employment situation of rural homeworkers, the marketization of labor relations in Mainland China in the non-agricultural areas has been almost completed (Qiao Jian, 2006) .

Market-oriented employment mechanism means that labor relationships in Mainland laborers have changed from the labor relationship of which workers are the "masters" in the planned economy era into the relationship of which the laborers are hired workers. This is the most profound change in the structure of social relationships in Mainland China, because it implies a profound transformation of various powers, rights, and interests in labor relationships, which also means the changes of role-status structure of the members of society. Because of this change all members of society involved are at stake, therefore, which inherently implies a

structural tension between labor and capital. In fact, since the mid-1990s, labor conflicts in Mainland China has appeared in considerable numbers (Figure 7). As for the total amount of cases of labor disputes, it showed a growing tendency in 2006 and before; the number decreased significantly in 2007, but the number of labor dispute cases soared since the new labor contract law was enacted in 2008; in 2009 and 2010 the number declined slightly, but remained high. A lot of mass incidents occurred in recent years have their roots in these labor disputes .


Figure 7 The trend of case number of the labor disputes in 1999-2006

Class and stratum structure: social mobility, division and structural tensions

Under the drive of structural changes mentioned above, the social class and stratum structure in Mainland China has undergone significant changes. Compared with the period before the reform and opening up, the structure of social class and stratum in Mainland China is closely related to the acceleration of social mobility and division. Non-agriculture economy and urbanization of population have been enlarging the non-agricultural employment, enhancing the level of occupational structure, forming a larger room for career advancement, thus creating the objective conditions and possibilities of social mobility. The marketization,the restructuring of the ownership structure, the change of the structure of labor relationships, as well as the formation of the system under which distribution according to work is dominant and a variety of modes of distribution coexist, make the different social members occupy different social resources, enjoy different comprehensive income, which has differentiated the socio-economic status, and thus changed the social class and stratum structure. Before the reform and opening up, the working class, the peasantry and the intellectuals constituted the social class structure of two classes and a stratum. Since the reform and opening up, they have undergone differentiation in the trend of reform and opening up: migrant workers, self-employed industrialist and businessmen, private entrepreneurs, management personnel of various non-public enterprises and private non-enterprise institutions, continued to separate from the social classes they belonged to; the former intellectuals as professional and technical personnel, the staff of state organs, social organizations and various enterprises and institutions obtained relatively independent new social roles and status under the new labor relationships(Lu Xueyi, 2004) .

If we combine the resource-based class analysis with the occupational-status-based stratum analysis to examine the present structure of social class in China, an outline of ten social strata can be found: country and society administrators, management personnel, private entrepreneurs, professional and technical staff, clerical staff, individual industrialists and

businessmen, commercial service workers, industrial workers, agricultural workers, and the unemployed/underemployed persons (Lu Xueyi, 2002). Before 1978, the class structure is not complex, agricultural workers, industrial workers and business services workers, accounted for 89.4% of all employees. Private entrepreneurs did not exist, the number of individual workers was negligible, the nation and society administrators, business managers, professional and technical personnel and clerical staff were less than 6% of the total share. In the formerly prevailing ideological terms, there were mainly two classes and a stratum—the working class, the peasantry and the intellectuals (i.e. professional and technical personnel). By 1988, the structure had more significant changes, a new social stratum of private entrepreneurs emerged, the group of individual industrial and commercial staff (mostly self-employed staff) expanded. By 2001, all ten strata could not be ignored. By 2011, commercial service workers, industrial workers and agricultural laborers dropped to 63.8%, six strata, including individual industrial and commercial staff, clerical staff, professional and technical personnel, private entrepreneurs, business executives and managers, state and society administrators shared a proportion of 33.2%, nearly 1/3.

Table 14   The change of the social stratum structure in Mainland China since 1978

	1978	1988	2001	2011
country and society administrators	0.98	1.70	2.1	1.67
management personnel	0.23	0.54	1.6	2.09
private entrepreneurs	0.0	0.02	1.0	2.45
professional and technical personnel	3.48	4.76	4.6	6.54
clerical staff	1.29	1.65	7.2	9.12
individual industrialists and businessmen	0.03	3.12	7.1	11.34
commercial service workers	2.15	6.35	11.2	11.37
industrial workers	19.83	22.43	17.5	13.38
agricultural workers	67.41	55.84	42.9	39.00
The unemployed/underemployed persons	4.60	3.60	4.8	3.02
Sum	100.00	100.0	100.0	100.00

 From Table 14 of the trend of the class structure, we can get two basic judgments about the changes of social class and stratum structure in Mainland China: ⊖The social class and stratum structure already has the basic elements and features of the modern social class structure, which is an important manifestation of the modernization of social class and stratum structure in Mainland China. ⊜The class and stratum structure is a pyramid one, with a large bottom and a small middle layer. There are a large number of studies on the scale of the middle stratum or the so-called "middle class" of Mainland China, but it varies greatly between the studies due to different measurement standards and other reasons. Generally speaking, if we take the occupational status as the main factor, to share economic resources, cultural resources and power resources as standards to measure the scale of Mainland middle class, the middle class's share of the economically active population is probably 25%. A small-scale middle class is not conducive to social stability and the self-regulation of the relationship of interests, and to narrowing the gap in income and the distribution of wealth,

which creates structural tensions. Many sociologists believe that many conflicts in Mainland China can be explained by the tensions exist in the social stratum structure (Li Qiang, 2005).

6. Income distribution structure: the widening gap, and the structural problems of the adjustment

Changes of the ownership structure and the class structure mean structural changes in the interests relationships inherently. Any social reform implies the restructure of social interests. If reform is a revolution, then the most far-reaching impact of this revolution is the profound social adjustment of the pattern of interests in Mainland China .

To have a look at the income distribution in Mainland China, the first thing be mentioned is that the income level of Chinese mainland residents have an impressive growth in recent 30 years, thus the material and cultural living standards of urban and rural residents has been improved significantly. According to the data from *China Statistical Yearbook* (2011), from 1978 to 2010, the per-capita disposable income of urban households in Mainland China increased from 343.4 yuan to 19109.4 yuan, 8.65 times as much as that of 1978(assuming a 1978 price level) . The per-capita net income of rural households increased from 133.6 yuan to 5919.0 yuan, 8.54 times of 1978(assuming a 1978 price level) . In the same period, the Engel coefficient which refers to the proportion of residents' food expenses of the living expenses decreased significantly, of which Engel coefficient of urban households fell to 35.7% from 57.5%, according to internationally accepted standards it means that their overall living standard has bee improved from the subsistence level to the comfortable level. Engel coefficient of rural households came down from 67.7% to 41.1%, marking their overall standard of living have access into a well-off stage.

 Meanwhile, in the process of reform and opening up, different members of society possess different amount of resources, with different starting conditions and opportunities, and the market mechanisms determine the distribution of benefits without considering these differences, but strengthen the differences to obtain efficiency. Also, because some of the key reforms have not been completed, a number of non-market factors, such as the urban-rural dualistic system, industry monopolies, corruption and the unfair redistribution system, have an impact on the distribution pattern of interests. In such circumstances, an obvious differentiation of interests appeared, the income gap between different social classes and groups is widening. For example, the Gini coefficient, which is used to measure the degree of concentration of income distribution, has been rising from 0.257 in 1984 to 0.526 in 2010 since 1985 after the first few years of decline(Figure 8). This shows that there exists a serious inequality of income distribution in Mainland China, polarization has become an increasingly serious problem (Chen Guangjin, 2010a) . More serious is that it is not easy to reverse the trend, because it means the readjustment of the newly-formed pattern of interest distribution which will be obstructed by other structural forces.

Figure 8   The trend of Gini coefficient of income distribution in 1978-2006

There are many reasons for the increasing inequality, ranging from the impact of institutional and structural factors, to the market factors. As for the structural/institutional factors, the first one is the income gap is too large (Figure 9). It should be noted that Figure 9 does not include the welfare gap between urban and rural residents, if it is included, the income of urban residents will be more than four times the income of rural residents (Li Shi & Luo Chuliang, 2007). In addition, in recent years, the income gap between urban and rural residents under the background of which the government tries to lighten the peasantry's burden and increase the investment in agriculture, rural areas and the peasantry. The reason is, firstly, the changes of urban-rural structure and the changes in economic structure are incompatible. As mentioned above, from 1983 to 2010, the case in China's economic structure and the level of non-farm household population urbanization level, the transfer of rural labors to non-agricultural industries failed to narrow the gap between urban and rural areas, which is attributable to the various forms of wage discrimination against the migrant workers (Xie Sisheng & Yao Xianguo, 2006). Secondly, changes in the structure of employment lag behind changes in the industrial structure. From Figure 5, the ratio of proportion of agricultural employment to proportion of agricultural output, is in accord with the ratio of the income of urban and rural residents, whether the amount or the trend. This accordance is a good reason for the income gap between urban and changes in trend.


Figure 9   The trend of the urban-rural residents income ratio in 1978-2010

The second structural factor is the high inequality of primary distribution（Figure 10）. Figure 10 shows, entering into the 21st century, changes in the composition of GDP in the

Mainland presents an unfavorable trends for the equality of income distribution: the proportion of labor compensation kept going down before 2007, then fell below 40% in 2007; meanwhile, the share of the so-called operating surplus (the capital gains in fact) increased significantly, exceeded 30% in 2006, reached 31.3% in 2007. In 2009 the trend was reversed slightly, but the two proportions soon returned to a tendency of closing to each other(The data for 2008 is not provided). The initial distribution plays a crucial role in the income distribution, if the trend continues, that is, the proportion of workers compensation continues to decline, while the proportion of operating surplus continues to rise, then the adjustment for the macro pattern of income distribution will be impossible. It was reported that the two proportions were 56.3% and 12.4% respectively in the United States (Roach, 2007) . This explains why the degree of distribution inequality in Mainland China will be higher than the United States.


Figure 10   The trend of the composition of GDP in Mainland China in 1994-2010 %

The third structural factor is the presence of redistribution in the field of structural irrational tendency to increase the overall income distribution inequality. This tendency exists in urban and rural areas, education between, health and other areas between the inputs are widespread. We will use a comprehensive index which can be found in the national statistical yearbook to measure this inequality, the transfer income of urban and rural residents. Transfer income refers to the entire income of the residents obtained in the secondary income distribution according to the *China Statistical Yearbook*. Figure 11 reflects the urban and rural residents' access to the transfer income and its trends in Chinese mainland since the 1990s. It is not difficult to find that, firstly, the proportion of per capita transfer income of the peasantry to per capita annual net income is very small, the absolute amount of such transfer income is very small considering the per capita net income of farmers is only two or three thousand yuan or so. Meanwhile, in consideration of the heavy burden of agricultural tax on the peasantry before 2005, transfer income from farmers their redistribution can not cover the price the peasantry paid(i.e. the tax payment) in the secondary distribution, while the urban residents are not taxed at the same level of income. In 2005 the agricultural taxes were canceled, the income the peasantry obtained in the secondary distribution is considered a real "income", but only 5% of farmers per capita net income of the year, and was soon offset by the soaring prices of agricultural means of production. Secondly, on the contrast, the transfer income of urban residents accounted for a considerable proportion of disposable income, although the proportion did decline in the mid-1990s, but still around 17%, and reached slightly more than 26% at the highest year. The proportion had been fluctuating at around

25% especially after 2002. Taking into account the relatively high per-capita disposable income of urban residents, the absolute amount of transfer income still have substantive significance. Thus, thirdly, the transfer income of urban residents is far greater than that of the peasantry, the minimum ratio is 10.81 : 1, and in the maximum year reached 21.81 : 1.

Figure 11   The effect of inequality of redistribution on the income gap between urban and rural areas

We can not ignore the effect of market mechanisms while seeing the effect of various structural factors of income inequality. Although there is a sharp controversy on how much the effect of the market mechanism on inequality in Mainland China, a recent empirical study done by the author showed that the market mechanism contribute 50% to the overall income inequality, while the structural/institutional factors contributes 35%, and the other factors contributes 15%. In other words, the effect of the market mechanism is significantly larger than the structural/institutional factors (Chen Guangjin, 2010b).

A brief conclusion
The drastic transitions of modern society will inevitably lead to the change and transformation of social structure, this kind of transformation not only is a necessary requirement of social modernization, but also brings a variety of structural contradictions which have influences on the social integration and harmony. What is important is in order to maintain social harmony, stability and order, to adjust the contradiction and to reduce or eliminate the conflict, we should find and take corresponding system-policies and measures, nurture a social structure adapted to the developing stage of the society and economy based on the specific problems that each society faces itself in certain developing stage.

The above analysis shows that, in the process of reform and opening-up, marketization, industrialization and urbanization, significant changes have indeed taken place in the social structure system of Chinese mainland society, the new population structure, family structure, urban and rural structure, regional structure, employment structure, occupation structure, organizational structure, ownership structure, class structure and interest structure are in incubation, modern structural factors are growing up gradually, and thus begin to create a new structure integration for the integration, order and harmony of modern society.

However, as pointed out by Huntington, the modernity brings social stability while modernization brings instability (Huntington, 1988), there are social tensions in the social structural modernization process of Chinese mainland and the structural system integration is faced with severe challenges because of a large number of inconsistencies and incompatibilities existed in every kind of social structure and among different types of structures, moreover these contradictions and problems in fact tangle various problems

existed in system reform of Chinese mainland. Consequently, for the construction of harmonious society in Mainland China, only constructing a modern social structure system adapted to marketization, industrialization and urbanization of economy can we diminish structural tension to the greatest extent, can we eventually establish social structure and integrate foundation for social harmony.

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Post-Colonial Ruptures and New Boundaries of French Society

Ahmed Boubeker

France is proud of its social model. It is because of this that identities are seen as positions in a society of classes structured by labor. This "figuration of the social" (Pierre Rosanvallon, 1998) founded on the protection of the salaried worker and the defense of social cohesion have for a long time permitted to exorcise the specter of the working class riot and to manage the conflicting social relations of production. The representation and the interests of various groups have thus been guaranteed by the social state. Institutionalized groups, precisely because the vagabonds of the lumpen proletariat – immigrants in particular – have never in French history been any more than supernumeraries of the social question! Too much praising of the providence of the state and the large working class family, and one forgets the social rights of immigrants have long been cut short. One forgets that they were never more than mere denigrates, prohibited from free movement, captives of the factory, subjected to all the administrative vexations, stuck in a situation of non rights, between asylum and expulsion. One forgets that they were simply poor parents, otherwise the black sheep of the large working class family. Must we remind ourselves that at the beginning of the twentieth century in certain bastions of the workers' movement, anti-immigrant strikes were more numerous than those against the bosses?

It is such sad irony to reduce the destiny of immigrants to the social condition of the worker. Certainly, the immigrant in the French imaginary is first and foremost the immigrant worker. Has not the anti-racist education of school children rested for decades upon the "images d'Épinal" as the trash-collecting hands of the Hexagon? It is France that invented the European model of "temporary work immigration" and never before the beginning of the 1980's were North African Arabs, Africans and other Turks perceived as an immigrant population. In spite of their progressive settling of families, they were still seen as isolated workers. Guests of the salaried society. Coming back, work was also the justification of any migratory project. It is in its name that millions of men accepted uprooting and a clandestine social confinement to invisibility. However, the last waves of immigrants were grounded upon the shores of industrial society. The situation is today a model, reaching far beyond the frontier so the Hexagon. Pushed by globalization, the foundations themselves of national societies falter. Rewards of financial engagements, development of new technologies, general flexibility and individualization of work relations are as much factors of the decline of the old social order. The race to productivity in fact sparks the decrease in jobs. When work begins to lack, it is the pillar of representation of the social world that is crumbling. Invisible, in as much as reduced to their work power, immigrants erupt on the public scene at the beginning of the 1980's. Today still, in the name of the defense of the job market that justifies the discourse on control of migratory fluctuations. Yet the families of immigrants are the first victims of this crisis (Ahmed Boubeker, 1999). How many inheritors of old workers have fallen away from the collectivity, living off of expedients and odd jobs, cut off from the circles of production and from social recognition? In a post-industrial society marked by unemployment, exclusion, and the loss of the old points of reference, the field of reading of the social question proves incapable of understanding the multiplication of breakdowns and ruptures, as much as the dynamics of re-composition of the social link, the new solidarities in the works.

It is however this field of obsolete reading that has been forcefully discarded based on the experience of these new visible minorities during a quarter of a century. All that comprises the life of the inheritors of immigration is therefore analyzed under the sole prism of "the social problem". Even the urban riots that testify to a capacity to revolt would announce nothing other than a social void, a difference with respect to the workers' movement, which would have served as a source of social cohesion. The ethnic question is thus positioned under the guardianship of the social question. All the way to its decomposition. For the re-evaluation of the givens of social protection doubles with a mounting suspicion against "false unemployment" and other immigrant actions judged to be responsible for the social security deficit. The National Front that made the immigrant the concurrent of the underclass worker collects therefore the electoral fruit of French nostalgia for its social model.

1. **The primitive scene of a huge misunderstanding**

The Minguettes in the suburbs of Lyons or the lost illusions of a city that was believed to embody a new turn in interethnic relations in France of the 1980's. Here in fact, in this sad décor of pavement and concrete – nine thousand buildings hastily constructed during the 1960's – French society witnessed its first urban riots. IT was the summer of 1981. The summer of the first "rodeos". Interpreted as a "menacing tearing of the social fabric" according to the words of president François Mitterrand, the event signals the alarm on the problem of the suburbs by bringing the youth of the "second generation" out of anonymity. For a long time, they had remained "negative beings" in the shadows of their parents, invisible omissions from public discourse, between a theat of expulsion and compassion, police and social assistants. The intrusion of the youth of the Minguettes on the public scene seems to mark the end of a reciprocal exclusion between French society and the cities of exile. Under the fire of the balustrade, of rodeos on hunger strikes, until the media moment of the March for equality in 1983 that gathers 100,000 demonstrators, the "Minguettes generation" affirms its right to the city beyond the confines of immigration. The press evokes the nationalization of these young immigrants under the name of "beurs" and the government decrees the urgency of the rehabilitation of the forgotten cities of the Republic. This beginning of public recognition appears like the dawn of a new era where French society can finally heal a festering sore of its history. The time of a heartbeat, the "beurs" are seen as the "heralds of a multicultural future of the Hexagon" (Nicolas Beau, Ahmed Boubeker, 1986).
But very quickly, the pendulums returned to the time of an eternal France of assimilation. To publicly ask the ethnic question, this would be to re-instate the universal republican model, for only the extreme right would speak this language of sinister memory! Since 1985, the "beurs" return to the forgotten for the urgency is precisely to oppose the rise of Jean Marie Le Pen who rests his platform on his stance on immigration. It is from this period that dates the huge misunderstanding at the origin of a recurrence of political-media passions on the cities of exile of the inheritors of immigration. This public misunderstanding that incites to limit the "discomfort of the suburbs" to an exacerbated manifestation of the social question, ends in fact by passing to silence the profound mutations of French society. It is therefore the extreme right that takes care of the identity question and becomes paradoxically, like in an inverted mirror, the only space of representation of the increasing visibility of ethnic minorities. Under the leadership of these xenophobic crusades, a public imaginary is built on actualizing the clichés of collective memory. The return of a world of "slums, negros, and queers" already described with irony by Albert Londres. It is a return as well of large public fears relative to the urban violence and to the threat of invasion by hordes of dark-skinned delinquent sons of the "fellaghas" of French Algeria. To publicly evoke the new internal frontiers where these barbarians of delirious security camp, is to think aggressions, violence, degradations, all the

stigmas of a chronic sickness that it would suffice to circumscribe, the choice between amputation and shock treatment in order to avoid spreading to the social body.

By the end of the 1980's, the socialist left, itself overtaken by the fear of losing power, misses a historical occasion to initiate a huge public debate on the new multiethnic, pluri-cultural dimension of French society. The defect of the debate, some outmoded pain-killers: a celebration of the rights of man against the racist sways and the grandiose proclamation of an old republican scheme to reaffirm common values. The "words of the State", to borrow the expression of Abdelmalek Sayad, illustrates this shift of a politics of opinion. Words that very rarely undergo any debate at all, no discussion, words that signify a public opprobrium with no other form of due process, words that create events by the mere fact of their enunciation, words of a sorcerer's apprentice who calls into existence the phenomena which he evokes with his secret charms of the good of the State. Thus the terms: "threshold of tolerance" or "social diversity". Thus also the term: "clandestine" which would permit to distinguish between "good" and "bad" immigrants. The media-political treatment of the unrest in the gloomy suburbs is stuck in "the universe of closed discourse" (Herbert Marcuse, 1964). The word of the state becomes cliché once the meaning becomes imprisoned in the word. And it escapes all contradiction as long as it is enclosed in the word. Hence there is the paradox of the order for integration given to the third or fourth generation of inheritors of immigration. Hence the cheap formulations such as "the good words" of a prime minister Michel Rocard: *"We cannot accommodate all of the misery in the world!"* (January 7, 1990). Some good words that stink if fact of the "banality of evil" (Hannah Arendt, 1963), for it would be in the name of political realism, and even to further the fight against racism that the excess foreigners be deported.

However, the suburbs of the 1980's say a lot in the language of antiracism. Political questions are found to be reduced to a universal morality and the charitable love of mankind. According to this perspective, in order to curb the return of public fears and racism, it would be necessary to put in place an analysis of the general consensus, in the name of political realism, of the choice of the lesser evil in order to avoid catastrophe. For whoever ascribes to this moral understanding of the "community of citizens" (Dominique Schnapper, 1994) it becomes impossible to politically comprehend the revolt of the suburbs. However, the Republic is left naked for whoever rejects the rules of the game. Political impotence based on the impossibility to name the people of the suburbs and to reach a conclusion. For even in these neighborhoods, there does not exist a disciplinarian society dominated by a stately Big Brother. The state has lost so much of its superabundance that the suburbs are the last bone of its enormous appetite. The tiny white state that jealously and vigilantly watches over the subjects of its torment. As if immigration, in its peripheral position, had become a central fiction of public discourse, crystallizing the verbal tremors of the general movements of French society. Strange story this reality of illusion. It is History of mirrors and memory games that seem to have left things to the state. It is History of misunderstandings and blinders. It is History of a society swept away by the demands of its own reality that it recollects them periodically from the oubliettes of its memory.

2. From a society of exclusion to an eternal resurgence of "dangerous classes"

At the beginning of the 1990's, the rhetorical treatment of the troubles in the suburbs must address a new wave of urban riots: Vaulx in velin, again in the outskirts of Lyons. The problem becomes endemic. The public devices put in place seem to anchor themselves in "counter-productivity" in the sense of Yvan Illich. In terms of social gain, years of political rehabilitation at the price of several hundred million French francs have led to nothing. Or very little. Access to jobs, to housing, or to social recognition remain a mirage for the sub-

citizens of the suburbs, perpetual interns, long term unemployed, or intermittent subjects of house arrest.

The notion of exclusion allows for a moment of belief in the advent of new perspectives beyond the classical model of the social question. But the unbridled use of this notion of the excluded assumes a dimension of an ideological catch-all, in which suburban youths, those abandoned by social services, and other handicaps of hope become muddled together. On the other hand, the social movement of 1995 brings about a return of the hard-ball social question in terms of the defense of salaries and social gains. The theme of exclusion finds itself thus minimized, in as much as the impotence to effectively fight against the social roots of discontent in peripheral cities leads to a moral radicalization of character. The public suspicion with respect to immigrant families is that they are deemed responsible for their own condition. There is suspicion of double play or suspicion of community bending. This is the theme of the mafioso, ethnic, islamist, communitarian tendencies in these areas. It represents a new version of L. Chevalier's "dangerous classes" aligned against the Republic and the "sacrosanct" community of citizens. The return to power of the Right at the end of the 1990's translates as a return of nightsticks in the cities, and police intervention becomes the cure-all. The Left itself pretends to forget its angelic stance in the domain of public safety, and a political consensus tends to reduce the discontent of the suburbs to a problem of public disturbance caused by a few delinquent minorities.

The riots of November of 2005 do not alter this new given. In the wake of these events, a series of diverse facts promote a new form of public enemy by a troublesome media depiction. Thus is the case of Youssef Fofana the brain of the "gang of barbarians" at the base of a sordid affair of a murderous taking of hostages in March of 2006. Bigger evokes this sad sire as the "native son" of Richard Wright. He would in fact be given the devil without confession of this guilty ideal redressed in the faded finery of the human beast, very much akin to the nightmares one has of the primitive huts on either side of the Atlantic. James Baldwin states from the other side of the racial question in the United States, that the black soul of Bigger is no more than a mirror image of the dishonesty of white society. This monstrous character of the novel reassures people, as it must, for it is sufficient to simply evoke its existence in order to be overtaken by a true sensation of virtue. Along the same lines, the Fofanas of the media world leave us to believe that certain men can be less human than others. These are neither more nor less than mere caricatures of a vain strangeness, which reinforce a sour taste for the sensational, all the while serving the certainties of a clean conscience. Without fire or a recognized place, these new barbarians of the news are not even the attenuated circumstance of being the progeny of generations of misery and oppression. For under the regime of exception of monstrosity and infrahuman barbarism, they are emptied of all social significance, deprived of all proper experience. Like the image of Bigger, eternal stranger to his own life, is not Fofana the quintessential perpetual immigrant for whom every trace is erased beneath the fires of the limelight? Scapegoat of the French exception, this guilty ideal in fact obscures the crowd of its constituents, the other outcasts of the interior, "children of the nation", those who end up resembling everything for each of them that one should definitely not resemble. It allows the relegation of their experiences to an outside place of radical alterity.

3. The new dimensions of a postcolonial rupture

France is in decline like a leitmotif of public discourse. The patria is in danger, threatened by internal collapse from the archaisms of its representations. Yet strangely, the majority of its critics argue around the prestige of France and the safeguarding of its universal heritage. As if the grandiose summoning of the past glory of the "one and indivisible Republic" could revive

it. For she is beautiful, and long past dead this eternal France of republican nostalgia. How can one denounce at the same time the archaisms of representation and buttress at the same time the defense of an abstract universalism that has for a long time derived itself from French provincialism? It is precisely this tension about a nostalgia for grandeur, for "the imposture of an unreal France" – according to the old formulation of Emmanuel Berl – that exacerbates the unrest. The French unrest is a crisis of a political paradigm founded on a single form of universal rationality. The French discontent that provokes the unrest of the suburbs by its refusal to accept the other as a part of a composite whole, as a condition of its own identity. Thus the inheritors of immigration find themselves the designated strangers of the interior. This one-upping of symbolic violence in a language that is more and more devoid of any real content, seems to lead to a definitive concealment of the ethnic question. France refuses to look at the ethnic dimension of social inequality, which translates from problems of urban segregation, from racial discrimination, and from the denial of recognition.

Do not impede: the protectionism of the republican model lays bare these internal tears, the ruptures in representation that ask questions.

4. The urban question and segregation

For a long time the French city has remained the reflection of the social question in a partitioning between working class suburbs and "red suburbs", versus the bourgeois neighborhoods in the city center. It seems that there would be no ghetto in France, but "delicate zones" Once again, history and reality testify to the opposite. Have we so quickly forgotten that the North Africans of France had long ago found refuge only in slums? Slums were on the outskirts of cities, in non-places, places that officially did not exist. Slums, phony cities, cities of the rubbish bins of the History of the "thirty glorious years", invisible city behind the city, like a disposal for the waste products of the feast of French democracy. The slum built itself on the borders of public discharge and by the taking charge of the problem of housing for immigrant workers by the merchants of sleep. Nobody sees the slum grow. Neither the public powers, nor the bosses, too content to tie the worker to a dwelling. Clandestine existence in the knowledge and view of the public eye in a time when clandestine immigration is unsanctioned. One must wait a generation in order to absorb the slums. Thus begins the age of transit cities, and of the suburbs.

Workers, administrators, small businesses, the pioneers of the suburbs are from the most diverse social worlds. But this mixture is at the foundation itself of urban planning. In the spirit of the architects of grand ensembles, by cutting off their respective adherence, the candidates of happiness in HLM (low income housing) represented the avant-garde of a new modernity. For the grand scheme of these "radial cities" was to create new sociability on the ruins of the working class neighborhoods: finally the social classes would be reconciled, the communities forgotten, the popular mentalities reformed, thanks to the public facilities of a pedagogy of collective life and a civilization of leisure! Never in the Hexagon had the delirium of a grid plan of space as a way of dealing with the social question been pushed so far! And never had an urban utopia fallen upon such a terrible failure. For the history of the suburbs is laced by a veil of lost illusions. Very quickly, the image fractures. The promised collective facilities remain simple projects. Complaints replace hopes. The pioneer families pack their bags and the landlords become less fastidious regarding the criteria for satisfactory attribution of their HLM complexes. The radial cities mutate little by little into a refuge for "problem populations". The degradation of buildings and the increasing presence of immigration thus create a picture of the "ghetto of France".

From the dream of radial cities to a haunting ghetto, the public discourse is diametrically opposed. Everything is said about the discontent of the suburbs, this chronic illness that must

be amputated to prevent a gangrenous infection of the social body. Public policies put in place to "break up the ghetto" make a reference to positive discrimination, but they are written within the framework of a classical politics of social redistribution far from a new project of social justice for all. Thus the question of access to housing for immigrant families remains marked by the seal of discrimination. The public priority is still the control of the fluctuations of new candidates for social housing. This sieving of the HLM consists in slowing the arrival of immigrant families and in investing in urban marketing to attract the mythical middle classes in the name of an order of public action: "social integration", the "social rebalancing of neighborhoods". The difficulties of the suburbs are placed on the heads of the concentrations of immigrant populations. However no scientific study can verify these *a priori*. Yet, some studies (Catherine Grémion, 1996) reveal the perverse effects of procedures designed to fight against inequality, which in fact contribute to the entrenchment of processes of ethnic segregation in the HLM complexes. What does it matter for the mayors, that is the price of the war of images! Restoration of the emblems of communities disfigured by urban reality becomes a public priority. This justifies the sacrifice of families without fire nor place in the name of a municipal dream of the return of a modern HLM peopled by virtual middle classes. The suburb still dreams of the ideal city. But this dream is confined nonetheless to an illustration of moral issues and politicians in a desert of social perspective. It is a dream of a "Big brother" of a second zone for an ideal city cleared of the stench of human exuberance. But this dream of stone is also the last rampart defending against the declared nightmare of the American ghetto. The war of images in the suburbs becomes therefore one of dreams. However the substrata remain the same: the fear and rejection of the other, the denial of the real.

However the city is a heterogeneous space where the control of diversity cannot be reduced to an ideology. Taking into consideration the narratives of the journeys of the inheritors of immigration, one always ends up by getting out of the confinement of social housing. Not only do "those people" play at getting beyond the fortress, but their means of escape outside of the walls of the suburbs participate in a new urban dynamic, in the construction of relay spaces, anchor points, thresholds of passage, a meeting place between the local and the global. Certain neighborhoods of "ethnic business" thus constitute crossroads of mobility of a "globalization from below" (Alain Tarrius, 2004). That which escapes from the feeble knowledge of the urban crisis, is precisely this capacity of the inheritors of immigration to cross over boundaries, to bet on the miracle of a path to perpetuate a nomadic construction of doors and bridges between fragmented universes. Between the world, the Hexagon, the city, and neighborhoods, new territories of mobility tie together the courses of exile in networks across which circulate men, merchandise, and information. This happens far, very far indeed from the social question.

5. The national question and questions of discrimination

The urban question is constantly linked to the social question: but the urban is more significant. Deep down, it is the gradual loss of former social frameworks and the rise of the national. What is in play, then, is indeed the republican model upon which the French political imaginary and national identity repose – neither of which succeed in stemming the mounting tide of ethnic discriminations. French society is paralyzed by the questioning of national categories of political understanding; how else are we to interpret civil society's silence after the riots of the autumn of 2005?

Contrary to American "equal opportunity", the French model is founded upon a movement of equalization of conditions which is supposed to lead individuals to recognize one another as similar to each other despite their original affiliations. With the crisis of the

welfare State, this model, based on policies of social redistribution, collides with its own limitations. When talking about the most recent guests of French democracy, there is a tendency to talk about "problems of integration" so as to better obscure the historic failure of the public and institutional relays of equality. Not only have the schools, unions or businesses not fulfilled their integrative role, they have in fact become havens for reproducing the inequalities and discriminations they were supposed to combat. Thus, far from abolishing differences in the public sphere, the model of equalization of conditions has only succeeded in imprisoning the inheritors of immigration in stigmatized identities. Starting in and since the beginning of the 1980s, with the irruption into the media of populations from the former colonial empire, the golden legend of our national model of integration seems to be stammering. Having once been banished into the nether-regions of national history, immigration is back in/through the prism of the "news", to such a point that it now appears in the modes of articulation of national identity. This tends to indicate the extent to which the frontiers between Self and Other have been blurred – the Other having become Self and the Self having become Other, a foreigner to one's own hi/story, as though the only thing that the French exception had wanted to ignore in immigration and immigrants revealed precisely what France didn't know about herself and the golden legend of the "French crucible" (Gérard Noiriel, 1988).

The history of the French crucible indeed goes back quite a long time. It is a history that, with time and the contribution of multiple waves of immigration, just might have consecrated the union of the great French family. An immigration of isolated workers was in the past crucial to the proper functioning of the employment system: they were the fodder of social regulation, flexible guinea-pigs, the black-market workers of the period of economic growth who allowed society to go beyond the rigidities of the world of labor without undermining the social gains of the traditional working class. No other country in the world saw such a considerable influx of foreign labor since the beginning of the century. Yet France, contrary to the United States, has never thought of itself as a country of immigration/immigrants. The French liked to think of the ethnico-linguistic unification of the country as long-accomplished when along comes an afflux of new populations and migrations. The aim of these migrations is not to populate France and no-one presages the hope of citizenship for these uprooted of the Capital, these sub-proletariats submitted to every imaginable form of control, given the meanest tasks along with the statute of temporary work force – temporary, just the amount of time needed to build the industrial France that rural France snubbed. Thus, is the national amnesia concerning the contribution of generations of migrant workers explained; these supplements to the working class are the exception to the universality of the republican model, condemned to invisibility by dint of their original exclusion from collective memory and from the History of France. Such a strange lot in life for these foreigners who, for ages now, are in fact no foreigners at all to French society. The history of these invisible men has yet to be integrated into the national patrimony: no monument erected in the places of memory of the Hexagon symbolizes the presence of a North African immigration which traversed the 20th century without disappearing, as others had done, into the French crucible. The model of integration thus tolerated a series of processes of discrimination and, behind the window-dressing of the French exception, there is also an exclusion from the great national designs to be found.

The children of these pioneers are subject to an invisibility of an entirely different order. Individually deprived of the right to socially recognized positions, they are also any and all forms of collective expression which is perceived as a communitarian deviance. They are invisible in the sights of representation of French democracy and accused of wanting to destroy republican egalitarianism when they demand their rightful place in it. In order to escape this paradoxical injunction of invisibility – an invisibility for those in the position of

the victim as well as for those having "made it", succeeded – the visible minorities henceforth demand "equal opportunities". When more than 30% of the youth in the suburban ghettos are jobless and homeless, we are in good measure to ask ourselves a few questions about the havoc wreaked by the integration policy! It was thus that the State of rights urgently decreed the creation of an apparatus destined to combat discrimination. However, in reality, we're still in the stage of declarations of intent, as though an escalation of public speeches were all that was needed to take care of the problem. Whence the public trial, which was an attempt on the life of "affirmative action" by the ultra-Republicans. What does it matter if no political majority carries out this reform and if, *de facto*, certain citizens are less equal than others, for these ideologues, it is in its very abstraction that the threat of a questioning of the universal, abstract notion of republican egalitarianism is intolerable! As for the rest, it would seem that Charles de Gaulle's formula is still pertinent: "administration will follow…".

And yet, the immobility of public powers will remain equal to itself if we remain in a French conception of formal rights in which principles always prevail over objectives and which never implies the need for results. No one single juridical order will permit us to definitively circumscribe interethnic relations in a tribunal of egalitarian normativity – because, if so, we would simply be hiding the reality of the multiple situations and historical backgrounds upon/in which discriminatory processes are founded. Formal law is thus powerless because society in its practices is anterior to the law. Consequently, having failed to seek to rely on a mobilization of those on the ground – and especially from suburban associations and collective groups comprised by immigrations inheritors – having failed to undertake a mobilization which would permit the "forsaken of equal opportunity" (Yazid Sabeg, 2004) to constitute themselves as subjects of law, the very qualification of discriminatory acts remains a challenge.

But the fight will continue to remain dubious without a large public debate on the national question; for, in a French society which aspires to an equality of conditions but which dreams only of individual privilege, it is above all corporatism, nepotism, merit-less favors, the forms of withdrawal from society and drifts towards the police state which constitute the breeding ground of ethnic discriminations.

6. The Question of identity and recognition

Is it time to sound the death toll of the French exception ? The historian P. Nora points out the extent of the metamorphoses that French society has undergone; underlining the passage, in the space of a few years, from a unitary national conscience to a type of "patrimonial" conscience (Pierre Nora, 1977) in which (collective) memory serves as kind of last line of defense. Hence the incantatory evocation of the model of collective assimilation via an individual and cultural integration in the name of the universal values of the Republic; values which will remain eternally valid because they are declared to be a heritage of humanity in the heaven of ideas: first, second, third generation – we're all the children of immigrants! The exile, suffering and persecution of the generations of the miserably impoverished, of those excluded from the History of France shall henceforth contribute to the prestige of the Nation-State. The irony of collective memory is that the genealogies of invisible men are all reintegrated into the uninterrupted jurisprudence of the model of integration; they are reintegrated into the narrative of a golden legend celebrating the endless, un-eclipsed glories of the French crucible. The sorrows of the past find their meaning in a justification of the present and France populates itself with memories and ancestors she never suspected existed. What does real, lived History matter? What counts is the eternal return of the same grid of reading in the narrative/history of the "intra-self" *(entre-soi)* that goes against the singularity of the experience of foreigners/strangers at the interior (of the metropole). Milan Kundera

evokes this "patrimonial hijacking of the Republic" (François Noudelmann, 2006), this virgin genealogy of a patrimonial version of universalism, in his last novel "Ignorance": "You know, the French don't need experience. With them, judgments always precede experience. They weren't interested in what we thought, they were only interested in us as a sort of living proof of what they thought of us."(Milan Kundera, 2005, p. 194) The history of immigration in its most republican version is thus assimilated to the golden legend of the French model of immigration. The Republic thus maintains the myth of a French exception which is addressed to everyone without regard to origin or race.

Can one truly say that there were never any races in the country of the Jacobin universal? There indeed exists a shameful memory of the Republic and, by Engels' own admission, the concept of "class war" was inspired by that of "race war" elaborated by French historians. The racial argument was defended by the Gobineaus, the Barrès and other Lapouges, as well as by the ethnologists of colonial thought. It was also a biological theory of the foreigner that inspired the demographer-inventors of immigration policy at the beginning of the 20th century. And yet, even today, there's still no such thing as "minority studies" or "race relation studies" in France. As opposed to the Anglo-Saxon countries, where the neologism "ethnicity" has supplanted a racial lexicon, this term is only little by little assuming a conceptual dimension in the language of social sciences in the Hexagon where it is faced with a continuing skepticism by the university institutions which, if they do not regard it as an ideological instrument for actualizing racial theories, at least tend to identify it with a concept localized in the context of inter-group relations in the United States. More generally, in the world of research, immigration remains an object of shame, a black hole in the French tradition of social sciences, a victim of a "nationalism of the universal", in the words of Pierre Bourdieu. But perhaps we should see there the expression in the field of the social sciences of an incapacity to envisage the very existence of the immigrant as a constitutive dimension of the national corps. The dramatizations in the media of the "malaise" of the suburban ghettos, along with the question of French Islam, have thus served as a platform upon which certain engaged intellectuals, in the name of a heritage of French universality and Enlightenment humanism, take a stand against the obscurantism of foreigners, those strangers to this European patrimony. What a strange scientific rhetoric is this repetition of thoughts already thought, like a public ritual worthy of a new quarrel of the Universals, in which it is a matter of first mixing about words like a magic formula in order to conjure up the language of society.

For the society in question, at least in so far as the part of it that stems from immigration is concerned, refuses to wallow in "the denial of recognition" (Axel Honneth, 1992) or to live with the identitary yoke of the grand designs or haunting regrets of Eternal France and her clerics. This assigning of one identity amounts to a negation of the right of the individual to identitary ambivalence – of being simultaneously from here and elsewhere, without being forced to chose from one of many different belongings, affiliations! It is a flagrant absence of respect in the Kantian sense of the term! It is confinement in visibility! One word sums up the drama of visible minorities: "*racaille*" or riffraff. One word, one word too many from Nicolas Sarkozy set flame to the powder keg in November of 2005.

"*Racaille*" is a form of recognition via self-deprecation for the youth in the suburbs, but it becomes the most perfidious version of social disdain when it is in the mouth of the Minister of the Interior. This is because the Police also represent the symbolic violence of the institution of language; it is the trap of already-evoked words – a trap from which the subject may escape once s/he manages to place her/himself in discourse. It is there that one finds all the power of the practices of symbolization that are mobilized by dominated groups against the omnipotence of those who control language. To the obscenity of the stereotypical, poets of "verlan" (or back-speak) in the cursed housing-blocks respond with the mystery of the secret

in order to avoid the contamination of language labels. Beyond fossilized formulas, it is a question of finding a voice that is smothered by the din of others; of finding ways of speaking that refer to linguistic explorations, to verbal creations in the name of the possibility to choose. It is a question of finding a way to respond with one's convictions, to construct and evaluate one's own identity whilst forgetting the stigmata and the over-talkative language of others. Finding new words, but also perversions of "State/ments" (mots d'Etat). It's a question of always opening up a space inside the word itself, of opening up words in order to go beyond words and triumph over the sedimentation of language – to triumph over and beat homonymy at its own game; to triumph over the stereotype. Style, according to Gilles Deleuze, is a means of "hollowing out a space in language for an-other language", of articulating difference and repetition at the point of rupture of language in order to give rise to a secondary figure in already-spoken words. These are the secret words behind words, the ineffable codes of a community of interpretation which passes through a common feeling, through a figurative meaning/sense. The power alone of the symbol, in effect, feeds into the vehemence of breaking out of the semantic prison which passes through a power to metaphorically re-describe reality.

But, if the symbol posits itself as a return to the point of birth of language, it is not a question of losing oneself in forever lost origins, in search of the purest meaning of the words of the tribe. On the contrary, as Paul Ricoeur points out, a mediation on the figures always starts at the center of language and of pre-existing meaning: what is at stake is an actualization of language, a recharging of language. Hence, the legacy/heritage of immigration is the creation of a referential, identitary "us" which can be evoked by different systems of signs incarnated by specific figures in those sights of emergence that are the "worlds of ethnicity" (Ahmed Boubeker, 2003). Figures, then –figures of the authority of the narrative, of the thing narrated, figures of resistance to a narrative that persists; figures as a cultural base, as an exigency of meaning/sense and as a quest for expression; figures of the Imaginary of worlds of ethnicity, with its pioneers, heroes, victims or combiners; figures of individual and collective destinies collapsed into one another in an imagery that is popular, but that also symbolizes entire universes of signification; figures that symbolize a communitarian ethos and generational rupture, modes of expression and of communication with the other worlds of French society. Beyond the dispersion of itineraries, it is indeed a narrative of several voices which is speaking itself via a play of individual histories and collective references – a narrative by immigration, and by the suburbs about themselves – an alternative to the golden legend of the French melting pot.

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Chinese Feelings: Research of Social Mentalities under China's Transition

Zhou Xiaohong

1. China's Experience and Chinese feelings

"China's experience"（中国经验） is not a concept with unique and clear definition; as a result, there are some other expressions like China's model, China's path, China's miracle, etc. containing the similar meaning of China's experience. The concept originally from "Beijing Consensus" put forward by Joshua Cooper Ramo, a senior editor of *Times*.

At first, Ramo put forward this concept to replace, or at least another model besides "Washington Consensus", which constructed upon Capital and market-centered neoliberalism. But, Chinese scholars who were inspired by Ramo are cautiously realized that "consensus" means to be a "solution that agreed and shared by common sense", while China has not got a universal model for everything is still changing in the country. Therefore, they chose the concept "China's model" to express the same content that Ramo said. Even so, some of the Chinese scholars still think it is too early to put forward "China's model", as a result, "China's experience" becomes the alternative concept.

During the discussion about the conformation and connotation of "China's experience", people gradually take it as a new part of the development experiences that different from western modernization. Li Peilin thinks this concept has these following basic connotations: (1) It not only refers to the achievement, also includes the lesson, including all the special experience through the development of the path; (2) It specifically refers to some new development rules shaped by specific population size, structure of Chinese society, and culture characteristic; (3) It is not a finalize the design that still in the practice with inclusive characteristics and respecting other experiences. It is not constructed as the opposite of western experience; in contrast, it doesn't emphasize the universality, but only shows the possibility of a unified law perfectly combined with diversity.

In comparison, "Chinese feelings" （中国体验） is a new concept.

Although "Chinese feelings" is a new concept, it does not mean to replace the former or other similar concepts. It is novel because it is also the reflection of the Chinese society for more than 30 years of rapid change, on the one hand. Just like China's experience, it is a social phenomenon that the previous social scientists did not and also cannot pay attention to. On the other hand, "Chinese feelings" is different from "China's experience", referring to the change of Chinese people's value and attitude; while "China's experience" focuses on the transition of China's social and economic structures. "Chinese feelings" and "China's experience", which are the both sides of the consequences of the tremendous transition since the year 1978, give us the historical meaning and cultural value of this unique era completely.

"Chinese feelings" has these following basic connotations: (1) Different from China's experience, it is the micro change of the Chinese people's social values and mentality under the background of macro changes. (2) It includes both positive and negative attitudes. Positive refers to openness, mobility, competitiveness, aggression, peace, inclusion, and etc.; while negative refers to materialistic, material, impetuous, indifference, lack integrity, hatred the rich and showing off the rich. "Chinese feelings" has obvious feature of marginality and polarization. (3) The change among Chinese minds may appear in all the transition from tradition to modern society, "Chinese feelings" is unique for China's certain population, big gap between before and after economic reforming, special history and culture, and rapid

change pushed by globalization. (4) Besides the unique characteristics, "Chinese feelings" also has its universal significance. That is to say, parts of the experience might be useful for other nations or countries, especially reference to the developing countries under the upheaval. Another part may even be reproduced to some extent, reflected in the social sciences, namely to law, links up with the universality of human behavior.

2. Marginality: Features of "Chinese feelings"

Just like the feature of Chinese social structure appears to be polarized, "Chinese feelings" has marginality. This feature shows, on the one hand, "Chinese feelings" is a spiritual inspiration of the rapid social transition; it is also a unique perspective that helps us understand the change in temporary China.

In the field of social sciences, the concept of "marginal man" originally comes from the concept "stranger" put forward by Georg Simmel, a German sociologist. After Simmel, in the year 1928, Robert E. Park put forward the concept "marginal man" in his paper *Human Migration and the Marginal Man*. Following the path that Simmel created, Park compares "marginal man" to a person of mixed cultural heritage, who "lives in two different worlds that he is considered as an outsider in both of them". These experiences shaped his mind, where cultural change and mixing is happening, as a result, we can study the process of cultural development perfectly.

Since then, along with social cultural change and the process of globalization, marginal man became a common personality during the transformation all over the world. We can even think that this personality is shared by, at least shaping on, every social member in our contemporary society. Under this trend, the marginality of "Chinese feelings" is more distinctive since the social transformation within these 30 years is more tempestuous.

As a spiritual scene of transition, if the concept of "marginal man" can accurately draw Chinese people's attitude in contemporary China, polarization is the feature of "Chinese feelings", which manifesting as:

(1) Antagonistic between tradition and modern, which can be considered as normality for all the transformation and social transition. Further, the overlap of tradition and modern in people's spirit provides the possibility of changing in social and personal life, it made the individuals and social groups do not know what to do as well. As a result, everyone in the society appeared to be anxious. Based on the traditional Chinese society, Fei Xiaotong once assumed a bright society that everyone can settle down and enjoy their lives. But judging from the situation we have now, the ideal society can never become reality until Chinese people deal with the problem of spiritual floating and settle down in this social transformation.

(2) Gap between Ideal and reality. Ideal became a motivation of every Chinese people because Chinese society is still developing, especially these recent 30 years, the big progress gave every hope. Simultaneously, everyone is disappointed by the reality, because of the imbalance of everyone's life under the transition of these 30 years-contemporary Chinese society is not constructed by equalitarianism as it used to be any more, but a disparity divided by the rich and the poor. Although people's tolerance for the gap between rich and poor had been wider and wider, this disappointed attitude turns into the hatred towards the rich. The reason why people did not realize the cause is that the speed of the transition is rapid, which improved living condition and people's social expectation at the same time. Thus, the feeling of happiness reduced.

(3) Confrontation between urban and rural areas. In China, society had been divided into urban and rural parts for many years. The difference between urban and rural area is tremendous huge. Therefore, the difference shaped two modes of personalities: urban and

rural. The former the values and behavior patterns that is consistent with the industrialization and urbanization, manifesting as smart, open, hedonist, and self-centered, as a result, people that living in the urban are aggressive, heterogeneous and occupation-related. The latter is consistent with the agricultural production and life style, manifesting as decent, hard working, close, and other-oriented, as a result, people that living in the rural area are homogenous, negative, blood-related and place-related. In fact, the confrontation between urban and rural in personalities does not only between citizens and peasants, but also within individuals.

(4) Clash between East and West. Since 1840, the progress and development has been under the clash between East and West. The reforming and opening in the year 1978, especially the trend of globalization, makes the values and attitudes of Chinese people are always influenced by mixing and clash between the west and the east. Western culture advocates individual's independence and self-domain, as a result, the social interactions are involving the mode of equality and democracy; while eastern culture emphasizes family and family-centered, which means obey the authorities, no matter core family, big family or nations. The clash caused the binary opposition in Chinese people's attitude.

(5) Coexistence of positive and negative. It is also the feature of transformation. Meanwhile, spiritual features can cause social consequences in a positive or negative way. For example, the tremendous economic development and increasing GDP results of 30 years reforming also led the social values orient hedonism and mammonism.

3. Distinctive Significance and Universal Value of Chinese feelings

As far as we know, western culture prevails for its experience of hundreds years' modernization. But now, people had realized that the way to produce ideology was nothing but a generalization of western culture. In fact, as Edward Waefie Said wrote, all kinds of western center or orientalism have covered their particularity and reveal their universality.
Looking back the history of social psychology, we found that there are at least two studies that reveal the meaning of people's spiritual change. They are considered as Research paradigms, which in turn got the universal significance in explaining human behavior.
The first study was *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,* wrote by Max Weber, a German sociologist, during 1904-1905. In Weber's theory, the spirit of capitalism was an intellectual impetus, in other words, it was a social attitude among Europe and America world after Protestant Reformation, which helped social transformation and modern Capitalism.
The second study was *Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries*, wrote by two American sociologists, Alex Inkeles and David Horton Smith in 1974. First started in the year 1962 - 1964, the research aimed on people from Argentina, Chile, India, Israeli, Nigeria and Bangladesh, including 6000 peasants, industrial workers and people in urban area pursuing traditional professions. According to the large-scale empirical research, the two sociologists want to show that people are not born with modernity but their special life experience.
The two studies above reveal that the special historical process that occurred in different nation and era shaped people's spiritual world, therefore, they became the paradigms that people observe how social transition impacts on human social psychological change. The conclusions from these two researches were also considered as a universal value regarding the law of human behavior.
Getting back to Chinese feelings, its peculiarity is beyond doubt when examining the China's 30 years change and the impacts toward people's spiritual world. If fact, it is peculiar to both Chinese and the world for it never happened in China's 5000 years history or other countries before. Under the background of this peculiar change, the change and shock inside Chinese people's spiritual world has its distinct features, in both wideness and deepness.

However, just like China's experience, the distinct features on Chinese feelings do not mean that Chinese and their spiritual world can only be considered as "other" with special meanings, but also has its universal meanings in two ways: (1) For those nations and countries like China that have similar cultural tradition and historical experiences of the eastern world, the complicated and tremendous spiritual change experienced by 1.3 billion Chinese people may provide a reference for their future life. (2) Regarding the universal factors in humanity and human culture, theories formed on China's experience also has a chance to explain the empirical phenomena of western countries, just like now we have already get used to explain China's empirical phenomena with western theories. In fact, East and west may not have so much difference as we imagined. The difference between western and Eastern theories may be only the reflections of different sides of developments in different era.

Thinking about social differentiation: a contextualist and dispositionalist point of view

Bernard Lahire

It is really seldom to find a core scientific agreement among all the sociological trends that confront one to the other on all kinds of questions. However, there is a phenomenon which wins unanimous support: the social differentiation of activities. Considered as modern or industrial, our societies are seen by really different authors as clusters characterized by an important social differentiation of activities and functions. They distinguished themselves over there from societies that are demographically often more limited, where social division of labor is extremely less advanced. From Adam Smith to Pierre Bourdieu, through Herbert Spencer, Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim, Georg Simmel, Max Weber, Maurice Halbwachs, Karl Polanyi, Talcott Parsons, the sociologists from the Chicago School, Marshall Sahlins, Norbert Elias, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann or Niklas Luhmann, everyone at least agree that this growing heterogeneity has to be thought and that it has consequences on psychological structures, behavioral structures or personality structures of individuals from these societies. "Social differentiation of functions", "social division of labor", plurality of "social realm", " register of action", "social circles", "interaction scenes", "worlds", "fields", "under-spheres", or "systems": all these sociological words are evidence of the interest of scholars for the realities of differentiation.

The issue is so wide and complex that it has been studied through different ways and from various realities: there is some (numerous among the historians of culture and art, but also among sociologists of culture) that rather studied differentiation of cultural production sphere. Others focused their attention on the empowerment of the economic activity sphere. There is also those who took as object the "fields of power" where a set of struggles to redefine or to take over specific capital to each of these fields plays out. Others rather focused on "worlds" as a space of coordination of a set of jobs, institutions and actors around a central activity. There is also some that suggested a theoretical model to explain the operating of certain types of microcosms (theories of systems, worlds, fields, etc.); some that investigated the effects of the differentiation of activities on "role repertoire" of ordinary actors, and so on and so forth. This scientific division of tasks and work, which is an effect itself of what the researchers try to seize, contribute to letting us lose sight of the whole problem, or to make believe that regional theories, which apply only to certain parts and certain dimensions of the social world, are general theories.

We can understand regional theories with a general claim like the one of Talcott Parsons and Niklas Luhmann on social systems, or those empirically more productive of Howard S. Becker on the worlds or Pierre Bourdieu on the fields, only if we locate it in the continuation of a long tradition of sociological and anthropological thoughts on the historical differentiation of social activities or functions.

If the field theory has been one of the most successful in recent history of French sociology on these issues, it is both because of its empirical character and the will of its creator to take as object very different spheres, which generally were the subject of specialized research that almost never communicate with each other[1]. It is impossible to advance in the analysis of

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1 This is also the opinion of the historian Carl E. Schorske in, "Pierre Bourdieu face au problème de l'autonomie", (Pierre Bourdieu facing the issue of autonomy), Critique, n°579/580, août-septembre 1995, p. 697-703.

differentiated societies without a wider vision of the process of being more autonomous in really different sectors of social life and without operating distinction between the different types of microcosms among the social macrocosm. But the conceptual wavering of this same theory, especially on the issue of autonomy of fields, as well as its inclination to favor the study of invariants compared to the study of specific, are explained in the same way by the extent of the covered social areas. To make progress in the study of the contemporary social world, we not only have to mobilize all the global or partial theories which had the ambition to think the social products of social differentiation (the one from Durkheim, Weber, Polanyi, Luhmann, Meyerson, Bourdieu, Becker, etc.), but also to fall again these facts within the history of societies.

An examination of the different knowledge of the social sciences shows the role that the symbolic struggles for recognition play in the process of differentiation for demographically vast societies, as well as the importance of specialized writing practices and the accumulation of objectified knowledge in the history of the gradual separation of the different branches of human activity, especially in the areas of cultural and symbolic production (religion, law, sciences, literature, etc.). It also helps to realize that microcosms are not closed on themselves, that they may, in part, develop their specificity by relying on each other, and that they maintain interdependence relationships (which explain that when a microcosm alters, the others won't stay unchanged and that transfers and circulations of any kind can be seen), concurrence relationships, or power struggle.

But in the time assigned to this statement, I will only mention the effects of social differentiation of activities on mental and behavioral structuring of individuals, trying to draw some consequences from a point of view of a sociology of social "dispositionalism".

1. Plural actors in differentiated societies

A large part of a book published in 1998 and entitled *L'homme pluriel (*《多元的人》*)*, consisted in supporting the idea, not that the man was *necessarily* "plural", but that he had even more chances of being, with a dispositional point of view, that he was living in highly differentiated societies and he frequented, more or less precociously, a plurality of heterogenic social contexts, and also sometimes contradictory. Indeed, the socio-historic conditions of an actor's fabrication, whom heritage of dispositions and skills would be summing up in a "formula which generates and unifies all the practices" (Bourdieu), have been less and less gathered as and when the advancement of labor division and social differentiation of functions.

Objectify the micro-shifting or the splits that these actors from differentiated societies have to do during their biographical career or at different moments of their daily life helps us to understand the reasons that makes each actor the bearer of tendencies (mental and behavioral) and some heterogenic skills that can sometimes bump into each other. Contradictions, swings, ambivalence or dissonance that individuals live are only the product of internalization (the "folding" inside) of tendencies to believe, of perceptual habits, of types of judgment and ways of acting coming from different social / socializing contexts.

The internal plurality of individual actors clearly appears in lots of sociologists' thoughts who explicitly linked it with the forms of social life in which the actors in question are required to be part of. In this way, Georg Simmel envisages, following Freud, the possibility of internal conflicts due to the double dependence of individuals with regard to contradictory forces or ideals. This is the typical situation experienced by the "servant of two masters" which can be seen especially among "children shared between parents conflicting the one with the other"[2].

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2 Georg Simmel. Sociology. On social differentiation. P. 201

But this double (we should rather imagining it as multiple) contradictory dependence can be totally internalized and take the form of "ideal moral forces whom expectation are situated even inside the man" and of "a conflict of duty"[3].

What becomes "the moral personality" of an individual when he exists at "the crossing of numerous circles"[4]? The plurality of "social circles" or "groups" in which the individual of differentiated societies are involved in (original family group, funded family, professional milieu with all the sub-groups of subordinates and superiors frequented, different friends' circle, etc.) "lead to internal and external conflicts that threaten the individual of psychic duality, even of rift[5]". But this duality is precisely what is at the origin of the relative singularity of each actor. Because "the more numerous (these affiliations groups) are, the less chances there is that other persons present the same combination of groups, that these numerous circles intersect again in *another point*. We don't know anymore a concrete object in its individuality when one put it under a general concept according to one of its qualities, but it get it back to the extent that we highlight other concepts under which its other qualities put it, so as to each thing, to speak like Plato, take part into as much ideas as qualities it has, which give it its individual determination: it is exactly the same for the personality facing circles it is part of[6]".

We can see well that it is useless, even impossible, to understand "individuality" or "singularity", to go out from networks of social ties, and by the same token, from social determinism. The latter is just much more complex than the one that make an object move under the effect of a force that is used on it. Individuality or singularity is all about complex combination and dosage of shared social properties ("an infinite possibility of individualized combinations"). It is no accident if Simmel quotes Plato to support his reasoning, because this latter defined the Idea as a pure quality that we can't observe such as itself in reality. The Idea of "son" is "a son purely son", that wouldn't be anything else but "son". Yet, in social reality, a "son" is also "father", "brother", "husband", "lover", "worker", "friend", "card player", "former pupil", etc. So each one's relative singularity is the product of "the crossing of countless social strings, as a heritage of circle and of the most diverse adaptation periods.[7]" The strong social differentiation implies that individuals are determined to be multiple. And the multiplicity of determinations that are exerted on the individuals cannot in any way reduce the strength of these determinisms.

Simmel emphasizes also the diversity of "positions" (dominant or dominated; competition or alliance; love or hate, etc.) simultaneously occupied by the same person in the different circles she belongs to and on the variation of these "positions" from a relationship to another among the same circle. He takes as an example for the second scenario, the case of "private teachers": "The private tutor has to have the advantage on his pupil, he has to dominate him and to lead him – whereas in the same time he is a servant, and the other one is the master.[8]" The diversity of circles let the actor live phenomenon of compensation from the one to the other, and to satisfy different "likings" or "aspirations". Unlike Durkheim, who envisages the stakes such as scientific reputation, military glory, moral authority, political power or wealth, only in an "unfold" perspective of groups or professional milieu emanating from the division of labor, Simmel draws consequences from this differentiation of some forms of "honor" from an individual point of view ("folded"): "In this way, different aspects of a person can obey to different conceptions of honor, that are as reflections of the different groups this person

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3 Ibid.
4 Ibid. p. 417
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid. p. 416
7 Ibid. p. 417
8 Ibid. p. 426

belongs to at the same time.[9]" Belonging to different circles, it is internalizing stakes, orientations or logics that are heterogeneous, and potentially contradictory.

Later, Talcott Parsons will also attempt to draw consequences from plurality of social systems from a point of view of individual that frequent less often these different systems. If Simmel hesitates between several definitions of what is at the heart of these phenomenons (norms, likings, aspirations, duties, etc.) in his analysis of contradictions, tensions or compensations that individual live, and, in the same time, on the central elements of a theory of action, Parsons essentially emphasizes on the possible "loyalties' conflicts" caused by the plurality of the "roles" played by the same individuals in differentiated social systems:

"Role-pluralism, the involvement of the same person in several collectivities, is a fundamental feature of all human societies. On the whole, an increase of the role-pluralism is a main feature of the differentiation processes leading toward modern types of society. Therefore, the regulation of the loyalties, to the community itself and to various other collectivities, is a major problem of integration for a societal community. (…) The self interested motives of individuals are, on the whole, effectively channeled into the social system through a variety of memberships and loyalties to collectivities. The most immediate problem for most individuals is the adjustment of obligations among the competing loyalties in cases of conflict. For example, the normal adult male in modern societies is both an employee and a member of a family household. Although the demands of these two roles often conflict, most men have a heavy stake in fulfilling loyalties to both. A societal community is a complex network of interpenetrating communities and collective loyalties, a system characterized by both functional differentiation and segmentation. Thus, kinship-household units, business firms, churches, governmental units, educational collectivities and the like are differentiated from each other[10].

By reducing the question of commitment or of the placement in different context of action to the one of duty toward the different groups, communities or institutions concerned, Parsons make the actor a kind of a bit abstract *homo juridicus* or of *homo moralis*, forgetting that the commitments to different universes especially imply dispositions (to act and to believe) and competences, as well as a lot of energy and time.

The heterogeneity of affiliations or social placements was also the object of a reflection for Maurice Halbwachs in his work about memory. Unlike Durkheim, who was essentially thinking on the scale of groups and institutions, Halbwachs, who has a strong interest for psychology, in particular for the so-called "collective" psychology, takes an interest in the effects on each individual of the fact to be "plunged in the same time or successively in different groups[11]", themselves neither homogenous nor unchangeable. The different groups an individual took part to (family, successive schools, various peer groups, professional milieu, members from the same political, religious or cultural association, etc.) are the social framework of his memory and the heterogeneity of the social frameworks leads to the heterogeneity of incorporated memories. In *The collective memory*, the sociologist shows his concern to think the plurality of social frameworks and to cast doubt on some groups hastily considered as homogeneous:

"To get an idea, on the contrary, of the multiplicity of collective memories, imagine what would be the story of our lives if, while we tell , we stop whenever we remember one of the groups that we visited, to examine itself and say all what we've known about it. It won't be sufficient to distinguish a few sets: our parents, school, high school, our friends, the people of our profession, our social relations, or a political, religious or art group in which we could

9 Ibid. p. 432
10 T. Parsons, The system of modern societies, p. 12-13
11 M. Halbwachs, The collective memory (La mémoire collective), Paris, PUF, p. 67-68

have become attached. These major divisions are convenient, but they respond to an external and even simplified view of reality. These groups include many smaller groups, which occupy only a portion of the space, and it is only with a local section of them that we have been in contact. They are transformed, segmented, so that even if we remain on site, if we do not go out of a group, it sometimes happens that by slow or rapid renewal of its members, it actually becomes another group that has few common traditions with those who were in at the beginning[12]."

These reflections are not unconnected with the orientations that will be the one of the Chicago School. In a text from 1938, Louis Wirth described the urban phenomenon with a background of differentiation of activities, of increasing division of labor and of specialization linked to densification of space. Referring to Durkheim's book on social work division, he insisted, as for him, on the fact that "townspeople meet in strongly segmented roles". He thus wrote: "No group in particular has the exclusive allegiance of an individual. The groups he belongs to do not lend themselves easily to a simple hierarchical ranking. Because of the diversity of his interests, born from different aspects of social life, the individual take a part in widely different groups, everyone working only according to a segment of his personality.[13]" This starting intuition will be found later in other authors as Erving Goffman, Anselm L. Strauss, Ulf Hannerz, and lots of other. Strauss even makes from this multi-affiliation to social worlds and sub-worlds, not always compatible the one with the other, sometimes even with contentious relations, one of the fundamental condition of the contemporary social life[14], and highlights, in contrast, the fact that few social formations are composed of actors acting and committing themselves to an only social universe. Hannerz also sees this as a fundamental characteristic of urbanized societies. Resting on a text of Max Gluckman, which opposes reality of "the very big city" to "tribe society" on the base of the fact that "the multiple roles played by most of the individuals are distinct the one from the other, because they are not played on the same stages[15]", he mentions the child going out of his house to go to school, the working place distinct from the family life place, as well as religious places and the places of the exercise of a political activity, that are different from all the others. Roles' segregation and moral judgments' segregation are one of the consequences of social differentiation of activities.

In many texts of authors from the Chicago School, or inspired by it, social life is however reduced to questions of "roles" (and of "repertoire of roles"), of "presentation of self" and "maneuver of presentation of self", of "manipulation of information from behind the scene", of "control of impressions", of "images that the other have about self", of "concern for the fate of these images", of "information" and of "disinformation" confessed about oneself, etc[16]. Yet, in the notion of "role", and in all those which accompany it (manipulation, presentation, maneuver, dupery, etc.) there is a strong conscious and even strategic dimension: one adopts or plays a role, while being aware that the role is not completely one's "self". Everything happens as if the roles were assumed and left without leaving a mark or fundamentally transforming those who play them. What interests the authors as Goffman or Hannerz about the plurality of roles and their segmentation is all the possibilities of dupery and dissimulation started by the fact that individuals may present to others on segmented scenes. Such a game of "said" and "non-said", of "showed" and "hidden", is much more limited in the societies narrowed of inter-knowledge where risks of frequenting the same

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12 Ibid., p. 76
13 Louis Wirth (1938), Urbanism As A Way of Life. in: AJS 44, p. 1-24
14 A. L. Strauss, Continual Permutations of Action, New York, Aldine de Gruyter, 1993, p. 41-42
15 M. Gluckman (ed.), Essays on the Ritual of Social relations, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1962, p. 35-36
16 All these expressions are in Ulf Hannerz book, Exploring the City: Inquiries Toward an Urban Anthropology, Columbia University Press, 1980

persons on different scenes are much bigger. But there is clear evidence that it is a theory of socialization that lacks to these authors to size up incorporated social effects of the frequentation of differentiated contexts.

*What retaining of this from the perspective of a sociology of dispositionalist socialization? The long historical movement of differentiation of functions and of constitution of relatively autonomous (defined as specific) microcosms has important consequences in terms of *social construction of individuals*. The multiple social contexts carrying specific logics are as many potential socialization frameworks, making up dispositions and skills. When socializing heterogeneous frameworks are used by the same individuals (one could indeed imagine a differentiation such that each individual would be scarcely confronted with the plurality of frames), and when these experiments are done relatively early, they are at the basis of the making up of individual heritage of dispositions and relatively heterogeneous skills whose activation depends on each new context of action.

The multiple socialization of individuals in differentiated societies is what is first giving credit to all the inter-individual variation in their social behavior. In such societies, even two individuals belonging to the same social class, to the same social sub-group, or to the same family are likely to have some of their practices differ, for not being strictly subject to the same socializing frames. Moreover, the review of the existence of intra-individual variation in social behavior thus records the effects of social differentiation and the plurality of frames of socialization. Because of the plurality of socializing influences they lived and the diversity of contexts in which they are called upon to act, individuals composing these social formations have a high probability of being characterized by a dispositional plurality (Multiple socializing experiences crystallize in the form of more or less strong dispositions and skills). Intra-individual and inter-individual variations are microscopic realities, which refer to the most fundamental properties of a macroscopic reality characterized by the complex and differentiated structure of our societies.

If dispositionalist sociology of Pierre Bourdieu could not explore systematically the individual effects of the plurality of activity spheres or action registers, that is, paradoxically, because he thought homogeneous individuals in a heterogeneous world. Instead of taking into account of the socializing effects of the plurality of social frames, he often did as if an actor already socially constituted (implicitly in his family of origin) faced heterogeneous situations. He wrote as well that "the very own efficacy of habitus can be seen quite clearly in all situations where it is not the product of its actualization's conditions (more and more frequent as we go along with the differentiation of the societies): this is the case when agents shaped in a pre-capitalist economy face, disarmed, the demands of a capitalist cosmos, or when elderly perpetuate, like Don Quixote, misplaced dispositions, or when the dispositions of an agent ascending or declining in the social structure are in dissonance with the position he occupies.[17]" The described individual actor is not fundamentally marked, in its heritage of dispositions and skills, by the plurality of frequented social contexts. Mono-socialized product, it seems that he discovers the outside plurality only in a second time. And of course, by a principle of conservation, he resists, enters crisis or is confused, but never transforms himself.

The same point of view let Pierre Bourdieu write that it will be interesting to conduct "the study of persons who, because they participated in a more or less "creative" way, to several fields have, according to the typically leibnizian model of possible worlds, products several realizations from the same habitus (as, in the order of consumption, the various arts provide opportunity for expressions, objectively systematic, as "counterparties", according to Lewis,

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17 P. Bourdieu, « Le champ économique », Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales », n°119, 1997, p. 65

of the same taste)[18]." Again, what is presupposed is the existence of a habitus which is *One*, systematic, homogeneous, *one* formula generating practices, which would result in fields with different properties and possible. Individuals live in differentiated societies but their habitus is strangely unaffected; everything happens as if they were protected from a heterogeneity they encounter only after being formed in homogeneous social conditions.

However, the examination of contemporary situations incites to try to think specificity of actors socialized in differentiated societies, and especially the foliated structure of their heritage of dispositions and skills, that is nothing else than their multiple social placements and the complexity of their socialization experiences.

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[18] P. Bourdieu, « Le champ littéraire », op. cit., p. 18, note 33

Inequalities and solidarity

François Dubet

After thirty years of a « miraculous » reduction of social inequalities in post-war Europe, inequalities are worsening everywhere. The Haves are even wealthier, inequalities in property and assets are much more considerable than income inequality, unemployment and instability are taking roots while the figure of working-poors is increasing and in the cities "ghettos" are emerging where the migrants and the poorest flock, and beggars are seen once again in the streets. In the same time, the representations, beliefs and institutions which upheld solidarity seem to be weakening with the welfare-state, and the rise of populism, racism and distrust towards politics, the obsession with security, the nationalist drives of wealthy regions that don't want to pay for the others anymore, the flight of those organizing tax fraud and avoidance, the secession of those who want to separate themselves from the poors and the strangers, and the *exit* of those who give up the public sector to turn towards the private sector.

We could conclude that this decline in solidarity mechanically stems from the worsening in social inequalities. In that case, it means that solidarity, the deep feeling of living in the same society, this word that the French republican motto calls "brotherhood", is a consequence of equality: the more equals we are, the more "brothers" we are too. Conversely, the less equals we are, the more the solidarity chains slacken and consequently it would mainly be the fault of the great economic crisis that widen the inequality gap if the "brotherhood" is weakened[1].

Without radically putting into question that way of thinking, my intervention aims at discussing it so as to show that the decline in solidarity not only is a consequence of the worsening in social inequalities, but also is one of its causes[2]. Everything looks as if we had chosen inequality by giving up on solidarity. Digging into that hypothesis is not without political and practical consequences because, if solidarity is a prerequisite for equality, it then has to be made a new major sociological object. In a very different context from that of the dawn of the 20th century, we are confronted, again, with new essential issues of sociology, especially that of the Durkheimian tradition: how can democratic, individualistic and market-oriented societies be held-together.

1. The choice of inequality.

We give credit with reason, for the worsening of inequalities, to objective economic mechanisms "independent from our wills", because they are systemic and global with the competition between national economies, the ascendancy of a financial economy disconnected from the "real" economies, with the spreading and steady growth of networks and communications, and with the competition between welfare-states which leads them to reduce the cost of labour. This explanation is all the more obvious because it clears ourselves

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1 Nevertheless, declines in solidarity and extreme-right drives can also be observed in countries less impacted by the economical crisis, like Austria, Norway, or Switzerland.

2 Even if J. Rawls says that : « In comparison with the ideas of liberty and equality, the idea of brotherhood is less important in the theories of democracy" (A theory of justice, Paris, Seuil, 1987 (1971), p. 135), the principle of difference that requires to adopt the point of view of the most disadvantaged demands a solidarity bond, a feeling of living in the same social world. That is why the theory of justice is only valid for nation-states, and the hypothesis of priority being given to what is fair cannot be fully implemented.

from the responsibility for the inequalities while we are, it seems, more and more attached to the principle of fundamental equality between individuals.

Nevertheless, though this explanation for the increase in social inequalities through economical mechanisms is hardly questionable, it is very insufficient because a lot of inequalities are accepted and produced by the individual and collective social actors. If no one, or not that many people, chooses deliberately inequalities, a great deal of social practices and social movements produce inequalities sometimes "without meaning to", which allows one, on the one hand, to denounce it on a moral point of view, and on the other hand, to develop it practically. We can mention a few hard to miss mechanisms which cause inequalities accepted more or less consciously by individuals. I will stick to the case of France that I know the best, but most of my points are transposable to all the countries in Europe.

All the great cities in Europe have known comparable processes of space concentration of the different social categories. The city-centers are gentrifying, urban peripheries are getting poorer while the middle-classes that can't afford living in the city-centers are settling away from it. Everywhere, the desire to live with one's own socio-economic group, a social "entre-soi", is growing, as if one had to put as much social and space distance between the disadvantaged social categories. These particular inequalities are chosen by the groups which want to develop an endogenous social capital[3]. The working classes only have to be perceived as dangerous classes so their being kept at arm's length is justified. The old criticism of the consumer society seems extinguished today while the desire for distinction and ostentatious consumption does not grow weaker, quite the opposite, it is now an essential feature of the economy: the luxury products' industry has never been that well, the horse-power of cars is a sign of prestige more than a capacity to drive fast, and tyranny is forced on teenagers, included the poorest. Setting oneself apart from the masses and the vulgar is still central.

The production of education inequalities is one of the clearest manifestations of the choice of inequality. Every family wants its children to succeed in school and every family that has the ability to do so develops the strategies that widen education inequalities: choice of the most prestigious schools, taking on private schools and tutoring to make sure the children succeed. In order to do that, one has to run away from the most disadvantaged schools and to choose the most selective curriculums, even if it means thinking regrettable the absence of equal opportunities. The education offer itself has become more and more competitive and selective. Public school, which meant to give to every student the same opportunities, cannot resist to these unequal strategies. At the end of the day, the democratization of education implemented for the sake of equality in the last fifty years has led to the conservation or the worsening of inequalities and social reproduction. The fear for loss of social position has given these strategies a form of legitimacy because it has become obvious that there is no greater tragedy than seeing one's social status slipping toward the bottom of the social-scale.

Labour unions and corporatist strategies often lead to a shutdown of work markets and to the maintaining of the distances within the professional world. Protecting some implies that risks and instability are then offloaded onto others, as it can be seen in the medical world where doctors who are nationals and doctors who are foreigners do the exact same work in the same hospital under totally different security and income conditions. Besides the qualified and relatively protected nucleuses, a subcontracting system is set-up and being developed in the interest of the big companies of the sector, and also in the interest of the employees and professionals that consequently strengthen their positions[4].

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3 The more inequalities widen, the more social capital is limited to economically, socially and racially homogeneous groups. D. Putnam, "E pluribus Unum. Diversity and community in the Twenty-first century", Scandinavian political studies, Vol. 30, n°2, 2007, p 137-174.
4 R. Reich, L'économie Mondialisée, Paris, Dunod, 1991.

In a more general way, the denunciation of inequalities does not mean that the victims of these inequalities are seen as totally irresponsible for their fate. Common support of the principles of merit and autonomy of every individual, common support and belief in our very fundamental equality, imply that we are responsible and the very causes of our actions. Consequently, in the same way that students are held responsible for their failures, a look of suspicion is cast upon the poor, the unemployed, the migrants, the sicks, all of them somehow responsible of their own fate and not deserving nor compassion nor any solidarity[5]. At the opposite, the ridiculous incomes of football players do not spark controversy because their merit is beyond any doubt.

Therefore, the welfare-state is less legitimate, protesting against taxes turns into a more or less accepted tax-fraud and tax-avoidance, not only with the wealthiest but also with those who can enter these strategies and ask themselves why they should pay for the others when those others are not like them and don't deserve to be helped. Mistrust becomes the rule: mistrust towards representatives, institutions, and mere citizens suspected of cheating, benefitting from illegitimate benefits and not playing by the rules of solidarity. Vote is guided more by mistrust than by endorsement[6]. Not feeling united and alike is the one condition for inequalities to be acceptable, included when one supports the declaration stating that "all men are born and remain free and equals in rights".

2. Solidarity as a condition for equality.

The statement of fundamental equality of the individuals making up a democratic society is today a hardly disputed principle of justice. During the 20th century, that kind of equality was extended to women, sexual minorities, members of different cultures and, except from a few fringe ideologists and feelings long buried at the bottom of collective representations, nobody dares to defend the ideas of natural inequalities between sexes and between races[7]. To quote Sen, the diversity of human beings makes do with their fundamental equality as human beings and even more as citizens of a same nation. Nonetheless, for the idea of equality to stop being an abstract principle of justice and to become a social philosophy aiming at the real equality of living conditions or capacities, it is important for the members of a society to feel united and brotherly enough, similar alike, close and reliant on each other to give up the advantages of inequality to limit the inequalities, big or small, that they are benefitting from.

To pay one's taxes willfully, to accept to socialize with others, to accept to be educated together, to have enough civism and mutual engagements at the price of some sacrifices, one has to have something in common with others. One has to feel part of the same society and to perceive that society, as big and complex that it may be, as a community. To feel truly equal to the others and to wish their being equals, I have to perceive them and feel that they are equals more or less clearly, as "brothers" whose fate is touching emotionally, and concerns me practically. The imaginary and the feelings of solidarity are among the conditions for equality to thrive. That I feel equal to the others is not enough, I also have to feel close and alike so that "real" equality becomes desirable. That "brotherhood" was first conceived as an "outside the world" equality when religions stated that believers have a common "father" and that they are equals in the eyes of god and that they all have something holy and equal within themselves. With the decline of the political-theology, democratic equality was implemented

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5 Since the 1970's, international surveys indicate that the percentage of those who explain poverty by the behavior and culture of poor people has climbed steadily. S. Paugam, M. Selz, « La perception de la pauvreté en Europe depuis le milieu des années 1970. Analyse des variations structurelles et conjoncturelles », Économie et statistique, n° 383-384-385, 2005, p. 283-305. In the United States, one of the pillars of the conservative revolution consisted in « blaming the victims ».

6 P. Rosanvallon, La contre-démocratie, Paris, Seuil, 2006.

7 Racist rhetoric has gone from biological inequality of races to the incompatibility of cultures. P-A. Taguieff, Face au racisme, Paris, La Découverte, 1991, two volumes.

within the frame of a national brotherhood, as imaginary as the religions', but as efficient because it defines the space for a communitarian equality, of an equality enlarged beyond the social divisions and the local communities, an equality based on blood-spilled, the language, an historical narrative or on the political contract within the nation.

I am not trying to hide here that these themes often have a bad reputation because the definition of the community that gives birth to equality is one of the pillars of the counter-revolutionary, nationalist, communitarian, xenophobic, and, in the end, anti-equality thought. Anyway, thoughts that only conceive the society through exclusion and natural hierarchies, especially with the sex hierarchy, the generation's and the family's, as currently demonstrated with the debates on national identity, Islam, Immigration, security, sexual minorities' rights, debates all imposed by the conservative, populist and xenophobic movements, though one cannot ignore that they mobilize a lot.

But it is not because an issue is unpleasant and generally raised by "vilains" that it is not worth to ponder over it. More so, if the left and the democrats don't try to cope with these issues, they will hand the monopoly over to the worst political ideologies. The moral condemnation of these ideologies, which are like natural solidarity and community of roots emerging from the repressed, is indeed indispensable, but it doesn't resolve anything if one refuses to see that the feeling of solidarity is one of the necessary conditions to equality politics. Therefore, one has to rearticulate the theme of equality with that of solidarity and that requires to state what we have in common in order to turn equality into a policy and not only a moral postulate.

3. From integration to cohesion.

The feeling of solidarity rests upon an imaginary and symbolic construction whose ingredients and mutations are known: religion, ethnic group, the sovereign, the nation. And I won't go over again that archeology, identified with modernity itself, which shows that not everything in the contract is contractual. The fact that this imaginary be a construction which is always possible and desirable to deconstruct doesn't solve anything in the end because social life needs these constructions, these imaginary constructions, these imaginary institutions of society, which results in the society being more, and something else, than the sum of the individuals that compose it, to quote Castoriadis[8].

Integration.
My remarks, too fast and too simple, will aim at trying to show that we have gone from the paradigm of social integration to that of social cohesion. Similarly to the sociological tradition, which was born from the tension between community and society, the current social thought is underlain by the tension between integration and cohesion, like two silhouettes of the way societies hold together.

Democratic and national industrial societies are not able anymore to be based on a common religion, politic sovereignty and its derivative, patrimonial links, which all define community, therefore they develop another representation of social life based on the idea of integration. Republican France and Durkheimian sociology have given an exemplary expression to that model.

First, the olds bonds of similarity and coancestry have been substituted with a functional and organic image of the society. If the capitalist division of labour divides the society, it also creates a functional solidarity in which each element of social life, each role and each social position is supposed to act as a functional cog of society. Each person is useful and must be

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8 C. Castoriadis, La construction imaginaire de la société, Paris, Seuil, 1975.

recognized for its utility, for its contribution to the life of the whole, as the workers' movement always demanded, denouncing the exploitation of misery while the working class produces most of the wealth. That functional representation of society is not necessarily believable in scientific terms, but first one has to consider it as a social philosophy of solidarity since, in that system, each and everybody has debts and claims towards the collectivity. Social protection, public services, the welfare-state, are as many ways to give the individuals back what they gave to society, and to give the society back (through taxes, military service, and work itself) what society gave to the individuals. For most of it, solidarity and social rights are associated with working: organization capitalism considers that it is the collectivity of work that creates new wealth. That representation creates new large areas of exclusion for those who do not work or are dependent on others' work, like women dependent on their husbands' social rights. But this representation of society is oriented towards a justice model that privileges the progressive levelling out of social positions in the name of their contributions to the whole, rather than towards equal opportunities asking for an equitable competition between individuals theoretically equals.

Social integration rests upon institutions in the double meaning of the word. On the one hand, they are representative political systems and "intermediary bodies" which, without cancelling domination, transform the struggles and conflicts of interest into social compromises. On the other hand, they are socialization institutions, even more since the creation of compulsory public school and education which build an "institutional individualism": in France, an autonomous and patriot citizen who endorses that vision of society. To be clear, socialization is conceived as the internalization of society by the individuals, as the adjustment of the actors' subjectivity and the system's objectivity, as an uprooting from the little local and familial societies to ascend towards the big modern and universalist society, thus freeing the individuals from the communities through an access to the great cultures and reason.

But society not only is a functional organization and a democratic way of handling conflicts. It also is a community based on a national imaginary whose predicate is that equals citizens are alike in language, culture, tastes, subtle collusions, share a national narrative, a feeling of solidarity, an emotion staged through "civic religions". And if the idea of society as a solidarity has thrived with such a strength, it is because equality concerns all fellow citizens, the "brothers", all those who perceive themselves as alike beyond inequalities and regional, religious, and village singularities. The oldest countries of immigration have indeed inscribed immigration in that representation: the "melting pot" in the US and the "republican model" in France are conceived as processes transforming strangers into nationals. Equality is for the fellows, and one becomes equal when one becomes alike. It is because it is perceived, at the same time, as singular and universal, that the nation can accept cultural and social diversity[9].

Of course, there is a big gap from the society's social philosophy to the societies' practices, and all the social and sociological critics, as most of the social movements, have never ceased to oppose reality to the model: no society totally evacuates violence, domination, exclusion, oppressive social controls, contempt and racism. But this is a representation and a regulatory horizon in which an economical system, a political sovereignty and a national culture assemble and form a frame and an imaginary of solidarity. Furthermore, in most of the cases, social criticism and conflicts appear in the name of that imaginary ideal of solidarity since the society doesn't keep its promises.

9 It goes without saying that this is a very particular model, even the opposition of the French and the German model is greatly ritualistic. The conception of the nation as "an everyday plebiscite" by Renan requires that national awareness and memory exist already. G. Hermet, Histoire des nations et des nationalism en Europe, Paris, Seuil, 1996.

Or social cohesion.

That representation of the society is falling apart, and a great deal of social movements, among them the most populists, but not only, can't stop grieving for the loss of that imaginary of solidarity as integration. If one only holds changes in vocabulary as trustworthy indicators, we have entered the regime of social cohesion.

Under the effect of globalization, the weight of financial markets, the division of the labour market, the narrative of the "great transformation" seems to be inverting[10]. While the capitalist free-market has gradually been interlocked into society, one rather waits from society to fit with the economy and be good for the market. Organic bonds are perceived as obstacles to free initiative, as archaisms that must be replaced by trust, the networks, and by instilling responsibility to individuals in the name of an ethic of liberty and creativity. Meritocratic equality of opportunities is substituted to the equality of positions, as the ideal of justice and a good society must develop equity; trust and social capital have become in the last thirty years the keywords of social philosophy[11]. The society "holds together" because individuals trust themselves and the others, because they develop their social capital. In terms of sociological theory, the change is dramatic: since thirty years, the holistic theories according to which the society precedes the individual and includes it are being replaced by more individualistic theories in which the society is an emerging effect, the product of the aggregated individual actions.

Not only is a part of political sovereignty transferred towards supranational institutions, but faced with the international restrictions and economic regulations, the very control of the political institutions seems to be weakening. At the same moment, socialization and social control institutions aim less at instilling common frames than at producing efficient ant authentic individuals by allowing the expression of their singularity and the development of their social capital. Socialization institutions aim at articulate in a more or less effective way competitive, instrumental and selective goals, to expressive values often associated with juvenile cultures and consumption[12]. More or less universalist social policies are being replaced by targeted policies and measures aiming less at protecting individuals than at mobilizing them. They seem less willing to take charge of the entire society than to try to solve a succession of particular social problems: destitute neighborhoods, underperforming at school, domestic violence, the youth, "medical deserts". The old image of the social issue falls apart into a series of problems and specific policies.

Lastly, the implicit identification of society and nation does not go without saying anymore. What went without saying when the modern national democratic states were formed, when the western empires dominated the world and when the fact that migrants were to mingle into the nation was commonly accepted, is not today anything but a nationalistic reflex. National societies have become plural and diverse, they have to deal with communities that want to belong to the nation all the while maintaining cultural and religious specificities to which they are entitled like they are entitled to rights and equality. That evolution provokes a reemergence of the national-repressed: the universalist and secular France suddenly discovers itself as white, Christian, and as singular as anyone setting foot on the territory and who is destined to become French.

From then, the traditional frame of solidarity is falling apart. A great part of the citizens defends it in a nostalgic, authoritarian, hostile to Europe and foreigners way, in the name of traditions, roots, the republic and the nostalgia for an almighty state. However, these extreme tendencies and, unfortunately, less and less a minority, are not the prerogative of extreme-right populists. The demand for equality is shutting down in the name of an equality for

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10 K. Polanyi, La grande transformation. Aux origines politiques et culturelles de notre temps, Paris, Gallimard, 1983.
11 F. Dubet, Les places et les chances, Paris, seuil, 2010.
12 F. Dubet, Le déclin de l'institution, Paris, Seuil, 2002.

people in the same social position. A lot of citizens are worried, have the feeling that institutions are letting them down, that the clash of civilizations is going to take away everything. Many think equality is threatened because solidarity has no substance anymore. In the cohesion model, equality in fundamental rights and equality of opportunities, calling for a fair competition between individuals, are the only ones left while equality policies have more and more trouble to be legitimate.

Except from the most qualified, educated and cosmopolitan social categories, which may find in the EU and constitutional patriotism supports to solidarity, most of the people have the feeling that the society is crumbling beneath their feet. French surveys have been showing that for twenty years: independently from economic and political situations, the French have the feeling that society is falling apart, that civism, trust and solidarity are losing ground, all the while being rather satisfied of their own personal situation. The distance between private happiness and public action is widening[13]. Therefore, why should one want equality when everybody feels "good" even if society goes bad? That is to say when each person does not feel sufficiently connected to the others to think that what he could give will be given back to him and to willingly accept that equality deserves to be sought.

That issue is even more acute when it comes to accepting "cultural differences" in national homogenous societies that became plural. It seems clear that the more majoritarian groups identified with the national society have a firm trust in their solidarity and solidity, the easier this acceptation will be. At the opposite, when "the society" feels weak, threatened, uncertain, when one has the impression that everything is unraveling, acknowledgment demands are perceived like threats and aggressions. One only has to take a look at the populist electorate to see the power of the association of uncertainty and rejection of the unlikeness: the feeling of being abandoned and withdrawn on private pursuit of happiness, on values threatened and local communities, reinforces the hostility towards everything that doesn't look like me, because I don't recognize myself anymore in that society. In that case, cultures and identities equality is a threat and the "fascist" parties can mobilize electorates that are not, but could turn fascist in the end.

4. Tools for solidarity

Which solidarity policies may allow us to really want equality? Answers are not easy if one rejects the "going back" option: going back to religion, to the nation, going back to the traditional institutions, to the values. Not only are these "going backs" as many grins associated with the reject of external threats, patriotism turned xenophobia, religion turned fundamentalism, the defense of institutions turned authoritarianism, but theses "going backs" are in practice impossible. Still, the "living together" crisis analyzed by Finkielkraut is our problem, whether we want it or not. Therefore, wider solidarities able to found a common imaginary have to be built again, but this foundation must rest on democratic and individualistic principles.

Symbolic dimensions of social policies.
In a general sense, we must pay attention to the symbolic dimensions of social policies. For example, targeting specific policies and measures on specific parts of the population might divide, stigmatize, and provoke in the short-run a counter-move which blames the victims. The power of these opinions during the Reagan era in the United-States is well-known. At the

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13 Happiness and public action do not seem to apear and create each other in a series of cycles, as A. Hirschman states it (Private happiness, Public action, Paris, Fayard, 1986), but they would rather be a steady couple, because of the distance that might exist between a society's representations and the categories of individual experience. Individuals do not identify society with their own lives when the model of solidarity as the definition of the likeness or the "brotherly" are disappearing.

opposite, the fact that universalist measures are often very positive to the middle-class is also well-known. The middle-ground between these two extremes might be the individualization of the helps by focusing on projects, trajectories, and specific conditions, and consequently mobilize more equitable conceptions of justice. It has to be recalled that, in the short-term, public services opened to all remains the surest way to combine social justice and feeling of solidarity. At the condition that citizens don't feel these services are not benefitting the ones who pay for them.

Renewing democracy.
Pierre Rosanvallon showed that democratic representation has a two-sided nature[14]. On the one hand, it is a representation of the different interests dividing society that must find a reasonable way to an agreement. On the other hand, it is a representation of the unity of society. That double representation must constantly be reactivated so that citizens identify as both divided and alike on the political scene. Rather than calling for celebrations and civic religions, the political representation should be renewed so that citizens identify with the political dramaturgy: the non-accumulation of political offices, the clear distinction and autonomy of the political levels, the political participation of every citizens, the creation of new electorates and the revival of those who disappeared…Countries with a democracy at the local level are indeed more united, even when they are liberal without being paralyzed by democracy, like Switzerland for example. There exist local patriotisms, bonds, if one prefers, that doesn't threaten wider forms of patriotisms and are also factors of mobilization and growth, dynamic cities and regions prove it where at the same time collective celebrations and consultation processes about important project take place.

Who pays, who gets paid?
The welfare-states crisis is not only a financial crisis triggered by lowering resources and growing needs. Even in the example of France, where welfare-state is rather efficient, it suffers from a lack of visibility. No average citizen can say what is for taxes and what is for national insurance contributions, even less to understand who pays and who gets paid in the impenetrable, full of tax breaks and exceptions contributions system, and the many cogs and gears to the benefits managed by as many institutions and measures. Consequently, each one can legitimately feel being ripped-off, to be paying for those who do not pay (the wealthy and the poor) each one has the feeling he is not receiving what he pays, each one may have the impression that what is free does not cost anything. This is not only a technical problem, but rather a democratic duty to make this system understandable so that wealthy people don't feel they are paying too much for the poor who never pay and poor people don't feel the wealthy only think about escaping.

The foundation of institutions.
Socialization institutions (school, hospital, justice) do not have much symbolic dimensions founding people's adhesion and professionals' authority on their capacity to "embody" superior principles anymore. All researches show that these institutions are facing a crisis and that professionals working there feel they've been abandoned by society. "Disenchantment" on one side, social control criticism on the other, and these more and more powerful institutions give the strange feeling to be abandoning the individuals who, in turn, cultivate a strong resentment towards them. When these institutions cannot be founded on superior and sacred principles anymore – the nation, reason, science – their real or supposed efficiency is not enough anymore. They must be based as much as possible on democratic legitimacy

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14 P. Rosanvallon, Le peuple introuvable. Histoire de la représentation démocratique en France, Paris, Gallimard, 1998.

processes: students, parents and teachers' rights at school, health professionals and sick peoples' right in hospitals, users' rights…

Work collectives.
The industrial society of classes exploited workers, but the labour organization also created collectives, a world of "comrades". If the word disappeared, it is not only because of its communist origin, but also, and even especially because new-management destroyed work collectives. It has to be reminded that suffering at work comes from the feeling of never being able to do one's work correctly and of not being in a stable and predictable organization. The obsession for employment made us give up on work as a theme and accept the idea that there is no alternative to the new ways of organizing work and working. By doing so, we have accepted the destruction of work solidarities even though they still are, in modern societies, one of the central supports of solidarity, as a community and as a functional relation to the others. Of course, going back to the times of Fordism is not on the agenda, that was not a "good old time", but there is no reason one should accept the words of those saying that instability is the rule and gains in efficiency only come with the destruction of work collectives.

Empowering people.
One of the clearest paradoxes of today's situation, especially in the case of France, is the calling to individuals and their action capabilities all the while not empowering them. Individuals are separated from the supports that used to hold them and suffocate them both, without being armed to act and be responsible for themselves. That issue, discussed at length by Castel, doesn't require an institutional and protected individualism to be brought back, it rather calls for individualization and people mobilization policies. Yet, the French education system, to stick only to that case, is a kind of counterexample. It puts individuals in competition, all the while destroying their self-confidence and their trust in the others if they don't perfectly achieve their studies. It is therefore important to change this education model and to consider that a good school is not only fair and efficient, it is also that which shapes individuals able to act with the others, able to distinguish singularities and to multiply projects and socialization activities. That is known today by many as "capability development".

The recognition of what?
That is certainly the most sensitive aspect because it more or less directly asks the question of the nation, of the imaginary community confronted with cultural diversity and multiple demands of acknowledgment. Equality demands coming from discriminated against groups is normal, at least in principle, but the acknowledgment demands create many problems because they call into question the community's imaginary and what makes equality desirable. A research on discriminations' experience leads to the conclusion that the less the majority is able to define what it has in common, and the more its confidence is falling apart, the more recognition of differences is difficult, even impossible[15]. Rather than shifting constantly between "communitarianism" and "republicanism", it would be preferable to define what the minorities and the majority community, the nation, may have in common: the right to one's own identity as long as it gives the priority to the individuals autonomy[16]. But that debate is only possible if the feeling of solidarity is strong enough that acknowledgment of difference is experienced nor as a threat, nor as a courteous indifference, nor as a way to cancel one's own guilt.

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15 F. Dubet, O. Cousin, E. Macé, S. Rui, Pourquoi moi ?, Paris Seuil, 2013.
16 That is the solution proposed by W. Kymlicka, Politics in the vernacular, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011.

Conclusion

The fact that we are convinced of being equals in right can induce a demand for justice and equity since the principle of equality has to make the best of men and women's diversity, but that belief is not sufficient when the policies of social equality, of an equality independent from diversity, must be built. To do so, the desire for equality must be associated to a feeling of solidarity and brotherhood, to the fact that equality is desirable because individuals have something alike, that they are linked and share a common future, and that their private happiness depends on their public happiness. When these feelings grow weaker, inequalities worsen. Today, many a political movement ask for equality for some and rejection for others by recomposing an archaic communitarian imaginary and that should force us to rebuild policies of solidarity that do not look at a mythical past, but at the same time do not ignore that equality implies a brotherhood imaginary. "To make men mutually acknowledge and grant rights to each other, they must love each other and, for any reason, they have to care for each other and for a society which they are part of[17]".

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17 E. Durkheim, De la Division du travail social, Paris, PUF, 1978, p 91.

Guanxi, self construal, and public participation in China

Yang Yiyin

Living in the context of Chinese society, people have developed some psychological structures, mechanisms, such as social cognitive styles, affection express way to match the social structure and the cultural situation in which Chinese embodied. Among these psychological structures and mechanisms, the self construal is the most typical one. Therefore, it will be the most important concept to understand Chinese social behavior, especially to explain the individual-collective relations in Chinese cultural and social change in contemporary.

1. Chinese self construal

Self-construal refers to how individuals define and make meaning of the self. Concerning the self-construal, Markus & Kitayama (1991) have put forward a theory to distinguish independent self and interdependent self—individuals with independent self seek to maintain their independence from others by attending to the personal self and by discovering and expressing their unique inner attributes, while individuals with interdependent self insist on the fundamental relatedness to others. Furthermore, they point out that independent self is mostly available to Western people (to North American, to be exact); while interdependent self are mostly available to Eastern people (to Eastern Asian, to be exact,) (shown in Figure 1). This understanding of the self is based on Euro-American beliefs about individualism, personal rights, and the autonomy of the individual from social groups. In contrast, the underlying principle that shapes the interdependent self-construal is the premise that the person is connected to others, so that the self is defined, at least in part, by important roles, group memberships, or relationships.

Figure 1 Two types of self construal
Source: Markus & Kitayama (1991)

However, I think that the concept of interdependent self could not fully characterized Chinese self-construal. Instead, I propose the concept of boundary penetrated and permeated self to characterize Chinese self-construal. This self must have shown as an expansive-contractive psychological construal in both horizontal and vertical dimensions. Here, on the horizontal dimension, the individual, as an agent, can control the variety of his/her self boundary and make the decision which one can be received into the boundary and which one cannot be according to his/her intention and affection in different situation. Its main characteristic is not two individual interdependent each other, but each individual master this interdependent independently.

On the vertical dimension, the individual mediates his/her self boundary by judging relative moral or immoral in social rule. It means that when dealing with the relation between private benefit and public benefit, people would be expected to expand self boundary larger than before and contain others' benefit as themselves. Therefore, the contradiction is solved (see Figure 2).

(A) Boundary-permeated self on the horizontal dimension
(B) Boundary-permeated self on vertical dimension
Figure 2 Boundary-permeated self

How does this self work? A Chinese concept, *Guanxi*, has to be introduced here. It means for understanding Chinese self, *Guanxi* is a key and sensitizing concept for explaining its cultural and social psychological structure and mechanism.

2. *Guanxi*

The concept of *Guanxi* originated from a kinship system in Chinese. This system regulated the relations among family members and relatives in affective expression, and instrumental exchange in daily life. Confucianism holds that human beings are fundamentally relationship-oriented and that building a strong and orderly hierarchy of relations can help achieve social

and economic order in society (Luo, 1997). Such a hierarchy of interpersonal relationships with an emphasis on implicit mutual obligations, reciprocity, and trust, has formed the foundation of *Guanxi* and *Guanxi* networks in China (Yang, 1995).

The *Guanxi* concept has the four following characteristics.

(1) It is ethically related to role norms. The use of social identity (especially kinship identity) to define norms for interaction with others implies role norms.

(2) In particular, *Guanxi* establishes requirements for degrees of closeness, trust and responsibility. The closer the kinship between two parties is, the greater their familiarity and intimacy and their mutual trust and responsibility. Thus closeness, trust and mutual responsibility arise only in kinship or pseudo-kinship relationships. Requirements based on kinship institutionalize emotions, trust and duties and determine the appropriate psychological distance between one person and another, in what appears to be a pre-established formula.

(3) *Guanxi* can be established or broken through interchange, in what is called "pulling strings" or "breaking off relations." By performing duties normally performed only by someone closer to the person in question and thus showing feelings normally shown by someone more intimate, one can turn from a outsider (with no *Guanxi*) into an "acquaintance" (with *Guanxi* newly established) and thence forge a "solid and ironclad relationship" (with *guanxi* firmly established).

(4) With the "self" at the center, a web-like structure can be built with others spread across it. The determinate nature of these role duties and the structural character of their interwoven exchanges allow *guanxi* to work as a melting pot that fuses ethics and morals, power structures, resource allocation, motives for interchange and social networks. In such circumstances, hardly anyone living in Chinese society can stay clear of *Guanxi*, and *Guanxi* influences everybody's concept of self.

3. *Guanxi* self

Chinese self construal is shaped by *Guanxi*. *Guanxi* is an elaborate concept in Chinese Confucians culture for dealing with interpersonal relations, self-collective relations and intergroup relations. Under the prism of *Guanxi*, we can find there are more types of Chinese interdependent self construal in details and rich.

(1) In the interpersonal interaction, it is social role self, individual definite himself in a dual relation; in self and close interaction, others are contained into the boundary of the self and become we-ness (Zijiren);

(2) In dealing with the relation between one's benefit and collective's benefit moral values lead the self from focus oneself to consider others, until to consider universal; in construction of ethic, it become a self which respect the person in high position and close the person in the core of kinship system;

(3) In social stratification, the self focus others critical and status of himself. However, with more and more space mobility in modern China, individual become independent in some time. There are two self-construals being inter-twist in this situation.

4. Public Participation

The most remarkable characteristic of the Chinese self is its boundary of "elasticity" and flexibility. The more expansive the self is, the more superior individuals are in morality, according to Confucius. For individuals with a strong expansive-contractive self, the boundary of the self changes depending on the context and the influence from *Guanxi* others. When the expansive-contractive self expands to the national level, individuals would like to be more patriotic, and become involved in national affairs in a positive and supportive manner. Meanwhile, individuals would depend on government mobilization to expand their self to the national level. If the government or the authorities higher in the hierarchy does not mobilize the national sentiments, individuals with expansive-contractive self will return to a lower self level (e.g. the family level), and may no longer be concerned about national affairs. Therefore, the expansive-contractive self differs from the independent self. For individuals with independent self, the boundary of the self is more fixed and invariable, changes less in different situation. When people with independent self realize that they have the responsibility to involve in national affairs, they would like to be more patriotic and participate positively, irrespective of government mobilization. When these selves realize that they do not have the responsibility to involve in national affairs, government and those in power could not motivate them to participate in such affairs.

The concept of "expansive-contractive self" has some similarity but is not identical to the concepts of "interdependent self" and "relational self" put forward by cultural psychologists (Cross, Hardin & Gercek-Swing, 2011). Individuals with an interdependent self are characterized by close relationships to and integrated into significant others. The expansive-contractive self, however, is characterized by changes in the boundary of the self, illustrated by perforated concentric circles (Figure 2-A). The content of the self therefore changes depending on the context and the influence from significant others. This self construal does not only reflect the interdependence between two or more individuals generally and in all situations, it also reflects how the interdependence between individuals is dependent on the social structure called "the differential mode of association" (Fei H-t, 1985). The individuals with expansive-contractive self would include important others into the self, and form an expansive self under the principle of **"**respect those who should be respected and excluded those who should be disregarded", regulated by the differential mode of association. Meanwhile, under certain situations, the self would shrink its boundary and exclude important others from the self, establishing a more contractive self. The expansive-contractive self can be regarded as one category of "relational self", proposed by Andersen & Chen (2002). "Relational self" emphasizes that individuals are linked together through the regulation of "relationship". The expansive-contractive self can especially explain the relationship in a hierarchical social structure and the implication of morality and obedience in such relationships. When individuals with expansive-contractive self contain more people inside the boundary of self and reach a higher human level according to Confucius, they also could be regarded as becoming more moral. Hence, the expansive-contractive self-construal is more prone to provide an explanation for whether Chinese people have the collectivistic orientation or not. To some degree, it can also clarify some problems concerning the self, collectivism, and individualism in cultural psychology (Kim, 1994, Oyserman, 2002; Brewer, & Chen,

2007; Gudykunst, Mastumoto, Ting-Toomey, Nishida, Kim, & Heyman, 1996, Kolstad & Horpestad, 2009). Meanwhile, it could also verify the assumption put forward by L. K. Hsu (1985), that is, the Chinese self has the characteristic of being "situation-centered".

Since the publication of Markus and Kitayama's (1991) pivotal paper on culture and the self, the concepts of *independent,* and *interdependent self-construal* have become important constructs in cultural psychology and research on the self. But research on self-construal should pay greater attention to the limitations of Western understandings of the person.

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Migrants and segregation in Chinese Cities

Liu Yuzhao, Wang Ping, Ying Kewei

In China coastal regions there emerge numerous immigrant enterprises and colonies with large scale foreign investment and migration since the reform and opening up. There are three main colonies, (i) high-level immigrant investors, including financiers, entrepreneurs, high-level management personnel and their family; (ii) white collar class, mainly including university graduates from western regions and rural areas. They are hired by the enterprises as technicians and middle-level management personnel; and (iii) migrant workers at the bottom of the hierarchy.

Among the three immigrant colonies, compared with the middle level colony, the other two colonies, are more difficult to be integrated into the local society. In the previous studies we realized the difficulties the two colonies have in social integration. Our interpretations for such phenomena are mainly based on the classification of the characteristics the colonies have. One of the things we have not take into consideration is the colony structure at the surface of organizations. For most of the immigrant people, their life is centered on their workplace when they move to a new place. It is mainly through work organization and work process that they succeed in building their social relations network crossing the colony boundary and hierarchical structure.

Through our study, We found a totally different organization in Taiwan enterprises, which is far from an enterprise based on typical hierarchy. In the organizations, whether in human resource employment or in internal promotion, supervision system, pay system, internal space distribution and social contact, we found the distribution among different groups or colonies are discontinuous. The difference and distance between the two are very big and there is also an state of isolation as well. In other words, there presents a characteristic of ruptured structure. In the most studies of the scholars found that the Taiwan enterprise and Taiwanese are increasingly breaking away from the Taiwan society, But in the perspective of the connection between Taiwan enterprises and the local enterprises, the Taiwanese have been localized in a very low level because it is hard for them to be integrated into the local society, Why does this situation happen? What are the reasons debarring Taiwan enterprise and Taiwanese from integrating with the society? Because the contact between the Taiwan colony and the local society of mainland mainly happen in the 'domain' of enterprise, the structure and operation of this unit will directly influence the social integration between the two colonies. This paper will introduce into Baron's theoretic frame on organization analysis, It will reveal how the structure and operation of the organization affect the social integration of the immigrant colony with the local society.

1. Investigations and Data Used in the Study

From 2002 to 2007, We studied the issue on Taiwanese businessman in conjunction with Geng Shu, Gunter Schubert, Lin Ruihua,Ect.for ten times, We made a series of studies, including in-depth interviews on 54 Taiwan businessman, 45 high level management personnel from Taiwan, 10 high level management personnel from Mainland China and other 17 people. Interview for each of the enterprise lasts at about 1 to 2 hours. Most of the interviews are recorded and verbatim transcriptions are made. A semi-structured questionnaire investigation is conducted as a supplement to the investigations for part of the enterprises.

2. Organization Rupture in Taiwan Enterprise

We found a totally different organization in Taiwan enterprises, which is far from an enterprise based on typical hierarchy. In the organizations, whether in human resource deployment or in internal promotion, supervision system, pay system, internal space distribution and social contact, we found the distribution among different groups or colonies are discontinuous. The difference and distance between the two are very big and there is also an state of isolation as well. In other words, there presents a characteristic of ruptured structure.

Organization character	Hierarchical system	'Ruptured' organization
Human resource deployment	Continuous distribution	Discontinuous distribution
Promotion	Promotion step by step, continuous distribution	Ceiling effect
Supervision	Step by step Supervision	Skip-level supervision, trans-departmental supervision
Pay system	unified standard, continuous standard	Multi-standard, evident difference
Dormitory system	Grade, continuous	Isolated from each other
Social interaction	Random distribution with work	Too much density in the groups, scarcity between groups

3. Rupture in the organization affect the social integration of the 'Taiwanese Colony'

In the inside of the Taiwan enterprise, the boundary between two colonies will form a 'fault' in job division and human resource deployment. Moreover, the 'ceiling effect' in promotion, the skip-level and trans-departmental supervision, different pay system and large income gap have been consolidating the boundary in some sense. Dormitory Labour System and isolated social contact have been furthering the extension and development of the boundary between the colonies. From the perspective of social construction, the operation of the 'ruptured' structure is indeed consolidating and strengthening the social structure, which makes the

social integration between different colonies miss a very important opportunity and room.In fact, in most of the enterprises we have investigated, there is little intersection between 'Taiwanese colony' and the society in Mainland China. The contact and social relations between the two is gradually established in the domain of enterprise, based on their work relations.

4. Organizational Difference and Change

The 'ruptured' phenomenon in the organization has different representations in different Taiwan enterprises. This has something to do with the scale of the enterprise and the extent to which the enterprise has been internationalized, and the nature of the enterprise and the importing and exporting characteristics of the enterprise. Moreover, with the time that the enterprise has been in the Mainland being longer and longer, this phenomenon will be changing gradually to some extent. In other words, in some of the Taiwan enterprises that have been localized to a high extent, cadres from Mainland China have more opportunities to be promoted, on the contrary, some of the enterprises that have not been localized to such a high extent, cadres from Mainland China are limited to low-level management positions. No matter how the situation is, the 'ruptured' structure is the basic characteristic shared by most of the Taiwan enterprises.

Global cities, inequalities and urban democracy

Agnès Deboulet

World cities are encountering new challenges which are rarely adressed in their sociological dimension. The issue of globalization, conflict and democracy can be discussed through the case of several "partial world cities" searching to upgrade their position in the urban competition. This major shift in their position directly modify policies and especially urban planning and therefore has an impact on inequalities. Based on surveys on international migrants neighborhoods and urban renewal issues this presentation will underline the new set of claims and mobilizations among people affected by this new world urban standards, with a special emphasis on vocabulary of justice and compensations.

1. Partial world cities

There is a constant tendancy to undermine the capacities of world peripheries to be incorporated into globalization in sharp opposition to analytical frameworks such as De Sousa Santos that rather acknowledge their plural dimension. A quick review of this litterature reveals that this comprehensive view depicts internationalization by including all material and imaterial flux of people and ideas. It is as well important to state that world cities are not restricted to the most reknown « global cities » but can be extended to what we call « partial world cities ». These emerging metropolis play a role of regional capital, as specialized in certain segments of production or even as steps-cities, steps in a dreamed final migratory destination. Thus, paralllel to these world cities, the temptation of globalization is a important in Teheran than Cairo, Tanger or Marseille. This perspective has to do with the post-western modernization issue. A clear change of wolrd perspective allow us also to consider J. Robinson theory to revise the usual ranking of large cities based on development levels and modernity ladders.

In parallel, practices of urban management are quite often submitted to privatization logics, often entangled with neo-liberalism and engendering major recompositions. The expansion of the scope of planning and urban large projets intervention follows a modernization paradigm associated with a vision of change associated to a global gentrification process. Henceforth, it is worth considering that large scale projets able to rescale the city on a world measure of attractivity and connectivity. If the links between globalization processes and economic restructuration can not be exposed here, we should rather emphasize the forms, language and social impacts of urban restructuration, acting more than ever as a predominant factor of social change and increase both of inequalities and demand for consideration and democracy.

2. Globalisation et redistributions sociales

All world cities today and especially the mega-cities with more than 10 millions dwellers as well as the capital cities share with part of the 400 one-million and more large cities some

common objectives : being visible on the international « radar » through « phare-projects »[1] with projects such as Casamarina, the royal avenue, the big mosk in Casablanca or the TangerMed large new port activity connected to a large free zone and project of new marina in Tanger (respectively 3,5 and 1 million people). This example taken from Morocco follow quite similar patterns of thought among decision-makers, based on a willongness to reframe the city landscape, to reorder it in order to adapt both to International investments capacities, to offer new opportunities for the local private sector such as organized developpers and to the new residential, leisure and security expectations of the « winner classes ». Consequently, global cities are the places where the productives arrangements are subject to rapid mutations with an important logics of concentration and offshoring often reinterpretated in order to canalize these new flows of informations and capitals. Besides these economic planned transformations restructurations goes along with the creation of leasure and consumption places directed at the new local and international elite.

The masterpiece of these mutations lies in the planned regeneration of city centers often decayed and impoverished into Information technology spots for the informational capitalism or at least shining new residential, cultural and leisure complexes often partially privatized (such as CID in Johannesbourg, see Morange & Peyroux, 2013 or the contested Toki programs in Istanbul). Pathes of globalization also hegemonize coastal and waterfront redevelopment, be it for giving emiratis developpers the opportunity of investing and redeveloping (Rabat, Casablanca, Tunis) or a mix between saoudi and national developpers in Cairo. The mega-projects do convey major institutional changes as their governance is handed out to to private – public parterships, often embedded into new agencies allowing for fast decision-making within a black-box even more difficult to understand than national institutions.

3. Urban restructuration from below

New urban space in its post-industrial a neo-liberal vision becomes an agency for reorganizing social group and develop all sorts of mobilities, wanted or not. The major nodes of redevelopment are envisioned as able to generate an enormous value-added and new resources and key points in order to become global. They also explain new patterns of development taking place with a dismantling of central public housing in many large cities of the west (Goetz, 2011) especially those experiencing heavy gentrification pressures. Then, they contribute to and reorganize social groups and circulations therefore constituting central places and redevelopment challenging locations as traps for populations in place often considered as general entities to be displaced because « not at the good place » or not deserving central locations. Corporate and technical discourses on the global city also forget to take into account the frequent oppositions towards their global projects, that tend in the long run to be frequently stopped or at least modified because of violent resistances or pro-activ mobilizations of the anonymous.

Paradoxically, most of the current economies and production of housing in most of the large world cities have grown without any state support and locate in place of little legibility, recognition and legitimity. In the course of rapid change endured by large cities within this

1 Oral presentations from local decidors

globalization process, residents of these neglected territories, epitomized recently by the spread of the « slum discourse » understand clearly that their linving space is heavily coveted by stakeholders of the world city.

Poor people, residents without legible land titles, impoverished middle class living in central and coveted districts or places, remaining farmers, fishermen, minorities are more than often shaken and under pressure due by this constant official willingness to redevelop spaces. Unrecongnized migrants are also a major target as they reside in non-recognized settlements adjacent to large new infrastructures, expressways and other government techniques of mobility and sometimes dispersal. Fragile groups created through forced migration offer a good example of this extreme discrepancy created by the mega-project reconfiguring strategies. Different force fields put local residents into informal negocations with the authorities, especially in the shi'a neighborhoods governed by the opposition parties such as the Hizb'allah in lebanon. But in this case precisely foreign workers renting overpopulated rooms in these southern popular and unrecognized districts are left out from this field force and not even incorporated into informal discussions with local authorities. During a survey on social impacts and transition effects of mega-projects we found out the massive presence of foreign residents, rarely described neither by officials and the litterature. Among these migrants, we find not only male arab workers from neighbouring countries (Egypt, Syria) or numerous refugies without recognized rights (Kurds, palestinians, soudanese, Irakis…) but also domestic workers from asia and african (Ethiopia, Philippines, Sri Lanka). These fragilized groups are composed from a large part of self-named *runaways*, domestic workers that have abandoned their assigned place of work because of bad treatments and find themselves in a grey zone without promises of return in their homeland and devoid of official and financial capacity to stay as authorized foreign residents.

These neighbourhoods have become overtime havens for unprotected populations that do not have the legal capacity nor the civic support from Ngo, trade unions or other intermediary bodies to voice their claims as undocumented workers and unprotected tenants. They will certainly be excluded from financial compensations –even inappropriate- finally granted to homeowners and tenants, be them lebanese in order to find another place of residence. This example illustrates how exogeneous and corporate decisions influence a variety of social resources, capitals, reception and understanding as well as political influence, heavily constrained by their location and recognition within national and local/urban social ordering.

4. Conflicting representations at work

The narrative of physical and social decay also play a large role to explain the dismantling and demolition of a part of public housing in large real estates in France or in some peri-urban post-industrial districts in many large cities (UK, USA…). Demolition program acts as a major pressure, bringing up major uncertainty and risk in contexts where public housing or controlled rents are often the last protection given to working-class residents. Sites choosen for urban renewal are often the most fragile. In some of them riots have occured at several periods, including for the most recent in 2005, (H.Lagrange, M. Oberti, 2006), among others. While is it common to state that most « grands ensembles » are inhabited by resignated dwellers or young people eager to demonstrate their radical indifference to the republic, the

national program of renovation urbaine has been depicted by authorities as a way to diversify population, give a new start and reaffirm citizenship.

      - Our starting point is double : we rather question urban renewal and citizenship as a by-product of conflicting representations of space and place. Whereas a minor part part of beneficiaries have succeeded to gain from this policies in getting acces to better dwelling and locations, a major part is left without clear explanations about the programs goals and intentions. They have to struggle for maintaining a place in a suburbian « grand ensemble » which is ultimately considered as a more desirable place than an unknown other social housing estate. Our main argument is to consider that conflict allows to open a path towards a plural urban citizenship (Uitermark, Rossi and Van Houtum, 2005 ; Ion, 2001) as opposed to the strict « republican promise » (G. Duhem, 2006).

How, in a first place, is this voluntarist scheme of demolition (as well as upgrading, reconstruction) perceived and understood, considering the previous tensions in this sites ? Our investigations show that urban renewal conveys a double dimension of shock and event that is important to consider following a sociology of conflict and mobilisation (Cefaï D., 2007 ; Murard N., 2008 ; Matthieu, 2004). Its major dimensions allow a comparative approach with survey results in other urban settings caracterized by large-scale evictions.

      - shock : the vast majority of city-dwellers in sites concerned by urban renewal would learn the demolition scheme incidentaly. In a sharp oppostion to the legal and framework and growing tendancies of participation in urban issues in France, demolition programs are not discussed with the concerned people, they are therefore « discovered » as a hidden project or perceived as a major top-down decision. Many interviewees describe the « *choc* » as the first step of a fear that will last till the individual and collective rehousing solution is to be clarified. Fear can lead to « trauma » of the demolition itself, some years after, or for some others to a feeling of mobility and sometimes liberation. This discourse is shared in many situations of evictions due to mega-projects such as in Beirut with urban bypasses projects (Deboulet, Fawaz, 2012).

      - event : the focus of personal experience of the demolition is also experienced by the group and the vast-majority as a major event. Destabilisation is deeply affecting most of the concerned dwellers with many questions such as : will I be rehoused ? Where and when ? Will my neighbours be friendly or even worse than the previous ? The cost of the new appartments is also a source of fear, as very often no public actor is able to describe precisely the rise in prices. In many evictions in fast-developing large cities evictions are rather compensated financially and thus, again, creates a source of worry.

As asserted before, housing is a major source of worry. Lack of information and default of participation also conveys its part of desappointment, anger, misunderstanding. In Argenteuil for example (Ile de France region), the urban renewal program of the Val d'Argent, a huge neighbourhood of 27 000 inhabitants has gone through a demolition program of 446 dwellings. Contrarily to the intentions of the national program, rehousing has been marginally done (5%) in new buildings. Reconstruction is ineffective, as in most of the sites, at the time of demolition and this time gap allows for a real « dispersion » of the concerned households, generally the poorest and often with the largest families (which does concern primarily recent migrants families from Africa). Meanwhile, the remaining poor households tend to be

reconcentrated in the same sectors, as many of public landlords or housing associations refuse to rehouse them (C. Lelévrier, 2010).

Thus we've like to emphasize at an individual as well as an collective level plural expressions of risk and injustice, embodied among other elements by the selection of buildings to be demolished and the weakness of reconstruction on site and reinforcing threats due to the rise in private eviction due to the subprime crises (in the US, Spain) or to encouraged or uncontrolled market led-evictions in many booming cities of Mumbaï and Bangalore, Teheran (Saïd, 2013), etc.

In Cairo, most informal dwellers concerned by evictions because of urban projets or rapid-transit systems contest radicaly the idea of an upward social mobility if and to the condition of being rehoused in « formal » dwellings and becoming owner. Nothing has changed in many developing countries such as Egypt (or India, Morocco, Brazil…) concerning relocation schemes : they are still thought off in far-away destinations, 10 to 40 km away from city-centers or from the previous residence. Therefore the major element of discontent and anger lies in the loss of sources of incomes and empoverishment due to transportation fees. In Cairo we found that all breadwinners relocated from one alley in a slum that had been distroyed because of alledged landslide risks were rehoused in a new city 40 km away and could not afford to remain there. They had adopted a strategy of staying among former neighbours or parents in the previous slum in order during week time and returned on week end to visit their wifes and children.

5. Lack of shared understandings and feeling of Injustice

Social movements arise from expressed and open conflicts. Our assumption is that conflicts arise in a first place from splittering values between governants and ordinary citizens in decision-making processes. Depending on the level of private and public investment the previous participation on project before its launch can be very weak both in democratic situation or in autoritharian regimes. Furthermore, large and especially internationalized mega-projects are clearly operated within a closed and new framework that does not allow for any previous participation and is almost perceived on the ground as imposed and reflecting a logics of neglect and sometimes disdain.

Dynamics of contention should be described briefly hereby in focusing on the primary aspect of ordinary judgment and understanding of the situation creating tensions. Yet, rather than reconciliating segments of society left apart and administrative bodies, urban renewal processes seem to accelerate a lack of misuderstandings of urban renewal, in France, and of urban regeneration operations in middle-eastern studies. On the first hand, ordinary and professionals explanations of what should be demolished differ in most parts.

Drawing from our empiricail work, in France, according to quantitative and qualitative research, demolished buildings appear to be representative of a housing stock that has already been cleaned from its most deteriorated devices. Thus, selections of the former often encounters a vast set of criticism from dwellers. Discontent is expressed through a positive description of dwelling units targeted for demolition : they are depicted as large[2], cheaper

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[2] Which is statistically true as there is an overrepresentation of bid flats among the demolished units (Report, CES de l'Anru 2008).

than the most recent housing stock including the social one, « beautiful » (benefiting from a nice view), etc. Demolition is a very global phenomena that shakens the whole life of concerned people, even if they find an interest in leaving the place. Not finding material reasons for demolition, these people will look for social ones. Prevails a double set of ideas anchored on a moral grammar of the stigmatized « grand ensemble » (Lapeyronnie, 2008): « they » want to get read of undesirable populations (large families with children left to themselves ; petty delinquents ; households with a disturbing relation to the neighbours and environment...) or « they » (and it is sometimes personalized through the mayor personality or the Municipality itself) want to get read of « us », understood as the « petty », the workers or the immigrants.

On the other hand, part of households that have never been explained the complex machinery and temporality of the project remain in uncertainty. Often deprived of clear explanations about relocation (quality-place-prices-social environment) they are also looking for rationales about demolitions, and do not find answers from the planning side, that remains unstable and somehow not understandable.

As stated by this retired woman, living alone with one of her son in the perimeter of operation in Argenteuil : « *at once the mayor (the former one) came, in person, at the meeting, then, to explain to us. Yet it is written down on this paper. It is in order to « disenclave » the district. I dont understand well. They will build a road passing through this building in front of it, in order to break the « enclavement »...then, I don't see well... »*

I don't find that the neighborhood is landlocked...I don't see what it would bring... ».

Question : what has been explained to you ?

*-What has been told during these meetings, it's what it would lead to. Practically speaking, that people had to move elsewhere, this was necessary to empty the flats, that they were about to be demolished. What I have, personnally I have..., I have understood that it was to mix the population, to prevent...to prevent that...that there would only be foreigners, and especially only poor people...with all the consequences it brings, at school...***»**

Combined with the weakness and the time gap for on-site reconstruction, the qualities of selection (for demolition purposes) leads to perceive these choices as non technical but rather pertaining to political agendas. This prove to be particulary true among the richest municipalities of the Paris region (Ile de France), well summarized by a local leader in Poissy-la Coudraie after a public information meeting in 2005 where the intended urabn development had been presented to a non-informed population : « *the cake was looking very nice, but it was not for us* ».

In some locations, speculative land tendancies and metropolitan issues play a major rôle in urging for demolition (as eviction from central areas, see Marseille, Berry-Chikhaoui and Deboulet, 2008). This knowledge proceeds to the development of a moral grammar of injustice, that has helped to shape new contendings expressions based on a growing awareness of metropolitan issues (and also raising some city-dwellers voices). We should add that well before the « technical » aspect of demolition, the lack of understanding echoes a shared injustice feeling based on the default of participatory schemes. Most of inhabitants, even the activists, would agree for discussing the opportunity of demolition, they use to justify themselves as non-systematic opponents. Questioning but not refusing this account, they argue that such an decision relies upon a necessary exchange and debate, summarized as

« concertation » with the concerned population. This statement is common to all sites concerned by the urban renewal program (more than 500) and stands for the major argument pointed out by contestants (also see Rui and Villechaise-Dupont, 2008).

A point stressed in this respect part would also be that controversial justifications of the local and built environment as « qualities » express new capabilities of populations often depicted as apathetic, desiring to escape for better places to live etc. Linking this to participation issues, they suggest that consideration to them is the main issue. New governementality of the suburbs therefore has to learn from the ordinary call for justice through respect and consideration of anchored residents and opinion-bearers, meaning clear early informations. Local resistance was often totally unexpected and therefore tells a lot about popular visions of social conflicts mediated through urban policies and normative claims.

6. Inequalities and spatial redevelopment : a focus on residential vulnerabilities

Adapting Fainstein (2003) researches on three europan cities, it is possible to argue that inequalities rise in major cities with a predominant part taken by the most qualified in the growth distribution whereas in developing countries the two first deciles see their share in the income distribution declining to less than 4% (UN-HABITAT's State of the World's Cities 2008-2009).

Poverty and insecurity are almost everywhere. Housing deficiencies, service inadequacy or lack is the mere manifestation of tenure insecurity in the vast majority of urban settings in the world where more that 85% (Onu-habitat) of the households are living without recognized tenure. The link between povery and insecurity is also paramount, although rarely studied as such, through the vast numbers of world events inducing large-scale redevelopments and displaying an objective of new urban order. Following the Ngo Cohre, 2 million people would have undergone forces evictions due to the sole organization of olympic games since 20 years. This is highly corroborated the the preparation of the Rio games that have gatjered hundreds of community based organizations united agains human rights violations in the course of the olympic games huge favelas displacements (Soares Gonçalves, 2013). Residential stability, which was a major factor of upward mobility in favelas (Perlman, 2010) is at stake within this globalization logics which, is the present case, is associated within a large gentrification process and unprecedented marked-based evictions and housing prices rise. Mega events sooner or later become a pretexte for reopening locations of the poor to the wealthiest and to refurbish neglected spaces in increasing the desire for the metropolis.

The combination between new global sources of residential insecurity and land insecurity opens up a new spectrum of reflexion. At this crossing point, let us recall that the sociology of internationalization and urban development is also made of a movement and mobility approach. The scale of change is unknown, in a connected world where villages become in a few decades multi-million cities, raising all sorts of new questions such as social risk prevention in societies where social protection are uneven and weak. Urban revolts and the arab spring or this summer challenging urban events in Brazil and Istanbul reveal, after Tunis, Cairo or Amman that the weakening of social fabrics through neo-liberal opening has also impacted urban fabrics as it is the case in Beijing and many other asian cities. Residential tensions and risks have become a major source of claims and contests in many large cities (on

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Tel Aviv, see Bulle, 2013 ; on Delhi, Dupont 2010, etc) revealing the new consciousness of spatial inequalities, initiatives that need to be studied and understood carefully. Our research expercience in the middle east reveals the recent creation of a large display of civil societies organizations (Deboulet, 2013) based on the premices of right to housing defence following a variety of approaches and political tendencies.

Large scale refurbishing have since long contributed to destabilize affected populations. But the scale of these imposed changed is unprecedented. Also, as it affects non only « poor neighborhoods » but also lower and some parts of the middle class residents, it does create the ground for future large contests and rebellions. Social inequalities are also reinforced by the unlocking of residential and tenants protections, an understudied challenge of most developing countries. This is not only the case of former communist countries looking for a quick liberalization of land and housing markets but does also apply to countries with a large social housing stock that is often dismanteld or privatized and to a set of other measures proned by transnational institutions such as the world bank : for instance rental deregulation of frozen housing (in France, law of 48 establishing the impossibility to increase the rent and some equivalents exists in countries since their independancies (in Egypt, Algéria, India). This sudden deregulation is paving the way for future impoverishment and situations of vulnerability and is also carefully followed by NGO in order to prevent it. Housing markets recompositions are embedded into the spaces of global neoliberalism or at least global competition.

Beyond the structural loss of tenants or landlords protection in many large cities, these changes modify urbanscapes and capacities to be part of the city, to express urban anchorages and sense of place. They are part of risk civilization that expands to urban and especially metropolitan contexts and is not without remaining us that, following Bauman change is what brings the highest profit, even unseen changes of residents and tenants contracts.

Somalis in Johannesburg: Muslim transformations of the city

Samadia Sadouni

Introduction

Theories of secularism in the West and in the twentieth century have tended to neglect the visible presence of religion in modern urban spaces. With the increasing movement of international migrants, the city's religious landscape has been transformed over the last thirty years, not least in Western Europe. Migration is also at the centre of major changes in Johannesburg, southern Africa's economic hub. In this metropolis, the Muslim religious landscape has undergone major changes with the incorporation of many new immigrants since 1994, that is, in the post-apartheid era. These include South Asians from Pakistan and Bangladesh, sub- Saharan Africans, who come mainly from Somalia, Senegal, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria and Mali, and to a lesser extent North Africans (Moroccans Algerians, Egyptians), Bosnians and Turks. This pronounced pluralism in Johannesburg has led to the increased visibility of religion (new religious institutions, religious events and religious festivals in public spaces) and to the creation of diverse territories marked by the settlement of different migrant communities.[1] These three intersecting transformational modes of the post-apartheid urban era are also closely linked to transnationalism.

This chapter will focus on a particular group, Somali refugees, who add to the diversity of Islam and to the ways of being Muslim in South Africa, thus contributing to the analysis of a group which is still understudied. Here I examine how Somalis' "religious spatiality" (Hervieu-Léger, 2002) has created new Muslim communities and spaces in inner-city Johannesburg. The main argument of this chapter is that religious solidarity, a religious urban environment and aspiration (van der Veer, this volume) represent the main resources for Somalis' incorporation into their new host city. Somalis have chosen to settle where they can hear the five daily calls to prayer (adhan). In Johannesburg religion has been and still is a source of identity and meaning, as well as of group affiliation and group membership. In this chapter, I will discuss the local and religious urban context, as well as the impact of Somalis on that context.

1. The Post-Apartheid Muslim Religious Landscape: The Case of Mayfair

Most Somalis in South Africa are refugees or asylum-seekers who have fled the wars, political conflict, ongoing turmoil and humanitarian crises in Somalia. Forced migrations of Somalis have helped to reshape the neighbourhood of Mayfair, an area close to the Central Business District (CBD) of Johannesburg, where the majority of the population is Muslim.

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[1] This is nothing new in South Africa: during colonialism South Africans experienced the perpetual negotiation of frontiers and demarcation of territories in order to differentiate 'us' from 'them'.

During apartheid, with the introduction of the Group Areas Act, inner-city Johannesburg became a White area. Forced removals began in the 1950s in part of Vrededorp, more popularly known as 'Fietas' (Carrim, 1990). Fietas, which began as the Malay Location in 1893, was renamed Pageview[2] in 1943; it included different population groups, such as Coloureds, Indians, Chinese, Africans and Cape Malays.[3] The inhabitants of the area were relocated to separate racial ghettos in Lenasia, Soweto, Eldorado Park and the western townships. However, some Indians succeeded in remaining in Fietas and Fordsburg,[4] adjoining Mayfair. They refused to abide by the apartheid laws and used different political strategies to avoid their relocation to the newly designated Indian areas, such as Lenasia (south of Soweto), Azaadville, Laudium (near Pretoria) and Roshnee (in Vereeniging).[5]

Scholarly literature has not yet provided a full record and analysis of the political and legal strategies which undermined the apartheid government's attempts to implement its policy of racial and ethnic segregation and impose its racial human geography. By appropriating their own space (Lefebvre, 1991), Indians have rooted their presence (Sassen, 1998) in Johannesburg since the 1900s. Despite several efforts by the state to evict them, they have contributed to the urban planning of the city. When Mohandas Gandhi addressed his Muslim, Christian, Parsi and Chinese supporters in 1908, Johannesburg was the home of a strong Indian community settled around the Hamidia Mosque. Earlier, in 1904, Indians had been forcibly removed from the "coolie location", an Indian slum west of the inner city which was deliberately burnt down for sanitary reasons. The authorities wanted its former residents to settle about 19 km south of Johannesburg in Klipspruit. However, they refused this evacuation and chose to move to the Malay Location, which became the cosmopolitan area known as Fietas. As soon as they arrived, wealthy Indian merchants invested in the area by acquiring stands and became the main agents for the immigration of African residents by giving them leases (Dugmore, 1993). As we shall see, Indian Muslim landlords would extend this capitalist form of hospitality to Somalis during the post-apartheid period.

During the apartheid era, Indian Muslims (mostly Gujarati) continued to oppose the government through a process of the 'détournement' of laws that enabled them to shape their community in confrontation with pre-existing urban and racial policies. As long as their economic interests and cultural life were protected, Indian leaders were keen to negotiate with the relevant authorities; if this failed, they would take legal action against the particular town council or the government. Indian Muslims, like other religious groups that were discriminated against, went through a process of secularization, in the sense of the separation of religion from national politics over generations during the colonial and apartheid periods. This is best understood as a privatization of community space: on the one hand, this served the interests of the apartheid regime (by conforming to its policy of separation); on the other hand, this helped the Muslim groups to protect particular religious and cultural identities. The

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2 Pageview was named after the then mayor, Mr J.J. Page.
3 The terms Cape Malay, Indian, Black and White are used in the 2001 Census, even though they are contested. In the specific case of South African Muslims, 'Cape Malay' refers to people descended from Muslim immigrants brought to the Cape, initially as slaves, by the Dutch East India Company in the seventeenth century; 'Indian' refers to people whose ancestors arrived from India in the late nineteenth century; 'Black Muslim' is used to refer to the descendants of the Zanzibari population in the province of Kwazulu-Natal and to local Black converts to Islam. A small number of Whites have also converted to Islam.
4 Fordsburg was originally established in 1887 for White miners.
5 The part of the Transvaal that is centered on Johannesburg was made a separate prov¬ince called Gauteng after 1994.

racial segregation imposed by the Pretoria regime was in fact seen by conservative and bourgeois Muslim leaders as a way of guaranteeing their freedom of religion and their community initiatives and modes of local and community governance. Secularization here means that the racialized society and state bureaucracy, the latter with its policies of enforced racial segregation, structured the autonomy of religion and influenced the internal organization of a particular religious group. These are the political and cultural alchemies that have enabled the Islamization of community territories with the construction of mosques, madrasas (Islamic school) and Islamic organizations. Within their particular local community borders, Indian Muslim leaders used politics to serve the religious interests of their group and its Islamization, even though in society in general, Islam remained apolitical until the 1980s In that decade, Muslim movements began to participate in the non-racial struggle against apartheid and tried to distance themselves from the ethnic-religious communalism that the apartheid system encouraged (Esack, 1988).

Since the 1970s, the Indian presence in the metropolis has been represented and symbolized by the Oriental Plaza mall built in Fordsburg. This marked a new period in the urban engagement of Indian Muslims. The Indian traders who for many years refused to be evicted from 14th Street in Fietas finally decided to move to the Oriental Plaza after drastic forced removals in 1977. However, in the late 1980s a new influx of South African Indian Muslims returned to the inner city area of Johannesburg. They were able to move from the Indian suburbs and townships to Fordsburg and Mayfair by using proxies – White South Africans – to buy houses on their behalf. Today Mayfair, from Hanover Street in the east to Mayfair West, is predominantly Muslim and home to most of the Somalis living in Johannesburg. Not only has the demography of Mayfair changed as a result of Somali settlement, but religious beliefs and practices have also been transformed. For example, Somalis belong to the Shafi'i madhhab (a school of Islamic jurisprudence), which differs from the Hanafi madhhab to which most South African Indian Muslims adhere. We turn now to the periodization of Somali incorporation into the global city that is Johannesburg.

2. The Invisibility and Visibility of Somali Immigrants

However, this Muslim space in Mayfair, which Somalis have helped to enlarge and diversify, was not a virgin space for them. Although the study of the different waves of post-apartheid Muslim migration in South Africa is still a burgeoning academic field, we still need to analyse earlier African Muslim migrations. Somalis represent just such a group. They came as the servants of British soldiers during the Anglo-Boer war and then decided to settle in Johannesburg. At this time, they were not classified as a distinct Somali racial group but integrated into the Cape Malay population by the Transvaal authorities.[6] A new history of Johannesburg therefore needs to be told by taking into account earlier Somali migration. This, of course, has implications for urban belonging linked to local histories (see also Burchardt, this volume). Analysis of the narratives of early Somali immigrants shows how memories create a sense of belonging to South Africa in terms that remind us of Lefebre's concerns

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6 National Archives of Pretoria, LTG_94_97-9. A letter dated 3rd August 1904 sent by 'Shikh Ahmad Effendi' to the Transvaal authorities testifies to Somalis' early presence in Johannesburg. Effendi requested that Somalis should be classified as Cape Malays.

about the inter-related topics of time and space. By emphasising that in the past Somalis were integrated into the Malay community of Pageview, present-day Somali migrants are able to take ownership of the space and claim their "right to the city" rather than rely on their rights as refugees or asylum-seekers. They have embedded their legitimate presence in an invented generational history of settlement which resembles the claims of Malays and Indians to be part of the city.

There is a strong relationship between the collective memories of these international Somali migrations and the construction of identities. Those narratives that insist on an earlier presence of Somalis in Johannesburg having been established are either permanently produced or rejected as marginal and embarrassing by several informants. For one group, the use of names like Magodishu, El-Alamein, Sidi Rezegh and Benghazi on the front of different buildings in Coronationville is self-evident proof of the presence and imprint of Somalis in Johannesburg prior to the post-apartheid era. The suburb of Coronationville is linked to the history of Fietas: Coloured residents had to move to this new area near the Coronation Hospital, and it is likely that these buildings were named El-Alamein and Sidi Rezegh in recognition of the service rendered by Coloured troops who fought in North Africa during the Second World War. Somalis who arrived in Johannesburg in 1994 or 1995 appropriated this military history as proof of the earlier migration of Somalis. Today, narratives that emphasize the historical presence of Somalis in Johannesburg represent newer migrants' aspirations to be socially and politically integrated into the post-apartheid, cosmopolitan city of Johannesburg. Unlike the Indians, Somalis have no figure similar to Gandhi whom they can use as evidence of their historical, political and charismatic presence in Johannesburg. Does this suggest that the historiographies of Johannesburg produced so far only recognize minority groups through their heroes and great leaders?

A second group of Somali migrants tend to assert their urban legitimacy by emphasizing their religious beliefs. They link this to local knowledge that portrays the Somali as the symbolic figure of African Islam or the authentic Black Muslim. Even today there are those among the West African Muslim migrants who regard Somalis as the Arabs of Muslim Africa. This cultural symbolism may provide Somalis with the opportunity to take revenge on history and finally assert their particular identity and visibility in the new democratic dispensation in terms of religious apologetics, rather than insisting on their historical presence a century ago. However, the underground Somali identity among Cape Muslims or in the Coloured communities of the past can still be seen in present-day Mayfair, which is marked by a Somali Muslim culture that is strongly linked to its ethnic diaspora. However, some members of this second group of Somali migrants do not endorse these narratives of a past Somali presence, rejecting identification with earlier migrations which do not serve their present identity interests and their desire to portray themselves as faithful Muslims. According to one informant, many of these Somalis have escaped charges of murder and other criminal acts by migrating to southern Africa. In this latter case, Somalis refuse to acknowledge the past wrongs of their counterparts (whether imagined or real) or whatever role they may have played in the British Empire. What is important for them is to overcome or deny the memory of an earlier Somali diaspora within their community and to gain legitimacy in the South African Muslim space by emphasizing their faithfulness and authenticity as Muslims. Identifying themselves first and

foremost as Muslims seems to give them better opportunities to gain economic and political solidarity among South African Indian Muslims.

For both groups, representation of the past in their biographies tend to be selective and to serve as a mode of self-production. However, this does not prevent us from using these diaspora narratives as a way of understanding these two modes of being Somali in Johannesburg: on the one hand, the assertion of migrants' rights to the city (based on a real but reinvented local history); on the other hand, the Africanization of Islam and its idealization through the Somali figure. Both serve a common interest and objective, the incorporation of Somalis into South African Muslim urban areas, in which they succeeded in Mayfair and recently in Lenasia, another Indian area mentioned above.

3. Uncertainty and Somalis' Survival Strategies

Most Somali immigrants in post-apartheid South Africa are refugees who left their country because their safety was threatened after the collapse of the government in 1991 (Menkhaus, 2007; Samatar, 1992). This had a serious effect on the Horn of Africa region where Somalis have sought refuge, particularly in Kenya. The spaces crossed and created by these migrant trajectories constitute experiences and provide embedded memories of migration and of refugee practices. Indeed, crossing not only affects the identity of the migrant, it also contributes to the formation of a refugee culture in South Africa that will probably be transmitted to the second generation. The migrant trajectories of most of my informants included the crossing of four or five borders before reaching Johannesburg. These migrant experiences in places of transit such as Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique and Malawi, together with their home identities, have produced a multi-layered Somali refugee culture in South Africa (Farah, 2000). Indeed, Somalis have contributed to a new Muslim culture in Mayfair through the construction of a Somali mosque and a community madrasa (Qur'anic school), the creation of various Somali community organizations and the establishment of an ethnic mall, Amal, which provides the basis for a Somali-based urban economy. As much as the Somali immigrants add to the cultural and economic diversity of Mayfair, they are also influenced by the South African political context, by their migrant trajectories and by "South African Islam".

Today, the processes of innovation through migration and immigration in South Africa touch on all spheres of Somalis' life. In Johannesburg, they have learnt how to overcome various barriers (such as those created by gender and clan identities) which would have been more difficult to cross at home. Gender relations, for example, come under great pressure in the context of migration and are being transformed as evidenced by the number of divorces and single-parent families in Mayfair. Somali women have gained a measure of independence through their involvement in small businesses. They work as hawkers, selling vegetables on the streets of Mayfair, or they own shops in the Amal mall, sometimes in partnership with Somali men. This challenges the ideology of the male breadwinner and increases the financial independence of women in the community. Some women even venture into African townships, like those near Kimberley, in order to earn better incomes, in the process learning to speak a South African language, which guarantees their relative safety.

Even though they have succeeded in crossing different international borders, Somali migrants find that their journey has not ended once they arrive in South Africa. The difficulty of acceptance in South Africa is often emphasized, especially in the African townships, whose inhabitants are often rather hostile to migrant entrepreneurs like Somalis: since the late 1990s, many Somalis have been violently attacked and some murdered. One young Somali described a traumatic situation that anticipated the tragic xenophobic events that occurred in May 2008, leaving 62 people dead and forcing thousands from their homes:

South Africa is good and it is not good. Good because there is a government and a job, but there is no peace, the peace Somalis are crying for. The [South African] government comes to a useless point. People who are here for twelve years, they can't open a bank account. They call them makwerekwere. … It is something embarrassing, something bad. They burnt people with paraffin, they set them alight. It is not fair.

This quote describes the difficulties faced by Somali migrants in townships and informal settlements, where they have opened shops providing basic commodities and foodstuffs. The so-called makwerekwere (those who speak in an unintelligible language) are seen by Black South Africans as aliens, as outsiders. This term refers in particular to African non-nationals, who, according to Francis Nyamnjoh, are seen as the uncivilized who hailed "from the sorts of places no South African in his or her right mind would want to penetrate without being fortified with bottles of mineral water, mosquito repellent creams and extra-thick condoms" (Nyamnjoh, 2006: 40; Sharp, 2008). Amakhoela (coolies) is the other xenophobic term used to refer to Somalis who are assimilated to Indians, who originally supplied the labour needed on the sugar plantations of colonial Natal in the late nineteenth century. The uncertainty and danger that Somalis encounter in the township have been particularly traumatic for Somali women. One Somali mother and her three children were murdered in their Eastern Cape home in October 2008. News of this brutal slaying, which was condemned by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights,[7] spread rapidly among Somalis in Johannesburg, who immediately enquired about the well-being of female friends and shopkeepers living in African townships. However, in large cities like Johannesburg the situation is more secure for Somali migrants, most of whom still regard the country as a transit country.

4. Community Protection and Muslim Infrastructures

The relatively secure life of Somalis in Mayfair is the result of a Muslim ethic of solidarity and mutual protection which has developed in an urban context. A Somali is more of a stranger in a Black township than in an urban South African Muslim area, where religion has played a major role in the incorporation of Somalis into society. With the exception of one Somali who was murdered in Newtown, near the CBD, the wave of anti-immigrant violence in Johannesburg in May 2008 did not affect Somalis in Mayfair. This human geography of xenophobia needs to be taken into account in order to understand the so far relatively secure situation of Somalis in Mayfair. Some Somalis claimed protection from South African Muslims when a few of their houses in Mayfair were identified as belonging to foreigners and singled out for attack.[8] According to one informant, the South African police were also asked

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7 "UN slams xenophobic killings in SA", The Star, 8 October 2008, p. 3.
8 Interviews with a Somali family in Mayfair, June 2008.

to patrol the area at different times in order to prevent the incursion of violent mobs at this time. Somalis have benefited from this protection because South African Indian traders and owners want to protect their investments in a place they previously struggled to preserve from forced removals and to gain recognition of their rights as citizens. This is part of the legacy of apartheid, and is based on community governance, urban productivity and security.

The support given to Somali Muslim co-religionists in the name of Islam supersedes ethnic, migrant and national identities. It is in the name of Islamic solidarity that Somalis have been able to rent houses in Mayfair without entering into complicated arrangements to do so. However, as Lefebvre has suggested, the space is also a place where conflicts exist, and in the case of Mayfair the Muslim community is far from being united. Historically grounded ethnic identifications and boundaries continue to divide the Muslim population in South Africa. There is in fact an acknowledgement and mutual recognition by Muslims in Mayfair that theirs is a diverse community. In addition, the protection of Somalis living in Mayfair has sometimes led to patronage politics, which (according to my informants) leads to unfair treatment from landlords charging high rents. This has not, however, prevented Somalis from settling in Mayfair since it is considered a Muslim area and is well equipped with mosques, Islamic schools, Muslim butcheries and shops.

In general, Somalis remain attached to their religious belonging and do not seek to settle in other areas than Muslim ones. This is particularly the case for female entrepreneurs representing the "people as infrastructure" (Simone, 2008), who decided to run community businesses such as single-sex hostels accommodating Somali men in three or four-room shared apartments situated in a Muslim and urban neighbourhood. Hostels managed by Somali women have as their first the objective the provision of food and shelter for new incomers who can rely on community support in order to start new lives in South Africa. However, they also play a role in the segregation of Somalis from the majority of Blacks. Black hostels in South Africa have a history of undermining the "migrant ethic" of South African black labour and breaking the structure of migrants' families, who are often left in poor rural areas in the 'homelands' (Chipkin, 2007). Somalis who arrived in South Africa in 1995 remember these hostels where they stayed as places of immorality:

We were in a hostel, where homeless people are. People are drunk, my first time I have ever seen people who were drunk. In Somalia there is no bottle store. Before South Africa, I've never seen, I've never seen someone who drinks it. So, you know for me it was an emotional…emptiness.[9]

This 'emptiness' seems to have encouraged Somalis to control acculturation and re-appropriate the post-apartheid structure of the city, which is still based on a segmented ethnic population. In post-apartheid South Africa, people and the spaces they occupy remain marked by ethnicity and religious affiliation, and more recently by migrant origins. This production of space seems not only to threaten the dream of the rainbow nation, but also to reduce the state's capacity to deal with factionalism or communalism.

The communal relations between Somalis and South African Muslims in Mayfair have also been strongly influenced by the ways in which pluralism and immigration into the country were managed. South African Muslim organizations like Islamic NGOs give financial and material support for the integration of Somalis and other migrant groups into Johannesburg. The South African National Zakaat Fund (SANZAF), in charge of the distribution of zakat

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9 Interview with A., June 2007, Mayfair.

(obligatory alms) and other charitable financial products, has implemented a South African norm in terms of which the community is seen as the key actor in hosting migrants. This humanitarianism from below, performed by South African Islamic NGOs, is strongly influenced by government migration policies and a sense of communal responsibility. South African migration policies do not support the establishment of refugee camps. Once their status has been granted by the Department of Home Affairs, refugees must seek employment and shelter for themselves (Neocosmos, 2006). Even after the xenophobic attacks of May 2008, the government dismantled refugee camps and asked the refugees to resettle in their 'community', a loose term that does not measure the complexity of social links. Both human rights activists and the refugees themselves denounced this decision. Fearing a new wave of violence from their South African neighbours, many refugees refused to return to the urban townships. However, the same policies which place the responsibility on the community seem to have succeeded in Muslim areas such as Mayfair, where Somalis feel more secure. As one of South Africa's religious "denominations" (Casanova 2007a), Islam and its moral economy, exercised through the distribution of zakat, continues to be crucial for Muslim migrants. The South African Muslim merchant class and other professionals have been generous in providing funds to a number of Muslim charitable organizations.

Even the powerful transnational Islamic missionary movement, Tabligh Jama'at, assists Somalis to adjust to the global city, and its influence appears to be felt even by those who claim not to be members. As a pan-Islamic movement concerned with da'wa (the call to Islam) mainly among Muslims, Tabligh Jama'at (TJ) provides valuable resources to all its members, including Muslim foreigners. Along with Islamic NGOs, it is an actor in the field of religious governance that affects Muslim urban life, at the same time providing the ethos for a social order which is strongly linked to the political narrative of the nation. However, TJ's interventions are limited to the suburban and inner-city spaces: the townships definitely constitute the frontier for any Muslim activist and organization, and even the TJ seems to be unable or unwilling to cross it. The Somalis of Mayfair who are the members and sympathizers of TJ recognize its power to purify their religious lives and protects them from an imagined African decadence. As already noted, for them the loss of morality is mostly linked to the African township, the 'location', as it is commonly called in South Africa. This is how a young Somali refugee narrates his experience as an employee in a Somali shop in a township near Port Elizabeth, where he thought he would be protected by the elders:

The other guy he was a teacher, he used to love deen [religion] mashallah, he studied in Arab countries, Saudi Arabia. (…) he stayed in location [township], so I used to know him, he was a sheikh. So when he came to take me, to locations, I saw him [as] different, he throws the khamis [Muslim dress for men]. He took me from that side to that shop, that shop first time to see, (…) I saw a Black people area, it is very quiet, it's a scaring place. How can you live [here], your guys? So I became shocked (…) I said sheikh I can't stay here anymore. You can't take bath nicely, you can't go to the toilet, and they said take paper, no water. I said no, this life I can't do this. Then I said I have to leave you, then I went to work in town in the Somali hotel, then the Tabligh came and took me.

For many small entrepreneurs, African townships offer the possibility to earn more money than in cities like Johannesburg, where employment and business opportunities are concentrated in the hands of merchant families and individuals with the financial resources to

be competitive and organize their own businesses.[10] Somalis who decide to live in these townships may have to pay a high price: not only do they risk being murdered, they also run the risk of losing their so-called morality, as this young Somali who joined the TJ emotionally emphasized. Islamic practices and ways of life in South Africa are embedded in an urban existence and have yet to bridge the gap between the modern cities and the townships and informal settlement. This is why Islamic NGOs encounter such difficulties in the township and are not well prepared to deal with the transition from cosmopolitan metropolis to township and informal settlement. Furthermore, they are often trapped in their role of intermediary between the state and the people at the grassroots level. They are often targeted in political protests and sometimes unable as social workers to cope with so-called "service delivery protests".[11] Here two worlds coexist without a common language in which to communicate.

5. The Call to the Diaspora

The modes of community construction and religious practice described so far among Somalis in Mayfair are also strongly influenced by another form of solidarity, Somali diasporic solidarity. In the absence of a viable state, the Somali diaspora plays a political role, helping to define the identities of its members and playing a central role in their daily lives. Transnational networks with fellow Somalis have assumed greater significance for Somali entrepreneurs in Johannesburg, especially for those who do not have a passport. Unable to travel outside the country, such entrepreneurs have to rely on relatives and fellow Somalis to obtain goods from Dubai or from elsewhere in Africa. These modes of conducting transnational business are also found among other immigrant groups in South Africa, such as the Senegalese and Congolese, and this tends to provoke the hostility of Black South Africans in the townships, who do not have access to these migration-based resources (Simone, 2004). However, these transnational remittances do not reach the majority of Somalis, who are left marginalized and seek to publicize their plight by simultaneously claiming migrants' rights in the South African city and their right to the political institutions and Somali solidarity of the diaspora.

This diasporic dimension of Somali identity helps to explain their attitudes to the refugee camps built and managed by the UN after the xenophobic attacks of 2008. Several media outlets reported on protests by Somalis at the living conditions in these camps and on their demands for better treatment. This has been understood as a way of putting pressure on the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to allow them to resettle in countries such as the USA and Canada. However, it is their refugee culture, accumulated through their experience of multiple migrations and encampment, that has shaped their attitudes. Some of the refugees who transited through refugee camps in Kenya witnessed the resettlement of their relatives by the UN or heard about such possibilities. These vulnerable migrants, who had little economic or political power, knew how to assert their presence through the politics

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[10] It is difficult for refugees and undocumented migrants to find employment in South Africa. Most of the Somalis in Johannesburg have invested in small businesses in order to be self-sufficient and have created their own ethnic market.

[11] During October 2009, people in townships and informal settlements took to the streets en masse in violent protests over service delivery failures.

of protest in these non-permanent refugee camps. These protests, made possible by the power of their culture and identity as Somali migrants, were also intended to attract the attention of the Somali diaspora to their plight in South Africa. Publicising their situation as refugees was a way of making their suffering known to the world and to the diaspora, which, as we saw, was the only alternative for solidarity when even the TJ or most South African Islamic NGOs were unable to provide aid in informal settlements. Their call via the media was directed at co-nationals who send remittances to relatives in Somalia and in various refugee camps in Africa. Remittances as a religious duty and cultural obligation sent by Somalis living in Europe, Canada and the US are at the heart of diasporic life (McGown, 1999). The UN and the Somali diaspora are external agencies that can play a major role in improving the social and economic condition of refugees. The networks of financial assistance formed throughout the Somali diaspora illustrate a common transnational practice observed in different diasporas, which tends to reproduce itself in rather similar ways in different social contexts. Here the responsibility of government with regard to emigrants is no longer exercised by the Somali state, which has collapsed, but by the Somalis in the diaspora, which is regarded as a new political entity by its members.

Conclusion

The case of Somalis in Mayfair shows how local histories of Somali migrations, the urban context and transnational identities all intersect.

However, this intersection differs between cities in South Africa, and also between the suburban or inner-city setting and the township. Somalis' urban aspirations, combined with a claim of belonging to Johannesburg, play a role in the religious fabric and bring new elements into South African urban Islam. These urban aspirations are not only linked to local and national politics, but also to British imperial connections, which brought Somali servants of British soldiers to the emerging global city of Johannesburg in the 1900s. Reinvented histories of the British Empire, combined with South African Islam and diasporic practices, have contributed to the visible presence of Somali immigrants in Johannesburg.

Although high rates of crime and other serious obstacles to integration into the economic and political spaces of South Africa have led many Somalis to leave the country, their presence in Johannesburg is now an established part of city life. The development of Somali business networks and the building of places of worship (such as a Somali mosque and a network of madrasas) demonstrate a process of community-building in Mayfair. Somali refugees have made Johannesburg their own place, not least as a result of Muslim solidarity. Somali clan differences remain important in modes of identification, but the construction of a more pan-Somali identity has helped to secure the protection of South African Indian Muslims and afforded a sense of security (Sadouni, 2009). This religious solidarity has been a main obstacle to rising xenophobia in the city and has helped to secure Somalis' livelihoods and presence in the religious and economic life of the city. The study of religion is likely to become increasingly powerful in existing and future megacities, especially in South Africa, where the dichotomy between the townships and the cities is central.

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Institutional Vulnerability, Situational Ethics, and Waves of Chinese Industrial Collective Actions

Liu Neng

Institutional Vulnerability, Situational Ethics, and Waves of Chinese Industrial Collective Actions

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- Backgrounds: the Chinese social uprising in general
  - Structural conduciveness and the changing pattern of grievance production
  - The shifting basis of mobilizing structures
  - The paradoxical role of the Chinese state and the evolving cognitive realities of the insurgents
  - An overview of China's social uprising

- The nature of the world of work
  - ☐ Structural changes in the world of work since mid 1980s
  - ☐ The starting point of my argument: to perceive the world of work as a cultural mosaic
  - ☐ Other social forces that determine/demarcate the ecology of work

- Three waves of Chinese industrial collective actions
  - ☐ Mid 1990s: defensive demonstrations toward SOE reform
  - ☐ Since the new century: migrant workers [especially those in the construction industry] protesting delayed payments
  - ☐ Last decade: workers in joint venture or foreign owned sectors demand for pay raise

A theoretical explanation

Term clarification

- Institutional vulnerability: a term to describe the phenomenon that the unfavorable structural situations that each of the insurgents found themselves been trapped in are not the result of their own social characteristics/endeavors, but rather that of the institutional arrangements/designations of the Chinese state

- Situational ethics: moral resources that those insurgents utilize to counter back their disadvantageous institutional situation, and through which to restore the disrupted redistributive justice

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Wave 01: violent resistance of the SOE workers during mid 1990s

Institutional vulnerability	- State-led industrial re-adjustment at the expenses of the labor force - Ownership reform favored toward the management class, and severe corruption might involved - With insufficient financial compensation and limited social welfare provision, those laid-off workers encountered not only a suddenly break-down of their daily life and career, but also a sense of betray and being deserted - Typical emotional reactions toward this reform were anger, insecurity, and injustice
Situational ethics	- It was the management class, or the state itself, to blame for the economic difficulties that led to the reform - As a former member of collective owner who contributed everything to the work unit, the latter, or the state behind it, should be responsible for their future welfare and economic security - A culture of the 'golden rice bow' paved the cognitive base of this ethical reasoning
Mobilizing structures	- Social solidarity rising from living in the same work-life totality, or an ecological concentration at the working class residential area - Shared social fate and cultural mentality

□ **Wave 02: construction workers protesting for delayed payments since 2000**

Institutional vulnerability	□	The predominance of sub-contracting practices in the construction industry, which favored the owner of the real estate at the expenses of the ordinary labor force, who suffered not only from their powerlessness in industrial decision-making, but also from the cultural exploitation of the sub-contractors who happened to be their '*laoxiang*'
	□	Government agencies at various levels are among the main categories of the real estate owner, thus delayed payment was all too often a phenomenon of governmental failure
Situational ethics	□	The traditional saying of 'those who did their job get paid' [干活拿□] is a fundamental ethical imperatives that exert huge cultural pressure toward
	□	Higher level governmental agencies become an ideal arbitrator through collective petitioning [上□]
	□	When this kind of arbitration failed, the protest will usually go to a public space, using dramatizing strategies in order to attract media and public opinion support
Mobilizing structures	□	Social solidarity rising from living in concentrated labor camps, shared interests, and shared cultural origins and beliefs

□ **Wave 03: workers in joint venture/foreign owned sectors demanding for pay raise for the last decade**

Institutional vulnerability	□	The protectionist moves of local governments [who thought of FDI as one of the major engines of GDP growth, and has a strong motivation to keep the labor cost at a comparatively low level] favored the capital/investor while at the expenses of the labor force
	□	Rising life cost due to successive inflations stemmed from central government's economic policies paved the institutional origin of industrial strikes in major coastal industrial centers
Situational ethics	□	A decent and respectful life is among one of the most influential cognitive expectations for most of the participants of the serial strikes
	□	A more reasonable share of the 'cake' is another apparent ethical appeal behind this wave of industrial uprising
Mobilizing structures	□	Social solidarity rising from common membership, and independent labor organizing sometimes

Gender and ethnic discriminations on labor markets

Djaouida Séhili

In 1956, in Essay on skilled labor, a mythical book of the Sociology of Work in France, Pierre Naville began to understand the systematic subordinate placement assigned to North African labor when conducting a thorough study of the qualification structure, taking into account ethnic and social factors. He thus highlights the existence of similar "ethnic qualitative discrimination," he said, that existed for black people in the United States or South Africa. He also underlines that women as well as the elderly suffer from "other" forms of discrimination, notably salary discrimination; he connects "sex" and "age" variables as "situations firstly as natural". Thereafter, the Sociology of Organizations would accentuate this neutralization of "gender", but also that of "ethnic origin", by providing the image of a universal worker in a neutral and asexual appearance.

In France, it is in the late 1960s and through some major contributions notably from female sociologists, that "the question of women's work" slowly started to be considered by the social sciences as "subject to a relevant study itself". This focal oriented on the strict variable "sex" or more fundamentally on the concept of "gender" has gradually greatly enriched the problem of social relations by highlighting, for example, mechanisms on the labor markets of a hierarchy and segmentation of jobs mainly determined by the sex of the individuals. I am thinking here particularly of the works and contributions of Danièle Kergoat. Consequently, if the professional insertion/exclusion process of the so-called "autochthon" women have for a long time attracted relatively less or illegitimate interest, unfortunately we can easily imagine that it becomes downright epsilon when considering the situation of people being, or having been perceived as being, an ethnic origin "other". Especially without going back to the exploitation of their visibility (invisibility of the mass in the flow of global migration/ultra visibility of a "minority" stigmatized on the media and political scene), taking into account the work of "migrant" women or "perceived" as such, particularly belated, as women, especially these particular women, who are supposed to be confined to the private reproductive sphere (care work, domestic work and sex work). Indeed, until the late 1980s, research and studies on their contribution to the productive sphere constituted a "novelty". Gradually, by the force of a certain "institutional awareness", in the 1990s a sort of discovery of their alleged particularities was revealed, however, generally regarded as "disabilities"; recognition that causes them to oscillate, according to ideological and theoretical positions on the axis from victimization to emancipation. The fact remains how to debate this injunction of attention, instilled by the European scale as so aptly reminds us Chaïb Sabah, seems difficult to free oneself from a number of relatively simplistic national presuppositions. Thus, paradoxically, one might say, that are on one hand, the government (responding to the injunctions of European legislative framework) and, on the other, companies (taking the opportunity of increasing the process of individualization and therefore flexibility), will grasp, in developing their respective, public or managerial politics, the concept of gendered and ethnic discrimination.

However, via a skillful and opportunistic conceptual reversal in political and neoliberal discourse, the struggle against this discrimination subversively leaves room for a "eulogy of diversity". Indeed, the notion of diversity seems to allow consideration that the difference is an immutable fact, even "natural" as we develop later, it can be claimed as a right, especially since it can benefit everyone, individually and economically. And it is with a certain eagerness and consensual, that the French society and its labor markets will appropriate the term to promote the enactment including "diversity" Charters and Labels. Women and people being, or having been perceived as being, an ethnic origin "other", are thus part of a diversity, certainly unequal, but at the same time not discriminated, since recognized as "other". "Other" compared to what or whom? In France, we never take care to determine this explicitly. Through this sleight of hand, we can see all the resilience of political and entrepreneurial bodies, carriers of an egalitarian republican doctrine a priori meritocratic, to consider social hierarchies as primarily the product of relations of domination, here in a gendered and ethnical case.

Especially one of the other alluring aspects of the notion of diversity remains in its inclination to refer to autonomous individuals and pro–active, rather than segregated and discriminated groups. It is in this context that perfectly fits the new criteria of professional competence, that carries a rhetorical valuation of natural differences, between women and men, between "autochthon" and people being, or having been perceived as being, an ethnic origin "other". Under the guise of privileging the individual dimension, and thus leading to a revaluation of an individual "actor" at the expense of the "invasive" collective, the politico-managerial rhetoric state that the gendered and ethnic diversity would carry germs, no more than a "universal" struggle for equality, but from a "productive" inequality ... additional recognition ! As I will now explain in a clearer manner by mobilizing my own empirical research. From the 1980s, and according to the above-mentioned process, we have seen in France a real transformation of the restructuring of labor markets and of the redefinition of work time through forms of management and new legal status. Everything seemed to be at the coronation of flexibility involving "strategic reorientation" related to the imperatives of industrial logistics, requiring "technological changes" requiring "optimization of competences", etc... The flexibility injunction is then generally justified as the only way to allow a readjustment to the new conditions of global competition and volatile macro-economic developments. Independently, even technological choices, work flexibility has thus become the most characteristic form of current employment. Public enterprises, yet still far from being on a highly competitive market, are no exception in executing particular European debates focused on the privatization of public services. In practice, and beyond the community of the term, flexibility will be based on very different forms but mainly related to the tight management resources called "human"...

With regards to my own personal research, I was specifically interested in the new forms of work assessment, which enhance competence (the "know-being" or the individual's ability to change and adapt) and depreciating the qualification (the "know-how" or initial training and collective experience). Until then, the model of qualification had attempted to establish through the classifications in branch agreements and companies, a social order resulting in a relatively clear hierarchy of power and relations of domination, specifically gendered and ethnical. Faced however with new economic constraints, making the organizations "more

complex", "more unstable" and "less readable", this model has gradually emerged as an inadequate response a priori, to prior demands of a more reactive organization. It is essentially under the guise of economic destabilization that emerges the model of competence. The purpose of the work activity therefore no more lies in the strict obedience of orders, it lies in the ability of individuals to mobilize their autonomy, responsibility, responsiveness, etc ... inherently subjective and personal. Escaping to public policy, the competence model has been apprehended by the company as an operating device management, insofar as competence serving to rethink the employees' contribution to the performance of the company, to conform their behavior to new norms of action, to define new forms of cooperation and exchange.

This shift, from the model of qualification to that of competence, operated in France as in the U.S., will therefore significantly contribute to the implementation of individualization policies. These minimize the place of work groups to lead to a revaluation of the person at the expense of the same collectives whose essence was built around "a certain notion of equality" and "common destiny". More fundamentally, they substitute a logical career progression by replacing available job positions within pre-established charts, a qualitative logic through the competence of being a "flexi-mobile" individual. These individualization policies suggest a new way of understanding hierarchical relationships a priori more direct or contracted through skills assessments. This, in turn, contributes to the diminishing role previously attributed to unions. This new legitimization of knowledge, measured by the logic of competence, mainly individual, is generally presented as allowing a fair assessment of the value of each individual without distinction, linked amongst others to the sex/gender or ethnic origins of individuals. So here we are ...

In fact, if women and people being, or having been perceived as being, an ethnic origin "other", have long had to copy the standard "male-autochthon" behavior to make room for equality in companies, it seems a contrario whether by posting their differences certain persons may succeed today. Paradoxically, this emphasis on the specificities of each individual, which is rooted in a naturalizing and thus essentialist thinking, causes them to be considered and judged on their membership to a group rather than their own qualities, unique and different from those of other groups, but also within those same groups.

Because the notion of "diversity" does not refer to the designs of equality and / or legality, but the "business case" or in other words the "business reason". The main argument is that a workforce called "diversified" (woman/man, black/white, young/old, disabled/"normal", etc.) increases the performance of the organization by improving professional fulfillment and motivation by promoting the use of specific know-being/know-how (linked to sex/gender and ethnicity), and finally increasing on one hand competition between individuals, distinguished, and on the other hand company productivity. Far from being denied, the economic argumentation for diversity is here on the contrary displayed by using capital/capitalist reason. The "business case" of professional diversity policies therefore partially replaces policies against discrimination for equality. The active encouragement of diversity is therefore particularly a commercial and social marketing ("good image").

Thinking in terms of diversity holds promise of opportunity, to the extent that it highlights the acceptance of differences associated here with a competitive advantage, instead of putting forward an "ideology of equality". Rather than relying on a legislative framework, the

diversity introduces the idea that the contribution of women and persons being, or having been perceived as being, an ethnic origin "other", on company performance must be over-visibility to justify their place in companies. This takes us away considerably from the social imperative to provide equal opportunities to view the fundamental respect for existing laws to prevent various forms of discrimination. In this context, the egalitarian principle in "à la française" becomes even insidiously secondary.

In addition, this approach embellishes and even more sanctifies the notion of performance, "this magical term that blooms in the culture of the present time". I quote here Marcel Bolle de Bal, according to whom performance goes hand in hand with the concept of "flexibility", "Ideological Trojan Horse" of néo-libéralisme, adorned with all the economic, social and political virtues that involve : de-bureaucratization, stimulation of employment, autonomy of individuals and groups, advent of individual freedoms. The problem being raised here, is related to the idea of deregulation, in particular with regards to the fixing and individualization of wages as to working time. Especially, in the strict sense, the notion of performance translates into an encrypted result with a view to classification and hierarchy in relation to oneself or others. The assessment of performance is therefore built under a frame of reference, of a measurement scale. It also includes a dimension of gained victory or success that must be remarkable. Specific, gendered and/or ethnical skills are related to a "deposit" that should not be overlooked as they serve as a tool for economic performance; a task for companies to do everything possible to use the full potential until now, a priori underutilized. Everything seems an excuse to accentuate diversity to enhance and promote "differences". For example, in this context, different research management will be produced attempting to provide objective evidence and numerical correlation between the presence of women in positions and financial performance. Their proliferation is itself a fairly significant illustration of management interest in the feminization of companies. Research conducted since 1996 by the Society of Economic SCRL information for the magazine "L'Entreprise" had demonstrated that the profitability of SMEs run by women was almost three times greater than the average, as was the growth of their sales. Lately, the Registry of the Commercial Court of Paris has also examined the companies created and managed by women. Result: their life expectancy is longer. Furthermore, in a survey conducted by Arborus, it is also explained that the so-called feminine values are inherent in the performance criteria. We learn that the three most important factors in women are: company stability, loyalty and the presence at the workplace. But it proves that it is precisely those "companies that believe the most strategic for their dynamism". Reserving more space for women, "the industrial and financial groups do they have to gain in terms of efficiency, management, entrepreneurial values , or serenity?" Also questioned Yves de Kerdrel for the newspaper "Les Echos". The Board "More Management have even created a mutual fund called "Feminine Values" allowing managers to invest in companies with women in management. Another plethora of management authors also insist that gender diversity at executive levels would contribute to enriching the spectrum of management styles, at a time when companies are effectively looking for new management methods less hierarchical and more participatory and more flexible.

But, what are the real effects of gender diversity on company performance? Is it the fact of declaring to lead feminization policies impacting on performance (picture effect) or is it the feminization policies themselves involved in the construction of the performance? In reality,

very few studies have been conducted on the subject. In addition, housing relationships between "sexual diversity and performance" are attempts, often partial which require empirical studies in the long term. In short, despite dithyrambic speeches and inconclusive studies, the link between the policies initiated by human resources for positive discrimination and company performance has not yet been clearly demonstrated. In reality, and paraphrasing by Christine Kerdellant, Managing Editor and co-founder of "Arts Magazine": "even assuming a causal link can be established, the figures do not say that women, in absolute terms, are better managers than men, but those hoisted to this level are better than the average man. And for good reason: there is a bias in the selection. All recruiters admit: with the identical skills and qualifications, unless expressly requested from the client, men are usually chosen in preference to women. In order for a woman to win the match and break the famous "glass ceiling", she must by far make the difference".

What does the transition from the category of equality to that of diversity signify? Does it exceed it or does it abandon the ethical increase founded on the principles of equality and non-discrimination?

In fact, it is not so much the idea of the positive contribution to the companies' organization performance from women and persons being, or having been perceived as being, an ethnic origin "other" that is problematic, but rather the mobilization of arguments based primarily on the value of gendered specifics and/or ethnicized. Here we can see the announcement of the inevitable offensive of a "naturalization" of differences, itself producing a renewal of modes and forms of male and ethnic domination. Therefore on the grounds of employing women for their specific work skills, do we not also see a return to the theories developed in the late nineteenth century, by work science? By focusing on the worker's body, his/her movements and rhythms, have they not produced in France, a racial classification based on differentiation, of the migrants skills, called scientific, and in this way organized a hierarchy? "Equal does not mean similar" Tocqueville said... Class or position struggle is no longer the issue since the difference is expected to result as a complement to competition. And this is where the problem lies, when you consider as I do, that difference is above all a social construction always aimed at unequal ranking of individuals.

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Workers, conflicts and Mobilizations in France

Sophie Béroud

The hypothesis of a decline of the strikes, especially in the industrial sector, has become a dominant reading frame in France since the late 1980s. Deep restructuring of the production structure, via the reduction of some parts of the industry, the development of outsourcing, the destabilization of work collectives and the diffusion of precarious jobs are phenomena that fuel the idea of a strong tendency to reflux and the marginalization of the strike practice in the private sector. Administrative statistics produced by the Ministry of Labour have contributed to shaping this interpretation. They measure the number of individual days not worked because of a strike (JINT) in the private sector : from three million in the late 1970s, these JINT then fall in successive stages to oscillate at beginning in the 1990s in a range between 250,000 and 500,000. Only a few "peaks " interrupts this continuous decline, reflecting strong multi-sectorial mobilizations, as in 1995 and 2003.

Many interpretations have been built based on these datas. The first combines the idea of a trend to the fall of strikes caused by the profound crisis of the labour movement, its institutionalization and the weakness of the unionization rate in France since the 1980's. Other readings inspired by the work of Alain Touraine about new social movements, labour disputes have become peripheral to other forms of mobilizations and other actors of social protest. Central component of social relations within the fordist era, the strike would be a practice enshrined in a specific historical context, that of the industrial world of big business.

A second interpretation grid, more nuanced, insists on moving labour disputes and their transformation: the "programmed" strike - that is to say, called by unions some weeks before - no longer exist that in some sectors, with strong public component : transport, hospitals, national education, electricity and gas industries…The 1980-1990's decades have thus resulted in substitution in the central figures of the conflict. Workers of industry - steelworkers and minors - were replaced by public sector workers, seized through their professional identity, like railway workers or postal workers.

If the share taken by sectors such as transport or energy appears important in the statistics of strikes, it is mostly made visible by large social movements like this of 1995 against the "plan Juppe", this of 2003 against pension reform or the this of 2006 against the CPE (a reform of employment politics for the young workers). Characterized by high participation of employees of companies and public functions, these movements are also showed the importance of manifestations like a central element of the protest action's repertoire unions, instead of the strike [Pernot, 2010]

The analysis of the strike's evolutions in the 1990-2000's decades implies, therefore, to adopt three angles complementary approaches to escape a too fast generalization. The first consist to vary the scales games for see that is observable at the local level and that is in largest and multisectoral mobilizations. The second means not separate the study of representations of strikes to the study of strikes. Significant researches have decrypted the mediatic construction of social conflicts, particularly related to processes of politicization. These are often the result of a presence of strong local roots in the conflict, caused by the consequences for the local

economy of the redundancies. And this situation leads to a deployment of real "local mobilizations" through the creation of citizen committees with the presence of elected. The medias contribute also to shape representation of the "radicalism" in these local conflicts [Lagneau, 2005]. But the production of knowledge on strikes is not only influenced by the media filter : it is also dependent, as has been said above, by the ways of counting or measuring disputes job. From this point of view, criticism of the method of production of administrative statistics - the JINT - and implementation of new tools by the Ministry of Labour have officially recorded a significant change in 2005, paving the way for a qualitative improvement in these data. But this change makes any statistic projection on the long term rather fragile [Béroud et al , 2008].

A third methodological requirement consists in the very exigent periodization. The uses of strikes and a largest repertoire of protest actions must be understand in relation to the perception that employees have of the economic and political context and that is possible to obtain to the government. For example, the social movement against pension reform in the fall of 2010 differs from that of the autumn of 1995, while remaining in his lineage: the participation of private sector employees is much stronger, with delegations from SMEs and to the major role played by the "refiners" in renewable strike during the month of October 2010 [Excoffier et al, 2011].

We try to keep these different angles of approach, focusing on two thematic entries. At first, we return to the elements that we authorize to speak about a transformation of the strikes. In a second step, we will question through multiple uses of the strike about the complex relationships that develop between the collective of employees and trade unions.

1. From workers of industrial sector at the workers of trade sector : transformation and appropriation of strike's practices

The series of conflicts throughout 2009, particularly in the automotive suppliers but also manufacturers of electronic equipment (Caterpillar, Continental, Goodyear, Molex, New Fabbris ...), revived, amid financial crisis, media representations of strikes particularly "hard" in the industry. This vision does not date from the late 2000s. It results from the combination of two widespread assumptions: one assuming that the strike action is scarce in the wage labour outside a practice almost ritualized in some large "corporations" of the public sector, and the other that the few conflicts that erupt are the reflection of a broken labourer world, hit hard by the effects of neoliberal globalization. Struggles to maintain employment due to site closures and restructuring - mobilisations aimed mostly to get extra bonuses notice of layoffs - are seen as generally marked by a degree of violence and radicalism. Conflicts, such as Cellatex in July 2000, during which employees occupy the factory into liquidation and threaten to explode and spill toxic chemicals into a tributary of the Meuse, or one of Métaleurop 2003, fuel speculative comments on the "return of the Luddism" and irruptions of uncontrolled violence, not mediatized by the unions.

Similarly, in 2009-2010, the apparent growth - as it was transcribed in the media - of cases of "restraint" leaders or "sequestration" of these restarts the theme of a strong radicalism present in these workers' struggles permeated by a social despair [Ancelovici, 2011; Hayes, 2012]. However, if these mobilizations are indeed a part of the reality of labour disputes in the

industry, they cannot summarized the years 1990-2000. Moreover, beyond the literary and cinematographic imagination which they give rise, allowing to "relive" a working class that had become socially invisible - we think in particular at the novel of Gérard Mordillat, The Living and the Dead, brought to the screen television - these conflicts are interesting for what they say, not for the exclusive use of radical forms of action, but the articulation between different elements of the protest actions directory. These struggles for employment are built, indeed, by the combination of actions in different arenas, starting with the legal field, and different resources, like the number or the "mediatic shock." The use of building occupations, the looting, the threat of explosion are all means, first and foremost, to create "the event" for the media and hence to challenge the government. The on-media coverage of some of these defensive struggles for employment, presented as emblematic, tends to obscure more "ordinary" struggle practices in the industry. Indeed, labour disputes in this sector are not limited in any way to consecutive mobilizations announcing job cuts. For example, the use of statistical data compiled as part of the investigation REPONSES conducted by DARES shows that over the period 2002-2004, modes of action such as "occupations with sequestration" or "threats of destruction of property or damage to the environment" are relatively marginal. However, the industry continues to emerge as the central place of outbreak of labour disputes (in relation to trade, services and construction), with a clear progression of walkouts as a form of action [Béroud et al , 2008]. These results, although they concern only a limited period, have the merit to lift the veil a little on what we know relatively little: either to be challenged in the industrial sector which reveal much more diversified and more recurrent than the media coverage suggests. Especially, as ethnographic approaches show, these arrangements may be offensive [Giraud, 2009]. The use of a release a few hours or even less than an hour, repeated day after day, is sometimes enough to disrupt a production line operating at lean. Such observations allow out to break with a vision of working conflictuality reduced to radical forms of action because desperate.

While strikes have not vanished in the industrial sector, especially in the mode of disengaging, they are understood in a set of practices that inform about the process dimension of labour disputes. Modes of action such as petitions and demonstrations also appear on the rise, according to the survey results REPONSES in all sectors. Possibly preceding the strike, they are also related to phenomena that attest to the harshness of labour relations and the existence of a backward or individual resistances, such as the use of tribunals, absenteeism or the refusal of overtime. This diversity also helps to identify common features between the conflicts taking place in the industry and those in other sectors, such as trade.

One of the striking phenomena in the 2000s, is, in fact, the new visibility gained by strikes of trade employees including employees in precarious situations. From the beginning of the decade, strikes with blocking stores in several brands of fast food highlight both the determination of young employees and their learning process of collective action. Brands such as McDonald's and Quick have certainly already known in previous decades, first strikes and union organizing attempts. But the novelty here comes from the involvement of young employees in the conduct of movement while their previous experience in union activism proves limited. This is also the case at Fnac Champs-Elysees in February 2002 when the mobilization of one month shows that the renewable strike proved possible in this type of business, despite the turnover of jobs, precarious new entrants and the effects of management

techniques to individualize situations. Related to strong resentment about the deteriorating working conditions, the inability to do a good "job", the pressure requirements of profitability, these conflicts come to contradict the idea that the massive use of different forms of precarious labour break all possibility of protest [Abdelnour et al, 2009].

The mobilization of categories at the bottom of the social ladder, or to put it differently, of groups combining different factors of fragility and undergoing several forms of domination - social but also gendered and ethnic - also contributed to relativize the idea that strike tended to become a practice reserved for employees relatively "protected". The struggle over a year in 2002-2003 by the maids in the company Arcade, a subcontractor of the Accor group, is this significant point of view, as is the gradual construction of strikes among cashiers at the end 2000s in some supermarkets [Benquet, 2011]. These examples attest that different forms of collective action spread in sectors where the traditions of wage struggles are less rooted.

2. Labour disputes as grounds of trade union struggles

Importantly, these conflicts demonstrate the importance of the unions' mediation in a context where structural and numerical weakness of French trade unionism continues to be pointed. Even in situations where the relationship to the union structure is source of tensions, as in the case of strikes in fast food when relations between the collective of employees mobilized support committee and the trade federation CGT were marked by strong tensions, union support remains crucial [Giraud, 2009]. The REPONSES survey for the period 2002-2004 again brings an interesting perspective : it shows that a conflict is even more likely to happen than employees who work there have capacity of collective organization, are able to transforming their dissatisfaction in claims and to unite in a common action. This dimension is well known in the sociology of work and the sociology of mobilization [Béroud et al , 2008] .

Emphasize the importance of trade union mediation in labour disputes does not exclude the existence of critiques. From this point of view, it is less the phenomenon of "coordination" which marks the years 1990-2000 that debates on the conduct of struggles within organizations. The use of coordination, however, has not completely disappeared, especially in low-wage sectors where predominant women.

The apparent recurrence of "hard" industrial disputes could feed questions about the ability of unions (trade federations or regional unions) to control the actions, at least in the choice of modes of action, and "produce frames of interpretation relevant to employees exposed to globalization " [Join- Lambert et al , 2009] . In some of these struggles, some shopstewards have openly criticized their confederal leaders. These events have fueled the hypothesis of a gap between the policies decided at the top of the unions and the reality experienced by the field teams. Teams who are faced with increased decentralization process of bargaining, the invisibility of the employer figure behind that of shareholders, and that would have no other resources than those they manage to reach obtain by themselves. However, it would be an exaggeration to harden this opposition.

The strategies for the construction of intersectorial movement in 2009 with the adoption of a common platform in the context of the crisis have provoked tensions between unions. During the first half of 2009, especially the conduct of the movement by the CGT, with one day strike

every week, has caused divisions among activists on the issue of "general" strike. The reference to this one, with the emotional and historical links to the revolutionary syndicalism, could serve as a marker to tell the differences between organizations. These tensions are, for example, presents in the railway where existe an electoral rivalry between the CGT and SUD Rail.

However, if the speech on the general strike comes on the occasion of each major mobilization, no union organization claims to be able to lead alone a general strike. Phases of mobilization such as autumn 2010 have rather highlighted the new difficulties in the public sector - at the Post Office, ED -GDF, national education - to make strike,while these sectors have been at the forefront of social struggles since the 1980s . Outsourcing a large share of execution jobs, the pressure exerted on the work by managerial devices focused on the achievement of financial targets are phenomena that weaken the ability of collective resistance in these companies and administrations. In addition, strengthening the legal framework on the continuity of service in public transport, set up by the Act of 21 August 2007, now tends to give less visibility to activities in the railway. We are far from common representations of a public sector that would become the last refuge of the strikes.

In the late 2000s, conflicts no longer correspond to representations forged in the 1980s. The private sector doesn't correspond on large industrial concentrations, but ponctual strikes exist. Other forms of struggle arose in productive universe both fragmented and precarious. The public sector is not a protected environment which escapes market pressure and competition. On the contrary, the effects of management are such that the use of collective action becomes problematic.

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