



International Associated Laboratory (LIA)

CNRS-ENS Lyon/Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Beijing)/Shanghai University

**“Post-Western Sociologies in France and in China”**

METROPOLIS, URBAN GOVERNANCE  
AND CITIZENSHIP  
IN CHINA AND IN EUROPE

2015 November the 28, 29

Siyuan Hall, Shanghai University Lehu Hotel

Host : Shanghai University

Organizers :

School of sociology and political science, Shanghai University

Institute of Sociology, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Beijing)

Triangle « Action, Discourses, Economic and Political Thought », ENS Lyon



From 1949 to 1979, the urbanization process stagnated in China before entering a period of considerable acceleration in tandem with industrialization. In Europe these two processes were spread over several centuries but only in two decades in China. This leads to the appearance of specifically Chinese economic and social phenomena which have been the subject of much recent research. The specificity of these processes has raised questions which have not really been asked in Western Europe. We shall distinguish different boundaries in Chinese and European Metropolis. These colonial, ethnic, social and economic boundaries are the expression of multiple dominations, which always adopts different forms and, above all, that become entangled in differentiated modes that are producing inequalities which are situated. Contemporary Chinese metropolis are characterized by new urban hierarchies, which are less contrasted than in European metropolis, since they are scattered around the city and concentrated in certain specific areas. So it means transformations of social stratification in metropolis and megalopolises: augmentation of segregations, strong social polarisation, emergency of a new underclass, urban gentrification, urban re-foundation... It also means we have to consider a diversity of national models, of modes or urban governance, of public policies.

Citizens and social groups are caught between assignment to certain localities and flowing through the metropolis. Depending on the moment, life phase or situation, they may seem to be trapped or able to move. Social and ethnic segregation is to a large extent an institutional product, and especially a product of social housing policies and practices. Contemporary metropolis may have different forms of segregation and discrimination –especially of less-qualified and qualified migrants- but they still allow access to different kinds of space and provide renewed opportunities to individuals and groups, making it possible to enter high legitimacy economic spaces as demonstrated by some migrant workers who construct and experience upward social mobility.

European and Chinese Metropolis are producing plural economies in a multiplicity of high or less legitimacy places. Furthermore mass unemployment, growing uncertainties in work relations and labor, the decline of institution and the recomposition of new institutional forms, all concur to point out that modernity is mostly about the wavering of an actor relentlessly forced to define again and again his place and his identity. On the one hand, social, economic and ethnical inequalities keep growing, along with new forms of exploitation, reject, stigmatization and even destitution of the “weakest”. On the other hand, cultural domination, recognition denial and disrespect create situations of injustice. Exploited workers, young people facing high uncertainties, migrants -and ethnic minorities in European Metropolis- subject to racial discrimination, do express recognition demands which can break into

public space at any time, as social movements, riots, rebellions. In such instances, they force a redistribution of social, moral and public recognition and they redefine the hierarchy of identities.

Furthermore, new risks of health, food, floods, environment and ecological disasters have produced uncertain situations, new public spaces and new inequalities in European and Chinese metropolis. The global urbanization and metropolisation phenomena lead return of questions about justice in the city. Between social, spatial and environmental justices, the concept of "just city" appeared in recent years. In these contexts of more or less uncertainty and of high social and physical liability, collective action and social mobilizations emerge and reveal new forms of citizenship in a new local and global public space.

In this respect, new forms of citizenships are productive of new social exchanges, new solidarities, new moral economies, related to social inequalities in Chinese and European Metropolis in turmoil. Citizens compete for material and social goods, emergent moral economies produce new social and economic frontiers, new social and moral orders for the struggle of public recognition and social justice.

Saturday, November 28

8:30 Registration

9:00 Introduction

Professor Li Peilin, Vice-president of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

Professor Li Youmei, Vice-president of Shanghai University

Professor Laurence Roulleau-Berger, Research Director at CNRS, Triangle, ENS  
Lyon

9:30 Session 1 : Metropolis and multiple inequalities

Chair : Li Peilin, Professor of sociology, Institute of Sociology, Chinese Academy of  
Social Sciences

9:30 Laurence Roulleau-Berger, Research Director at CNRS in sociology, Triangle,  
ENS Lyon, Co-Director of the LIA :

*Metropolis, turbulences and diffracted mobilizations*

10:00 Zhang Wenhong, Professor of sociology, Shanghai University:

*Social Inequalities in Chinese New Urbanization*

10:30 Bruno Cousin, Assistant Professor, Lille 1 University:

*Homophily without community: upper-middle-class aggregation within Paris  
refounded neighborhoods*

11:00 Luo Jar-Der, Professor of sociology, Tsinghua University:

*The Measurement of Guanxi Circles—Using Qualitative Study to Modify Quantitative  
Measurement*

11:30-12:00 Discussion

12:00-14:00 Lunch

14:00 Session 2 : International metropolis and urban governance

Chair : Zhang Wenhong, Professor of sociology, Shanghai University

14:00 Zhang Dunfu, Professor of sociology, Shanghai University :

*Shanghai's Unlicensed Taxi (Hei Che) :insights for social governance*

14:30 Min Xueqin, Professor of Sociology, Nanjing University :

*Research on the Logic and Path of Urban Governance : Based on Negotiation*

15:00 Chen Guangjin, Professor at Institute of Sociology, CASS :  
*Transformation of Social Development Models Under China's New Normal State of the Economy*

15:30-16:00 Discussion

16:15-16:30 Break

16:15 Session 3 : Environmental justice and citizenship

Chair : Michel Kokoreff, Professor of sociology Paris 8, GTM/CRESSPA

16:15 Guillaume Faburel, Professor of urbanism at Université Lyon 2, Triangle :  
*Environmental inequalities and "just city": towards a cosmopolitical perspective for urban policies*

16:45 Liu Chunyan, Associate Professor of Sociology, Shanghai University:  
*Why people distrust experts: science reflexivity and its implication for risk management*

17:15 Cui Yan: Assistant Professor of sociology, Institute of Sociology, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences:  
*The Contemporary Environmental Problems of China and Civil Engagement of Environmental Protection*

17:45-18:15 Discussion

18 :30 Dinner

Sunday, November 29

9:00 Session 4 : Metropolis and urban life

Chair : Sung Tae Lee, Professor of sociology, Nanjing University

9:00 He Rong, Professor of sociology, Institute of Sociology, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences:

*New Person grown out of old tenets: faith, social network and urban life of christians in s-nj church*

9:30 Valérie Sala Pala, Professor of Political Science, University Jean Monnet, Saint-Etienne, Triangle :

*The institutional production of ethnicity, discrimination and segregation in European cities. The case of housing*

9:30-9:45 Break

9:45 Jin Qiao, Professor of sociology, Shanghai University :

*Large Residential Community in Shanghai: Features, Problems, and Development*

10:15 Liu Neng , Professor of Sociology, Peking University :

*Homelessness in the Chinese urban context: A preliminary examination*

10:45-11:15 Discussion

11:30-14:00 Lunch

14:00 Session 5 : Metropolis and urban actions

Chair: He Rong, Professor of sociology, Institute of Sociology, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences=

14:00 Gilles Pinson, Professor of political sciences at Sciences Po Bordeaux:

*Beyond neoliberal imposition: State-local cooperation and the blending of social and economic objectives in French urban development corporations*

14 :30 Su Yihui, Assistant Professor of sociology, Shanghai finance and economics University :

*Emergence of the Interns' Collective Actions*

15:00 Sung Tae Lee, Professor of sociology, Nanjing University:

*On the Political Potential of Confucian Ethicality in the making of Post Cosmopolitan Society*

15:00-15:30 Discussion

15:30-15:45 Break

15 :45 Session 6 : Metropolis and new urban economies

Chair: Guillaume Faburel, Professor of urbanism at Université Lyon 2, Triangle

15:45 Michel Kokoreff, Professor of sociology Paris 8, GTM/CRESSPA :  
*Metropolis and criminal economies*

16:15 Liu Yuzhao, Professor of sociology, Shanghai University:  
*Identity Definition in Village Shareholding Reform: A case study about the shareholding reform in NM village, Xiangshan county, Zhejiang province*

16:45-17:15 Discussion

17:15-17:45 CONCLUSION by Professor Zhang Wenhong, Professor Li Peilin and Professor Roulleau-Berger

18:30 Dinner



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# Social Inequalities in Chinese New Urbanization

Shanghai University      Zhang Wenhong

Using the survey data of China Social Development and Social Construction completed by Shanghai University, 2012, we have explored the social inequalities of urban and rural residents in income, consumption, education attainment, employment, social mobility and social security. Our findings are that gender, education attainment, region, household registration system, social class and *Danwei* system have key contributions to the social inequalities. The main reason are segmental household registration system, class closed, different social development policy of regions and resource accessibility of *Danwei*. Our Suggestion is to reform household registration system, improve income distribution system and social security system.

运用上海大学 2012 年在中国东、中、西部 6 省市完成的大规模随机问卷调查的数据，我们探讨了城乡居民在收入、消费、教育获得、就业、社会流动和社会保障等方面存在的平等现象。统计分析发现，性别、区域、单位类型、户籍制度、社会阶层、公共政策等是影响社会不平等的主要因素。完善现有的户籍制度、收入分配制度和社会保障制度是解决社会不平等的可能途径。

# Homophily without community: upper-middle-class aggregation within Paris refounded neighborhoods

Bruno Cousin  
University of Lille, France

## Abstract:

This paper is based on fieldwork conducted in three new neighborhoods of Courbevoie and Levallois-Perret (Hauts-de-Seine, west of Paris), which are located near the business district of La Défense, and where corporate professionals and managers are overrepresented among the residents. These areas have been transformed by the process of new-build gentrification that regularly contributes to enlarging the historic western axis of Paris' upper-class neighborhoods. The paper analyzes successively the causes and motivations of the inhabitants' residential choices, the weak local sociability associated with this specific type of urban self-segregation, and the key role played by the drawing of socioeconomic symbolic boundaries among the upper-middle classes. Indeed, homophilic aggregation in the refounded neighborhoods follows a logic largely different and autonomous from the (complementary) one – based on radical alterization and stigmatization – that motivates the avoidance of the working class.

## Biographical note:

Bruno Cousin is Maître de conférences in sociology (assistant professor) at the University of Lille, and a Research and faculty affiliate with the Centre Maurice Halbwachs of the École Normale Supérieure, Paris. His research stands at the intersection between urban sociology, the analysis of social inequality, and cultural sociology. It focuses on upper and upper-middle classes' avoidance and refusal of social and/or ethnoracial integration, and especially on residential segregation (for a complete publication list, see: <http://clerse.univ-lille1.fr/spip.php?article646>). Bruno is also the

current Chair of the Section on urban and regional sociology of the French Sociological Association.

Selected publications:

Bruno Cousin, 2014. "Entre-soi mais chacun chez soi. L'agrégation affinitaire des cadres parisiens dans les espaces refondés" *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* 204: 88-101.

[http://www.cairn.info/resume.php?ID\\_ARTICLE=ARSS\\_204\\_0088](http://www.cairn.info/resume.php?ID_ARTICLE=ARSS_204_0088)

Bruno Cousin, 2013. "Ségrégation résidentielle et quartiers refondés. Usages de la comparaison entre Paris et Milan" *Sociologie du travail* 55(2): 214-236.

<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0038029613000290>

Bruno Cousin and Edmond Préteceille, 2008. "La division sociale de l'espace milanais. Comparaison avec le cas parisien" *Mélanges de l'Ecole française de Rome – Italie et Méditerranée* 120(1): 315-333.

Bruno Cousin and Sébastien Chauvin, 2013. "Islanders, immigrants and millionaires: the dynamics of upper-class segregation in St Barts, French West Indies" Pp. 186-200 in *Geographies of the Super-Rich*, edited by Iain Hay. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

<http://sebastienchauvin.org/wp-content/uploads/Cousin-Chauvin2013-Islanders-immigrants-millionnaires.pdf>

Bruno Cousin and Sébastien Chauvin, 2014. "Globalizing forms of elite sociability: varieties of cosmopolitanism in Paris social clubs" *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 37(12): 2209-2225.

<http://sebastienchauvin.org/wp-content/uploads/Cousin-Chauvin-Globalizing-Forms-of-Cosmopolitanisms-PUBLISHED-2014.pdf>

# The Measurement of Guanxi Circles—Using Qualitative Study to Modify Quantitative Measurement<sup>12</sup>

Luo, Jar-Der<sup>3</sup>, Xiao, Han, Burt, Ronald, Chou, Cao-Wen, Cheng, Meng-Yu, and Fu, Xiao-Ming<sup>4</sup>

## Abstract

This article demonstrates how to integrate qualitative and quantitative studies together in network analysis, and uses measuring guanxi circles in an organization as an example. We first conducted various qualitative studies: collecting second-hand data, noted field observations, in-depth interviews, and informal surveying of all workers with open questions, to classify all actors by roles in guanxi circles that were centered on the organization's supervisor. This is the "ground truth" used for testing the accuracy rate of our various methods of quantitative measurement. We then computed guanxi circle effect, denoted as  $G_{ji}$ , by which we further classified all actors into guanxi circle roles using quantitative methods. By comparing the results with the "ground truth", we found the five best questions in our survey and the best computation method so as to form a quantitative measurement with the highest accuracy rate.

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<sup>1</sup> We are grateful for the financial support of Center for Social Network Research, Tsinghua University and Tsinghua's research project "Trust and Guanxi Studies on the Internet", Project number: 20121088015, , as well as the support of Chinese Natural Science Foundation Project "Social Network in Big Data Analysis: A Case in Investment Network", Project number: 71372053, National 863 project, Project number: 20141860074, and the Project "Simulation Center" sponsored by State Lower Saxony and Volkswagen Foundation, Germany..

<sup>2</sup> Part of this book chapter is adopted from the following two papers: a. Luo, Jar-Der and Cheng, Meng-Yu, 2015, "Guanxi Circles' Effect on Organizational Trust--Bringing Power and Vertical Social Exchanges into Intra-organizational Network Analysis." *American Behavioral Scientist* 59(8): 1024-37. b. Luo, Jar-Der and Yeh, Kevin, 2012, "Neither Collectivism Nor Individualism--Trust in Chinese Guanxi Circles." *Journal of Trust Research*, 2(1):53-70.

<sup>3</sup> Luo, Jar-Der is a professor of Sociology Dept. , Tsinghua University, China, and Director of Tsinghua Center of Social Network Research. The corresponding author is Luo, Jar-Der, and his e-mail is [jdlo@mail.tsinghua.edu.cn](mailto:jdlo@mail.tsinghua.edu.cn) ; Tel: 86-62771827 ext 309.

<sup>4</sup> Xiao, Han is an assistant professor of Business School, Shanghai Finance and Economics University, China. Burt, Ronald is a professor of Sociology Dept., Chicago University, U.S.. Chou, Cao-Wen is a master of Sociology Dept., Tsinghua. U., China. Cheng, Meng-Yu is an associate professor, Feng-Chia University Department of Business Administration, Taiwan. Fu, Xiao-Ming is a professor of computer science dept., University of Göttingen, Germany.

# **Shanghai's Unlicensed Taxi(Hei Che) :**

## **Insights for Social Governance**

Dunfu Zhang

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**Abstract:** Mainly as an explorative research, based on fieldwork, informal interview and participant observation in Shanghai, this paper addresses the issue of unlicensed taxi and its service, including dominant forms of Heiche and the emerging form of Uber. It argues that these unlicensed service are often institutionally stigmatized mainly from governmental perspectives , leading to a stereotyped image among the common people. Unlicensed taxi service are part of the informal economy or sharing economy which provide easier chances for collaborative consumption. For the old forms, as rural-urban migrants ,Heiche drivers actually are trying hard to make a living for their family welfare in the city where they do not have equal citizenship as those with local household registrations; For new forms such as Uber, the young middle-class are trying a novelty fashion of lifestyle motivated by their international counterparts or pioneers. Both Acquired Appeal as a Sustainability Strategy as solutions for global warming and China's Gaze particular.

To understand Social governance of unlicensed taxi in China , the bottom-up perspective and global visions of sharing economy and sustainable consumption are very necessary to be incorporated.

March 28, 1999,Sunday.Han Han(韩寒)and his father rush to Jinshan traffic center located at Zhujing town without breakfast, get aboard a blackcar (heiche) at ¥200 to catch the “new concept composition final competition”. He was the first prize winner and now best-selling author and China's most popular blogger,possibly the most popular blogger in the world .There was few or no taxi in such suburb towns o f Shanghai.

Han Han and his father was not the only passenger of such black cars. 黑车 (*heiche*, black taxi) or 开黑车 (*kai heiche*, operating a black taxi) is a private citizen that using their private car to make money by giving rides to passengers. *According to Shanghai Daily* April 5, 2006, licensed taxi operators estimated that the total number of black cabs in Fengxian district was about 2,000. While the total Minhang district investigated and processed illegal operating vehicles of all kinds in the year 2005 are were 2928, according its governmental web (<http://www.shmh.gov.cn/Content.aspx?id=11186>). Actually heiche is everywhere in China ,from small towns, to medium cities and global metropolis like Shanghai, Beijing and Guangzhou. Thus due to lack of serious research, the ethnography of heiche phenomenon in Shanghai can be a miniature of the landscape in China as a whole, and help us to understand what kind of life of the drivers? Why those young migrants take this risky, illegal jobs? Who are their costumers? How the passengers like their service, why they are labeled illegal and how they are treated by powerful organizations like the government and the legal taxi companies?

### Why Shanghai?

Much research have been done regarding the floating people, namely the rural-urban migrants, or Nongming gong, yet their production and consumption activities as an informal economy, are neglected. In fact, their production, consumption and services are a growing part of China's informal economy , its Social significance are crucial to both producers, providers and consumers. While informal economy research has been influential in the west (Portes eds 1989; Sassen 1988), little progress has been made regarding China's counterparts.

Shanghai is a leading global city as well as the leading dragon head(Longtou) during China's reform era. As Lucian Pye (1981:xi) wrote in the early 1980s, "serious analysis of nearly all important aspects of life in China must, eventually, confront Shanghai and its special place in the Chinese scheme of the things". His comments still make sense today. This paper will take Shanghai Unlicensed Taxis (heichuzu/黑出租)

as an epistemological reflection of Urban China's informal economy. As to unlicensed taxi, published papers or reports focus on general description and how to handle them from the governmental perspective. Unpublished data could be found regarding Beijing. No serious research from the bottom-up approach, without which misunderstanding, misinterpretation and mistreatment could be led to.

The paper is framed by the following three objectives: first, In-depth description of the Unlicensed Taxis in China as a whole, especially focusing on Shanghai's livery taxis service as "headache" for the governmental regulations but a means of living for the less privileged people. Second, it will discuss economic and social significance for service providers and consumers. This paper will also try to develop a more adequate grasp of how the less privileged grassroots society balance or react to the powerful formal authority.

#### Research Strategies and Tactics

Existed data are rare. The official media intended to have a propaganda function as the parrots of the party-state, yet sometimes exposed information about what was going on like the above newspaper or government web. New medium, especially the new social media provide a source of information how the bloggers, microbloggers feel about and evaluate such a special area of service, but it's hard to identify, trace and follow. Since this is an virgin area for anthropologist and sociologists, data must be found by researchers themselves, thus making first-hand observation extremely valuable.

Since crimes, bribery, gangsters community and underground society, legal enforcements are involved in this booming industry, careful research strategies and tactics have to be developed. Most of the empirical data used in this study was collected by participant observations where rides happen, interviews with differing degree of formality, ranging from unexpected encounters, prepared questions and group interviews. As a qualitative anthropological or sociological research, everyday situations provided significant data. As part of the unexpected encounters, I employed



“guerrilla interviewing”, a form of picking subjects by engaging people at work on the sidewalks in seemingly idle conversation. This strategy was engaged also in Thomas Gold (1989), which he describes as “unchaperoned, spontaneous but structured participant observation and interviews as opportunities present themselves” in which notes are written up afterwards.

It is very hard to persuade the drivers to co-operate with researchers. Most often they will keep their own business as a secret to outsiders. Inquisitive passengers or strangers are suspicious of being spies of the police or government. It is also very hard to establish trust between the drivers and strangers. One of my graduate students from my “urban anthropology and China studies” course, used to plan to do similar research because his uncle and the uncle’s friends, town fellows are illegal operators. When I asked him if I could co-operated with him about the research so that I could have easy, close and trustworthy access to their community, he quitted eventually. Since the drivers Informants will not follow an agenda and will not answer a list of questions based solely on presuppositions, often than not, I chat with them while I take their car. I am a consumer, sometime curious and talkative to them. I never expose myself as a researcher. This strategy may be similar to what Watson named “In fieldwork you live where people live, you do what people do, and you go where people go.” (Watson, 1997: Viii) .

### **Stereotyped Heiche**

Before you get inside the life of unlicensed taxi operators, what you get about the Heiche are always stereotypes which characterized by danger, cheat, violence, abnormal and unprotected. One online tips in English say: “Shanghai has the best- managed taxi service in China. ...Licensed taxi means it is necessary to have a meter and an illuminated vacancy disk on the dashboard. Without all these things, the taxi is probably unlicensed and you should avoid it, even if the driver solicits you. You have no rights if injured in an unlicensed taxi.” These advices are pertinent not only for foreigners but also for Chinese. Reports of cheating, unjust fair charge, robbery (more

often the passengers rather than the drivers are victims ) are frequently published on Newspapers and most popular webs like sina.com, sohu.com. One Heiche drivers ride 70 kilometers to the passenger's 8-kilometer destination, charged 10 times the reasonable price(<http://sh.sina.com.cn/news/s/2012-03-03/1556210025.html>). Shanghai online reported that one bad heiche driver killed a late-night girl passenger and disposed her corpse twice a day. 2011 July 4<sup>th</sup> Dongfang daily said that Songjiang's most popular traffic policeman Qianyong was attacked by Heiche driver. Warnings are everywhere from blogs and mouth-mouth messages that these heiche are dangerous, strangers are strongly suggested to avoid taking rides in Heiche. Health Care and Hospitals in Shanghai | InterNations.org told its audience ,” To avoid such frequent instances of sexual harassment, expat women may prefer taking a taxi. With the sole exception of the odd unlicensed cab...” It is easy to find such Street slogans “For safety, please do not take Heiche”. All levels of governments, from Municipal to town and street office, declare that unlicensed car pooling is illegal and should be forbidden. The most obvious, popular and most evaluated District level government are especially working hard on it. For example, Minhang Government issued separate public letters to drivers to give up the illegal business and to potential passengers to resist, avoid and report the black car pulling. In 2012 my son get a formal public letter to all students' parents with similar warnings co-issued by the Minhang educational committee and Shanghai Minhang District Traffic Administration Enforcement Division. Petition letter No 5286 to Minhang Government say, ” Illegal operation of non-Shanghai license plate Heiche seriously influence the normal business of legal taxis and harms social order”. You can tell what a narrow social space for the unlicensed taxis, squeezed by all powerful institutions and cultural settings.

It is true that unlike New York and Belfast , Ireland, where drivers were murdered or violently attacked, drivers have to develop street wisdom to collect signals of passengers to establish trustworthiness(Gambetta and Hamill 2005), passengers are

victims of cheating, crime in most of the public and private accounts of China. It is the riders who have to develop strategy to judge the trustworthiness of illegal operators.

In everyday-life encounters, these serious crime, violence are not often. One of my informants, a new-comer in Shanghai,told me.

About six or seven years ago I went to Pudong airport to see my friend off.The next day, I planed to go back home.My friend give me a card, telling me to call the man whose telephone number was printed on the card. He will send me to HongQiao,where I was supposed to board a train.The man asked me questions at times and I replied reluctantly when something unpredictable happened: the man dropped me off half way to the destination, Actually,I was forced to get off his car without any explanations or apologies.

I paid him 60 or 70 maybe.He could definitely tell I am a stranger here from my native tongue and conversation.

Similar situations happened when strangers are bullied by gangster-like drivers.On March 20, 2012, I saw an Anhui badge car stopped nearby a cross in my town Zhuanqiao.The seemingly-25-year-old driver tried to drag a young girl inside the car,while a young man (her brother or boyfriend?) standing by 3 pieces of luggages.They seem agreed to take the ride yet disagree about the price.In fact they quarreled for more than 10 minutes . When I tried to approach to see what was on, the black slim driver just threatened me viciously “what for? Get out.”

Most of the unhappy experiences are just higher prices charged to strangers to the city, but not so high as several times the common price.

I went to Shanghai with my wife, hopefully to see an expert doctor to cure my liver disease. My cousin who has been in Shanghai for 10 years called me, telling me to take the formal (zhenggui) taxis to get to his apartment. When we just got

out of Hongqiao station, a young lady approach us:“taxi,taxi!” I thought they are the formal ones, so I followed her to a car, its middle-age driver gave us the ride with 100 yuan. When I saw my cousin, he told me the legal taxi driver will charge just around 70 yuan for the same ride.

Actually, what the livery drivers care about is how to make more money faster. Once they get the passengers, all most all of whom are strangers, they will try every means to name higher prices with reasonable explanations. I asked one familiar Jiangsu driver if he can take my friend to Pudong airport at six am from my apartment at quite the same price as formal taxi ,like 200? His answer is “Sorry big brother, if only you could pay more, around 300 , you know we can not take passengers back like taxis. “There are nice drivers that charge reasonably. This happened often to familiar passengers. “I could not see my guest off to the airport. Taxi is not easy to get here. So I give her one name card of a black car driver, Anhui fatty as we name him, a quite friendly and honest guy. From our dormitory to Wujing town, taxi charge 10 for a single trip, he said 15 is fine for my round trip when I go there to buy train tickets or go to post office. Don’t forget he has to wait for me for several minutes. You see, I have 3 Heiche name cards. Familiars are easy.” One Songjiang driver told his costomer-to-be, “from here to HongQiao airport, we ask 60, if you take a taxi you’ll have to pay 70.”

Sometimes friendly atmosphere could be found on Heiche. Prof. Zhou (a visitor from Guangdong, though not the first time)took a blackcar with his 2 friends from East China University of Sicence and Technology in the shower,they chated with the driver all the way, before they reach the restaurant. Zhou asked how much, the driver pleasantly replied :you name it. They were all happy with 20.Zhou’s local friends said, the price is good for such distance in a rainy evening.

Some drivers would argue, the prices varies depending on who gives the ride. “Some would charge higher, the others just charge moderate price, and on all situations

two parties do discuss the price before they reach an agreement.”One passenger even insist that price is Heiche’s advantage.

“Unlicensed taxi is much cheaper than licensed taxi and more convenient, what’s more, we can bargain with them for a good price, especially when several friends go outside for fun.”

So it is understandable that Heiche are popular for those who need a ride while taxi are not available. “The last one/two/three kilometer “ is an often mentioned issue regarding the unmet need by public transportations for people’s traffic. There are people who could not afford taxi, so they choose Heiche , not only because they charge less, but also they are necessary. Especially in those newly developed suburb areas, when public transportation closes at around 10 , or the metro and public bus does not coordinate well. “I don’t want to take Heiche, but I have no other choice.”One young girl said before he got aboard a Heiche near Fujin Road, metro 1. “You can take a walk as an exercise back home , or pay me 10 yuan and I will deliver you to your gate,” said one 40-Y-O driver at Meilan Lake Station, Metro 7 at 11 pm one March night.

Some unlicensed operators have established so strong trust between its regular passengers that they could not use alternatives. Deng, my 35-year-old lady neighbor told me :

Our company are located in the far-off downtown,we take Heiche’s rides quite often, but we often take the same car.the driver used to work for a bus company or a taxi company,we are familiar with each other.so nothing special. We won’t take other driver’s no matter who they are and how cheap the price is, not even taxi, he give us the same receipts as the big taxi corporations. We feel secure and safe of course riding with him.

A few of the drivers said, far from the stereotyped criminal cars, the unlicensed taxi operators can also be victims of crime or violence. One of them said: “Though we make easy money but robbery could happen on us. Once happened, then few of us call the police for help since we are operating illegally.”

#### World underneath and neglected: make a living in a narrow space

For most of the unlicensed taxis operation, immigration account for the increasing demand for rides. As it is noted that yellow cabs hold the monopoly on street pick-ups but are subject to costly regulations and licenses , which are reflected in their high fares. The monopolistic limits on the number of taxi licenses to maximize revenues on every shift have led to a shortage of yellow cabs. Livery drivers are responding to this unmet need by (Light,2004:718). In fact, informal economic actors are informalizing the formal, regulated market. Yellow taxi drivers can too make much much more with a private car, as Deng’s story can tell, making the informal business more attractive. For those who get involved, most of them just find a popular way to make money, cash at hand.

In China the booming rural-urban migrants are the main source of stimulation to the unlicensed operation. Heiche are often found in the suburb areas such as the districts of Nanhui, Fengxian, Minhang, Songjiang, Jinshan, Jiading , Baoshan, Qingpu and Pudong New. These areas are identified as less civilized, dirtier, messier and shabbier parts of Shanghai, where the migrant workers, relocated middle and lower class urbanites find jobs and housing. This is quite the same as in the Western countries, where the socially and legally constructed world of licensed cab companies restricts private livery cabs to carrying only call-in customers and prohibit them from picking up people hailing a cab, except in a low-income fringe areas (Kennedy, 2001). It resemble what happened in New York where the gypsy cabs servicing increase in low-income neighborhoods, while registered cab drivers typically refuse to go there (Sassen, 1994:2297). Though it is hard to identify if there is such fully registered limousine line that exclusively services New York City's financial district in Shanghai. To be specific,

Heiche gather at Places where Brand institutions which have a large staff. July 2010 In Songjiang export processing zone, when I did my fieldwork there I found dozens of small Heiche cars near Foxconn dormitory, they happened to be all red cars. The young workers say:we can have easy access to commercial centers for shopping or gathering since there is no public buses here. Similar phenomenon exist in other high technology development zone like Pudong or Minhang. New university campuses , especially its suburb new campuses, like Baoshan campus Shanghai university ,Minhang campus East China Normal University, and Shanghai Jiao Tong Universtiy, Songjiang Universities' Town, Fengxian Universities Town, especially where public transportation are not available. Heiche emerges also at popular Metro stations in the suburbs , where no or few public buses service could be found nearby.

They are seldom found downtown ,a Fengxian operator told me “Such popular places as People’s Square and the railway stations are strictly administered , nobody dare to go there,once caught (the driver )will be fined 5000 yuan. “But they still operate in certain popular places like hospitals and shopping malls . On March 14, I saw 3 men, ages from 20-35, joking and teasing, ask patients or their family” do you need a ride, I will drive for you in front of Changhai Hospital, fruit shop manager nearby told me “they are a fixture here”.

Rather than criminals or hooligans, what I met are ordinary people just take this as main source of income to make a living.

“Nothing bad about (our job).Shanghai is full of so many people, we drive to serve the masses, we give faster and convenient delivery at lower price. We often work hard very late night and very early in the morning, the same as everyone here, to make a better living.”

Besides business cards, they can get formal receipts from their taxi company connections to attract riders who are professional job holders, those who work in such

institutions as public sector, corporations, educational and research institutions. Driver Zhang joined Jiangnan taxi company, but he did unlicensed operating as his second job. What's more, he has a sworn follower and town fellow who can print the receipts just for sale.

“Want receipts to reimburse, yes we have, I have the formal receipts from. You can have as much as you want now.”

Some of them are working hard to make a living in low quarters . Around 9:30 pm at the entrance of East China Normal University, one driver said:

We just make extra cash to cover gas cost and car insurance. You can tell I stay here for half an hour without business. I rent a local peasant's house, for 400 a month, you know a shabby one for this price. We can't afford apartments. My wife and my child are with me. We both have our own job in the daytime.

We have to be very cautious of being caught by the police. Once caught, will be fined 200 yuan, 3 points on your driver's license, you have 12 point only one year. 4 times caught, your license will be confiscated. I was caught one time last week, bad luck. We will try all means to slip away, but sometimes it is too late before the police car stop in front of yours.

Mr. Xi seemed better. He has been a livery driver for 8 years. He bought a car at 90000 together with the plate after he quit his job (2000 salary hard to support his family). Now the monthly gas cost him 3000, other costs 1000, total income 10000, profit 6000 monthly. With the help of his wife's small shop, he can support his 2-kid family. Luckily, Xi always make better money on Weekends and holidays since lots of college students and professors will call him to tour Suzhou or Hangzhou.



In fact , these several years, the law enforcement is not so strict as during 2005-2009 crack down, when the law enforcement even applied the much controversial method of “using bait to catch black taxis”. One female driver in her 30s said,

“It’s ok for our business. We park our cars right, don’t mess up this place,don’t block the traffic. They complain about confusing parking, Nothing else.”

I was told that they play hide-and-seeK with the police.At Jianchuan road Metro 5, 9:20 pm one day, there is no black cars. The thing is, Once the police leave here , they will come instead.

Most of the drivers choose the job because they enjoy freedom be operating their own car comparing with any other institutional employment opportunities. Jiading drivers told me,

“Yes we can driver and familiar with the traffic systems, there are a few did join in formal taxi companies but so many regulations there that most of us would stay since we make more money without paying tax, and less gas of our car brands .”

“Yes the job is unstable, but lots of freedom, most of the time you can do whatever you want. We don’t like to be supervised by a company boss or an official. We make decisions about our own life.”

The group of drivers on a certain popular site consists of stable members, who know each other very well. They chat, joke together when there is no business. Some of them are close friends and relatives from the same town, county of one neighboring province of Shanghai. At Luonan New Village station of Metro 7, I observed that the unlicensed taxis queue in line , the second can only take passengers after the first one

leave. Obviously they have discussed the situation and agree to the rule. Yet if the passenger insist on , or the drivers agree, the regulation may change slightly, especially if the drivers have very close ties.

“You can pick any car if you like. The car next is my younger brother’s. Our hometown is Anhui Shou county (寿县), there are so many so many town folks take this job. We were brought here one by one, and we bring in new relatives and friends again. We know each other from the same town, but not necessarily from the same county. People from the same place know each other quite well, that works much better.

Most of unlicensed cap drivers come from Anhui. They are in their 20s or 30s, a few in their 40s. When I talked with one group of them, I was told the most literate one only graduate from Junior school. Few of my informants graduate from high middle-school. Their educational background explains why they are excluded from professional job and have to “play with cars”(玩车 as them name it). Different from other neighboring provinces like Jiangsu and Zhejiang, Anhui provides the majority of all kinds of rural-urban migrant workers for Shanghai such as construction workers, nannies, property management staff, and beauty salon or hairdressing assistants. Besides Shou County, there are also other guys from other counties. Drivers I talked with or rode with came from Anyang, Hefei, Wuwei and Fengtai etc. At Dong Chuan Road, Metro No.5, one driver told me,

“I’m from Fengtai county, Anhui Province. You can tell here the Heiche plates are all Anhui ones. We all came here introduced by town folks (laoxiang 老乡), easy for us to take care of each other. We are not afraid of the police or vehicle administrative staff. We have someone protecting us from the above, you know,

who remind us ahead if clearing will happen. Even if we were caught, our connections (in the government) can help us to get our vehicles back.”

To protect them from the police or other outsider dangers, some of them have established pseudo-relatives, by ritual of becoming sworn brothers, most of whom are from the same town of county, though close friends of some of them can join in. Once there are signal of danger, the message will be spread among them, they will response quickly and effectively, to avoid dangerous situations or even to gather to help the brother in difficulty. “They are factions one after another, or they could not survive”, one of the experienced taxi driver said.

There are hidden rule regarding who can take which place. Around 10:30 pm one night, when I was curious if the driver could pick up someone from the nearest metro station of my destination, the 30-Y-O driver said: “I have to go back where I pick you up, since It’s impossible to get a call-in rider just here. It’s hard to stop at the nearby metro station near your apartment to wait for passengers. These places were taken (by other Heiche drivers). I don’t know them. ”It is safe to say that Very often each popular place is monopolized by certain group of usual drivers who have strong ties like town folks or friends.

#### Conclusions and discussions: Toward Good Governance

The “informal economy” has grown dramatically worldwide in developing countries since the 1970s while China’s state statistical apparatus continues to neglect the informal sector “informal sector(Huang,2009). Shanghai’s Unlicensed Taxis could be one typical case to explore what this informal economy looks like, how the drivers and passengers take part in this semi-underground low-end service industry. Unlike Sassen’s case of New York limousine line and personal/private banking or financial centers as the structural outcome of the composition of advanced economies, unlicensed

cab operation are mainly migration oriented, driven by massive urbanization and economic development, with the rural-urban less educated Anhui young male migrants as the majority of providers, and lower or middle class (most of whom are old and new rural-urban migrants). The rural-urban duality social distinction characterized by Hukou System talk a great deal here. As one Jiangsu driver said, "Shanghai taxi (companies ) are state or municipal enterprises, they are not open to us rural migrant workers, we cannot enter. You have to get Shanghai Hukou here ,like those Chongming guys born to have it. We are not qualified. We have to use our hands , our own cars to create the jobs ourselves." This remind me the transitional society and economy happened in other former socialist countries. With the collapse of the Berlin Wall and communist regimes in the former Soviet Union , Eastern Europe witnessed what Stark has called "recombinant property" and" bricolage.This so-called mixed economy, or hybrid form of property rights, consists not so much of public firms mixed with private firms as in "new forms of property in which the qualities of private and public are dissolved, interwoven, and recombined(Stark,1996:1016; Nee 1992). It's obvious that Shanghai's bricolage of taxi industry are divided into two clear sectors, public and private, legal and illegal, white and black, with quite contrasting drivers and passengers.

In "Social Structure and Anomie," Robert Merton(1968:186) offered the insightful proposition that "social structures exert a definitive pressure to engage in non-conforming rather than conforming conduct."Merton focused on deviance and anomie, but he recognized innovation as another kind of non-conformance in his well-known Typology of Modes of Individual Adaptation. This approach always work in defining , labeling criminal, illegal or informal economies. Here the unlicensed taxi operation offers a case that drivers invented a not-so-new means to pursue accepted value: making more money to live a better life. Far from the stereotyped trouble makers, the unlicensed taxi drivers are just alternative cluster of migrant workers like Anhui nannies making a better life by their manual labor or skill. To understand Heiche in Shanghai and China as a whole, other approaches are necessary to be incorporated: due to unequal

distribution of power, wealth and prestige, it the government, together with its the formal legal taxi corporations and monopolized mainstream media that successfully labeled this Heiche service as illegal and informal, hence similarities between the two are omitted , blurred or concealed.

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# Research on the Logic and Path of Urban Governance Based on Negotiation

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**Abstract:** The concept of service transformation, devolution of power, multiple governance in the Chinese cities is one that fits with the principle of behavior on multi-participation, equal respect, all-inclusiveness in the negotiation. The negotiation support the validity, maneuverability, democratization and usability of urban governance. Important to note is how to move from political consultation to social negotiation, from top-layer negotiation to grassroots negotiation. Especially as a breakthrough point to approach negotiations of urban construction planning, environmental protection, cultural innovation and community governance. It will be a template of global practice of deliberative democracy to explore the path of urban governance based on negotiation.

**Key words:** Negotiation; Deliberative Democracy; Urban Governance

The transformation of the urban studies toward negotiation is initiated under such background: the over-thirty-year rapid urbanization essentially transforms China from a traditional agricultural country to a modern urban one. But the short period along with its high efficiency only materially completes more than half of China's urbanization, meanwhile on levels of man and society, China is far from attaining the real city spirit. It still remains obscure that how people from different regions and social strata can get along with each other when they gather in cities, how they can express their voice through society and how to endow them with rights and make them fulfill their obligations. In the later period of the unit system's reduction, various social groups emerge and expand. Cooperating with the country and the market, these social groups

are devoted to deepening the urbanization as well as improving the well-being of different social groups. Although a clear tripartite layout among the three sides hasn't formed, the active participation of society requires a normal, platform-like consultant mechanism. Especially during the recent transformation from urban administration to urban governance, the government is changing its image as both the helmsman and oarsman through power devolution, government purchase and the establishment of various advisory committees and think-tanks. At this point, only through multi-round and multi-aspect negotiation can the goal of urban governance be implemented. In early 2015, the central government issued a document on the deliberative democracy construction<sup>1</sup>, which signifies that China has entered into a brand-new consultant period and the first experimental area should be the cities as they have attracted over two-thirds of the Chinese population.

Both in China's local practice and the Western democratic theory systems, negotiation is an emerging new concept since the modern times. To explore urban governance based on negotiation requires the clarification of the cities' historical and cultural heritage, and during this process a plausible negotiation path can be found for the Chinese urban governance in globalization. This path can be widened in practice and extended forward in exploration.

### I. The Logic of Negotiation in Urban Governance

Urban governance has its theoretic background. In 1995, the UN Commission on Global Governance introduced the concept 'governance' for the first time in its report 'Our Global Neighborhood'. Since then, the UN Human Settlements Program selects cities worldwide to conduct field investigation. After abundant discussion and research, it proclaims five crucial principles for urban governance: validity, equality, participation, responsibility and security. Based on this, Yu Keping, a Chinese scholar

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<sup>1</sup> In February the 9<sup>th</sup>, 2015, China's central government issued a document named *Opinions on Boosting the Socialist Deliberative Democracy*.

maintains that legitimacy, transparency, accountability, rule of law, response and validity are the basic principles for local governance<sup>1</sup>. Following these principles, urban governance, compared with the past urban management, changes at least in the following 5 aspects. First, with governmental power devolution, the past urban management solely dominated by the government, will move toward the multi-governance led by the government, market and society. And these three sides respectively play roles, integrate resources and share interests. Second, urban governance requires more extensive public participation. Both individuals and groups have the right, or are obliged to raise their objection to urban development. In addition, such participation deserve interaction and response. No matter whether the government adopts the opinions or not, it should respond timely to the public participation. Third, compared with urban management, urban governance pays more attention to the legitimacy and validity of the process. If an urban development project is solely determined by the government, then no matter how reasonable it is, its legitimacy will be doubted because the process lacks multiple opinions and multi-collaboration. At last, the ultimate goal of urban governance is good governance instead of good politics, which means the sole pursuit of such governance is to improve urban citizens' benefits.

Urban governance refers to a multi-agent governance network within a city where the government, market and social organizations are inter-dependent as three main organizational forms; on the basis of equality and in accordance with the governance mechanism of participation, communication, negotiation and cooperation, these three sides cooperate with each other in solving public problems, providing public service and enhancing public interests on the city scale. The criteria for good urban governance include the sustainability of urban development, the governmental devolution of power and resources, equal participation in the decision-making process, provision of public service, promotion of local economic efficiency and the transparency and accountability of policy-makers and all stakeholders.<sup>2</sup>



The concept of negotiation is earlier than that of governance. In 1978, Joseph M. Bessette initiated the theory of negotiation and its practical exploration. Subsequently, Rawls' public reason, Habermas' communicative rationality, and Tu Weiming's dialogue of civilizations further promote extensive public negotiation. Rawls holds the view that public reason is the characteristic of citizens under democracy: it is the reason of citizens who possess equal status,<sup>3</sup> and this view supports that in public life citizens display the quality of autonomy, which means that through continuous negotiation and participation in public affairs, citizens' inner wish of autonomy will be fulfilled by obtaining the maximization of public interests; while Habermas more emphasizes the rationality and autonomy of construction, and he maintains that communicative rationality is dialogical and repeatedly dialectical. In addition, Habermas holds the ideal communication context guarantees a liberal communication, and the key to liberal discussion is openness. Consensuses must be reached through continuous open discussion instead of by force (Habermas, 1984:205-240).<sup>4</sup> For example, some public hearings are held by China Railway Corporation and civil aviation companies for modifying prices; some are held to elicit the environmental influences of the Summer Palace renovation project; some are held to determine individual income tax threshold. Habermas then deduces deliberative democracy with a foundation of communicative rationality. Since the 21<sup>st</sup> century, Tu Weiming repeatedly emphasizes that the transformation from Axis civilization to dialogue of civilizations is crucial to the sustainable development of mankind, which means multi-level, multi-dimensional, and diversified negotiation can open doors of dialogues between tradition and modernity, science and religion, China and the West, and even between different races, genders, languages, countries, regions, beliefs and social strata (Tu, 2014).<sup>5</sup> Seemingly, negotiation is a method, or a procedure to solve public problems and promote social development. But in fact the practical application of governance notions needs the help of negotiation. Many scholars specializing in governance hold that the key points in governance are negotiation and reflection,<sup>6</sup> but such negotiation is not limited to the

common sense. Sometimes, good governance requires nation-embedded negotiation, which refers to that, to ensure the validity of governance, countries should enact relevant negotiation policies to make negotiation follow the principles of transparency and cooperation, and at the same time make different sides keep legitimate and continuous interaction in governance. Developed in this way, the governance abilities of the country, society, and cities will enhance the accountability and globalization of the government.<sup>7</sup>

The framework of governance is still on the rise globally. And reflected on the local practice and theory studies of urban governance which have just begun in China, we can see the action demand and logical regression for public negotiation (as shown in the figure 1).




Figure 1: The Logic of Negotiation in Urban Governance

### 1. The Subjects of Urban Governance Are That of Negotiation

Different from the single subject of urban management which is the government, the subjects of urban governance must cohere through joint action mechanism because of the multi-participation property of governance. In case the subjects of urban governance are obscure or even absent,<sup>8</sup> the subjects can deal with temporary and

unexpected public affairs through negotiation. Through multi-subject negotiation, different subjects can continuously seek consensuses and gradually establish normal platform for negotiation. During these negotiation, the subjects who often contribute different opinions, respond to each other simultaneously, and finally reach consensuses, can be regarded as the subjects of daily governance.

## 2. The Application of the Concepts of Urban Governance Depends Essentially on Negotiation

In the process of promoting the hardware and software construction in cities, urban governance pursues concepts of equality, participation, response, validity and transparency, and these concepts conform with those of de-elitism and de-aristocracy. Concerned with the public affairs in cities, representatives of different social strata sit around a table to express their opinions, and this practice already demonstrates the concepts of equality, openness and participation to some degree. Furthermore, if they can respect each other, give feedback to each other, and altogether shoulder the responsibilities for public affairs, a great progress will be made in putting into practice the validity and responsiveness of urban governance.

## 3. Urban Governance Keeps Pace with Negotiation in Fostering Civility and Growth of Society

Nation, market and society are the three main sections of modern social organizational scheme, and they are also the three main subjects of urban governance. Although a clear tripartite layout has not formed among them, the general layout is becoming more and more distinct.<sup>9</sup> The emerging social organizations need the help of a reasonable, legitimate negotiation mechanism along with a negotiation platform to participate in governance. In the meanwhile, if the social organizations have enough opportunities to participate in governance, then citizens will have opportunities to get involved in organizations outside their workplaces and communities, and they will learn governance and autonomy, finally they will truly identify with their cities. These are exactly the obligations and responsibilities a citizen should shoulder.

#### 4. A Legitimate Path of Urban Governance Cannot Avoid the Mechanism of Negotiation

Once a city enters the orbit of governance, whether it builds a road, dismantles a house or constructs a town, easy or difficult, it cannot decide on its own; instead, the consensus must be reached after multiple negotiation. In the past, the wild urban expansion, devoid of negotiation, did great harm to the masses and also to the cultural and historical heritage of cities. Consequently, the credit of government fell to the bottom. Urban governance promoted from the perspective of urban development, together with the mechanism of negotiation put forward in practical application, not only boosts legitimacy, but also achieves validity. These two parts mutually verify and share fruits.

#### 5. With Negotiation Urban Governance Can Effectively Enhance Its Executive Ability

Urban governance deals with a city's economic, cultural, social and political development. If the citizens are forced to follow the top-layer policies without negotiation, they will have little knowledge of the policies' goals, original intention, and operating methods. But if the enactment of the policies includes negotiation, then citizens will know clearly the government's intention and they will also fully express their ideas. The process of negotiation releases, interprets and conveys information. If policies are enacted in this way, their execution will meet little rejection in the future. Many grass-roots government make various policies every year with the intention of benefiting their citizens. But because the policy-making process lacks negotiation, the results are always not satisfactory.

#### 6. The Multiple Goals of Urban Governance Can Be Realized through Negotiation

Because many organizations are involved in urban governance, the latter's public rationality or the maximization of different parties' interests cannot be realized

smoothly. But if the process of governance is accompanied by negotiation at all times, such governance will lubricate the relations of multiple sides, especially the one between the government and its citizens. The chances are that citizens will enhance their trust of the government, and then the cooperation between the two sides will be re-shaped. In the meanwhile, citizens will also acquire the ability of autonomy during the process. Because multiple sides deal with complicated public affairs and care about the city's future altogether, their mutual forgiveness and trust will increase. On the surface, negotiation adds the procedures of governance and subsequently extends the whole process, but the whole process of governance is that of society construction with mutual respect and understanding.

## II. The Exploration of Negotiation Path in Urban Governance

Urban management oriented to market economy for thirty years and driven by rapid urbanization, differs greatly from urban governance that lays equal stress on economic and social development, in terms of subjects, mechanism, and behavior path. Where to get started and in which area to experiment are in fact regular. I will analyze the path of urban governance based on negotiation in the aspects of urban planning governance, urban environment governance, urban culture governance, and urban community governance (as shown in figure 2). The former two used




Figure 2. The Path of Urban Governance Based on Negotiation

to cause the most usual predicament of governance in the post-industrial West, who has thus gathered plenty of empirical experience; the latter two are relatively solvable on which a consensus is easy to reach in the later period of the urbanization in China, and the governance strategies learned from them can be used as a reference in a wider sphere and more aspects of urban governance.

### 1. Urban Planning Governance

During the process of Western urbanization one hundred years earlier than that in China, their urban planning brings experience and lessons as well, but the basic approach is to follow the principles of governance, which means getting more people involved in planning, no matter whether one is at the center of being planned or lives in the same city or simply expresses support for the respect for public will in urban planning. France, for instance, constantly involves the public in the procedures of public participation and negotiation. The participation procedures include, which slackly or strictly act in different phases and with different emphases of urban planning: public inquiry, public negotiation, and public debate. These three must be taken to reinforce the democracy and science of decisions of urban planning, among which public inquiry and public debate are due course of law, and public negotiation, though not due course of law, also plays a very important role no weaker than the other two in the public participation of French urban planning because it has the widest range of application, flexible forms and the most varieties.<sup>10</sup> Similarly, in the renewal of urban planning in the Soho District of New York City in 1960s, Jane Jacobs, the author of *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, and the architect Chester Rapkin, led a large-scale campaign against the urban renewal, demanding that the most important elements should be the diversity of urban development, more convenience for people's work, and retaining of traditional values of neighborhood,<sup>11</sup> instead of monotonous express lanes and reinforced concrete. Owing to their efforts and the public participation and negotiation with the authority, the SoHo District free from the movement of urban

renewal gave a chance for artists to swarm into here, which then facilitated the SoHo District to be a community of the high-income class and gentlemen.

That urban planning renews urban layout is likely to be a revolution that intervenes into work and life of thousands of citizens and helps stimulate public participation, which means the process of expressing different ideas, making their own proposals, and negotiating with planners for several rounds. Certainly, if they cannot reach an agreement participants may slide into conflicts, making city emergency administration system more urgent. It tests government's capability of governance and simultaneously gets more citizens involved. Participation on a larger scale will help learn the idea of governance and ability to negotiate.

## 2. Urban Environment Governance

Urban environment protection is usually one of the most explicit public issues in the middle and later stage of industrialization and urbanization, both globally and locally. On the one hand, the damage of natural environment and historical relics due to rapid industrialization and urbanization is far beyond citizens' affordability; on the other hand, citizens chronically driven by modernization caused by industrialization and urbanization, have a group complex of returning to natural human environment. Moreover, possibly due to surrounding pollution, destruction, and demolition or deprivation of sunshine right, actions of temporarily assembled groups are occasionally happening almost everywhere, and public also gradually take part in the arrays because of environmental problems, either collectively protesting or negotiating with government and enterprises. There are superficially conflicts and unstable factors, but public may not only benefit or achieve their goal from participating in the environmental issue, but also get the opportunity to learn how to negotiate, detour, and comprehend collective power. The growth in actions is the added value of environmental participation that cannot be neglected. It is certain that the environmental review that has been taken into legal procedures in some degree compensates for the lag of environmental participation. Before the outset of various planning and

construction, surrounding residents and institutions have the opportunity to review the influence they may potentially exert on environment. This reflects both respect for environmental right of citizens, and the necessary base on which a city is rationally developed. Citizens are rewarded with real interest for participating in environment review, and thus understand the value of participation.<sup>12</sup>

Regrettably, for government's pressure of economic development and consideration about the stability of society, there is no usual path of environmental participation that has been found at present based on negotiation. It is always not until the environment has been destroyed, the water becomes undrinkable, or the construction of a landfill, a substation, a gas station and a food street gets started, that citizens come to know that and have to petition. But the true environment governance should negotiate with surrounding residents in every phase of various construction and planning that would potentially influence the environment. Environment is no small matter, but a big issue concerning later generations. From varieties of large-scale environmentalist struggles in the middle of 20<sup>th</sup> century in the West, to recently more and more news coverage and public participation about the issues of smog, water and produce pollution in China, the cooperation of multiple organizations based on negotiation has been urgently required. The negotiation platform of environment governance established in the process of hearing, responding, and negotiating of all interest groups including government and enterprises, serves not only for protecting environment and benefiting public, but also as a model for other urban governances.

### 3. Urban Culture Governance

Cities are historically an embodiment of culture. The culture of a city can be perceived from the material level such as mountains and rivers, architecture style, historical relics, and public space, to the spiritual level such as mass culture, avant-garde culture, grassroots culture, and citizens' value. These, though inherited from the past, relies more on urban culture governance. Governance means that solving problems and making proposals are not confined to the power of government who issues orders



or exerts authority. Compared with the other urban governances, the universality and publicity of urban culture determine that government is simply one aspect of governance. Especially in the West, apart from political cultural policies, the facilitators of culture governance mainly come from other public organizations like cultural funds, industry associations, and civil organizations. But it is still in the bud that native culture becomes part of public governance, which needs multiple groups to reach consensus, design top systems, cultivate cultural environment together, and gradually build up the culture governance space oriented to publicity.<sup>13</sup>

How to participate in the urban governance of public culture through negotiation? First of all, urban culture has its unique publicity in the aspects of displaying, sharing, and constructing. Public can perceive their natural responsibility and duty of participating in its governance as long as they live in cities. Secondly, as part of urban soft power, urban culture does not have the toughness of economic or social development, which well fits into the meaning of soft governance that negotiation takes on. The government with dominant power will be apt to bow down, guiding and hearing the public will to foster cultural development. Thirdly, not only does the Internet technology make urban culture almost freely accessible to individuals, but also various interactive platforms' facilitating culture would exert direct influence on people's urban interactions and public cognition, and in this case the cultural awareness of every individual would be easier to be promoted than ever before, with more bases on which they trust and negotiate with each other to foster urban culture governance. Last but not the least, the booming of all kinds of non-governmental organizations offers many possibilities to the self-organized production of urban culture on a large scale, and multiple governances of urban culture will be realized soon if equipped with corresponding cultural policies and appropriate cultural negotiation platforms.

#### 4. Urban Community Governance

Different from the aspects of the other governances, Chinese urban communities have been much favored since the year of 1978. The several rounds of mobilization of

the Central Government, including “Community Construction,” “Community Development,” “Harmonious Community,” and “Community Governance,” are all able to timely deal with the issues communities are faced with. From the original uniformed awareness of community, the role of community in economic construction and system innovation, and how community matches with social transformation, to the dilemma of multiplicity of community governance structure, they seem to be simply top-down design, but in fact, with the background of rapid urbanization in China, the extraordinary development of Chinese urban community forces all the areas and community-level administrations to breed a community evolving mode with self-discovery, self-regulation, and self-invention, in order to cope with new situations and problems.

At present the development of urban community has started a new round of governance. Apart from the fact that government resources converge on communities, the penetration of marketization and socialization renders a higher expectation to community governance. Urban communities are faced with many problems left by “old normal,” such as the issues of multiple organization and cooperation, weak participation of communities, community conflicts and autonomy. If we deal with them in the old uniformed administrative mode without opportunities for all to make proposals and cooperative idea of compromising mutually and siding with each other in the “new normal” of community governance, it will inevitably fall into chaos and deadlock. Community negotiation in multiple dimensions, from hearing different voices to discussing and planning together, is the path we must pass. But it is premature for community-level governance to blueprint community negotiation without normalized negotiation mechanism (Min, 2015).<sup>14</sup> The legitimation of community negotiation, justice and efficiency of it, the design of negotiation platforms, and the possibility of total involvement, are all issues that would come one after another, Although it is still globally in the experimental stage how to negotiate on a public issue, how to adopt negotiated decisions, and how to improve the efficiency of negotiation, but in China,

developing from rural acquaintance society to urban stranger society, Chinese natives are still silent majority even in communities. There is a long way to go from everyday life to discussing public affairs together.

### III. Urban Governance from Negotiation to Decision-making

To cope with normal problems, hotspot issues, and conflicts through negotiation, as it seeks a solution, offers an opportunity to the public for equally participation, learning together, and interaction, which will not only strengthen public awareness of public affairs, but greatly facilitate the mutual respect, understanding, and harmony between different social classes. However, the goal of negotiation is to reach a consensus and make a decision, as difficult problems in the process of advancing global negotiation democracy, so who will make the final decision? How legitimate are those decisions after negotiation? Who will supervise the implementation? It is from negotiation to decision-making that urban governance truly finishes the whole process from guiding to participating, from divergence and convergence. To ensure the effectiveness of negotiation, we should take enough measures in terms of the representativeness of subjects, the legitimacy of procedures, the necessity of negotiating voting, and the possibility of implementation of negotiation.

#### 1. The Representativeness of Subjects in Negotiation

On any public issue, the subjects in negotiation primarily are related interest groups, but not confined to them. The government departments, expert teams, notary institution, and social organization related to the issue, and resident representatives and even news press are supposed to be present when necessary according to the impact scope, the importance, and the influence. Apart from letting interest and non-interest groups fully express their stance and opinions, the greatest benefit of all presence is to pave the ground for legitimacy and effectiveness of the decisions after negotiation.

#### 2. The Legitimacy of Procedures in Negotiation

Urban governance is a comprehensive and intricate public affair with multiple intervention. The solutions to problems of urban governance through negotiation never

come into being all at once, and it is not rare to see negotiation for several rounds and years. With the precondition that subjects of negotiation are complete and representative, legitimacy of procedures is the following focus, including transparency of negotiation information, equal and adequate opportunities for subjects to speak, adding a debate section for controversial issues, leaving time for parted out-court negotiation when there is no result after negotiation for several times, online and offline evidence collection, and the appearance of experts or lawyers when there are conflicts. Legitimacy of procedures offers further chances to negotiating voting.

### 3. The Necessity of Negotiating Voting

If encountered with important public issues in urban governance and uncompromising opinions between each other, the final negotiation necessarily reach a consensus through voting. This is in fact a matter of democracy and centralism, which some scholars also call as “decision-making negotiation of citizens.” It has the property of direct democracy, and the decisions after negotiation tend to have direct social effects.<sup>15</sup> The voting should of course be enacted with the precondition that all groups have carefully discussed for several rounds and then agreed to vote, and there should be notary organization and press on the scene to ensure justice and transparency of voting.

### 4. The possibility of Implementation of Negotiation

Negotiation cannot skirt the difficult problem of implementation as judicature. Implementation is based on public quality, identification with negotiation mechanism, and common passion for cities, and even reflects citizens’ determination to construct a contractual society. Public will has been fully absorbed in the processes of negotiation with representativeness, negotiation with legitimate procedures, and negotiation of voting, blazing the trail for the execution of consensus resolutions. Surely, it is whether negotiation itself fully displays public reason and satisfies and enhances public welfare that marks whether negotiation process has been truly completed.

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# Transformation of Social Development Models Under **China's New Normal State of the Economy**

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## Abstract:

With China's economy stepping into a New Normal, the quantity-oriented development model turns into a quality-oriented model, which means the strategic adjustment at the state-level in the aim and means of development, the unique Chinese way toward prosperity and lasting stability.

Based on the reflection of the problems caused by the quantity-oriented development models, this study analyses institutional conditions, social-economic structural changes and conflicts of current social transformation, and states that New Normal means both challenges and opportunity for China's development. China's future success depends on an economic development plan with concerns on social structural changes.

## **Environmental inequalities and “just city”: towards a cosmopolitical perspective for urban policies**

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*(Forthcoming) Faburel G., 2016, “Towards a cosmopolitical perspective on environmental justice and citizens’ right of the city”, in Ecological Risks and Disasters. New experiences in China and Europe, Edited by Laurence Roulleau-Berger and Li Peilin, Routledge, New York, 76-95*

*Faburel G., 2013, « Comprendre les inégalités et injustices environnementales. Défis pour l’analyse et pour l’égalité des territoires », Vers l’égalité des territoires. Dynamiques, mesures, politiques, La Documentation française, pp. 204-221*

*Faburel G., 2012, “The environment as a factor of spatial injustice: a new challenge for sustainable development of European regions?”, Sustainable Development Handbook - Policy and Urban Development - Tourism, Life Science, Management and Environment, Intech Online Ed., 431-478.*

*Faburel G., 2012, « La ville durable aux défis des injustices environnementales. Constats empiriques et enjeux sociopolitiques », Revue Flux: Cahiers scientifiques internationaux Réseaux et territoires, n°89-90, pp. 15-29.*

### **Abstract:**

*The environmental injustices have emerged, first in Anglo-Saxon countries, as a new category of unequal phenomena analysis and segregation mechanisms. However, although increasing in major cities, they rarely contribute to debates on urban justice, as they are only subject to very little attention in the urban policies.*

*Through the social theories of justice, we show how the institutional representation of the environment in public policies plays a main role. The technical and normative approaches of environment are part of the main paradigm of justice (distributive one), with its perimeter protection and conservation policies, with its externalities assessment and compensation systems.*

*However, based on empirical research in Ile-de-France region, opened to perceptions and values, well-being and lifestyles linked to local environment and risks (flood, chemical...), it is stressed that environmental justice topic should take more local and historical dynamics into account, considering urban settings as living environment and place attachment.*

*On this basis, we propose to open the debate on urban democracies and, more on a cosmopolitical perspective of citizens' right of the city.*

### **1. Introduction: environment and risks as justice issues for cities**

The poor are much more subject and vulnerable to environmental degradation, or risks of its occurring<sup>1</sup>. They are also more strongly affected by the negative impact of certain international, national or local policies. This has long been the case, in Europe and outside, in the North as well as, of course, in the South (Schroeder, Martin, Wilson, Sen, 2008). Similarly, so-called pro-environmental practices (relative to food, energy or mobility, for example), which have recently made their appearance, particularly in western European countries, prove to be no less non-egalitarian or inequitable.

This issue should nowadays represents one of major stakes for social justice (Rawls, 1971; Young, 1990; Sen, 2009) particularly at the urban scale, where lifestyles are strongly affected by socio-spatial fragmentation and forms of segregation. These injustices justify the need to finding justice in the city, throughout the search for the ill-defined “Just City” (Fainstein, 2010<sup>2</sup>), embodied by a renewal of the currents of spatial justice.

However, environmental stakes only contribute a little to these reflexions, even less trough the inequalities they generate: social consequences of downtown rehabilitation through environment and of sustainable neighbourhoods projects, socially precarious related to energy resources... This theme of environmental

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<sup>1</sup> The author would like to thank Pauline Massé for her collaboration, suggestions and technical assistance.

<sup>2</sup> Susan Fainstein establishes a definition of the “Just City” with the elaboration of universal values which should guide the creation of public space and the creation of common good, through three guiding principles: *equality* or the principle of (re)distribution towards most disadvantaged populations and territories; *diversity* or tolerance for multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism in the city; *democracy* or the search for a greater involvement of the population in its governance.



inequalities, and the forms of injustice they generate, theoretically represents major stakes for territorial governance and urban regulation. It appears to be anything but neutral for policies, and so not just at intercontinental (e.g.: ecological debt, environmental refugees...) <sup>3</sup> , or national scales <sup>4</sup> . Nevertheless, the subject of environmental inequalities or injustices continues to be globally ignored or overlooked in major urban policies, mainly in European countries (Pye, Skinner, Meyer-Ohlendorf, Leipprand, Lucas and Salmons (2008), as, anyway and more widely, in scholars thought dedicated to social or spatial justice (Fainstein, *op. cit.*).

Admittedly, concerning policies, the subject closely interlinks environmental, social and economic aspects. It requires so the overcoming of sectorial approaches that have been historically developed and that are often implemented rationally from the top down. Here, the normative regulations and their technical rationales developed to date throughout the world play an important role. Traditionally, in France for example, both at local scale as at national one, environmental issues are viewed through an institutional lens, i.e. physic-chemical approaches to normative ends for environmental protection, with a lot of technical tools, as, for instance, Environmental Impact Assessment, Strategic Environmental Assessment... for major equipments and mega-projects for instance.

To our point of view, these approaches both partially address the mechanisms at work behind inequality in the urban dynamics and local environmental field, and reveal the limits of regulation-making processes of historical governmentality, to face a gradual reformulation of the joint government of culture and nature, in our so-called modernity (Beck, 1999 and 2004; Latour 2004a), particularly in urban policies (Harvey, 1992). So, the aim here is to understand why environmental inequalities and injustices

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<sup>3</sup> The equitable rights of individuals to a healthy and quality environment have already been set down in a number of texts, some of them constitutional, both international (Aalborg and Leipzig Charters, in 1998 and 2007, Declaration of Istanbul in 1996) and national (e.g. Environmental Charter in the French Constitution in 2005, for instance).

<sup>4</sup> As seen at national scales in the Strategy for Sustainable Development in Scotland (Section 8, 2005), in the report from UK Environmental Agency on *Poverty and the Environment* (2003), which introduced a poverty indicator into environmental accounting, and, main example, in the Executive Order 12898 which has decreed in 1994 in the USA that all federal agencies including the EPA or Environmental Protection Agency should: “identify and remedy the effects of measures that disproportionately affect the health and living conditions of the poor or those who belong to ethnic minority groups”,

could, under certain conditions, generate a new perspective for both social and spatial justice, highlighting the benefits of adopting a cosmopolitical approach (Stengers, 1997; Lolive et Soubeyran, 2007).

For this purpose, going out from findings and examples of scientific studies from several European countries (France, Germany, Netherlands, United Kingdom...), the second part will present some studies results on this topic at different scales. The third wishes to show that the main condition to shape a cosmopolitical perspective is to question precisely and simultaneously conceptions of environment and justice, both in studies and the policies related to. The fourth part proposes the summary of an empirical approach lead in 2009 and 2010 for French Ministry of Ecology in Paris Region. Towards local experiences of environment and risks (flood, chemical...), some results enforce the benefits of a cosmopolitical design and thought, to help emerging new topics, categories and goals for a “just city”. At the end, through democratic stakes and models of equality behind, we defend a rights-based approach rather than preferences-based approach, to also consider differently the citizens’ right to the city.

## **2. On observing environmental inequalities at different scales: challenging socio-spatial dynamics and mechanisms of segregation**

Environmental inequalities, even iniquities, are not a recent topic. Appeared first in the United States and born to the civic rights movement and the fight against discrimination, Environmental Justice current is based on early proof (Bullard 1983, 1990 and 1994) of a non-egalitarian distribution, first ethnic then economic, of populations relative to the major forms of equipment that have a major impact on the environment (health risks, mortality rates...). Even elsewhere than in the USA, in France for instance, environmental inequalities have emerged early on as a stake, since the 19th century and more recently since the 1980s. At the end of this decade, a peri-urban area was, for instance, four times more likely to be stretched across by a highway. And in 1986, low-income populations were proportionally four times more exposed to noise levels considered annoying.

However, ecological crises and environmental ordeals have given rise to new issues on all spatial scales:

- On a continental scale, the problem of climate refugees due to desertification, deforestation or soil erosion, as well as catastrophic events with ever greater geopolitical consequences (Welzer, 2009); on a planetary scale, poverty disparities between large regions (for access to drinking water and water for agriculture and for diversity of food products, etc.) with the main notions being: a very different ecological footprint depending on development levels and ecological debts (due by Northern countries to Southern: carbon emissions, exploitation of natural resources, exported environmental impacts and free use of space for depositing wastes);

- On national and regional scales, even urban subspaces, with subjects such as pollution, nuisances and risks that increasingly lead to spatial discrimination between social groups, create environmental segregations and as a result, the responsibility for *a priori* positive policies: actions for the protection of historic centres' heritage and landscape (which provokes a hasty departure of certain populations due to the increasing house prices thus created), the ecological rehabilitation of fallow land, even so-called “sustainable” communities that segregate, etc. (BedZED in London, BO01 in Malmö, etc).

- To the *a priori* micro-local level of energy precariousness or of unhealthy, unfit to be lived- in habitations of low-income populations in certain urban neighbourhoods (where environmental health is often a vector of issues), as well as so-called pro-environmental attitudes and practices which turn out to be no less unjust (use of energy, types of transport, food choices, agricultural practices, etc).

Catégorie de revenu	Nombres de désastres	Population (millions)	PIB par habitant	Nombres de morts	Coût total, en % du PIB
Haut revenu	1 476	828	23 021	75 425	0,007
Bas revenu	1 533	869	1 345	907 810	0,55

Source : Stromberg, David, 2007, « Natural Disasters, Economic Development, and Humanitarian Aid, » *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 21 (Summer), pp. 199–22.

These issues and adjacent notions have given rise to a number of observations. First of all, on the international scale, climatic deregulation and natural risks have been the focus of much attention. For example, the 2007 report of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Climate Evolution shows that in 2004, the poorest countries represented 37% of the world population, but 7% of CO2 emissions, as against a ratio

of 15/45% for the richest countries. Similarly, as shown in the table below, natural disasters imply different levels of damage.


Tab. 1 Rich countries and poor countries in the face of natural disasters Column titles: Income category, Number of disasters, Population (millions), GDP per inhabitant, Number of dead, Total cost in % GDP. Line titles: High income, Low income

In terms of ecological footprint, according to a few forecasts now being debated, we would need the equivalent of the natural resources of six Earths for all the planet's inhabitants to enjoy an American lifestyle, three Earths for a European lifestyle, and although no global evaluation has so far been done, ONGs estimate the rich countries' ecological debt at approximately \$2,500b.

On the national scale, several recent studies have examined industrial risks (chemical, etc.), sites and polluted soil, and classified equipment. It has been shown, for example, that metropolitan France has a very unequal distribution of risk sites (landfills, waste incineration plants, Seveso sites<sup>5</sup>, etc.): 8% of the communes have two sites, 2.5% have three or more. Most are found in the Southwest and the region to the north of Paris (along the Seine valley), the low-income territories of the Marseille region and the large "industrial" agglomerations of the Nord-Pas de Calais (Laurian, 2008). Likewise, according to a study made in the U.K., only five polluting industries (according to the European directive Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control) are located in zones where the average yearly household income is above 30,000£, whereas 662 are in zones where the average income is below 15,000£.

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<sup>5</sup> The so-called Seveso directive or directive 96/82/EC is a European directive that imposes the obligation upon all EU member states to identify all industrial sites presenting major risks of accident. The directive, which was made official on 24 June 1982, was modified on 9 December 1996 (Seveso II) and amended in 2003 (2003/105/EC). Companies are listed according to the quantities and types of hazardous products they handle.



Source : IGN BD-CARTO, 2000  
 - INSEE, revenus\_fiscaux\_ménages\_par\_commune\_2002\_nord\_pas\_de\_calais\_2002  
 - DPPR, seveso\_2003  
 - DPPR, installations classées polluantes  
 - MEDD, basol, nov 2004  
 N.B. : Document de travail

Map 1 Inequalities relative to risks and polluted soils (Nord Pas-de-Calais region in 2000s) Legend: Seveso site (red), Polluted soil (blue), Site classified as polluted (green). Income category (brown)

On urban scales – the least explored up to now – attention is increasingly focused on social disparities in the living environment. In 2004 it was revealed that in France, ZUSs (Sensitive Urban Zones) were particularly penalized. In Grenoble, 80% of social housing is located less than 300 meters from the city motorway that crosses the city from one side to the other. And in the Ile-de-France Region in particular (see below), it was shown that 2,750,000 people were in a situation of environmental inequality, mainly in the departments of the inner suburbs or in environments recently urbanized, causing strong impacts on the environment. On this more urban scale, more and more research is being devoted to inequalities of environmental health. Finally, on more micro-local scales, much attention has been focused on energy precariousness, which concerns 7-9% of the French population. Thus the ADEME (French Environment and Energy Management Agency) calculated that for France in 2006, the share of energy expense of the 20% poorest households was 2.5 times higher than that of the 20% richest households.

These data, which could have been easily multiplied in many geographic areas and countries (see Walker, 2012), give us a spatial picture of social disparities in face of the environment. They nonetheless have the particularity of being strictly descriptive and static, and most of the time based only on pollution or nuisances exposure, risks

occurrence, nature proximity, or, in relation to energy, on resulting /exposures of consumption. In fact, what all these data have in common is that they only partially deal with the socio-spatial dynamics and mechanisms of segregation at work behind the non-egalitarian facts in the field of environment, particularly in cities.

For example, Kruize analysed environmental equity at the scale of the Netherlands and of two strongly urbanized regions, including the Amsterdam-Schiphol airport zone (2007). Environmental inequalities were studied throughout the distribution of environmental “bads”, i.e. situations that did not comply with statutory norms, and of environmental “goods”, i.e. those that complied with the norms or fixed objectives, by income categories. The study showed that modest income populations usually live in slightly less environmentally friendly neighbourhoods, with stronger disparities in the distribution of green spaces. The differences observed primarily concern areas in which noise and nitrogen oxide emissions are low. But, the highest income populations are more exposed to noise (i.e. level of acoustical intensity) than populations with the lowest incomes.

More generally, although often described as unhealthy, or at least subject to high levels of noise nuisances and air pollution due to automobile traffic, city centres in western Europe receive more well-off populations than those living in the nearby suburbs. Moreover, when middle classes wishing to become property owners react to the increase in the cost of land and real estate, they exert more pressure on the environment, contributing to urban sprawl, intensive building in rural and agricultural spaces, automobile traffic... They nonetheless benefit from a better living environment, which in turn, argues in favour of measuring the differences between the effects being borne by social groups, and their impacts.

So, in fact, environmental justice situations do not seem to correspond to the most conventional definition, i.e. proportionally higher environmental pressure, i.e. physico-chemical exposure, risks occurrence... of low-income populations. Impact mechanisms and spatial dynamics are involved, as proposed in the definition given by Pye, Skinner, Meyer- Ohlendorf, Leipprand, Lucas and Salmons (2008) for the European Commission: unequal distribution of environmental quality (open to the question of social vulnerabilities and cumulative impacts); unequal environmental impact of different social groups; unequal impact of environmental policies on these same groups.

It would more correspond to the common definition of inequality, which is “the result of unequal access to the diverse resources offered by a society”, and would involve the rights for justice, as sometimes mentioned in other more political definitions<sup>6</sup>.

### **3. From conceptions of the environment to conceptions of justice: the individual at the heart of environmental issues**

The results presented above are generated by the historical assessment apparatus - nomenclatures, protocols and data - which is inherited directly in France, as in many other countries whether centralist or federalist (Shirazi, 2011), from a techno-centered cognition in public policies. This cognition is embodied in a number of actions promoted along with the creation in the 60s and 70s of politico-administrative arrangement concerning the environment. In that domain, technical and global evaluation criteria are numerous: physicochemical exposure limits, probabilities of official risks occurrence, acoustic levels as predictors of noise disturbance, metric distance for accessibility to city amenities, etc.

For example, in the field of urban planning, the French observatory of Sensitive City Zones (Zones Urbaines Sensibles - ZUS) showed the particularly disadvantaged situation of these zones in terms of environmental nuisances, pollutions and environmental risks, through technical approaches, but also through surveys (in Choffel, 2004). However, psycho- sociological relations with the environment are interpreted only in the official perimeter of the neighbourhood zoning, according to the same dose-response predictors. Moreover, housing is far from being the one and only issue concerning the environment. The access to nature and the countryside, for example, is another. In fact, this approach reflects commonly:

- ✓ i.e. regarding this last as a secondary and derivative category of urban functioning ;
- ✓ and a representation of environment historically techno-centered, somewhat non socially lived, giving rise to policies with a still strong techno-normative inclination.

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<sup>6</sup> “A difference of situation between individuals or social groups, evaluated not only in terms of “ecological” considerations, strictly speaking (pollutions, public health, natural surroundings, etc.), but also in terms of living space, accessible renewable resources, quality of human establishments and living conditions, landscape, etc. and that we consider **contrary to the rights and respect of the human being**, and moreover, likely to be a cause of disequilibrium harmful to the proper functioning of the community” (French Committee for the Worldwide Summit of Johannesburg, 2002, p. 164).

a representation of social justice still giving a very few importance to the environment,

Yet, as Wentz (1988) and Jamieson (2007) have already shown, any conception of the environment also conveys a conception of justice. And, Dobson (1998) demonstrated it, applied to sustainability.

For instance, the Anglo-Saxon trends of Environmental Justice have similarly developed, despite a few national differences (socio-ethnic categories in the U.S. and more social categories in Great Britain), individualized and community-based preferences approaches to the environment (Clayton, 2000). If the different national categories of analysis (e.g., more ethnic versus more social) and political goals (e.g., normalisation in the United States) are evidences of different environmental lessons, this trend is identically centred on handicaps and environmental damages. And the conceptions of justice are quite similar, i.e. distributive justice as fairness (Rawls, 1971), despite also less importance of procedural justice in Great Britain (Fairburn, 2008). According to John Rawls, justice means providing maximum benefit for the most disadvantaged members of society, thus allocating a priority help to populations and territories which accumulate disadvantages. Production of justice is then corollary to the application of the fair distribution principle and of the compensation principle.

At the opposite, in the current of ecological inequalities of development – more macro-spatial, hence macro-economic and macro-social, another concept of the environment is generally deployed: more oriented towards the ecological rights and collective duties of societies (Dobson, 2003). The first analyses looked at the economic mechanisms which produced ecological inequality (e.g., environmental dumping from free trade, see Baumol and Oates, 1988), before moving on political contexts, government regimes, and public policies (e.g., national environmental regulation). Under this approach, the inequalities studied are no longer called “environmental” but rather “ecological”, referring to a different conception of the environment: based less on the commensurability of the environment’s values than on rights- based approaches (Martinez-Alier, 2002). And the, this meaning brings with it a conception of justice which is also somewhat different: much more social and openly procedural, focused on citizen involvement in social change (Young, 1990), than strictly (re)distributive (via economic compensation for the weakest, for example). Young (2000) and Fraser (1999)



highlight the crucial role of recognition of the claims asserted from the specificity of social group positions in order to challenge structural inequalities.

Thus, these two currents differ greatly, both in environmental as justice conceptions. However, both lack a true exploration at the urban scale. This lack seems depend not only but mainly on the modern tradition of environmental purposes in public policies, notably in planning ones: the environment “is placed in a logic of rationalizing the administration, and not of public participation or ecological communication” (Charles et Kalaora, 2003). So, it perpetuates generally the top-down institutional order of power (Castells, 1972). Yet, over the last thirty years, the environment has everywhere imposed itself as one of the primary operators of our reflections on modernity:

- ✓ ecological irreversibilities of our societies' capitalist construction;
- ✓ a de-synchronization between social activities and of decision, by environmental challenges;
- ✓ an increasing detachment between problems scales, places for decision-making and the spots for action;
- ✓ ... with then, for example, the growing unpredictability of the effects of our technical “reason” in urban planning.

According to Latour (2004b), the environment even prefigures a new age for policy, in which the making of symbolic links, the appropriation of and relationship to identity, the spatial one in particular, are reconstructed. In France, this change can be seen in a certain number of recent programmatic aspirations or, essentially, watchwords which are often adequate in urban planning or urbanism fields, for instance urban energy transition and the post-Kyoto “paradigm” (cf. Greater Paris<sup>7</sup>). However, in France as abroad, these aspirations do not generally compete with other aims relative to change, notably community or affinity-group- based solutions (e.g. Cities in Transition movement). It is true that, as stated by Charles: “Although the environment is recognized as an object of universal concern, concrete measures relative to it, its

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<sup>7</sup> Project which is apparently justified by environmental inequalities as evoked in the presidential discourse when the different architectural projects for future were presented in 2009.

consideration at a finer scale and the subjective dimensions that constitute it are largely underestimated and ill perceived.” (2001, p. 21).

In fact, we suppose that the very first “disturbance” introduced by the subject of environmental inequalities, particularly in an urban analysis, is that in theory it makes room differently for a much more dynamic and active screening of a model of social justice, and its spatial correlations for land use planning, urban design, and especially for environmental protection policies. Here, besides the social aspect with the reconfiguration of links (e.g. the importance of nature for local forms of solidarity in cities, in the North as in the South), or with the economy of the new sectors of locally-oriented production (ecological housing, local consumption of agricultural and cooperative products...), it would first examine this model from the point of view of the “myth of the passive citizen” which makes it operational (Rosanvallon, 2008).

Let us note the presence, though with very different modalities, of so-called citizen participation in the two main approaches targeting environmental inequalities discussed above. As shown before, the constitution of new and more informal activisms, as local mobilization and struggles in the environmental justice field, increasingly underpins no less social forms, also via different relations to the environment and to nature (e.g. sustainable/ecological/green communities in Roseland, 1997). Especially, individuals and laypersons yearn more and more often for different ways of life and commitments, invoking nature and environment (Haanpää, 2007; Jagers, 2009). So, as mention by Pellow and Brulle (2005): “Departing from mechanistic models of EJ rooted in the equity paradigm, the authors force us to consider not only how communities might repel toxic facilities but also how communities might feed themselves, provide energy, build new systems of governance and decision making while influencing existing ones, and produce and control new knowledge about public health and the environment. This is the next generation of environmental justice theory and action” (295).

We are in fact encouraged here to consider the contribution of environmental inequalities to the debate of policy-making at urban scale in terms of both individual and collective capacities of involvement; and to examine precisely their non-egalitarian rights in social distribution and “just city”. It is here that we would today place the primary forms of environmental inequalities: no longer simply disparities of exposure (although this interpretation remains useful for the detection of long term sanitary

impacts), but gross social inequalities relative to more individualized forms of access to formal or informal involvement in socio-ecological changes (not only participation processes, but more lifestyle commitments, unaffiliated movements...). Even though studies tend to show that the poor are more and more involved in local causes (cf. case studied by Corburn, 2005), such capacities are no less unequally distributed than other, as stipulated in Article 3.9 of the Aarhus Convention (1998). On this conceptual basis, we conducted in 2008 an empirical study of environmental inequalities in the Ile-de-France, i.e. the capital region of France. Its realization and results are discussed below.

#### **4. From socio-spatial disparities to territorialized environmental inequalities/injustices in Ile-de-France Region**

##### *4.1 A pluridisciplinary approach and a multi-scale procedure*

A research was conducted for the French Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Development, Transport and Housing in close cooperation with the Ile-de-France region (Faburel et Gueymard, 2008; Gueymard, 2009; Faburel, 2012). On the one hand the study confronted so-called objective environmental data (geophysical indicators usually employed to characterize resources and harms<sup>8</sup>) with classical socio-economic information (indicators on income, proportion of subsidized housing, unemployment rates...) in 1300 municipalities in the region in order to pinpoint the major types of disparities.

But, the current scientific literature increasingly calls for pluridisciplinary approaches, in the attempt to integrate at least some elements of the inhabitants' living experience. As already stated, the system of environmental evaluation that still dominates worldwide is ill-suited to disclose the scope of environmental (in)justices, which has at least as much to do with the socio-environmental as the bio-physical domain. From its strictly evaluative aspect, this system still strongly depends on the segmentation of knowledge and scientific disciplines, on their disparate recognition by the powers-that-be, and – not to say above all – on a vision of the inhabitants as “statistical individuals”. Since, where socio-environmental issues as well as others are concerned, the gap between what is given by so-called objective environmental data and what the population feels and experiences constantly widens. “Studies to clarify

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<sup>8</sup> Thresholds of chemical exposure for air quality; probabilities of risks occurrence, flood risks and hazards for instance; acoustic levels for noise nuisance; distance for the accessibility of urban amenities, of green spaces...

the relationships between objective and perceived exposure and the influence of social status on the perception of environmental exposures are still necessary” (Kohlhuber et al, 2006, p. 254).

Thus, after identifying, on this basis, 6 municipalities close to Paris considered representative of different disparity situations, we conducted a survey with 600 inhabitants, face to face (average length 45 minutes), in order to confront their responses with the data generated in the first part. Our work closely combined geographical, sociological and psychological knowledge. We thought that, due to its territoriality and resulting transversality, the register of the personal and local experiences, satisfaction, place attachment and political expectations relating to the environmental qualities constitutes a non-negligible source of information, which could prove essential to:

- (re)define the analytic frameworks of these situations which until now have been mainly perceived as “objectively” unequal, often presented as a “combination” of environmental degradation and socio-historical spatial disqualification (i.e. disparities);
- shed a light on potential levers for urban policies, thus contributing to the entry into politics of a fully socio-environmental set of problems which are still rarely viewed from the perspective of public intervention and change (i.e. injustices);
- for example, by observing the aptitude of the current environmental evaluation system to describe a fully territorialized phenomenon, defined at least as much by felt, symbolic and axiological relations of local societies with their living space, as by largely accounted for physical or social characteristics (i.e. inequalities).

In view of the size of the sample and the various criteria which defined the choice of our sites as well as of our groups of individuals, we did not aim for representativity at a scale of the region (Marcotullio and McGranahan, 2007). We adopted essentially an exploratory perspective, fully focused on environmental inequalities as linked to individuals’ lived experience (World Bank, 2007).

#### *4.2 The major role of living environment and its politics*

The first stage led – classically – to the observation of a growing correlation between the environmental and social characteristics in the Ile-de-France.

## Socio-economic profile

<u>Environmental category</u>	<u>Affluent</u>	<u>Average</u>	<u>Low income</u>	<u>Total</u>
Good	45.53	31.49	22.98	100
Average	33.57	36.15	30.28	100
Low	17.84	32.39	49.77	100

Tab. 2 Socio-economic profile of the three major environmental categories

Source: Faburel et Gueymard (2008)

This distribution confirms the situation of certain areas in the nearer suburbs, which used to be industrial, but also that of peri-urban areas absorbing the dispersion of low-income populations to areas which may have been subject to recent deterioration (e.g. certain parts of the eastern Region).

It also generated a list of environmental objects and factors that make a place attractive or undesirable. At the scale of the three groups, four environmental objects powerfully structure the expected difference between the environmental offer of the most well-off municipalities and the poorest: listed heritage sites, Seveso class industrial risks, railway noise, noise generated by the major Parisian airports.

<b>Socio-economic groups</b>		
<b>Well-off</b>	<b>Average</b>	<b>Low income</b>
Listed sites (e.g.: ZPPAUP)* (+) 3	Green components (+)	Seveso (+) 1
Green spaces (+) 4	Air traffic noise (small airports) (+)	Railway traffic noise (+) 2
Overall pollution (+)	Waterways and bodies of water (-)	Local pollution (+) 3
Waterways and bodies of water (-)	Green spaces (-)	Road traffic noise (+) 4
Green components** (-)	Listed sites (-)	Air traffic noise (major airports) (+) 5
Road traffic noise (-)	Overall pollution (-)	Flooding zones (+)
Local pollution*** (-)	Air traffic noise (major airports) (-)	Overall pollution (+)
Flooding zones (-)	Seveso (-)	Green spaces (+)
Air traffic noise (small airports) (-) 6	Flooding zones (-)	Green spaces (+)
Air traffic noise (major airports) (-) 5	Railway traffic noise (-)	Air traffic noise (small airports) (-)
Railway traffic noise (-) 2	Road traffic noise (-)	Listed sites (e.g.: ZPPAUP) (-) 7
Seveso (-) 1	Local pollution (-)	Green components (-) 6

Tab. 3 Environmental profiles of socio-economic groups

Source : Faburel et Gueymard (2008)

\*Designates listed sites and historic monuments, protected urban areas, protected urban architecture and landscape heritage areas (ZPPAUP)

\*\* Notably includes natural and agricultural lands, open urban gardens (allotment gardens, private family gardens), hippodromes, golfs and cemeteries.

\*\*\* Population living close to (100 meters) road segments with annual average NO<sub>2</sub> levels higher than the annual quality objective, established by the air quality protection plan (2005-2010) and taken up by the air quality monitoring program for the Ile-de-France (PSQA) for 2004.

Here, it became clear that it would be easier to understand residential choices and the resulting geography, more via the repulsive effects of environmental damage and deterioration than via the attractiveness of certain elements, notably those called natural here (green spaces, waterways).

The second step carried out by the survey confirmed this argument that people are more likely to make their residential choices to avoid nuisance factors; with traffic noise or the bad quality of local architecture (and to a lesser extent, the presence of an industrial sites) as the major arguments. We must admit here that certain standard indicators have undeniable predictive power. But, it also showed that environmental satisfaction is strongly linked to local experiences and expectations relative to the lived and felt environment: the capacity of the near environment to provide a feeling of “being at home”, and confidence that elected representatives (above all municipal) will do something about these expectations. At the same time, the statistical analysis, using at this stage the Correspondence Factor Analysis, with the Maximum Percentage Deviation as indicator (PEM), shows that the rich are not systematically the most satisfied with their environment. These observations are along the same lines as other research, such as that of Diamantopoulos, Schlegelmich, Sinkoviks et Bolhen (2003), showing the decreasing weight of socio-demographic criteria in situations of environmental inequalities, this time in “green” consumption.

Variable	Deviation	Khi2	Test Khi2	PEM
Expectations as to improvement of environmental quality	19	14	...	42
Feeling of being "at home"	80	63	...	40
Regret at having to move	78	36	...	35
Confidence in the municipal elected representatives	106	73	...	35
Regret at having to leave the neighbourhood	87	82	...	32
Criteria of residential choice: environmental quality	80	32	...	32
Municipality of residence	101	72	...	30
Living in a ZUS classified neighbourhood	20	18	...	30
Reference to ideal living environment: here	42	18	...	30
Municipal environmental characteristics (3 categories characterized “objectively”, see above)	96	46	...	29
Attachment	75	44	...	29
Membership in association	45	12	...	27
Confidence in local public authorities	61	41	...	27
Frequency of use of green spaces	62	38	...	26
Criteria relative to residential choice: the image and atmosphere of the neighbourhood	39	10	...	25

*Tab. 4 Classification of explanatory variables of environmental satisfaction (global PEM)  
Source: Faburel et Gueymard (2008)*

Our results seemed at least just as much situated in the domain of sensible, symbolic even of axiological relations and transactions of local societies to their living

environment. We have like others stated that the registers of lived environmental experiences structure satisfaction, beliefs and attempts. It implies mechanisms, which in certain cases could easily be defined by already existing classical indicators. For instance, the length of residence (seniority), which is often included in surveys on social issues (for instance housing and environment surveys), reveal an attachment to the place of residence. Moreover, the variable “presence of a garden or terrace”, for example, constitutes a true environmental relay for certain people, whereas for others it acts as a compensatory factor within the domestic sphere. This may be more important than the distinction by type of housing (house/apartment) or by status (owner/tenant/rent-free), which surveys habitually use to distinguish social categories and/or to typify relations to the environment.

But, our results also allowed casting a light on a social category, which is often ignored in socio-economic approaches to the environment: non-working persons (retired persons of all social origins and others not gainfully employed). In fact, the differentiation relative to environmental experiences and satisfaction may have less to do with differences between professions and socio-professional categories (PCS), or between managers and workers, for example, than with the opposition between non-working/working persons, with the retired dominant in the first group, and lower-class group in the active population. We will have to understand how time set free by retirement, or links between age and place attachment, may generate possibilities of involvement in environmental issues and challenges.

So, new topics of study appear (“repulsive” situations, lived experience or satisfaction declared, self-evaluation of impacts, environmental beliefs as “being at home”...), as new categories of analysis (such as active/inactive, old/young, type of housing, residential length, political confidence...). Especially, this information generates in fact additional elements for a finer assessment, not only of structural disparities, but also of dynamical inequalities or even of political injustices. Following Krieg et Faber, who proposed some interesting views on the cumulative indicators of social vulnerability inspired by the capabilities (Sen, 1993) applied on environmental hazards (2004), and in the wake of Bonaiuto Fornara and Bonnes (2003) on the importance of place attachment in households’ residential choices, two paths appear: to focus on people's perceptions, experiences, lifestyles... linked to the environment, and place attachment; to adopt a procedural justice approach rather than a structural and

distributive one only based on behavioural indicators (such as moving house, for example), in order to investigate urban inequality.

In fact, as already developed by Schlosberg (2004), environmental justice needs to address:

- ✓ not only the distribution of environmental harms and benefits (worldwide first qualification),
- ✓ but also people's participation in decision-making processes (increasing definition, borned of the *Environmental Justice* movement in the English speaking countries),
- ✓ including recognition (more recent definition) of people's particular experiences, identities and visions of a desirable life (Honneth, 2004 and 2012).

Following Mitchell and Walker (2003) and Walker (2012) ("Unequal capacities to act upon the environment and address public authorities in order to change the living environment"), environmental injustice might well more represent, "the social and territorial inequalities of capacities and means given to populations and local public authorities to act in view of improving their lived and felt environment: the habitability<sup>1</sup>" (Faburel, 2008: 125). From this perspective, justice requires so not simply formal inclusion or equality but "attending to the social relations that differently position people and condition their experiences, opportunities and knowledge of the society" (Young, 2000: 83). It is true that, to return to the more official qualification of Pye et al.:

- How can the unequal distribution of environmental quality of places (the first attribute of the description proposed) free itself from subjective operations characteristic of the qualitative aspects of the environment?
- How can we deny that unequal environmental impact of different social groups does not correspond to unequal capacities of social behaviours and urban governance on the environment?
- How can we judge the unequal impact of various policies, without taking into account the new role played by individuals themselves in legitimizing, if not co-constructing these actions?

## **5. Conclusion: toward the cosmopolitical construction of an "equal society"?**

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<sup>1</sup> This notion refers both to the ethic of place and to its reference point of proximity, and to the ethic of the inhabitant and his or her sensory experiences.



The increased attention on the social demand for environment has led to a renewed conception of the environment, which is less passive and all-encompassing and more active and “fractal”. This more dynamic and action-based definition seems now to be particularly necessary for urban policies, i.e. the indispensable gathering of the environmental justice topic with that of socio-spatial segregation, still missing in scholars thought on “Just city”. In fact, this qualification would be better adapted to the changes that the environment now puts upon our societies: cognition, practices and projections. Environment could involve inhabitants in novel ways, both via their own experience of unequal environmental situations, via forms of commitments which such situations increasingly generate, as vital resources for participatory projects (Schlosberg 2007).

Based on the recognition both of the social vulnerabilities and on the capabilities (Sen, 1993; Nussbaum, 2000) of poor populations to deal with the habitability, this conception of environment allows identifying non-egalitarian situations and addresses new forms of institutional and territorial governance of projects, and their regulation. Dikeç (2001) features, by means of the “right to the city” concept, the role of emancipation politics to first mobilise marginalized populations, instead of seeking for a broader-based movement in the name of spatial justice. It would admit non only that citizenship can be differentiated (Young, 1990), examining other social groupings as essential markers in the uneven distribution of power and resources (Soja, 1999), but also their conditions for social justice (Di Chiro, 1996; Schlosberg, 2013), like a citizen's right to the city<sup>2</sup>, opened to other factors than only individual income or cultural condition: the rights of affinity-based groups (and not just community-based ones) to actively participate in shaping their own environment in an ecological global crisis context. In the same direction, Purcell (2003) proposes a “global right to the city” which encompasses the right to the appropriation and production of urban space, through participation to decision-making at each scale affecting the inhabitants. “*The right to the city, the good city and Just City share a desire to rearticulate the political and moral connections between inhabitation, social provision and social justice (Ong, 2006)*” (Connolly and Steil: 8).

As proposed by Pillow and Brulle in the environmental justice field (2005), we move away from the dominant approach to inequalities, i.e. a strictly egalitarian top-

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<sup>2</sup> In other critical perspective, see Harvey (1996).

down reading of social disparities in terms of the environmental endowment of places, towards a more dynamic analysis of inequalities. This should enable, according to us, to address this topic by means of a cosmopolitical approach, gathering other temporal scales (local heritage and trajectories, past public and private trade-offs, current territorial strategies, etc.) and other spatial scales (ecological spaces, areas of practice, historical places, etc.). Otherwise, other well-known liberal mechanisms will continue to directly or indirectly segregate populations and areas – notably through residential mobility, local economical policies of attractiveness and real estate logics for locating equipment with negative externalities. “*In actually existing democracies there tends to be a reinforcing circle between social and economic inequality and political inequality... One means of breaking this circle... is to widen democratic inclusion*” (Young, 2000: 17).

In fact, this meaning is pushing towards the creation of a more pluralistic, collaborative and participative governmentality (Sennett, 2012), which has already questioned some of the principles of action, particularly in the planning realm. Indeed, such inequalities cannot be no longer separated from whole political axiology, specifically in more territorialized decision- making processes:

- from the solely individual freedom of action (e.g. Tiebout model, 1956, even *Exit, Voice, Loyalty*, in Hirschman, 1970) which contributes to an increasing social division in urban areas... to the localized gesture's socialized responsibility (ethic), not through an environmental education, even just consultation still anchorage in the paradigm of representative democracy, set in planning and public policies practices, but by accompanying locally the poor first in the qualification of issues as well as in the improvement of their very own differentiated environmental situations;

- from the implementation of social (and intergenerational) mix and diversity throughout social quotas managed in housing policies (ibid.), for which they have demonstrated their limits... to a better anchored solidarity (mutual aid), increased by and for the environment, strongly querying the type of solidarity at stake in the historical model of cohesion – as one knows cohabiting does not mean exchanging, even less sharing nor helping one another ;

- from the principle of equal treatment in institutional policies resulting from the social model pact which, in contexts marked by mechanisms of much larger spatial and temporal scope (residential segregation, environmental gentrification, etc.), could not

manage to avoid social exclusion... to a fairness, not distributive (Marcuse, 2009), but in the capabilities for advocacy and direct commitment of poor populations.

Having also recognized, from a historical perspective, the shortfall of a distributive justice, P. Rosanvallon broadens the debate on equality and proposes outlines for the creation of a “society of equals” and of a new model for social cohesion upholding empowerment, for which the territory is critically influential (2011). Since “the concept of equality is as political as economic”, other components of social interactions have to be taken into account, structured around three guiding principles: singularity, reciprocity and communality. If the concept of singularity would be “one of the new objects of class warfare” (p. 370) and the reciprocity an equality in commitment produced by “faculties and capabilities mutually conferred by the individuals to build the society” (p. 376), it is the key notion of communality which is, according to us, at the core of the matter, as it reckons not only the legal but the social form of citizenship. The breakdown of the social fabric is thus translated into and worsened by spatial fragmentation, which accounts for the critical influence of territory in social cohesion. In this perspective, the construction of the “common” should be realized given its full scope: a common involvement or the coexistence throughout happenings; a common understanding founded on a reciprocal knowledge; a common flow or the share of places by a continuous replenishment the people. A keystone would be the renationalisation of democracies, understood as a “greater social cohesion of citizens and their (re)accountability for the political matters” (p. 411).

The model of equality at stakes so (re)interrogates conceptions of both environment and justice in the field of public policies. This would call for an egalitarian project that would finally be opened to socio-environmental singularities, to the ways in which they are lived and experienced through the inhabitants’ sensibility, and how they are recognized by local-based knowledge (Fischer, 2000)... in short how they are embedded in involvements, for an cosmopolitical perspective. At intersecting perspectives on science and politics, radical cross- disciplinary studies should help to shape locally based issues: participatory (e.g. real collaborative methods with inhabitants), experimental knowledge (e.g. landscaping experiments), and new topics (e.g. well-being as common). But, “there is a need for research that better deals with the procedural and recognition dimensions of environmental justice, using research methods that are more likely to be qualitative, experiential and participatory rather than involving the crunching together of statistical data sets” (Walker, 2012: 219).

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# Why people distrust experts: science reflexivity and its implication for risk management

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**Abstract:** Nearly all new PX projects of petrochemical industry have stalled in the face of citizen strong protests in recent years in China. Those projects are judged differently risk by experts and lay people, even though being existed for many years as part of Chinese basic chemical industry. Why citizens reject results of scientific risk evaluation, and how should we recognize risk perception of non-experts. This paper reviewed literatures related to experts-lay differences in risk judgments of petrochemical, nuclear power and other high-risk industries, and based on analyzing citizen comments in internet during anti-PX protests, criticized mainstream psychological, socio-cultural paradigms and put forward the thought of science reflexivity. Science reflexivity provides a more rational way of thinking on expert assessments, make science closer to its original nature, as well as make risk decision and management more scientific.

**Keywords:** Expert-Lay differences; Petrochemical industry; Science reflexivity; Risk perception; Risk management;

## Background

### 1. Anti-PX Protests

PX is the abbreviation of “Para-Xylene”. Aromatic hydrocarbon, belong to BTEX (benzene, toluene, ethyl benzene, xylene). PX is an ordinary product in petrochemical industry, and has been extensively used in daily life. It is aromatic, clear and colorless liquid, even tastes a bit sweet. The basic properties of PX are low toxic, flammable and highly volatile.

Over the past eight years, there are eight big protests against PX projects in different Chinese cities, since Xiamen protest in 2007. These protests are:

- Xiamen citizens protest against PX project in June 2007, Fujian province;
- Chengdu citizens protested P’eng-chou petrochemical industry integration project in May 2008, Sichuan province;
- Dalian citizens demonstrated for relocating the PX factory in August 2011, Liaoning province;
- Ningbo Zhenhai citizens protested Zhenhai petrochemical industry integration

project in October 2012, Zhejiang province;

- Kunming citizens against Anning 10 million-ton oil refinery project in Caopu industrial complex in May 2013, Yunnan province;
- Chengdu citizens took to the street again to protest P'eng-chou petrochemical industry in May 2013, Sichuan province;
- Maoming citizens protested PX projects in late March and early April 2014, Guangdong province;
- Shanghai Jinshan district citizens protested petrochemical industry integration projects in June 2015.

## 2. Failure of science

All of the Projects passed experts risk appraisals, and its safety guaranteed by government, but not accepted by local people. According to these projects appraisals, they are: adopted the latest technologies to meet the requirement of cleaning production; adopted multiple security measures; made under advanced standard, major pollution discharge parameters even more strictly than international level; consistent with local EPA indicators for the total pollutant discharge quantity; under strict government supervision.

During and after the protests, experts organized by government enhanced PX knowledge publicity and low risk propaganda. Twenty thousand pamphlets titled *How much do you know about PX* were distributed by Xiamen government; Pro-PX scientists gave positive information about PX on a TV show titled *uncovering PX mysterious veil*, as well as other state media. Guardian war of PX term initiated by Tsinghua university students of chemistry department was a better spread of PX knowledge.

But PX projects did not escape its being opposed doom, and against slogans were always: highly toxic, strong carcinogen, causing mutant babies, should be located far away from residential areas, et al.

## Introduction

Public risk perception research was founded a distinction between objective of statistical risk on the one hand, and subjective or perceived risk on the other. The former refers to risk as defined and measured by experts, for example through experimental studies, epidemiological surveys or probabilistic risk analyses. The latter typically refers to non-expert or lay misperceptions or misunderstandings of that (objective) risk. (Bickerstaff, K., 2004)



Experts-lay differences in risk judgments also can be expressed as: Objective versus subjective (Tanaka, Y., 1998), technical versus other characters (Slovic, P., 1987: 283), calculated versus perceived risks. The main difference is that calculated risk represents an attempt to define risk ‘objectively’ using various mathematical approaches, while the perceived risk tries to account for subjective factors of psychological and sociological nature calculated risk does not include. (Goodfellow, M. J., et al., 2011).

My question is why citizens reject results of scientific risk evaluation, and how should we recognize high risk perception of public. By reviewing about 100 literatures related to experts-lay differences in risk judgments of petrochemical, nuclear power and other high-risk industries since 1980, 67 articles were selected and analyzed mainly. Citizen comments in internet during anti-PX protests were analyzed. Through criticizing psychological and socio-cultural paradigms, and put forward the thought of science reflexivity. Provides a more rational way of thinking on expert assessments, make risk decision and management more scientific.

## **Scientific literacy, cognition and socio-culture factors**

### **1. Scientific literacy**

The reason why experts and lay give different risk judgments is that they have different scientific literacy. Experts have higher scientific information literacy than public, so they can give more objective and real assessment. Public risk perception mostly based on subjective factors of psychological and sociological nature, their judgments are not true.

#### **1.1 Science stigma**

The word stigma has been widely used in the social sciences to denote the process by which a person is marked, typically by a personal characteristic, as deviant, flawed, spoiled or generally undesirable in the view of an observer (Slovic et al., 1991). The social psychologist Edelman was one of the first researchers to employ the notion of stigma in the environmental risk field. He describe the social and psychological consequences of living in contaminated communities, which identified by local community may not however be assumed to be con-extensive with the exposed population defined by expert risk assessments (Edelman MR., 1988). Much previous research interest in applying and developing the concept of stigma on the social, psychological and cultural impacts, for example, Gregory et al. (1995) discussed the history of nuclear power stigma.

## 1.2 The Social amplification of risk framework (SARF)

Kasperson et al. (1988) first discussed the notion of social amplification of risk framework, and Pidgeon et al. (2008) proved an integrating framework combining psychological, sociological, organizational response and risk communication theories. According to the theory, a risk event is viewed as causing a risk signal. The signal is analogous to ripples on a pond, reaching and informing those closest to the hazard first and then spreading out. As the ripples spread out and move through society further from the source, it is likely that they will become distorted, amplified or attenuated. The experts are located near the center of the ripples, whereas the public is located very far away.

## 2. Cognitive factors

This is a psychological model that attempts to explain risk perception by using an expressed preferences method. The psychometric paradigm developed from the early work on risk perception by Starr (1969), which use “revealed preferences” to explore behavioral patterns. Starr’s work established four basic rules of risk perception.

Psychometric paradigm is mainstream theory for risk perception, non-experts’ risk perception are known as intuitive judgement (Slovic, 2000). Slovic et al. (1980) asked lay respondents to rate 90 hazards, according to 18 qualitative characteristics. These factors combined together a number of correlated characteristics of the hazards. The characteristics combined in the first factor, labelled by the term as ‘dread’, included perceptions of the risk as being uncontrollable, potentially catastrophic, dangerous to future generations and involuntary. A second factor labelled ‘unknown’, combined characteristics related to the observability of risks, whether the effects are immediate or delayed in time, the familiarity of the risk and whether the risks are judged to be known to science.

## 3. Socio-cultural factors

### 3.1 Cultural theory

Mary Douglas’ cultural theory (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982) were absorbed into psychological paradigm to interpret risk perception. Attitudes towards risk and danger vary systematically according to a small number of cultural biases or world-views, which can be identified in different contexts and societies. Dake (1991, 1992) wanted to integrate cultural and psychological approaches to risk perception research, and attempted to measure world-view using attitudinal survey techniques and correlate these findings with risk perception.

### 3.2 Place and local

Many public perception studies stress the role of practical everyday experience in how people come to know specific environmental problems.

### 3.3 History of risk life

Risks are forming and changing in ongoing negotiation in everyday life. People construct their identities in daily life, to be moving between trusting in expert knowledge and believing in their own personal knowledge around risk. (Tulloch and Lupton, 2001)

### 3.4 Trust

There is a widespread recognition in the literature that people's perception of environmental risk and their sense of personal agency to take meaningful action are strongly linked to concerns about the trustworthiness of controlling or regulatory institution. (Slovic, P., et al., 1991; Slovic, P. 1993) .

## Science reflexivity: rethinking about rational science VS sentimental people

### 1. Doubting about science

#### 1.1 Research of scientists

Experts possess similar cognitive properties as non-experts. Experts are not immune to the cognitive illusions that affect other people (Kahnemann, D., 1991). Lay people and experts are similar cognitive processes with both falling prey to errors from anchoring, overconfidence and the gambler's fallacy (Finkel, A., 2008). Furthermore, scientists are also affected by benefit, belief and values.

#### 1.2 Understanding of science nature

There are always difference of opinions in scientists. Some scientists say the project would pose a serious public health hazard; others insist it would be safe. Shanteau (1999, 2001) questions the convergence of expert opinion which is based on the widespread use of statistics and economics in assessments and on the widespread search for generalizability in how people think about risks. The bases of convergence are in themselves flawed.

#### 1.3 Experts' words are not matched by deeds (difference in attitudes and behaviors)

The research results of Raude et al (2005) show that non-scientists tended to express much more concern about BSE-related risk than scientists, however, no significant differences were found between these two groups concerning subjective epidemiological predictions, and scientists manifested greater avoidance of beef or beef by-products avoidance following the BSE epidemic than lay respondents did.

## 2. Public Scientific and rational risk judgements

Citizen-expert dichotomy appears fallacious, in which experts and public are given stereotype. Experts and public have no such significant difference in real life.

### 2.1 Professional citizens

Citizens are not all like low scientific literacy persons, many of them are experts and professionals in various fields. Citizens express their perception of risk largely through organized citizen groups, and that these groups employ and have access to many experts. (Sylvia N. Tesh, 1999) . Much of the risk perception literature oversimplified the concept of citizen by assuming that citizens only deal in values. The literature makes this mistake about citizens by ignoring the organized groups through which citizens influence environmental decisions and from which citizens get many of their ideas about risk. (Sylvia N. Tesh, 1999)

### 2.2 Rational citizens

Citizens have their own independence and modern consciousness. They do not have blind faith in scientists, and have rationality of critical judgement on knowledge. Hank C. Jenkins-Smith and Carol L. Silva (1998) , scientists play a large and increasing role in public policy debates. Members of the public are able to make quite reasonable estimates about what kinds of positions on the risks of nuclear waste disposal will be taken by scientists from differing organizations. Public place great emphasis on the independence of the scientists from those who fund the research, and prior expectations about the positions of scientists from different organizations substantially affects the ways in which people weigh and utilize information that comes from these scientist.

### 2.3 Objective factors of public risk judgements

Previous studies overemphasize the subjective factors influencing public risk perception, while ignoring that of the objective factors' fundamental role. Many studies have found that white men are less concerned about pollution than women or people of other ethnicity, and it may be that demographic, cultural and psychological factors. According to M. Barton Laws, et al (2015) , while white respondents, and particularly

white men, were less concerned about air pollution than others, this effect disappeared when controlling for distance from the highway. Racial and ethnic minority respondents are more likely to live in proximity to a localized source of pollution, in this case a major highway.

## Science and reason: risk judgements of Chinese anti-PX citizens

It is undeniable that not all persons who protested against PX are based on scientific evidence. Possibly, some people's fear comes from irrationality; however, irrational sentiments are not enough to be a solid foundation for citizens' persistent opposition. Sometimes, exaggeration of harmfulness and emotional expressions are just political strategies, not the fundamental reasons for PX protests. Scientists also use such strategies like conceal the faults of others and praise their good points seeking support. Fundamental reasons cannot be confused with political strategies in analyzing the causes for PX protesting.

### 1. Science diversity, errors and unknown

There is no opposition between scientific consensus and public perception. Many experts in various fields joined citizens to oppose PX, even some chemical top scientists also doubted about experts' assessment.

#### 1.1 Experts risk assessment rely on single specialty

The risk assessments of PX production involve knowledges of diverse disciplines, as well as there are differences within same discipline, but risk assessment often relies heavily on some special and single knowledge. Citizens cared most about the toxicity of PX factories, experts' publicity about PX highlighted its' chemical properties, but low toxicity of this product does not mean the production process is also less toxic and harmful. It is obviously that experts' explanation about PX cannot reassure people. Public rejected experts, they used a vivid metaphor to respond: paper is low toxicity, but paper mill pollute.

#### 1.2 Experts risk assessment detachment local context

Experts risk assessments lose touch with local context, such as population, environment and geographical condition, lack of awareness of the real impacts of potential risks. Chengdu citizens pointed out that PX projects in petrochemical industrial park are located in the center of Chengdu basin, closed environment, dense population, and in earthquake-prone area.

#### 1.3 Methods defects of experts assessments

On the one hand, total toxicity assessments is just for this one project, but neglecting cumulative effects of all factories in the whole chemical park; on the other hand, ecological impact assessment adopt average method, pollutant are averaged to everyone in the city, not just the residents affected directly.

#### 1.4 Science unknown

There are risks in any technology. Science unknown is one of the main reasons of technical errors. Public fears come from their doubts which science cannot give answers to.

### 2. Scientists' benefit, emotions and values

Scientists select which knowledge to introduce to public, implying their own interest, emotions and values. Citizens who against PX soon found where the scientists' interests come from. An academy of engineering who claimed that PX is low-toxic, was found to be affiliated to Sinopec company. Another scientist who worked in university and vigorously advocated PX is safe to the surrounding community. In fact, he is a participator of many PX projects. In the process of defending the PX project, some scientists showed a strong nationalist sentiment. They said that citizens who against the project were misguided by foreign interest groups, because the PX project touched the interests of Japanese and South Korean companies.

### 3. Huge gap between science assessment and practical implementation

Experts show people the PX products, they are crystal clear and fragrant smell. However, people's true feeling are thick smoke and pungent sour. What experts introduced to public are the world's most advanced production technology, heavy security protection measures and strict supervision. But the reality is explosion and security incidents.

Residents near chemical area in Xiamen tracked and measured the awful smell which plagued them. Due to serious steal discharges of upstream businesses of sewage treatment plant, the COD level of inflow wastewater is very high. The actual COD level of inflow wastewater is 1500-2200mg/L, which is much higher than the design standard 300mg/L.

On April 6, 2015, Fujian Gulei PX plant happened explosion accidents. This revealed the security loopholes in management. It is because of fierce opposition of citizens in Xiamen in 2007, Fujian government decided to relocate it to Gulei. There has had a small explosion during the commossioning in 2013. Fujian Gulei PX plant happened twice explosions on April 6, 2015 again.

According to investigation, the direct cause of the accident are: There are fluctuations of pressure and flow when the installation of xylene starts to detonate. The welding point of the pipeline which have quality problem broken at that time. What cause such a quality problem are:

(1) Enterprise pay more attention to interests of themselves than security of the construction, so the project quality and the management of security are not in place.

(2) Subcontracting of the project leads to problem of quality control of welding.

(3) Testing company alleged fraud.

(4)The supervision of local government and related departments did not reach the designated position. There are also lax law enforcement problems.

There is an article titled PX explosion, how science is routed by distrust? Which received attention of many internet users. These points of view was highly approved by netizens. Sentences praised and cited by netizens are as follow:

- *“Despite repeated assurances from experts and local governments that these projects are up to the required safety production standards and in accordance with environmental regulations, as well as more and more people are informed about the low toxicity properties of PX, all this are inferior to an explosion.”*
- *“No matter how much scientific theories about PX told by experts and government, explosion of living reality told everyone that the real danger is not PX but human beings and mechanism that it is controlled. Science is reliable but human being not. People have to objection. ”*
- *“An explosion shattered science, just like this. Science is still worthy of trust, but people are much more likely to believe that science will have different results in different hands. The problem of rebuilding trust is cannot be solved rely on science.”*

16 hours after the article released (April 7, 18:29-April 8, 10:51, 2015), attracted 32, 326 netizens comments, got 83% applause rate. The comments got highest follow-up applause are as follow:

- *“Not science is distrusted, but Chinese experts are distrusted.”(2196 credits)*
- *“We suggest that the office building of local government and environmental protection administration built in the range of 1Km of PX factory, if you agree with me, please credit me.”(1868 credits)*

Summarizing comments of netizens who are thumbed up over 500 times, highly agree with point of views are:

- *Believe in science, but not experts, especially Chinese experts. (7421 thumb up)*
- *Experts and officials should match words with deeds, and live near chemical industry area. (3066 thumb up)*
- *Expert evaluation and actual operation are two different things. (2527 thumb up)*
- *Xiamen refused to PX is right, the explosion is a loud response to the experts and officials. (1945 thumb up)*

The cause of people's opposition to PX is their experience and the objective existence of unsafe factors, not psychological factors, cognitive interpreted by social culture, emotion and values. There are huge gap between expert evaluation and actual execution, public's risk judgement rely more on the reality than scientific data.

#### 4. Scientific narrow definition of risk

Public perceptions of harm are far beyond physical scope, it also includes psychological, spiritual, ethical and other aspects. Worrying about the loss in home values, fear of diseases and ecological damages, angry at not being respected and government' black-box operations, etc., all these risk and harm are far beyond coverage of experts risk assessment.

### Implications of science reflexivity for risk management

From science reflexivity perspective, its' unknown, diversity and limitation, science decisive role should be rethought in risk decision and management. Here are some new ideas:

#### 1. Science unknown and precautionary principle

There are many unknown things in science. People should know these scientific unknown, and we should take more precaution principle in making decision.

#### 2. Science diversity and practical and effective principle

Public doubts cannot be answered by experts, because risk decision and management rely on single and specific knowledge, and risk assessment and safety precautions are disembed local context and practice. Risk decision and management should base on practical and effective principle, take more practical factors into consideration.

#### 3. Science limitation and public participation principle



Expert assessments are overwhelmingly dominant to risk decision and management, the reason why public participation being incorporated into risk decision and management is based on unavoidable cognitive and socio-cultural factors. Theoretical precondition of today's risk decision and management is that science is never go wrong, but really there is no understanding to it.

In the face of complex bodies of knowledge which PX production covers, who are experts? Who are the representative of science? The appliance of science in reality are basically the strategies of different interest groups gaming. Public participation in risk decision and management can prevent fake representative of science, make science closer to its original nature, as well as make risk decision and management more scientific.

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# The Contemporary Environmental Problems of China and Civil Engagement of Environmental Protection

Yan CUI

## Abstract:

Environmental Protection has become a strategic issue for China's social and economic development. The quality of environment affects people's quality of life; and the environment capacity becomes the bottleneck for China's economic future. The current environmental protection system and regulatory regime need to be reformed in order to optimize the interest of the general public. We should restructure a bottom-up, instead of the existing top-down, regulatory mechanism, and encourage active social participation in environmental protection. The paper uses empirical evidence to demonstrate the motivation of civil environmental organization participation, and makes policy recommendations on how to incentivize and empower civil groups.

**Keywords:** Environmental Protection, Civil Participation, Reform of Environmental Regulation

## Part One: Background

In recent years, with the process of industrialization and urbanization, environmental problems become more and more significant, and how to keep a balanced point between economic development and environmental protection becomes a key issue which profoundly affects China's social sustainable development. As we know, that Chinese government has advocated the upgrade of economic structure. However, the economic restructuring can not be achieved in a short period of time. And it takes time to reduce the heavy pollutant emission industry, and the environmental pollution caused by traditional way of development cannot be changed in foreseeable future.

On the other hand, the environmental awareness need to be improved. Firstly, the general public's cognitive understanding of environmental value is under a desirable level, and their awareness of the meaning of environmental protection is quite low. At the same time, the self organized environmental participation is very rare. And most citizens hold a free-riding tendency in terms of environmental protection. On the other hand, we also see some positive change. With the promotion of government agencies, citizens awareness of modernization keeps rising, environmental awareness started to be enhanced, and their knowledge regarding environmental protections has been

improved. More and more regular people begin to pay attention to environmental protection and environmental quality. However, we also realize that the limitation of current environmental regulatory regime and bureaucratic structure of environmental protection agency. The general public has very few channel to participate environmental policy-making process and the surveillance of government's environmental regulation. Meanwhile, the formalized channel of environmental participation has not been well built. In sum, only through rebuilding new type of social governance, explore more efficient environmental regulatory regime, keep promoting civil environmental organization participation, enhance civil group's role in environmental regulation, the ideology of building a beautiful can be achieved.

## Part Two: The Public Environmental Evaluation and Environmental Awareness

### 1、The Public Environmental Evaluation

Western scholars have found that, the general public's environmental awareness has been affected by the environmental quality of their direct surroundings. If the problem of environmental pollution becomes more serious, the public environmental awareness will keep rising. (Bao qingde, Wang zhihong, 2003; cao mingde, 2002; chen jianlan, 2003) . In this paper, we rely on national survey data to explore the general public's environmental evaluation and environmental awareness. The data used in this paper comes from the Sociology Department in CASS, and the survey was conducted in 2013. In the questionnaire, we have an environmental module which have a comprehensive question items regarding environmental evaluation, the environmental problem, environmental awareness, understanding of environmental value.


First, the data demonstrate that the level of the public's environmental satisfaction is below average. For instance, more than 25% respondents said that they have encountered serious problems regarding noise pollution, water pollution, and more than 30% respondents said that they had serious air pollution. And when we compare data between rural and urban areas, it shows that the satisfaction level of urban residents is much lower than their rural counterpart. For example, in urban area, 35% respondents said that they had serious noise pollution, which this percentage in rural area is just 13%. Regarding air pollution, 39% respondents said that they had serious air pollution, which this percentage in rural area is just 15%. When it comes to water pollution, 30.1% respondents said that they had serious water pollution, which this percentage in rural

area is just 19.5%. Therefore, in general, the environmental satisfaction level of urban residents is in general lower than rural residents. (see Table 1、Figure 1)

Table 1: pollution problems and the public evaluation

	Rural				urban			
	noise	air	water	other	noise	air	water	other
Very serious	4.5	5.1	6.9	4.1	13.6	13.0	10.2	8.5
Serious to some degree	8.4	9.7	12.6	14.1	21.2	25.6	19.9	21.6
Not serious	32.3	32.0	31.5	46.2	46.2	44.2	44.7	53.6
No pollution	54.0	52.6	48.0	34.2	18.7	16.7	23.2	15.8
DK	.8	.7	1.0	.9	.3	.5	2.1	.5
total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Figure 1: public's environmental quality satisfaction across areas



(2)、the general public's environmental awareness

With the rapid development of economy, environmental problems have become one of the important factors that affect the quality of life. And with the frequent occurrence of environmental problems, people's environmental awareness and the request of environmental protection also become more significant. For example, only 7.3% of urban and rural residents fully agree with the statement that development of the economy is more important than the protection of the environment; at the same time, only 3.5% of urban and rural residents fully agree that the protection of the environment is the responsibility of the government, and not the individual's responsibility; in addition, there are nearly 75% of urban and rural residents said they are very willing to participate in civil environmental organizations. However, it is worth noting that the free rider mentality still exists in a certain degree, there are 16.1% of respondents agree that if people do not pay attention to environmental protection, I do not need to protect

environment either. In addition, nearly 70% of respondents believe that the government should strengthen environmental protection, but should not be paid by ordinary people.

However, the data also shows that there is a big difference between urban and rural areas in our country. For example, in urban residents, only 29.1% agreed that economic development is more important than the protection of the environment, and in the countryside, the proportion is 44%; in urban residents, only 13% said that if people do not pay attention to environmental protection, I do not need to protect environment either; and in rural areas, the proportion is 21%. When it comes to environmental awareness, only 14.9% of urban residents said that it is the government's responsibility to protect the environment, not individual citizens'. And in rural areas, this ratio is 24.3%. In addition, from the perspective of the effectiveness of environmental protection, there is certain difference between urban and rural residents. For example, 50% of rural residents said they did not understand the environmental problems, and had no ability to make comments; the proportion of urban residents accounted for only 36%. (see table two)

Table 2: the general public's environmental awareness

	rural				urban				total			
	Fully agree	agree	disagree	Totally disagree	Fully agree	agree	disagree	Totally disagree	Fully agree	agree	disagree	Totally disagree
Development economy is more important than environmental protection	9.5	34.2	46.1	10.2	6.4	22.7	54.3	16.6	7.3	25.2	48.1	12.9
I don't have time and interest in environmental protection	9.5	43.2	40.8	6.6	7.5	37.1	46.0	9.4	8.1	37.2	41.4	7.6
If other don't pay attention to environment protection, I should not either	3.0	18.0	55.9	23.0	2.3	10.7	54.6	32.4	2.8	13.3	52.3	27.4
environment protection is government's job, it has nothing to do with me	4.5	19.8	51.9	23.8	2.6	12.3	51.5	33.7	3.5	15.2	49	28.5
I am willing to participate in environment protection NGOs	24.6	55.5	16.5	3.4	25.4	55.2	15.0	4.3	23.8	50.8	14.8	3.6

I know nothing about environment protection, and don't have the ability to participate	8.5	41.5	41.4	8.6	6.6	29.4	49.5	14.6	7.1	32.2	43.1	11.4
Government officers will not be willing to listen to my ideas about environment protection	17.1	51.5	27.0	4.3	18.5	48.9	27.6	5.0	17	45.2	24.8	4.3
Government should pay for environment protection, not us the regular people	25.1	47.7	23.7	3.6	25.5	45.8	25.7	3.0	24.7	44	23.2	3
I will fight against the proposal of building a chemical factory in my neighborhood	44.1	32.9	16.2	6.8	61.6	27.3	8.7	2.4	51.8	28	10.7	4.2

At the same time, from the perspective of social strata, there is a big difference in the environmental awareness of different social groups. For the elite, only 20.8% hold the view of the economic priorities, and in the bottom social class, the percentage is 37%. When it comes to environmental awareness, among social elite group, only 7.5% think that environmental protection is the job of the government, and among middle class, 14.6% considered the protection of the environment is the responsibility of the government. And in the bottom class, the proportion is 19.3%. And in the terms of environmental efficacy, only 17% of the elite has low environmental efficacy, and in the middle class, the ratio is 35%, in the bottom, this ratio is 44.2%;

Table 3: social status and environmental awareness

	Social elite		Middle class		Worker and peasants	
	disagree	agree	disagree	agree	disagree	agree
Development economy is more important than environmental protection	79.2	20.8	71.1	28.9	62.6	37.4
I don't have time and interest in environmental protection	65.1	34.9	51.6	48.4	43.3	56.7
If other don't pay attention to environment protection, I should not either	93.9	6.1	86.3	13.7	82.6	17.4

environment protection is government's job, it has nothing to do with me	92.5	7.5	85.4	14.6	80.7	19.3
I am willing to participate in environment protection NGOs	14.6	85.4	18.3	81.7	18.4	81.6
I know nothing about environment protection, and don't have the ability to participate	83.4	16.6	65.0	35.0	55.8	44.2
Government officers will not be willing to listen to my ideas about environment protection	37.7	62.3	33.2	66.8	30.3	69.7
Government should pay for environment protection, not us the regular people	35.8	64.2	28.8	71.2	29.4	70.6
I will fight against the proposal of building a chemical factory in my neighborhood	9.5	90.5	11.7	88.3	15.6	84.4

The existing western theory generally believes that environmental awareness and education level are positively related, in other words, the improvement of education level will affect the individual's choice of "Nature Center" and "human center" ideology. As a result, highly educated groups have a higher level of environmental awareness and environmental efficiency, and more active environmental involvement. Data show that this theory in China's current society has been well proved: with higher education, individual's level in the environmental concerns, environmental efficacy, environmental participation and other indicators are higher than other groups.

Table 4: education and environmental awareness

	high education		Middle education		Lower education	
	agree	disagree	agree	disagree	agree	disagree
Development economy is more important than environmental protection	40.98	59.02	28.64	71.36	18.24	81.76
I don't have time and interest in environmental protection	52.96	47.04	42.03	57.97	32.15	67.85
If other don't pay attention to environment protection, I should not either	20.23	79.77	10.45	89.55	6.18	93.82
environment protection is government's job, it has nothing to do with me	23.31	76.69	11.92	88.08	6.50	93.50
I am willing to participate in environment protection NGOs	78.13	21.87	85.68	14.32	84.49	15.51
I know nothing about environment protection, and don't have the ability to participate	50.94	49.06	30.28	69.72	13.95	86.05
Government officers will not be willing to listen to my ideas about environment protection	70.18	29.82	64.74	35.26	61.07	38.93
Government should pay for environment protection, not us the regular people	73.99	26.01	69.25	30.75	65.02	34.98



I will fight against the proposal of building a chemical factory in my neighborhood	81.06	18.94	88.75	11.25	89.79	10.21
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At the same time, some western scholars put forward that environmental awareness is generally more common in the middle class, and on the individual, only after the basic living conditions have been met, they will have higher requirements for the quality of the environment. In our country, in the early days of reform and opening up, the public require to raise the level of material life, and meet the satisfaction of food and clothing. In recent years, people gradually began to realize the importance of good environment for life quality and health level. Data show that the social status and environmental awareness has a positive relationship: the upper and middle upper groups in the environmental priority index is 4% higher than lower class. And the environmental responsibility index of the upper class is 5% higher than the middle and lower class. For environmental efficacy, the difference is 15%, For environmental concern, the difference is 10%. For environmental participation the difference is 4%. From the occupational classification, employees in government, state-owned enterprises and institutions show higher indicators than other groups. In other words, the employees of these sectors are the elite of the society, and their level of information exposure, social cognition, and other aspects are higher than other groups.

Table 5: social class and environmental awareness

	Upper class		Middle class		Lower class	
	agree	disagree	agree	disagree	agree	disagree
Development economy is more important than environmental protection	32.82	67.18	34.63	65.37	36.70	63.30
I don't have time and interest in environmental protection	38.24	61.76	45.88	54.12	51.35	48.65
If other don't pay attention to environment protection, I should not either	12.76	87.24	15.07	84.93	18.18	81.82
environment protection is government's job, it has nothing to do with me	14.50	85.50	17.41	82.59	20.86	79.14
I am willing to participate in environment protection NGOs	83.36	16.64	81.47	18.53	79.06	20.94
I know nothing about environment protection, and don't have the ability to participate	29.86	70.14	39.45	60.55	45.87	54.13
Government officers will not be willing to listen to my ideas about environment protection	60.66	39.34	67.17	32.83	69.68	30.32
Government should pay for environment protection, not us the regular people	66.97	33.03	70.55	29.45	73.90	26.10

I will fight against the proposal of building a chemical factory in my neighborhood	85.63	14.40	83.80	16.20	83.18	16.82
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To sum up, the current social and public evaluation of environmental quality is generally low, especially for air pollution and water pollution. However, the level of environmental awareness is relatively low, but there is a tendency of polarization, the social elite group has a higher environmental priority and environmental concerns, at the same time, this part of the group has a higher environmental efficiency and government efficiency. Compared with that, the lower social strata have a considerable agreement with the statement that the economic development should enjoy priority over environmental protection. At the same time, this part of the group have low environmental protection awareness, feel that they are lack of ability to influence government departments. Therefore, the enthusiasm of the environment participation is also naturally low.

### (3) Individual effectiveness and government effectiveness

The discussion of the existing Western theories of social participation usually focus on political participation. And the discussion of the effectiveness is usually one of the key research. In detail, the discussion about the effectiveness is carried out in two aspects, namely, the individual efficacy and government efficiency. the former refers to the individual's internal evaluation of the corresponding cognitive ability and ability to act, the latter mainly refers to the government's response to individual's request and whether government is able to provide timely and effective feedback and response to the demands of the public. According to the existing theory, when the public and the government are able to develop a positive interaction, the key is that the public has a higher individual efficiency, that the individual has the corresponding knowledge reserve and action ability; on the other hand, the government also has the ability to meet the demands of the public under the existing institutional framework. In contrast, if the public has a higher personal efficacy, but the government has a low efficiency, there will be a conflict between the public and the government, which is called negative interaction. If individuals have lower individual efficacy, regardless of the level of their government efficacy, there will be a situation of low participation and no interaction. Data show that the current social situation is that, most public has low personal efficacy and low government efficiency, 31.90% of respondents belonging to this category. Of course, the data also show that the number of negative interactions may be higher than

the number of groups of positive interaction, 35.70% of respondents belonging to the former, 23% of respondents belonging to the latter,

Table 6: Individual effectiveness and government effectiveness

	High individual effectiveness	Low individual effectiveness
High government effectiveness	22.60%	9.80%
Low government effectiveness	35.70%	31.90%

From the perspective of social strata, the upper social class has higher individual efficacy than the middle and lower class. The difference of individual efficacy between the upper social class and lower social class is 15%. However, it is worth noting that the difference is not very big regarding the government effective, so that a considerable part of the public gave a more negative evaluation to the government efficiency.

Table 7: social class and effectiveness

	High individual effectiveness	Low individual effectiveness	High government effectiveness	Low government effectiveness
Upper class	70.14%	29.86%	39.34%	60.66%
Middle class	60.55%	39.45%	32.83%	67.17%
Lower class	54.13%	45.87%	30.32%	69.68%

### Part Three: the discussion of civil group environmental participation

Previous studies have indicated that environmental problems can improve the public's environmental awareness and the public's environmental concerns, and will further promote the environmental action of the general public, such as active participation in environmental protection activities. As mentioned above, the existing western theories point out: both the more serious environmental pollution problems, and the higher the level of the individual social status, will lead to the higher level of environmental organization participation. And individual's age and education level also have significant effect on the response to the environmental protection organizations. ; (Dorceta, 1997; Rainey, et al., 2009)

In the paper, the author analyzes the environmental problems and environmental awareness from the social survey data in 2013.

First of all, the data show that age and the environmental organization participation has a significant correlation, especially for the post-70, 80, 90 groups, they are most likely to be the positive respondent of the environmental organizations. In

particular, the data show that the positive response of the post 70 groups is more than 2.5 times higher than those in the non respondents, that is to say, the post 70s is the most sensitive to environmental issues, and the most active participation in environmental organizations. Data also show that the respondents' education and environmental organizations participation have positive correlation, the higher the level of education, the higher the probability of the environmental protection organizations participation. This confirms the existing theory that education can enhance the individual's "natural center" values, and also shows that improving the quality of education on environmental value will also improve the environmental participation rate.

Table 8: Age and NGO participation

	Active respondent	Regular respondent	Non NGO respondent
60 后群体	20.7	56	23.3
70 后群体	30.3	57.5	12.2
80 后群体	26.7	56.9	16.4
90 后群体	25.6	59.2	15.1

Table 9: Education and NGO participation

	Active respondent	Regular respondent	Non NGO respondent
Low education	23.3	54.8	21.9
Middle education	29.7	56	14.3
High education	30.6	56.9	12.5

Secondly, environmental NGOs' participation has positively correlated with environment problem surrounding the residential community. For example, when it comes to water pollution, when the respondents are facing more serious water pollution, the possibility of environmental organizations response is 2 times that of non-responders (the above interaction analysis has been carried through with the chi-square test), otherwise the difference is not very significant. This shows that the current public participation in the environmental organizations is driven by pollution problems; in other words, the public participation in environmental organizations is to solve the environmental problem, rather than based on the environment protection ideology and

environmental value, which is different from the existing public environmental participation in the western countries.

Table 10: Environmental pollution and NGO participation

Water pollution	Active respondent	NGO	Regular respondent	NGO	Non NGO respondent
Very serious	37.7		44.6		17.7
Serious	25.6		55.4		19
Not serious	21.2		59.6		19.2
No pollution	26.2		53		20.8

Again, regarding social status and social class, the difference between the low frequent respondent of the environmental protection organization and the high frequent respondent is not significant. In other words, all social class may become an active respondent to environmental organizations, which has a big difference with the existing western environmental sociology theory. The existing western theory thinks that the higher social status, the stronger the group's environmental awareness. And for upper social class, they have high level of environmental concern, and they have more social resources and action ability. Therefore, with the increase of individual's social status, their possibility of environmental protection organizations participation also becomes higher. However, in the current Chinese society, environmental groups involvement mostly belongs to the passive response, in other words, our citizen's participation behavior is not usually active participation, but occurs when their environmental rights are infringed, they have to find passive coping strategies (Ren Liying, 2002; Hong Dayong, 2008; Zhou ZhiJia, 2011). Therefore, different from the western countries, China's citizens environmental organizations participation is passive strategy to protect their rights, and the occurrence of social action usually happens when individual's environment right is violated. Due to the fundamental difference, in the data, the environmental organizations participation between the various social groups is not significantly different.

Table 11: Social class and environmental NGO response rate

	Active respondent	NGO	Regular respondent	NGO	Non NGO respondent
Upper class	30		53.3		16.6
Middle class	24.5		57		18.5

Lower class	24.7	54.3	20.9
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Part Four: further discussion based on data

In summary, the data shows that the higher education level, the more likely that respondents become active participators of the environmental organization. This is consistent with previous research, which is helpful to understand the significance of environment protection, and to establish the correct environment concept, and then to actively participate in the behavior of environmental protection organization. Of course, from another point of view, the degree of education and social economic status is positively related to the relationship, and the middle class and above the social level of life quality is higher than the bottom of the society, the environment is more positive attitude to environmental protection. At the same time, the social status of higher social resources is also more abundant, social network is more extensive, therefore, the possibility of its participation in social groups is also higher. From the data, we also see that gender has no significant impact on environmental organizations, and the greater the age, the more likely to participate in the environmental protection organization.

When we analyze the data, we can see that the civil environmental response of our country still stays in the level of protecting individual environmental interests. That is to say, only when residents are facing environmental pollution problem in their neighborhood, they will have certain level of enthusiasm to participate in environmental protection organization.

Of course, the data also shows that people's environmental concern, environmental priority, and environmental values are important psychological mechanism of active environmental organization response, which shows that with the continuous development of China's economic and social modernity, and with gradual improvement of public environmental awareness, coupled with the increasing level of environmental pollution, NGOs' participation become more and more frequent. At the same time, China's development model needs to be transformed, otherwise, the serious environmental problems will trigger more social movements; as a result, the citizen participation in environmental protection will become more and more popular, and the environmental protection organization will become more and more active, which is an inevitable trend of development.

**Part Five、 The General Public's Environmental Awareness and Environmental Participation Have Significant Impact on the Realization of Building a Beautiful China**

With the expansion of China's economic scale and the process of urbanization, environmental problem becomes more and more serious. At the same time, social conflict and social movement caused by environmental pollution also becomes more frequent, which has significant impact on China's social stability. Therefore, it is urgent to promote the civil group environmental participation and the regular people's involvement of environmental protection. At the same, with the increasing level environmental awareness, when people's environmental rights are infringed, they intent to rely on all sorts of actions to express their interest and protect their own rights. As Professor Hong dayong points out: "Chinese people have experienced a significant transformation from environmental awareness towards environmental actions, there is why China has seen more and more group actions and conflicts regarding environmental pollution." (Hong dayong, 2008). This requires government agencies to adjust their measures in the process of environmental protection, and promote civil society's capacity and find ways of innovation in environmental regulatory regime.

Based on the analysis, we can see that the current Chinese people's environmental engagement has demonstrated the following characters. First, more environmental actions are triggered not by positive environmental value and awareness, but by passive response to self-motivated rights protection. Therefore, most environmental actions are directed to deal with day-to-day environmental pollution, and it is very rare for people to participate into environmental policy making process and environmental surveillance and regulation. Secondly, when it comes to political participation, more environmental actions in China aim to deal with environmental rights infringement. This reflects that government agency does not have sufficient channel to respond to people's environmental request, and does not have a well-built mechanism to promote positive government-citizens interaction. Under that current political structure, lack of communication platform and high cost of civil group participation directly leads to confrontational action between citizens and government agency when environmental interest conflicts happened. Without direct negotiation mechanism, many people choose to rely on irrational measure to protect their own environmental rights.

For quite a long time, the environmental protection regime and power is monopolized by the government, and the general public does not have resources to participate in environmental policymaking process. Without enough mechanism and channel for citizens to get involved in environmental regulation, the general public does

not put much interest in changing the current environmental regulatory regime. At the same time, civil environmental protection organization also does not have enough resource and power to mobilized citizens to participate in environmental protection. Therefore, in order to enhance the capacity of civil group participation, it is necessary to upgrade the system building, expand participation channel, and find bottom-up mechanism to ensure the rights of the general public is protected. Regarding how to build up environmental civil society and environmental NGOs, we propose the following suggestions:

First, we need to strength the education of people's environmental awareness. And the environmental awareness should not just stay at the shallow level of day-to-day recycling and garbage disposal. Instead, environmental awareness education should focus on the understanding of the balanced relationship between human being and the nature, and the nature-centered ideology, instead of human-centered ideology. Only through this way, the general public will be able to have more correct environmental value. However, data show that most environmental actions in current society are triggered by local pollution problems. In order to change this situation, citizen should receive long-term environmental education, and facilitate their comprehensive understanding of the importance of environmental issues. Only through this way, China will be able to build a environmental friendly and conservative society. In other words, the correct value is an important prerequisite for the participation of civil society, the establishment of the correct values can make the citizens from the social interests, effectively participate in environmental policy formulation, environmental policy assessment and daily environmental regulation, and reduce the environment to participate in the utilitarian mentality.

Secondly, to establish and improve the channels of citizen participation in environmental protection, through the promotion of political system reform and social management innovation, to create the conditions for the participation of citizens, especially the environmental protection, to broaden the channels of citizen's direct or indirect participation in environmental policy formulation and supervision, from the institutional level to provide effective protection for citizen participation. The experience of western countries tells us that the introduction of public participation can greatly reduce the cost of government environmental supervision, improve the supervision efficiency, therefore, the objective law of social development requires us to establish a new model of environmental management based on the new social



governance system rather than the bureaucratic system. (Cobb & Elder, 1983; Adler, 2001a, 2001b; Zheng zhunhao, 2004; Gong Yingzhou, 2006) 。 This requires that we fully guarantee the law gives citizens to participate in social management rights and the exercise of their political participation rights of freedom; on the other hand, we need to broaden the existing participation channels, establish and perfect the system of "environmental stakeholders", strengthening civil society participation in management function, so that the organizational citizenship will become the guardian of the environment, which is the protector for the largest public goods—the environment. The private environmental organizations will involve in the protection of public good nature of the environment, so we need to strengthen the organization capacity and mobilization ability, so as to ensure the participation of the active and long-term nature of the environmental protection.

Further, the current situation of our country's environmental participation is limited by the reality of the political system. First, for a long time, China's environmental management model has been carried out through the top-down, has not formed a benign interaction between the government and the people. And the existing public hearing system can not meet the requirements of the citizen's environmental participation, the private environmental organizations in the lack of institutional participation in the background, it is difficult to form a broad participation of citizens and social elites in the organization. In other words, the state monopoly on various levels of environmental governance rights led directly to the gap between the people and government regulators, and the current situation in some local governments is they usually motivated by the guiding ideology of the only GDP promotion, and many of them only hold a perfunctory attitude, in environmental law enforcement. In this lawlessness and lax enforcement of the environmental regulation, citizen's environmental NGOs can not perform more positive effects.

From another point of view, China has entered the high incidence of environmental issues. Environmental pollution damage is often not the interests of an individual, the scope of its involved is often very wide. Therefore, environmental activist often launched actions in the way of collective action. Therefore, how to correctly deal with the environmental rights of citizens, how to face the challenge of collective action, all requires us to take a look at the system of environmental protection. This is the only measure to prevent the evolution of environmental issues into social

problems. Only by improving the system of civil environmental rights, and by establishing a standardized and orderly participation mechanism, it is possible to realize the normalization of public affairs management, and will be able to effectively prevent the occurrence of conflicts, eliminate the hidden danger, and effectively avoid the problem of information asymmetry between government and citizens.

In summary, only through publicity and education to promote public awareness of environmental awareness and values, and through the empowerment of civil environmental organizations, and through providing institutional support for public environmental supervision, and providing more channels for the public to realize their environmental demands, it can achieve the goal of effective protection of the legitimate rights and interests of the public, and achieve public environmental rights and interests. And by improving the system of environmental supervision, putting the power of civil society into the practice of environmental governance in China, we can meet the needs of social development in China, and improve the level of environmental governance in China.

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# New Person Grown Out of Old Tenets?

## Faith and Rebellions of female Christians in urban house church

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### Abstract :

This study is based on fieldwork at a “NJ” house church in a big city of western China. Families, piety, submission, etc. are highly valued. The high attendance rate of female members is typical, while the narrative of church is to intensify a male-dominated gender role. Thus the conversion of the female Christians means a double-rebellion against atheistic ideology and egalitarian gender role since Chinese revolution in early 20<sup>th</sup> century.

The question of this study is: how can they be brave enough to break through the atheist teaching to be a Christian on the one hand, while refrain from the appeals of equality but accept the male-dominated gender role on the other? Will a “new person” grow out of the orthodox tenet about gender order, or the rebellion, from another direction, just coincides with traditional way of being a woman?

This study is based on fieldwork at a NJ church in a big city of western China. NJ church is a typical house church (or family church), which, in general, means an assembly of Christians gather and worship at a private place, usually home of the members.

In China, house church is a possible way of practicing religion when public religious sites are closed or destructed during the Cultural Revolution. Christians, also other religious groups, secretly keep worshipping at home. Since 1980’s, with the change of state policy, religious freedom, together with other human rights, are guaranteed by the central government. All sorts of religious groups flourish nationwide, including Christian churches.

But instead of merging into the bigger, San-zi church with ratification, the house church keeps its stand as autonomous religious unit. This may due to the call for independence, the lack of religious space in a fast-changing, urbanizing society, or just because of the small size of the church itself.

This study focuses on a NJ church and some of its female members.

### 1.NJ church: an urban house church

Located in a district with a cluster of universities, NJ church is composed mainly of university faculties, staffs, and their families. For fear of being accused of practicing religious activities on campus, NJ church has no university student members now.

NJ church cleaved from another house church around 2009. The former one, with more than 400 hundred regular attendance at the Sunday service, was too big to keep under control. From around 20 members at the beginning, to about 100 regular church attenders in 2015, NJ church grew steadily and has now two bible study groups and several fellowships.

The core member of NJ church is Ms. Wei, whose apartment opens for Sunday service, bible study morning prayers, even baptism since 1999. With her spiritual and theological lead, NJ church attracts members with high socio-economic status, Ms. Wei's apartment is still the place for morning prayers five times a week, and bible study once a week. Within a comparatively small network, the church members have close relationships, and enough time to discuss quotes from the bible, share the experience of encountering other people's questions about their faith, and admire God's grace in praise like "how can anyone disbelieve such a great God"?

Most of the church members converted to Christian only in adulthood. Several women have a "Wow" time before the decision of following Jesus. The "Wow" experience may be very personal, emotional, but make the strong feeling of being a member of a community possible.

After 2008, the development of the university and expansion of the campus not only challenge but also offer opportunity for the growth of church. NJ church now has another member's house in the new campus open as the second site of bible study and family gathering. On Sunday, the church manages to rent a conference room at the (main campus) university hotel for all the members to worship together. Christian festivals, like Easter, Christmas, will be the time for celebration, too.

## 2. Conversion: obedience or rebellion?

When observing the church events, my impression is, with more than half of the members are women, the core members and leaders in effect are women, too, yet the prior position of the church is set for the "brother": sisters are told to be submissive to their husband at home and subordinate in the church. Verses about the meek, pious woman in the bible are quoted as the evidence of the role order between male and female.

NJ church has no priest yet, and none of the core members wants to stand up and speak in front of the altar, instead a brother will be chosen on Sunday to lead the service, including streaming sermons online to compensate the absence of the male religious leader.

So the first question is: with the strengthening on male's dominating role (even though the "he" is absent), maybe we should say that NJ church has a male-dominate gender order; then, how could the self-made, well-educated woman accept it?

Qing, active and intelligent, is such a woman of successful career. She now teaches at a colleague. But she had strived for a better life by effort for a long time, when she was a teenager, her parents sent her to a technical secondary school while use the family's money and resource for her brother's education.

Qing studied hard to get the certificate for colleague-level self-education programs, after working and saving enough money, she passed the examination for a graduate program in a prestigious university and finally got the master's degree, then a teaching position.

After several years of working, she married a man with talents in writing. Good and bad, the two have an intimate-yet-violent relationship, to some extent Qing is a victim of domestic violence.

After convert into a Christian, Qing began her reconciliation with her past and tried to solve the present dilemma, i.e., with "less pride and more tameness", being ready to accept what's happened without resent.

Qing's case tells a story of personal striving for success. Consider that she and other members are all growing under an atheist background, which has a vivid narrative of equal gender role, i.e. woman as the "half sky", then how could they submit to unequal gender order and let the "absent Man" exert influence upon them? Will their conversions be a double rebellion against the atheist and equal-between-sexes stand, or just another adaptation into the traditional role order?

### 3. Man V.S. woman: "Will every woman be that 'rib'"?

Almost all of the NJ church members convert to Christianity during adulthood. Family tradition is an important factor for the youngest' decision, who, born in late 1970s and 1980s, during which time religious practice was visible in their household, could enjoy the loose and free circumstance after Cultural Revolution. On the other side, people who was born before 1949 into Christian family knows Christian teachings from early age, and became Christians as soon as the political climate changed in 1980s.

Other members who were born during 1950s~early 1970s, just as Qing, grew under a dominant atheist ideology. So on what occasion did they become a believer? According to the interview, serious accident & emotional yearning for 'home'/support are two common motivations. Interestingly, several of them encountered the bible when teaching, at first they read the bible for work, but after a while, they began to read the scripture for 'fun' or out of curiosity, at last were led to be a Christian.

About the gender role between two sexes, all of them rely on the bible as the authoritative source of guidance. In contrast, both the younger side and the older side of them take a flexible attitude toward the gender difference, while the "atheist generation" holds a more rigid opinion.

For instance, Ms. Wei quotes verses about how to be a good woman, she would accept gender difference by nature, while emphasize love and spiritual life in building the inner personality of both man and woman.

For order member as she and the youngest, bible is the model in life, the gender difference exists and will be the basis for the order, but not a hierarchy.

In contrast, those members grown under atheist aura would focus more on how to be a good woman and practice it in daily life, for them the womanhood needs to be learned with effort. They got the consciousness of feminine ethos gradually, learn self-control, practice apology, try not to argue for a clear cut of right and wrong, cultivate wife's respect toward husband and sisters toward brothers as "head". Qing, although holding the question that "will every woman be that 'rib'?" ,insists to unite with the other sex as is told in the bible.

#### 4. Discussion:

In becoming a Christian, these women with high education and social-economic status identifies with a gender order based on the biblical literature, i.e. a subordinate, submissive position for woman. The more atheist background, the stronger tendency of agree with the unequal gender order. With dramatic social changes in China, will this turn out to be a return to tradition, or a possible way for "new person"? This is the main concern of this study.

# The institutional production of ethnicity, discrimination and segregation in European cities. The case of housing.

**Valérie Sala Pala**

## Abstract:

Segregation is often seen as a “natural” fact or as the result of individual processes. What is argued here is that, in some specific social and political contexts, segregation is to a large extent an institutional product, and especially a product of social housing policies and practices. This is particularly the case in some European cities in which social housing has historically played a crucial role in the production of the urban space and its populating. This paper will focus on the ethnic dimension of segregation.

This thesis will be developed through a comparison between British and French cities. Social housing policy has a central role in the production of ethnic boundaries in both countries. As a consequence, it is not relevant to oppose a French universalist model, blind to ethnicity, to a British multiculturalist model which would recognise ethnic differences and mobilise ethnic categories. On both sides of the Channel, local social housing policies are a strong source of ethnic discrimination and segregation, embedded in the local management of social housing allocations. Social housing institutions routinely produce and mobilise ethnic categories and develop processes of ethnicisation and exclusion of some groups.

The comparison between France and Britain also sheds light on the contradictions of local antidiscrimination or antisegregation policies. In Britain, multiculturalist antidiscrimination, based on the recognition of “cultural difference” and of ethnic communities, encourages the euphemisation of ethnic discriminations into mere “cultural differences”. In France, universalist antidiscrimination, relying on the republican myth of ethnic indifferentiation, encourages the denial of ethnic discriminations, euphemised into socio-economic inequalities or attributed to the “misfitness” of some groups.

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Uni (Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2013) and co-edited, with Fabien Desage and Christelle Morel Journel, *Le peuplement comme politiques* (Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2014). She is also the author of several articles in international journals such as *American Behavioral Scientist* (2010), *Ethnicities* (2009), *French Politics, Culture and Society* (2006).



# Large-scale Residential Community in Shanghai: Features, Problems, and Development

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**Abstract:** Large-scale Residential Community (LRC) is a kind of special community, with different labels of residential community, low-income housing community, vulnerable community, problems community, etc. Based on the data of a questionnaire investigation in 2014, this article tries to get whole knowledge of LRC by analyzing its features, system of problems, and development in the future. The remote location causes problems such as difficulty on transportation and employment, insufficiency of public resources and living facilities, and then changes current social structure of population. Such structure not only brings series of problems of community governance, but also constraints community vitality and development capability of LRC. This article also analyses future tendency of population structure, then put forward some policy advices on how to promote the healthy development of LRC.

**Key Words:** Large-scale Residential Community, Problems, Development

## I . Background and Question

Since reform and open, with the speeding up of China's industrialization and urbanization, almost all big cities have been undergoing the process of quick development and construction. On the one hand, since the later stage of 1980s, the remake of old neighborhoods and the suburb urbanization made the urban space spread and living structure adjusted continually. On the other hand, the reform of housing commercialization and the construction of low-income houses since the late of 1990s have given rise of a large number of newly built commercial or affordable houses, which improved living conditions and also brought a series of issues of community governance and urban development. Such process is same to Shanghai, and millions of inner-city's residents were resettled to the outskirts or scattered in the newly built commercial houses. To meet the need of Shanghai's future development, and to improve the living conditions of low-income people, the municipal government of Shanghai had made two plans of programming dozens of Large-scale residential communities (LRC) mainly including resettlement houses and economically affordable houses(EAH) out of the outer ring road in 2009 and 2010. The construction area of these programs is about 134 square kilometers, and the residential construction area is



the transportation planning(Ma & Xu, 2012), putting forward suggestions to improve public transport and optimize facilities distribution by analyzing living-employment space matching(Zhou, et.,2010; Li, etc., 2013), travel features of residents(Sun, etc., 2013), travel behavior of using public facilities(Zhang, etc., 2013). In aspect of community governance, there are different researches analyzing the “Town-Governs-Community” pattern in Shanghai (Wang, 2013) and low-income housing community’s governance in Beijing (Fang, 2015). In general, researchers commonly argued that the LRC’s governance should push residents’ self-governance, exploit the community resources and power, promote social participation, and carry out collaboration and cooperation (Fan, 2010; Peng, 2012; Yun, 2014). In addition, a few researches mentioned the influence of LRC’s construction on changes of regional population (Wang & Wu, 2014), community culture construction, and so on.

Current researches of different disciplines analyzed problems faced by LRC and raised ideas of community governance and the future development. However, more systematic, comprehensive and detailed knowledge of LRC is still lack for us, some important questions still need further answer, such as how is the social structure of LRC’s population based on sampling survey, and what kind of relationship is among the population structure, lack of public facilities, problems of governance and the future development of LRC. This paper tries to put forward the overall cognition of LRC, summarize its fundamental characteristics, analyze core problems that influence its development and the logical relationship among all kinds of problems, then give out some policy advices on how to promote its healthy development.

The data used in this paper comes from a survey of "Residents’ Life of LRC in Shanghai", which carried out by School of Sociology and Political Science in Shanghai University and the Development Research Center of Shanghai Municipal People’s Government in June and July, 2014. The survey selected five low-income housing areas in outskirts of Shanghai (Gucun Area in Baoshan District, Sanlin Area in Pudong New District, Jiangqiao Area in Jiading District, Pujiang Area in Minhang District, Sijing Area in Songjiang District) as sites of investigation, selected 19 residents’ committees using judgment sampling, selected 50-100 families in each residents’ committee using systematic sampling, then selected respondents from residents above age 18 in every family using birthday sieving method. This survey finally collected 1108 valid questionnaires by interviewing each respondent in household. Main features of the data are: men(44.5%), women(55.5%); 18 to 39 years old (26.2%), 40 to 59 years

(39.1%), above age 60 (34.7%); elementary school or below (9.2%), junior high school (34.9%), high school/secondary technical school (35.6%), junior college (9.6%), university or above (10.8%); resettlement residents from inner-city (53.3%), EAH residents (32.1%), resettlement residents of local (6.7%), ordinary commercial housing residents(5.0%), other people of public rental houses, low-rent houses and so on (2.8%).

## II. Features of LRC

According to "Guidelines (Trial) of Planning and Designing about LRC in Shanghai" released by Shanghai Planning and Land Management Bureau in 2009, the common area of each LRC in Shanghai is approximately 5 square kilometers, and the population is approximately 100 thousands. In both area and population, the LRC is larger than ordinary residential community, and always includes some residents' communities or neighborhood areas. So, the first obvious feature of LRC is large scale. In addition, other basic features can be summarized as below.

"Residential Community": Guidelines above put forward that LRC is urban community that "its main function is to live, keeping appropriate balance between daily life and employment ". But in fact, there is serious imbalance between life and employment. Data shows that, only 43.3% have a job in residents of the working age, about one third (33.1%) have full-time jobs, the ratio of unemployed reaches 14.9% (N=776).

"Low-income Housing Community": In LRC, the resettlement houses, EAH, low-rent houses, and public rental houses are the main kinds. According to the plan of 2010, in the newly built houses of 12 first LRCs, low-income houses accounted for 56%, general commercial houses were 27%, farmers' resettlement houses were 17% (Xiong, 2011). According to the survey, 53.3% of respondents live in resettlement houses from inner-city, 32.1% is for EAH, ratio of resettlement residents of local is 6.7%. Other ratios are: commercial houses (5.0%), public rental houses(1.1%), low-rent houses (0.7%) (N=1095).

"Vulnerable Community": Directly associated with the above one, this feature means that there are many vulnerable groups such as low-income people. Data shows, the proportion of having old people (60 years or above) in families is 49.4%, 12.9% families have unemployed member(s), 6.3% have member(s) with serious illness (N=1106). The average personal income (after tax) of residents is 37235.07 yuan in 2013(standard deviation=44401.05) (N=1066). Compared with the average personal

income of urban residents (43851 yuan) in Shanghai in 2013 (Qiu, etc., 2013), the average personal income of LRC residents is very low.

"Problems Community": As newly built communities, LRCs have already put up many social problems more or less, including inadequate public facilities, inconvenient daily life, double dual structure, separation of residents from household registration, increasing extra population, many vulnerable groups, weak community governance, internal segregation, growing discontent mood, etc. In the aspect of community governance, as the survey showed, the most common problems are about living environment and public order. Some people don't care for protecting the environment when they keep pets or throw rubbish; the property company's serving level is not satisfied; illegal vehicles or crimes are threatening the public order.

"No Root Community": Most residents lack of identity and loyalty for living in LRC because of their moving in from other places. LRCs haven't become a true life community. Data shows that almost eighty percent (78.0%) residents have Shanghai hukou(N=1108), but among them there are only 35.2% persons brought hukou with them in LRC (N=863). The proportion of extra population is more than 20%, such is higher in resettlement houses. In aspect of community identity, 84.1% of residents regard LRC as the most important home (N=1103), but at the same time, 70.7% are not proud of living in LRC (N=1081), which means that for most residents, the LRC is just a living place, and not a true home in their hearts.

"Town-Governs Community": In aspect of management institution, the LRC is called as a kind of Town-Governs Community in Shanghai. That is, the town government is the direct administration of each LRC, as it is located in the scope of different town. Generally, three management organizations are set up in each LRC, including community party committee, community committee and community center. Main function of these organizations is to promote community self-governance and co-governance within the LRC. This kind of management mode has strengthened town government's duties of providing public service and management on the LRC, and left more developing space for community self-governance and co-governance. However, the town's financial burden is also increasing to some extent, with the problem of lack of law enforcement forces such as local police officers. Data shows that nearly ninety percent of residents (86.0%) know little or even nothing about this management mode (N=1108), which means that Town-Governs Community may be absent of powerful administration.

### III. System of Problems in LRC

Features or problems of LRC that we have discussed should be viewed as a whole system. But the relationship among different parts of this system still needs to make clear. All in all, we need go backward to the beginning of the process of planning and building LRC to discuss the reason of the problems.

The LRC is not a kind of natural community. The municipal government has taken a leader role in the process of planning and building, and this is also a basic principle to build the low-income houses in Shanghai (Fang, 2013). The government aims to achieve their policy goal in the process that brings many possibilities to born the problems. The first goal of low-income houses' building is to improve the living condition of lower income people. In some means this goal has been achieved. The survey shows that many residents think their housing conditions have been highly improved. Because lack of systematic planning, many residential communities don't have enough public service facilities. The government pays the most attention to the housing condition not the living condition, and neglects potential social problems caused by gathering of the vulnerable groups. The future to transfer into ordinary commercial community has not been taken into consideration.

Although lack of systematic planning caused many problems of LRC, it is not useful to criticize the government only. A more meaningful thing is to understand the logic relationships among different problems, grasp the nature of problems and find a possible way for the future of LRC.




Figure 2: Relationships among Problems of LRC

Figure 2 shows the relationships among different problems of LRC. This relationship impacts a hypothesis that different parts of community hold together to be an organic whole. Detailed analysis will be showed as below.

First, as an independent variable, the location of LRC has brought negative influences on the transportation, employment, public resources and living services. Thus causes problems of the first layer that the residents' demand of these aspects can't be sufficiently met.

The location of LRC has three main characteristics. 1) LRCs are far away from the city center; 2) they are located in the rural area and are lack of the public service resources; 3) they belong to the developing area with less opportunities of employment. These characteristics bring four problems at least.

The first problem is inconvenience of the public transportation. Although most of LRCs were planned to near the subway (Yin & Xu, 2012), the commuting time of going to downtown greatly improved because of the faraway location. Data shows that, 54.2% of residents believe that conditions of traffic travel become worse than before the move (N=1108). Not only the external traffic is inconvenient, but also the internal traffic due to lack of buses and long intervals. Figure 3 shows that the vast majority of LRCs are close to the subway stations, but more than half of the travel distances are in 1-3 km. The internal traffic conditions need to be further improved.

The second is the lower employment rate. Some LRCs are close to the new towns in the suburb of Shanghai. However, most of them are separate. Figure 4 shows that only a small part of LRCs locate near the industrial planning land areas which could be helpful to promote the employment in the future. As mentioned before, in the working age population, the proportion of employment is only four out of ten (43.3%), of which full-time employment accounted for about 1/3 (33.1%), the proportion of unemployed reached 14.9% (N=776).



Figure 3: Travel Distances between LRCs and Subway Stations




Figure 4: LRCs and the Industrial Planning Land Areas

Source: Ma Shijiang, Xu jianjian. 2012. Thinking of optimization and promotion of supporting traffic in large-scale residential communities of Shanghai. *Annual Conference of Urban Planning of China*.

The third is lack of public resources such as hospitals and schools. Because of the gap of public serving level between urban and rural area, LRCs lack of high quality hospitals, schools and other resources. According to the data, it is considered that the hospital is the most urgent need public service facility (18.2%). At the same time, hospital is the most inconvenient facility (41.1%). Field work of some LRCs also shows that if there is a good hospital or school, the attractiveness of LRC can be greatly enhanced.

The fourth is inconvenience of daily life. The government pays many attentions to meet the living need of the residents in the process of building. But it is impossible to reach the level as high as urban area in the near future. Survey shows that residents believe that the most lack of living services in LRC is big supermarket or shopping mall (17.6%), other options are: bank (13.2%), bus station (6.5%), food market (6.5%), post office (4.6%), institutions serving for the old (4.5%), etc..

Second, problems about transportation, employment, public resources and living services lead to the change of population structure of LRC. That is the second layer of problems: the unbalance of population structure.

According to the objective of policy to build LRC, the structure of planning population roughly is: residents in EAHs, low-rent houses and public rental houses are mainly lower-income people with Shanghai urban hukou, who are impossible to buy



commercial houses; residents of resettlement houses from inner city include high, middle and low class with Shanghai urban hukou; commercial housing residents are mainly middle-income whether they have Shanghai hukou or not; local resettlement housing people are native with Shanghai rural hukou. Generally, the population structure of policy planning should be that Shanghainese with hukou account for the vast majority, and different class of people live together.

However, under the influence of transportation, employment and other issues, the current population structure of the LRC has a large deviation from policy objectives. Nowadays population structure is: residents in EAHs, low-rent houses and public rental houses are mainly low-income people of Shanghai, which is consistent with the policy objectives; resettlement housing residents mainly are low-income Shanghai people, tenants and migration people; commercial housing residents are similar to resettlement housing people, also appeared the phenomenon of separation from hukou registration, renting of many houses and gathering of extra population. Data shows that, the proportion of Shanghai residents in EAHs is 93.5% (N=351), and the same proportion in resettlement houses of inner city and local is separately 75.8% (N=584), 65.7% (N=73). Similarly, the rental rate in EAHs is only 2.9% (N=352), while the rental rate in resettlement houses of inner city and local is separately 20.9% (N=584) and 37% (N=73). In short, current population structure in LRCs is that Shanghai residents of the lower class are the main body, and the extra population is increasing quickly.

This population structure can be further summarized as three characteristics. 1) There are many vulnerable groups. As mentioned before, proportions of the elderly, the unemployed and low-income persons are high, and the LRC is typical vulnerable community. In addition, the survey shows that the subjective status of residents is middle or lower. 2) Separation between hukou and people is serious. At present, only about 1/3 of Shanghai residents registered their hukou in LRCs (35.2%). If the local resettlement population is excluded, this proportion will be further lower. 3) The extra population is increasing continually. The proportion of extra population is more than twenty percent. The last two points commonly reflected characteristics of "no root community".

Third, the population structure of LRCs is one important reason for many problems of community governance. At the same time, lack of service facilities is the basis of some governing problems. Thus, the third layer of problems consists of many kinds of difficulties of governance.

Survey shows that for the residents, the most serious five kinds of worse phenomenon of governance is in turn: uncivilized keeping pets (17.7%), illegal advertising/posting (15.6%), throwing rubbish everywhere (10.7%), the serving level of property companies is not high (10.1%), illegal vehicles (8.5%). Other important options are: Poor public order (theft, etc.) (7.3%), noise (7.2%), group-oriented leasing (4.1%), street peddler (3.0%). The phenomenon such as uncivilized keeping pets shows the quality of some residents is low. The phenomenon including illegal advertising and throwing rubbish, reflect the problem of inadequate property management. Data shows that nearly half of the residents are dissatisfied with property companies (46.3%) (N=1051). The illegal vehicles and poor public order are the performance of that necessary city management is weak. In addition, problems of the security and the environment are more prominent in the resettlement housing estate, and the group-oriented leasing is its unique problem.

We can analyze the causes of the above governance issues in these three aspects as below.

In the aspect of service facilities, problems of transportation, employment and public resources means that the residents' living needs cannot be met adequately, which constitutes the existing basis of some problems. For example, the problem of illegal vehicles is related to the phenomenon of traffic inconvenience, and problem of street peddlers is relevant with lack of life service facilities. Even illegal advertisement can also provide information of meeting the needs of the residents. Because this kind of problems to some extent brings more convenience to the residents in their daily life, it is difficult to get rid of them. Sometimes, a special punishing act conducted by branches of government led to residents' opposition.

About the population structure, three characteristics mentioned above are all related to the existing problems of governance. The characteristic of vulnerable groups have two aspects influences: one is that the low-income people are more dependent on the public service, and need more cheap life services, which helps some relevant problems to continue; the other is that lower educational standard relates to some uncivilized phenomenon such as throwing rubbish everywhere. The second characteristic of the separation between hukou and people means dissatisfaction with the living environment, lack of community identity and sense of belonging, and lower level of public participation of Shanghai residents. All aren't conducive to the residents' self-governance to make community better. The third characteristic is gathering of the

extra population. People without Shanghai hukou are difficult to integrate into the community, and some of them are also the trouble makers of some problems such as illegal vehicles and group-oriented leasing.

In addition, governance problems of LRCs are also related to the current management system, that is, the "Town-Governs Community" model leads to LRC's shortage of administrative power and resources, and creates space for some problems of administrative management or property management. Data shows that more than 60% of residents (62.0%) think the LRC is short of police (N=1053). This is directly related with issues of illegal vehicles and poor public order.

Fourth, lack of service facilities and current population structure are not conducive to LRCs' prosperity and development. Then, weak impetus of future development is the fourth layer of problem, and also a fundamental issue.

In the aspect of service facilities, current situation of the transportation and employment is not conducive to the prosperity of the LRC, the most critical factor is the lack of industry support. Figure 4 shows that most of LRCs are not near industrial planning land areas. To the small part next to the industrial lands, a problem also exists that whether employment opportunities from the industrial area are matched to the needs or human capitals of residents. Lack of the economic support, the possibility for LRC to be an independent new city or new town will be greatly reduced. To a large extent it will still only play a role of living as part of the inner city.

In terms of population structure, the impact of the current characteristics on the development of LRC is reflected at least in three aspects. 1) Weak consumption capacity of the vulnerable groups give a negative influence on the prosperity of service market and the development of service enterprises; 2) Irregular services provided by some extra people are not conducive of the development of the service market; 3) The low human capital of residents has weakened the impetus of community development in some degree.

Above is the overall analysis of various problems that the LRCs in Shanghai currently face. We divide four layers of problems and introduce relationships among them briefly. In all factors mentioned, the population structure is the key variable, which is not only the result of the first layer of problems, but also influence problems of community governance and development. Some developed countries have had lessons in the developing process of low-income housing communities, which fell into places of poverty, crime and social isolation. LRCs of Shanghai should avoid becoming

such places in the future. People is the core of the community, people-oriented principle should be the most fundamental principle of the future development of LRCs. Healthy population structure is the basis of the prosperity of LRCs, and to meet needs of different classes of residents effectively is an important prerequisite for the formation of healthy social structure.

#### IV. Thinking of the Future Development of LRCs

In this part, we will analyze possible tendency of changes of LRCs' population structure in the future, and then put forward the corresponding policy suggestions in five aspects.

For residents with Shanghai hukou, most of them are middle or lower classes of the city, including the unemployed, the elderly, and the low-income people. Phenomenon of separation between residents and hukou, houses renting, etc. will probably continue to exist. Among resettlement housing residents, those who have a stable job with higher income in other places, who have several apartments, or people who tend to enjoy better public services are not willing to move in the LRC. Furthermore, if LRCs still can't provide enough public services or employment opportunities in the next few years, some residents maybe choose to leave.

Contrast with Shanghainese, most of residents without Shanghai hukou can withstand lower salary and public services. They have strong adaptability and their jobs are more flexible. In the condition of current public services and living environment of the LRC, the number and the proportion of extra population are likely to increase continually, thus probably bringing more problems of governance.

Gathering of vulnerable groups or the extra population strengthens the labels of "vulnerable community", "problems community" and "no-root community". It does not conform to the objective of policy to build LRCs, and is not conducive to their development. To optimize the population structure and promote the prosperity of the LRC, there will be at least five aspects of actions should be taken.

The first is to improve the public service facilities.<http://dict.youdao.com/search?q=%E9%85%8D%E5%A5%97%E8%AE%B E%E6%96%BD&keyfrom=fanyi.smartResult> - # One important facility is public transportation, especially the internal traffic should be improved quickly. The other is service resources with higher quality such as the big comprehensive hospitals and schools of the compulsory education in high level, etc.

The second is to make the LRC be common. At present, the LRC is still special community with many low-income housing. But in the future, with the increasing transaction of resettlement houses and EAHs, it is possible for the LRC to become ordinary commercial housing community. In the next few years, governments should guide and regularize the process of marketization of LRCs to raise the proportion of housing buyers.

The third is to promote interactions between communities and industrial areas. To solve the problems of lack of employment opportunities and separation of employment and living, current resources of new town, industrial areas and other development areas should be utilized adequately. Given more workers live in the LRC and more residents could get jobs nearby, the single function of living of the LRC will be changed gradually.

The fourth is to strengthen community governance. On the one hand, necessary administrative power and resources should be strengthened in LRC area. On the other hand, community self-governance and co-governance should be paid more attention through developing social organizations and promoting friendly interactions between Shanghainese and extra residents.

The last is to provide services by multiple subjects. There are a large amount of service demands in the LRC. To meet the demands effectively, the local government, enterprises, social organizations and community organization such as residents' committee, should cooperate with each other and play different roles in the serving system. Consumption community is likely to be one of the possible directions of LRC's future development.

## V. Conclusion and Discussion

Based on the data of a questionnaire investigation in 2014, this article tries to get whole knowledge of LRC by analyzing its features, system of problems, and development in the future. LRC is a kind of special community, with different labels of residential community, low-income housing community, vulnerable community, problems community, no-root community, town-governs community, etc. In general, the remote location causes problems such as difficulty on transportation and employment, insufficiency of public resources and living facilities, and then changes current social structure of population. Such structure not only brings series of problems

of community governance, but also constraints community vitality and development capability of LRC. This article also analyses future tendency of population structure, then put forward some policy advices on how to promote the healthy development of LRC.

This article is still a preliminary overall analysis of Large-scale residential community. Logical relationships among different layers of problems should be regarded as a series of hypothesis rather than definite conclusions. From the perspective of academic research, series of relationships in figure 2 remains need to be verified by further detailed researches. In addition, this article much more emphasizes problems or troubles in the process of LRCs' development. In fact, whether based on the questionnaire survey or field observation, there exists also positive development conditions and useful experiences, which need to remind the readers' attention.

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# Homelessness in the Chinese Urban Context: A Preliminary Examination

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## Abstract :

In this short presentation, I am touching onto the field of urban homelessness with an aim of clarifying three inter-related sets of inquiries: 1) by comparing the situation of Chinese homeless phenomena with that of the advanced societies and other developing countries, I hope to give you a glimpse of what constitute the Chinese way of urban homelessness; 2) by introducing some field narratives/stories that our research group has encountered/documentated from Beijing's streets and other public or commercial facilities, I want to make several hypotheses about the possible mechanisms that conducive to the social manufacturing of homelessness in Chinese urban context; and 3) discussing the possible scenarios of social control of homelessness in metropolitan areas. At the end of this presentation, several directions for future observation are proposed, with the hope of gaining a much fully understanding of this social phenomenon via ethnographic techniques.



# Beyond neoliberal imposition: State-local cooperation and the blending of social and economic objectives in French urban development corporations

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## Abstract:

For more than 15 years, the French central State has been creating Urban Development Corporations (*Etablissements publics d'aménagement*) in a series of major core cities. These corporations are in charge of large flagship urban development projects mixing infrastructure, office development and housing projects and, to this end, have been given formal authority over land use regulation. The similarities between French EPAs and British Urban Development Corporations created in the 1980s by the Thatcher government are striking. They both adopt a neo-managerial model of administrative action embodied in the “agency” instrument and implement neoliberal principles: market-led regeneration, a focus on urban marketing and attractiveness and a belief in the trickle down effects of urban redevelopment. In many ways, the case of the EPA fits with the neoliberalisation framework provided by radical geography and urban political economy and applied on British UDCs. Nevertheless, the paper shows that there are limits to the generalization of this theoretical framework and takes French EPAs as an empirical basis to challenge the theories of urban neoliberalisation on both descriptive and analytical aspects. Firstly, we show that the distinction between two clearly distinct periods characterised by different agendas, policy instruments and systems of relations between actors and levels is far from convincing in the French case. Secondly, we show that evolutions that could be attributed to neoliberal urbanism are rather the result of processes of rationalisation within organisations or professions which may have little to do with neoliberalism, or the result of a transformation of the welfare State and the reassessment of ways of producing social justice. On this basis, we argue for theoretical frameworks that put neoliberalisation at its right place and allow its articulation with other trends of change such as rationalisation and the refinement of Welfare mechanisms.

**Keywords :** *Etablissements publics d'aménagement*, France, neoliberalisation, Saint-Etienne, Urban Development Corporations, urban regeneration

For more than 15 years, the French central State has been creating Urban Development Authorities (*Etablissements publics d'aménagement*, EPAs hereafter) in a series of major core cities (e.g. Marseille, Saint-Etienne, Bordeaux, Nice) and in several areas in the outskirts of Paris. Created by State decree and formally controlled by central ministries, these authorities are in charge of large flagship urban development projects, mixing infrastructure, office development and housing projects. To this end, they have been given formal authority over land use regulation and negotiations with property and development interests, thereby bypassing the local governments.

French EPAs have received very little attention from the international literature in urban studies, policy analysis or local government studies (French urban historians being the exception, cf. VADELORGE, 2005). This lack of interest contrasts with the scholarly attention that quite similar bodies have attracted over recent decades, namely British Urban Development Corporations created in the early 1980s by the Thatcher governments. At first glance, the similarities between French EPAs and British Urban Development Corporations are striking. Both types of bodies were meant to accelerate the conversion of urban planning practices to more market friendly approaches and to shift the focus of urban policies from land use regulation, social housing and collective consumption infrastructures, to market led regeneration, public-private partnerships and the attraction of affluent social groups. In both cases, new administrative structures were set up to attain these goals more efficiently: agencies taking their authority from central government, endowed with extraordinary powers and borrowing management rules and forms of action from the private sector.

Most of the scholarly publications on British UDCs have depicted them as almost pure examples of neoliberal recipes applied to urban policies. According to Raco, "UDCs are underpinned by the logic of market-driven development and the belief that markets can and will deliver to meet social ends. They embody many of the characteristics of 'rolled-out' neoliberalism. They are unelected, yet possess strong planning powers. They represent market freedoms at the same time as they wield relatively large amounts of state power and resources" (RACO, 2005: 336). Imrie and Thomas concur when they state that UDCs exhibit "the institutional and political features of the emergent neoliberal local state, propagating an elite localism linked to central state powers, while seeking to restructure the nature of policy programmes in and through the market" (IMRIE and THOMAS, 1995 : 491).

These apparent similarities between French EPAs and British UDCs provide an exceptional opportunity to test the applicability of the claim that there has been a neoliberalisation of urban policies beyond the contexts where it was first articulated, namely the Anglo-American world.

There is now a vast literature in geography, urban studies and political economy that upholds the thesis of neoliberalisation of urban policies. This notion subsumes an ensemble of place-specific, path-dependent and contested processes that, its proponents claim, have gradually modified the content of urban policies, the forms of urban governance and the resulting balances of power within urban societies. More specifically, the neoliberalisation of urban policies has produced a situation where the imperatives of competition and competitiveness, the necessity to create a good business climate and to attract investments as well as affluent and educated social classes dominate urban agendas at the expense of redistributive objectives. Neoliberalisation also designates a trend among policymakers to consider market mechanisms as the most appropriate mode of regulation to develop land, deliver services, and their propensity to use public institutions and policies to spread the use of these mechanisms (BRENNER and THEODORE, 2002a and b; PECK and TICKELL, 2002; HACKWORTH, 2007). Thus, neoliberalisation does not mean the demise of the State but rather a shift of the focus of State intervention from redistribution and socialization to the promotion of market mechanisms and competitive behaviours in an ever-wider range of social spheres.

For its users, the notion of neoliberalisation has both descriptive and analytical virtues. As a descriptive notion, it helps to depict broad social, economic and political changes and distinguish contrasting historical epochs. Neoliberalisation is useful to make sense of the end of a so-called Fordist-Keynesian era, characterised by the prominence of progressive objectives in urban policies, and its replacement by a post-Fordist and/or neo-liberal age that stands out by its focus upon competition and market mechanisms. Brenner, for example, describes a shift from “spatial Keynesianism” to “locational policies” (2004). Jessop evokes the transition from a “Keynesian national welfare state” to a “Schumpeterian post-national workfare state” (1997); and Harvey establishes a link between the post-modern, post-Fordist and neoliberal breaks with the past (1989b). Moreover, neoliberalisation is also an analytical notion. It usually fits within analytical frameworks that try to give meaning to the evolutions and epochal changes evoked above. Inspired by political economy approaches focusing on the

transformation of capitalism and forms of accumulation (HARVEY, 2005), or by a Foucauldian approach putting emphasis instead on the silent and partially unplanned transformation of rationality and governmentalities (LARNER, 2000; BROWN, 2003; ROSSI, 2013), scholars that have used the notion all consider that neoliberalisation is the main source of social and political change. Here, neoliberalisation not only depicts, it also explains change.

The aim of this paper is to challenge the theories of urban neoliberalisation on both these fronts. Firstly, on the descriptive front, the case of French EPAs and their comparison to British UDCs will help us show that the distinction between two clearly distinct periods characterised by different agendas, policy instruments and systems of relations between actors and levels is far from convincing in the French case. Crucial elements of our neoliberal present were actually present in the Keynesian or progressive period; conversely, elements of this progressive period clearly remain crucial today. Besides, if some elements of neoliberalism have undeniably modified the purposes and governance devices of urban planning in France, they have not erased pre-existing institutions such as policy paradigms and objectives and inter-governmental relationships. Secondly, we will challenge theories of neoliberalisation on the analytical front. It is not our purpose to question the existence and the significance of all of the signs of change identified by the authors concerned. For instance, we consider that the recent promotion of market mechanisms in urban policymaking processes is undeniable. However, we consider that this phenomenon is not reducible to an effect of neoliberalisation. It can also be interpreted, like other changes in urban policymaking, as the result of processes of rationalisation within organisations or professions, which may have little to do with neoliberalism, or as the result of a transformation of the welfare State and the reassessment of ways of reaching redistributive goals through urban policies.

This article is based on data produced through fieldwork on the case of the *Établissement Public d'Aménagement de Saint-Étienne* (EPASE thereafter). Saint-Etienne is a medium-sized city of 170 000 inhabitants (in 2008), that lies at the center of an urban region of 0,5 million inhabitants, located 60 km from Lyon, the thriving 'second city' of France. Saint-Etienne is well known for having suffered from the decline of its traditional industries (coal mining, weapons manufacturing, metal works, and textiles) and for being one of the rare examples of shrinking cities in France. The central government created the EPASE through a decree published on January 24<sup>th</sup>,

2007. For this research, we conducted a little more than twenty semi-structured interviews with actors involved in the creation or the management of the EPA and with the major stakeholders of Saint-Etienne planning policies. Documentary sources (board meetings minutes, planning documents, newspapers) have also been analysed. The results of this research on Saint-Etienne were compared with two other empirical studies: one on the EPA Euroméditerranée in Marseille inherited from a previous research project (PINSON, 2002), the other on the EPA Euratlantique in Bordeaux. These two "counterpoints" have allowed us to control the results forged from the case of Saint-Etienne.

The article is structured in five sections. The first presents the British UDC experience and the theoretical literature about neoliberal and neomanagerial urban policies that has grown out of it. The second section provides an overview of the process that gave birth to the Saint-Etienne's EPA and relocates it both in the story of French urban policies and in that of central State interventions in Saint-Etienne. The third section provides evidence of strong similarities between UDCs and the EPASE in terms of neoliberal policy objectives and neomanagerial policy instruments. Nonetheless, the two last sections explore the limits of such an interpretation. Mobilizing empirical evidence from the EPASE case, the fourth section presents three challenges to the descriptive dimension of the notion of neoliberalisation. The fifth and last section articulates a critique of its analytical counterpart.

## **1. British Urban Development Corporations: enforcing neoliberal urban agendas with neomanagerial instruments**

The creation of urban regeneration agencies has often been described as one of the most brutal instrumental innovations for enforcing neoliberal agendas. British urban development corporations (UDCs) offer the best example of this break in urban policy objectives implemented by the creation of a new policy instrument (ANDERSON, 1990; PARKINSON and EVANS, 1990; THOMAS and IMRIE, 1999). Foreshadowing the wave of agencification of the 1980s and 1990s, the 1980 Local Government, Planning and Land Act created the UDCs. In a context of extreme tension between the Conservative central government and urban governments mostly controlled by the Labour Party, the former created 11 UDCs placed under its direct control. Within their "jurisdiction" (the Urban Development Area, UDA), UDCs were in charge of designing plans, delivering building permissions, as well as buying, reclaiming and selling land

instead of local government. UDCs were supposed to break with the then prevailing practices of passive and obstructive regulatory planning and to opt instead for a proactive practice of urban development based on the activation of real estate markets.

Four features have led many scholars to see UDCs as an almost pure incarnation of urban neoliberalism. First, they were probably the most emblematic element of the policy arsenal developed since the early 1980s by the Conservative central government to impose neoliberal recipes in the realm of urban policies. “Government policy towards the protracted problems of the inner cities brought forward many initiatives, such as Business in the Community, Task Forces, City Grants, and City Challenge, yet arguably none matched the level of resourcing, or political zeal, which underpinned the government’s support for the UDCs” (IMRIE and THOMAS, 1999:3). In particular, M. Thatcher’s Secretary of State for the Department of the Environment, Michael Heseltine saw the UDCs as a way to privatise urban policy, make the free enterprise spirit the core dynamic of inner cities regeneration, and reduce the role of the public sector and of an interfering local state (GURR and KING, 1987; STOKER, 1991). As a result, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, UDCs absorbed most of the central government funds set aside for inner cities.

Second, once established, the UDCs pursued policy objectives clearly marked by neoliberal ideology. Indeed, most of them promoted property-led answers to urban problems whereas previous policies (the Urban Programme introduced in 1968) had focused on social and community programmes. Before the neoliberal shift imposed by the Thatcher governments and the UDCs, the problems of inner cities were considered as a complex interplay of social, environmental and economic factors, requiring mixed approaches acting on these various dimensions. With UDCs, however, the Conservatives clearly reduced the focus to physical transformation of places, expected from the intervention of the property private sector lured by massive public intervention in the urban infrastructure. The task of UDCs was to activate property markets through the deregulation of urban planning and the circumvention of local government supervision of land use. ‘Nit-picking’ and ‘anti-business’ municipal planning practices were accused of being at the origin of the decay of inner cities. Consequently, most of UDCs’ resources were dedicated to land purchase and reclamation. “In contrast, [for the 1990-91] only 1% of total expenditure [of the UDCs] was directed to housing and support to the community” (IMRIE and THOMAS, 1999, 19). Another feature of the UDCs’ action clearly fits with the idea of a shift from “people welfare” to “corporate

welfare” (HARVEY, 2005:47) that lies at the heart of the thesis of neoliberalisation. Grant-giving to the property industry was a critical function of the UDCs. Indeed, Lawless considers that “the sector which benefited most from urban policy in the 1980s was the private sector in general and the development industry in particular” (LAWLESS, 1991: 26).

Third, UDCs are a clear example of the promotion of neoliberal policy objectives through the recourse to New Public Management (NPM) recipes. Neoliberalism and NPM share the same creed that the adjustment of behaviours through competitive mechanisms is the most effective way to produce goods and services and deliver policies. Consequently, NPM proponents advocated the application of competitive incentives and adjustment through price mechanisms in the public sector in order to improve efficiency and responsiveness (DUNLEAVY and HOOD, 1994). Hence, the diffusion of internal markets, competitive bids, league tables in public administrations and intergovernmental relations in the UK under Conservative governments. Another manifestation of this neomanagerial revolution was the multiplication of agencies. Agencies are administrative bodies that are specialised in execution and production tasks leaving « big policy issues » (POLLITT et al, 2005, 3) to the ministries (or local governments) and their administrations. Detached from ministerial administrations and embedded in economic sectors, agencies and their personnel are supposed to develop the same professional capacities, manners and ethos as people working in the private sector. Responsible for their own budgets and personnel recruitment and management, evaluated on their abilities to reach targets, focused on efficiency rather than on regularity, the agencies’ managers embody a new breed of public managers, more sensitive to market rationales than their predecessors (POLLIT & TALBOTT, 2004 ; POLLITT et al, 2005; BENAMOUIZIG and BESANÇON, 2008). UDCs clearly embodied this logic of agencification and unbundled government. They were meant to be provisional and to be dismantled once the activation of property market dynamics was ensured. They were detached from ministerial administrations and controlled by a Board composed of central government but also private sector representatives. Their staff was made up of public servants but also of individuals, whose previous experience was in the private sector, mainly in the real estate and development sectors.

Fourth and finally, the UK central government used the UDCs to marginalise local governments and their Keynesian urban agendas. If UDCs managements enjoyed a great deal of autonomy, the Secretary of State for the Environment defined the area of

competence of the UDCs (Urban Development Area, UDA) and appointed the Boards that formally controlled them. Conversely, UDCs escaped from the control of local government, bypassing its traditional role of deliverer of urban policy and planning permissions. Within each UDA, the regulation of land use and the delivery of building permission were transferred from local government to the UDCs. In a context marked by the introduction of expenditure targets for local government and sanctions for overspending, by the utilisation of local tax-capping, UDCs embodied the apogee of the redrawing of central-local government relations within which powers of policy formulation were shifted to the former.

## **2. The Etablissement Public d'Aménagement de Saint-Etienne: an extra-ordinary policy instrument for a declining city**

In this section, we examine the process that gave birth to the EPA of Saint-Etienne and describe some of its main policy objectives and projects. We also relocate this central state intervention in a longer story of statist efforts to revive the economy of Saint-Etienne.

### **Local mobilizations in front of an acute urban crisis**

Without being born of the Industrial Revolution, Saint-Etienne nonetheless experienced rapid urban growth from the 1820s onwards when an extremely fast process of industrialization transformed the whole city-region. Coal mining, metalworking and weapons manufacturing were the driving activities of this industrialization. Meanwhile, the central state was a key actor in the development of the city industrial structure. State civil engineers organized the modernization of coal mining and the connection of the city with the national industrial system. The population of the city rose constantly during most of the 19th and 20th centuries passing from 20,000 inhabitants in 1821 to 223,000 in 1968 when the city reached its demographic peak. From the late 1960's on, however, the city went through a dramatic industrial crisis: coal pits, large metalworks and consumers goods plants successively closed. This industrial decay triggered a strong demographic decline. Since 1968, Saint-Etienne has lost 50,000 inhabitants. This decline strongly struck some of the most central areas of the inner city, which is quite uncommon in large French large urban areas. Saint-Etienne is thus one of the rare French cities where deprived populations and ethnic minorities live in the city centre, and its derelict private dwellings in



particular. Indeed, poor housing conditions in the inner city was one of the key motivations for the creation of an EPA.

The roots of this creation can be traced back in 1999 when the National Census revealed a considerable acceleration of the demographic decline of the core city with the loss of nearly 20,000 residents between 1990 and 1999. While local actors had interpreted this demographic decline as the result of a lack of economic dynamism, thus requiring measures to favour the arrival of new businesses, they now considered it as resulting from a lack of attractiveness of the urban environment, in particular for the middle class (Béal et al., 2010; Morel Journel and Sala Pala, 2011). A civil servant of State field services in Saint-Etienne phrased this ‘necessity’ in the following terms:

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*“The economy, job creations... it was not enough! We were creating business parks, yet people would not come to live in Saint-Etienne. If we wanted to host large infrastructures and new economic activities, we had to offer decent homes for the executives in the city. We needed to switch to a service economy and develop the housing strategy that went with it” (Interview 5 June 2011).*


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Local policymakers started considering the founding of an EPA as the only suitable solution to dealing with the specific problems of the city centre. To be more specific, this vision grew inside State field services, in particular within the local offices of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment. This first circle then enrolled the chief of the City urban planning department, the mayor and his cabinet, and finally the Prefect of the Loire département (i.e. the head of the central State field services). In 2004, this mobilisation led to the drafting of a document that the Prefect transmitted to the Ministry of Infrastructures and Environment. The ministry decided to create a preliminary mission (“mission de préfiguration”) to check the actual necessity for creating an EPA and to draft the first lines of the regeneration project. In January 2007, a State decree officially created the Etablissement Public d’Aménagement de Saint-Etienne (EPASE) and gave it the following missions: “carrying out development and infrastructure building projects”; “acquiring, by expropriation if required, built or non-

built land”; “selling the acquired lands and buildings”; “exercising the pre-emption right”; and “undertaking surveys and the work required to carry out its mission”. The same decree that created the EPA also created an “Opération d’intérêt national” (OIN), a perimeter on which the EPA can deliver building authorizations instead of the municipality. The EPA was quickly set up over the following months and endowed with a 55 million € budget for the 2007-14 period.

#### The projects of the EPASE

The EPASE is in charge of a 970 hectares large area, which represents about 12% of the city of Saint-Etienne. Five distinct territorial entities are composing this perimeter (see map 1). In the city centre, the EPA’s main objective is to reinvigorate the structure of shops and outlets. Old and degraded neighbourhoods are the second target of the project. Here, the priority is to reinforce attractiveness through the renovation of housing and public spaces, as well as the construction of new housing and infrastructures. The Chateaucieux station district is supposed to become the second largest business district of the Lyon metropolitan area. The Manufacture Plaine Achille zone is dedicated to cultural industries. It already hosts the Cité du Design within the walls of the former national weapons plant and the Norman Foster’s Zenith. Pont de l’Ane Monthieu is the fifth intervention site of the EPA. It is a large and ill-organised retailing zone that the authority intends to transform into a more urban “city gate”.



Map 1 : The EPASE project area and other large renewal programs (source : Ville de Saint-Étienne — BEMO, 2011; ANRU stands for Agence Nationale de la Rénovation Urbaine and VSE for Ville de Saint-Etienne).

Two main narratives structure the marketing of the overall project: design and architectural quality. First, the EPA website proudly presents Saint-Etienne as a capital of design. Indeed, for many years, local stakeholders have decided to put design activities at the centre of their marketing strategies. This has given rise to the construction of the Cité du Design, which groups together the School of Fine Arts and Design and a dedicated exhibition centre hosted in a former weapon's factory. A Design biennale has also been organised since 1998. That strategy is based on the industrial past of the city and in 2010 was awarded the Design city label by the UNESCO. Second,

taking Barcelona, Valencia, Glasgow or Manchester as examples, the EPASE demonstrates a strong interest in planning and architectural quality. This has entailed systematic recourse to “big names” in the field (Forster, Maki, Chemetoff, etc.). It has also involved a search for labels and rewards given by State or professional bodies. For instance, the former mayor, Michel Thiollière (1994-2008) considered the organization by the Ministry of Infrastructures and Environment of the “Urban project workshop” (Atelier projet urbain) in Saint-Etienne to be a major issue. This workshop is actually a series of conferences, visits and meetings, which usually give rise to broadly diffused publications. Local policymakers consider that the organization of this event signifies the professional recognition of the excellence of their planning practices at the national level. The EPA website also proudly emphasizes the award of a prize for the Manufacture Plaine Achille project by the Ministry within the framework of the national EcoQuartier competition in 2011.

Another episode of State interventionism in Saint-Etienne?

Direct intervention of the French central State in Saint-Etienne is hardly a new thing. As mentioned above, already in the 19th century the State identified Saint-Etienne as a strategic location, due to the presence of coal and the concentration of arms production factories. The first signs of industrial crisis after the Second World War gave new impetus to State intervention in the city. Béal, Dormois and Pinson (2010, see also LEVY 1999) have identified three periods of State intervention corresponding to various objectives.

The first period that run from the end of WW2 to the early 1970s was placed under the sign of modernising “dirigisme”. The central State bureaucratic elites and the management of large national companies undertook the modernisation and concentration of sectors that made up the backbone of the local economy (coal mining, metal works, and arms) and tried to organize the location of new activities with higher technology content. Furthermore, since the mid-1960s, Saint-Etienne benefited from the “métropoles d’équilibre” policy implemented by the DATAR, the State agency in charge of regional policies. As a component of the Lyon-Grenoble-Saint-Etienne métropole, the city received extra grants for housing, transportation and welfare infrastructures.

The second period opened during the 1970s with the deepening of the industrial crisis and ended at the end of the 1980s. As a city deeply hit by deindustrialisation, Saint-Etienne again received extra attention from the central government. During this

period, State intervention was typical of what has been labelled the “stretcher bearer” State (Cohen, 1989) because it granted aids to several endangered local and emblematic businesses. Yet, after the “austerity turn” imposed by the Socialist government in the mid-1980s, this strategy gave way to another focused on the identification of alternative forms of industrial development. For this purpose, the DATAR created a “pôle de conversion” which was supposed to support the creation of new business in promising sectors. Progressively, State intervention became more symbolic and oriented towards the management of the social impact of the crisis. In the early 1990s, the creation of a sub-prefect in charge of economic development embodied this symbolic turn.

The third period opened in the 1990s and ran up to the creation of the EPASE. During this period, an “expert State” replaced the “stretcher bearer” State. Another feature of this period is the comeback of the Ministry of the Industry which tried to regain a place in local policies following the early 1980s decentralisation reforms, by developing policies targeting SMEs. In Saint-Etienne, the Ministry of Industry and its local field services (DRIRE) established branches of some of its satellites organizations like the National Agency for the Promotion of Research (ANVAR) and the Agency for the Development of Applied Industrial Engineering (ADEPA). In their respective fields, these agencies provided expertise in the automation of industrial processes, product improvement and technology transfer to SMEs.

### **3.A case of neoliberalisation of French urban policies?**

We have just seen that the strong presence of the central State in Saint-Etienne policies, compared to other French cities of equivalent size, is a not a new thing. Nevertheless, with the creation of the EPA, this intervention took a different path. First, the focus switched to urban regeneration rather than supporting industry and job creation. Second, State’s objectives and forms of action appeared to be characterised by the strong footprint of neoliberal and neomanagerial recipes.

#### **Promoting a neo-liberal urbanism**

There are four traits which support the idea that the creation of the EPASE has been a major step towards the neoliberalisation of Saint-Etienne urban policies: the obsession with attractiveness and economic competitiveness; its very selective approach to planning; the activation of private property market mechanisms as the primary dimension of urban planning and a quest to convert local planners to that

conception; and the focus on several privileged social groups as primary beneficiaries of the project. On all these items, the similarities with British UDCs are striking.

The obsession with attractiveness and economic competitiveness is highly visible in the EPASE's objectives. The authority is presented as "*reinforcing Saint-Etienne in its position as the second urban pole of the Lyon/Saint-Etienne Eurometropolis*", "*perpetuating the economic dynamism of the employment area*" and "*restoring the residential appeal of the city centre*"<sup>3</sup>. The failure of past strategies – based on the reassertion of the traditional industrial vocation of the city through the development of new industrial parks – is often invoked by stakeholders during interviews as a way of legitimizing this neoliberal turn.

Second, to enhance the attractiveness of the city, local stakeholders have adopted a selective approach to planning which has moved away from the comprehensive conception of planning embodied by land use regulation operated by the municipality (PINSON, 2009). Various scholars (HARVEY, 1989b; DENTE et al., 1990; INDOVINA, 1993; GENESTIER, 1993; MOULAERT et al., 2003) have identified this selective approach to planning that consists of concentrating public efforts where market dynamics can relay public investment as a hallmark of neoliberal urbanism. The EPASE's action is thus just another example of this "planning by projects" approach that targets "strategic areas", and operates through "exceptional tools" and "architectural gestures" to generate property value. Indeed, in order to have an efficient impact on land value creation, the idea has been to focus on "hot spots" where public investment and efforts to attract investors are concentrated. This approach has resulted in the setting of a special perimeter, the "*Opération d'intérêt national*" (very similar to the UDAs), within which the EPA has authority over the delivery of building permits. More crucially, it has resulted in a focus of planning efforts and public investments upon flagship operations located in areas where the creation of property value is the most likely. In Saint-Etienne's case, the EPASE has clearly identified two "hot spots". The first is the district surrounding the Chateaucieux railway station where the EPASE has made considerable investment in public spaces and selected a star of international architecture, the Japanese Pritzker prize winner Fuhimiko Maki, to design the area. The second is the Manufacture Plaine Achille area where prestigious cultural venues have

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<sup>3</sup> <http://www.epase.fr/fr/L-EPASE-un-outil-d-exception/Grand-projet-urbain>

been concentrated (*Cité du Design*, *Salle des Musiques Actuelles “Le Fil”*, *“La Comédie”* theatre and the Zenith Arena designed by Norman Foster).

The third striking feature is the strong emphasis on market mechanisms in the discourses and the practices of EPASE planners and developers. According to them, a liveable city is one where property markets are dynamic and where a constant level of private investment generates a self-sustaining dynamic of regeneration (DORMOIS et al., 2005). The EPASE’s projects clearly aim at creating land value and activating or reinforcing land market dynamics. Public money is invested only provisionally in order to activate private property dynamics. On interview, one of the executives of the EPASE *“mission de préfiguration”* clearly proclaimed claimed this vision of planning as an activity aiming at activating dynamics of land value creation:

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“What we do is create projects to create markets. [...] In the end, the operation should be without gain or loss for the State [...] The State is not here to subsidize investments without getting its money back [...]. *One of the conditions for the regeneration project to be a success is to design and implement scenarios of value creation able to attract investors and developers. My first priority then is to make the market rise. Without this, you cannot build your project*” (Interview, 10 March 2011).

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In the discourses of EPASE’s officials and of the stakeholders that have supported the creation of an EPA, planners of the Saint-Etienne city council and metropolitan authority are clearly stigmatised as lacking the professional abilities to organize the mechanisms of land value creation. These stakeholders consider that only the creation of an EPA has enhanced these abilities:

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*“At the time of the creation of the mission de préfiguration, there was no financial and technical culture of land development in Saint-*

*Etienne. That's rightly one of the things the mission's director wanted to change with the creation of an EPA. He wanted to facilitate the arrival of high-level planners and developers from elsewhere. Instead, we had local planners who had lost these capacities" (Interview, 12 february 2011).*

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Thus, as a “creature” of the central State, EPAs can be interpreted as a means for the central State to force the conversion of local governments to market-oriented place promotion strategies. In fact, once created, the EPASE clearly sought to quickly establish its ability to elaborate a marketing strategy, to seek out investors and to deliver development projects. To do so, the authority rapidly launched three special planning procedures (*Zones d'aménagement concertée*). A territorial marketing unit was created within the services of the EPASE. Economic developers were recruited in order to find investors. The EPASE also commissioned a study from a consulting firm in order to refine the positioning strategy of its project. Not surprisingly, the study asserted that one of the issues to tackle in order to attract economic activities is to enhance urban amenities so as to satisfy the needs of businessmen and women.

Indeed, and finally, the EPASE project was clearly designed also to satisfy the needs of specific social groups. During our interviews, stakeholders specifically mentioned “*executives*” and middle class families as the primary targets of the EPASE’s regeneration strategy. These groups tend to favour Lyon and the communes surrounding Saint-Etienne as residences and the authority’s first aim is to ‘repatriate’ them through quality housing, improved urban environment, amenities and job opportunities in the service and creative activities. Thus in Saint-Etienne as in many other cities, and as highlighted by Morel Journal and Sala Pala (2011), neoliberal urban policies are characterised by settlement strategies (better captured by the French expression of “*stratégies de peuplement*”). These strategies distinguish the social and ethnic groups considered the most suitable for a city’s development objectives and calibrate urban policies according to the specific needs of these groups. Within these strategies, social groups that are not yet living in the city are more important than those that are already there. To use Harvey’s words, “the speculative construction of place”



to appeal well beyond the city's jurisdiction is more important than the "amelioration of conditions within a particular territory" (HARVEY, 1989a: 8).

### Adopting neo-managerial instruments

There are therefore strong similarities between the EPASE and the British UDCs in terms of planning objectives. But similarities do not end there. As with UDCs, the EPASE incorporates the typical characteristics of the agency model. Everything happens as if neoliberal policy objectives were enforced through neomanagerial instruments. More specifically, there are three domains in which the resemblance between the EPASE and the agency model is striking: its forms of organisation; modes of action, coordination and allocation of resources; and methods of recruitment and human resources management.

Concerning organisational forms, EPAs like UDCs reproduce some of the characteristics of agencies. They enjoy a great deal of autonomy and operate within simplified circuits of command. In particular, the EPA director officially reports only to its board and not to the municipal council. That specific rule tends to emancipate his action from the various levels of control and approbation upon which the technical services of a city council or a ministry are dependant. For most of his daily activities but also for more strategic decisions, the general director only has an obligation to inform his board of directors. "Today, said a former director of the EPASE, I can buy land, sell serviced land with planning permission, conclude deals about large works or consultancy, sign agreement, without the obligation of having a formal agreement from the Board ... simply using my own powers given by the decree" (Interview, 1 July 2011). In terms of internal organisation, EPAs differ from the organisation of ministries and municipal councils. EPAs planners work within task forces and project teams enjoying large autonomy; they are evaluated on their capacity to reach targets and objectives rather than on the strict respect of rules and procedures.

The forms of action, coordination and allocation of resources applied within EPAs also fit with the agency model. Just like UDCs, EPAs operate through "externalisation" ("faire faire") rather than through direct "production" ("faire"). EPAs' capacity to deliver is based on their capacity to mobilise, select and coordinate external service providers (planners, consultants, property developers, investors, etc.) and steer private resources. For the EPASE's developers, the time when production of the city was mainly the result of the mobilisation of public resources and investments is long past. Today, private resources and investments are the raw material of urban development,

which require professionals able to understand and embrace the private sector's logics. The promoters of the "EPA formula" see urban policymaking as an activity that does not aim to substitute for the private stakeholders and processes that built the city, or even to counter their strategies and their actions, but instead to use levers allowing to influence the behaviors of these private actors. We are thus not far from a conception of planning as a regulatory or steering activity.

Finally, methods of staff recruitment and management are another similarity between EPAs, UDCs, and the agency model. EPAs are subject to standard labour regulations and not to civil service ones. In Saint-Etienne, in 2012, only 2 out of the EPA's 31 employees were civil servants. Many of EPA managers have worked previously in professional real estate, urbanism and development sectors or have held posts in public-private land development companies (Sociétés d'économie mixte d'aménagement), in the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations branches<sup>4</sup>, in social housing, real estate or development companies. According to our interviewees, this staffing model provides professionals who have an accurate knowledge of the rationale of real estate operators. This neo-managerial tropism in the management of human capital is also to be seen in the performance-based system of remuneration of the EPA executives. In an email, an EPA manager told us that a large part of the senior directors' salary was calculated according to performance indicators.

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*"All the senior directors have a variable part of their salary (20%) based on precise objectives representing twenty points and organized around the Ministry's themes: housing, economic development, sustainable development, quality of the establishment's management. These objectives are fixed annually during meeting with the DGALN<sup>5</sup>, a*

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<sup>4</sup> The Caisse des Dépôts is the public bank collecting the funds of the local savings banks and is has become a traditional source of funds and expertise for urban policies since the post-World War 2 period.

<sup>5</sup> Direction générale de l'Aménagement, du Logement et de la Nature du ministère de l'Ecologie et du Développement durable (Directorate for Planning, Housing and Environment of the Ministry of Ecology and Sustainable Development).

*typical example being to launch construction of XX housing projects, create YY square meters of offices, achieve TT exogenous installations, etc. And the result is assessed the following year.” (Email received 20 July 2011).*

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#### 4. The limits of the descriptive capacity of the thesis of neoliberalisation

The previous section displayed obvious signs of neoliberalisation and neo-managerialisation of urban policies in Saint-Etienne and showed that an EPA could be a crucial tool to accelerate the neoliberal conversion of these policies, very much like what UDCs were in the UK during the 1980-90s period. The two following sections introduce counterfactual elements that limit the strength and scope of the thesis of neoliberalisation in Saint-Etienne and the French contexts. In the present section, we present limits to the descriptive strength of this thesis. In particular, we show that the distinction between clearly distinguishable periods characterised by distinct policy objectives, instruments and central-local relationships is difficult to apply in the French case.

##### Urban agendas and policy objectives

The thesis of neoliberalisation’s proponents provides a “periodization” of the process that distinguishes a “before”, usually labelled “Fordist” and “Keynesianist”, and an “after” characterised by an ongoing process of destruction of the institutional arrangements of the Fordist-Keynesianist era and by the recreation of new unstable neoliberal arrangements. This second phase is itself usually considered to be structured by different sub-phases. The most famous periodization of the “after” phase is the distinction between the “roll back” and the “roll out” phases established by Peck and Tickell (2002). During the “roll-back” phase, that covers the 1980s and most part of the 1990s, national and/or urban governments systematically destroyed the institutions of Keynesianism. Systems of central government fiscal support to local government were dismantled; local welfare service-provision was retrenched; public monopolies for the provision of services were privatized or exposed to market competition; and “bureaucratized, hierarchical forms of public administration” were eliminated (Brenner

and Theodore, 2002: 369). Then, in the late 1990s, came the “roll-out” phase during which governments tried to correct the errors or excesses of the preceding phase and to institutionalize the prominent principles and achievements of the neo-liberal program. “The agenda has gradually moved from one preoccupied with the active destruction and discreditation of Keynesian-welfarist and social-collectivist institutions (broadly defined) to one focused on the purposeful construction and consolidation of neoliberalized state forms, modes of governance, and regulatory relations” (Peck and Tickell, 2002: 384).

Within this framework, the EPASE could be considered as a sign of the emergence of the roll-out phase. It is an agency controlled by the central government, endowed with strong powers, dedicated to the activation of property markets and replacing “bureaucratized, hierarchical forms of public administration”, embodied by the municipal services of land use regulation. The problem is that there has not been such thing as a roll back phase in Saint-Etienne policies, nor in the history of the relations between the central State and local government. The French central State never imposed a harsh policy of fiscal austerity upon local government. It never imposed a strong reduction of social service provision, and its field services maintained a strong presence to manage the effects of the industrial crisis. As far as the municipal and metropolitan governments were concerned, no clear signs of retrenchment of the urban social policies preceded the creation of the EPASE. Obviously, for fiscal reasons, these policies became increasingly difficult to fund, but they remained key aspects of the city’s agenda. On the contrary, the very same municipality (led by Michel Thiollière, centre-right mayor from 1994 to 2008) that campaigned for the creation of the EPA was also the one that developed area-based social policies targeting at deprived neighbourhoods. While before 1994 and the election of Thiollière as mayor, the municipality did not really get involved in the contractual policy frameworks provided by the State to address the issues of these neighbourhoods (Développement social des quartiers, Contrats de ville), Thiollière’s administration reinforced its intervention in this field as of the late 1990s. In the early 2000s, the city even applied to the Grand Projet de Ville national bid in order to regenerate Montreynaud, one of the most deprived outer neighbourhoods of the city.

Finally, the program of the EPASE itself evolved since its creation introducing, in particular, more concern for social housing. Indeed, 2008 was a turning point for the EPASE, an organization only created one year earlier. This year saw the election of a

new mayor, the Socialist Maurice Vincent, and the beginning of the global economic crisis. The new mayor did not challenge either the managing team of the EPASE nor its core objectives, but he insisted on giving more importance to social housing within its program. The global financial crisis also led the EPASE managing team to reconsider this issue. With the rarefaction of available investors, social housing developers became more attractive as a way to achieve the authority's goals.

### Urban policy instruments

As mentioned above, there are many common features between UDCs and EPAs, such as agency status, formal control by central government and a focus on property markets and attractiveness issues. However, in contrast with UDCs, if the EPA formula has certainly been revived in recent years, it was not born with the so-called neo-liberal turn of the early 1980's. In actual fact EPAs were born during the Keynesian-Fordist phase. More interestingly, they always held various types of objectives, both redistributive and pro-market. They did in the 1960s; they still do nowadays. They can thus be considered as evidence of the limit of the descriptive dimension of the thesis of neoliberalisation which identifies a clear-cut historical break in the instruments of urban policies.

The first EPA was created in 1958 to implement the construction of a business district in the Western periphery of Paris, an area known today as La Défense. The issue for the French State was already to compete with London and to stimulate the structuring of a real estate industry specialised in the development of office buildings. In this case, the Etablissement Public d'Aménagement de la Défense (EPAD) embodied the rise of a French developmentalist State eager to structure new markets and facilitate the rise of powerful market actors, and this, right in the middle of the Keynesian period! The central State was seen as the strategist best suited to directly taking charge of this project and thus to take it away from local authorities.

Another element further blurs the very ontology of the EPA and the divide between a Keynesian/progressist era and a neo-liberal one. Indeed, the most favourable period for the foundation of EPAs was between 1969 and 1973. During that period, nine new towns were created in the outskirts of Paris, Lille, Lyon, Marseille, and Rouen and their planning was endowed upon EPAs. Here again, the choice of EPAs was justified by the huge development tasks they supposedly had to accomplish, tasks said to exceed the capacities of the local authorities (Vadelorge, 2005 : 39; Claude, 2005). New towns can be seen as the archetype of spatial Keynesian strategies, project through

which the central State aimed to alleviate forms of urban congestion, control and organize a spatial redistribution of the processes of land value creation, and provide decent housing conditions near employment zones. To this end, the control of land and planning procedures was seen as crucial. Thus, as Brenner put it, the “broad diffusion [of new town policies] in the Western European context must be understood above all in relation to the distinctive types of state spatial strategies that emerged under the Fordist-Keynesian configuration of capitalism development” (Brenner, 2004, 157).

The end of the new towns experiment marked the end of a first epoch of the history of State urban policies. The crisis of the 1970s and above all the Decentralisation reforms of the early 1980s could have rung the death knoll of EPAs. Indeed, one of the main aspects of these reforms was the transfer of urban planning and land use regulation functions from the central State to municipalities. Yet, against all odds, a series of new EPAs have been created since the mid-1990s in Marseille, Nice, Bordeaux, and a series of locations in the Paris suburbs. Their development programs mix developmental issues (flagship projects, office properties development) and redistributive issues (social housing, collective consumption equipment). The EPA formula has continued to be chosen because, for various reasons (political fragmentation, inter-municipal conflicts, lack of technical expertise), local authorities have been seen as unable to develop their own operational planning instruments.

The long story of French EPAs thus highlights two things. First, it is quite difficult in the French case to distinguish a clear divide between two epochs characterised by two sets of policy objectives and instruments (the claim of proponents of neoliberalisation theorists). Practices of property-led urban development already existed during the so-called Keynesian period; conversely, redistributive issues remain key components of EPAs’ agendas. Second, same policy instruments can be used for a variety of objectives and even a mix of potentially contradicting objectives (THELEN, 2012). It is therefore misleading to categorize EPAs in particular, and agencies in general, as indicators of the adoption of NPM and neoliberalism. EPAs were, and still are, used for mixed policy objectives.

### Central-local relationships

The third limit to the descriptive potential of the theories of neoliberalisation concerns central-local relationships. In most accounts of neoliberalisation of urban policies, urban governments are usually victims of radical changes decided by higher levels hitting the very core of their activities: redistribution, collective consumption,

welfare provision, etc. (see Harvey, 2005 and the example of New York). Neo-liberalism and NPM not only changed the substance of urban policies, they also changed the very nature of State-city relationships. In the “roll-back” phase of neo-liberalisation, the transformation of central-local relationships took quite a paradigmatic shape, in particular in the UK. Central government deliberately cut grants and capped local tax rates in order to force local governments to cut social expenses, and thus re-establish brutal forms of control by the centre over the peripheries (GOLDSMITH, 1992; COCHRANE, 1993). In later phases however, central control took more subtle shapes. Competitive bids, evaluation and league tables, and the distribution of awards and labels progressively supplemented if not replaced more brutal forms of control (Le Galès and Scott, 2010).

In the French case, Epstein (2013) has precisely documented this shift towards a competitive model of resources allocation in central-local relationships using the example of the National Program for Urban Renewal (Programme National de Rénovation Urbaine). Launched in 2003, this program embodied a break in policies targeting deprived areas and, more generally, in central local relations. Whereas previously State and local governments designed and implemented these policies within a partnership-based and contractual framework, the PNRU inaugurated a device where local governments were placed in a competitive situation, through bids and applications, to obtain central grants. A central agency, the Agence Nationale de la Rénovation Urbaine (ANRU), arbitrates the competition, organises the bids, sets the rules, and deals out the grants. In order to explain this new situation, Epstein uses Foucault’s (2004) insights on neoliberalism as a form of governmentality where the State enhances its control on individual conducts through the contradictory promotion of freedom, a freedom that appears to be defined in strictly economic terms. Thus, the central State set rules and devices that will drive local policymakers to act as rational, competitive and calculating actors. While the State has gained control through central agencies with almost no local ramifications, it has progressively dismantled its field services suspected of being involved in too cooperative and empathic relations with local government. Thus, Epstein describes a shift from a negotiated coproduction of territorial policies to a logic of government “at a distance”, or at arms’ length, in which a remote position offers the State a better capacity for steering.

The creation of EPAs could be interpreted as another manifestation of this new trend towards arms’ length government allowing the State to spread competitive

behaviours among local governments through agencies. First, EPAs were designed to be technical and managerial ‘islands’ protected from local influences. Second, they have benefited from exceptional powers (in terms of land use regulation in particular) and are not hierarchically linked to local authorities. Third, the recent wave of EPA creation corresponds historically to the creation of the ANRU and the deployment of the logics of the government at a distance.

Nevertheless, our material shows great difference between the EPAs and the ANRU case that makes it difficult to consider that EPAs are mere vehicles of a neoliberal form of government “at a distance”. First, this model implies that the central level has elaborated and imposed clear policy objectives and methodological guidelines upon the local level through the agency instrument. In the case of the EPASE, those elements are almost totally absent. During one of our interviews, a former director of the EPASE explained his dismay when he arrived in Saint-Etienne, having a very strong feeling that “Paris completely disappears from the game”. The setting up the agency took place without any support from the central administration: “The people from the Ministry had not set up any EPA for a long time. For example, they didn’t know what kind of labour law we had to apply. They’re civil servants; they don’t feel concerned by these issues” (Interview, 1 July 2011). In fact, EPASE’s executives found relevant technical support instead from the Marseilles’ EPA management team. More fundamentally, EPASE’s managers do not consider their relations with the central State as a structuring on for defining the authorities’ methods and strategies. Formally, they are supposed to be important. For instance, a specific meeting gathering the executives of the EPASE and the representatives of the central State in the board precedes every plenary board meeting. Despite this specific arrangement, these “Meetings of State Administrators” are not occasions when the EPA gets instructions from the central administration.

Second, the relationships with State field services seem much richer in content than those with the central services. They seem to be the real place where a “State strategy” is invented. Again, this contradicts many research findings that claim that the once powerful State field representatives at the département level –the Prefect, the field services of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment- were the first victims of the recent neomanagerial reforms of State organizations (Bezès and Le Lidec, 2011). In our cases, the density of the relations with these field services compensates for the



poverty of the relations with the centre. This is how the EPASE director represents this issue:

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*"It is the Prefet and the DDT [Directeur Départemental des Territoires, head of the Ministries of Infrastructures and Agriculture field services] which somehow, and still now, bring together the State's word, organize the State's word, organize the State's taking the floor in the Board. [...] So this 'Meetings of State Administrators', we shunt it with lunch at the Préfet's at which there is the DDT, the Préfecture General Secretary, there's the Préfet, the Treasury representative ... and they're much closer to my concerns, the issues, the difficulties ... of the strategic positioning of what we do..." (Interview, 1 July 2011).*

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Third, the relations between the EPA's staff and local elected officials and bureaucrats are also dense, which also departs from the neo-liberal model of government at a distance. In Saint-Etienne, if the "Mission de Préfiguration" corresponds to a period of tension in the relations between State and local authorities, on the contrary, the arrival of the first director and the setting up of new collective work devices made it possible to ease relationships and install a genuine system of partnership. For instance, the EPASE gave back to the municipal administration the granting of building permits in the OIN perimeter, whilst its status allowed it to take charge of this procedure. The general director regularly reports to the mayor and he has perpetuated, at least initially, the coordination system called the "G group" which brings together around him the managers of certain State field services, the city council, the metropolitan authority and the urban planning agency. Finally, having good relations with the mayor is essential for the EPA director. This is of course linked to the important political influence that local elected officials have in the French political system (GREMION, 1976). The president of the EPASE is the mayor of Saint-Etienne and even if an EPA director's legitimacy is based on the national decree rather than on a local political nomination, he cannot neglect having good relations with local

prominent figures, and firstly with the mayor of the city. In the 2008 municipal election, the Socialist Maurice Vincent beat the incumbent centre-right mayor, Michel Thiollière. Playing the card of loyalty to the municipal power, the director offered his resignation to the new mayor who refused it. So, at the end of the day, an EPA implements a local project as much as a project imposed by the central State. If the EPA bears some elements of the neomanagerial system, it departs radically from it as far as central-local relations are concerned.

## 5. limits of the analytical capacity of the neoliberalisation thesis

Neoliberalisation is not only a descriptive notion depicting dynamics of social, economic and political change and contrasted historical periods. It is also an analytical notion encapsulating theories that give meaning to those changes, and identify independent, causal variables. According to the various authors mobilising this notion, changes can be explained either by the transformation of capitalism and the socio-political arrangements in which it is embedded, and in particular the abandonment of the Fordist compromise, by the success of an ideological crusade or by the spreading of new forms of governmentality. In all cases, processes of neoliberalisation affecting economic transactions, political choices and social relations are considered the main explanans of social change at various scales.

In this last section, we argue that if neoliberalisation might be one explanans of the rebirth of EPAs, and more generally of the transformations of urban policies in France, it is not the only one. We consider that there are other sources of change that explain either the focus on the redevelopment of centrally located urban spaces, the emphasis on specific social groups or the choice of an agency to implement the project. Some of these alternative sources of change are specific to Saint-Etienne's case, others have a more general scope.

Indeed, there are peculiarities in Saint-Etienne's case that explain the focus on the redevelopment of central urban areas, the emphasis on urban quality and the choice of an agency and that prevent from considering these choices to be a mere alignment on a neoliberal agenda. Industrialisation severely marked the landscape of Saint-Etienne. Industries developed right in the centre of the city and the demise of industrial activities left huge quantities of brownfield sites. Moreover, housings and industries were intimately imbricated in the urban fabric. The result today is the poor quality of housing in the city centre, a situation that the absence of local policies targeting specifically at

old housing stock has not improved. That poor housing quality triggered the flight of populations towards the surrounding communes, the concentration of deprived populations and ethnic minorities in the central areas and a lack of investment from property owners. Thus, the alarming state of the housing stock is an explanation to the focus on inner areas as much as the wish to foster dynamics of gentrification.

On a more general level, it is not evident that the choice for the agency model embodied by the EPA is the mere outcome of neoliberalisation. Indeed, another interpretation of the choice for an agency model is possible. The EPA is part of what is called “operational planning” (*urbanisme opérationnel*) in the French planning milieu, a practice that is also embodied in the ZAC special planning procedure<sup>6</sup>. The development of this practice was rooted since the 1960s in the collective recognition by the milieu that land use regulation was not enough to steer the process of urbanisation and make it compatible with the public interest. To make this control more effective, public authorities had to intervene directly in property markets, by buying land, preparing it and selling it to developers. By doing so, public planners gained leverage over developer choices but also drove them to participate in the funding of public amenities. In a way, the EPA formula proceeds from the recognition that planners need to support land revaluation processes in order to master them and make them contribute to redistributive policies. Thus, we cannot simply explain the recourse to this kind of instrument as the mere sign of the conversion of planners to neoliberal principles. Instead, it came out of the acknowledgment of the limit of passive land use regulation.

Similarly, the very objectives of the EPASE’s project, and more generally of contemporary urban planning policies, cannot be reduced to the pressure of neoliberalism. First, the new focus on city centres and the quality of housing and public spaces in inner areas certainly results from a will to make profits from the new appeal of these spaces for the upper classes and property interests. However, it also results from the urbanisation of economic development in the more advanced countries. With the shift to more intensive forms of growth, relying on the intensity and productivity of factors of production, innovation in its various forms has become a key aspect of

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<sup>6</sup> The *Zones d’aménagement concertés* (concerted planning zones) are derogatory planning procedures that enable local authorities to accelerate the development processes in areas considered as strategic. The ZAC procedures enhance the capacity of the body in charge of it to preempt lands and negotiate with investors the funding of equipments and public spaces.

economic competition. As Storper (2013) writes, innovation occurs through the development of non-codified, non-routinized forms of economic operations. These operations usually blossom in places characterised by the density of social interactions. That is why the most crucial operations from the point of view of innovation tend to concentrate in urban agglomerations and more routinized ones, requiring less interactions and proximity, tend to be relegated to peripheral zones. The fact that cities' elites are willing to seize the opportunities that the urbanisation of development brings about and to offer the proper material frames for those interactions to develop cannot thus be interpreted as a mere submission to a neo-liberal agenda, but rather as a way to create the conditions to benefit from this new "urban moment". Considering that the new geography of economic activities and the urban policies that seek to adapt to these new conditions are the results and/or manifestation of neoliberalisation runs the risk of stretching the concept beyond its limits.

Another alternative explanation to this focus on central areas and urban quality has more to do with reactions to the shortcoming of former dogmas in urban planning. To a degree, the kind of planning objectives that the EPA is pursuing are the results of the social and professional critics of functionalist recipes applied to the production of the city. Indeed, the new focus on centrality, the preservation of urban heritage, and concern for the quality of public spaces emerged from a critique of Fordist urban policies, leading to privileging the construction of brand new spaces either at the peripheries or in central areas where slums had been eradicated. In France, this critique was formulated by social movements denouncing the poor quality of architecture and infrastructure in high-rise peripheral social housing estates and the destruction of old inner neighbourhoods (Tomas, 1995). This in turn led to the abandonment of the "grands ensembles" policies and to new planning doctrines more respectful of inherited urban forms and social practices. This wave of critiques also engendered important transformations in the balance of power between the professions involved in planning and urban policymaking, in particular between engineers and architects. The former were considered responsible for the disaster of functionalist planning. They were criticized for their excessive focus on technical networks, their obsession with circulations, the industrialisation of housing, zoning, and their complete lack of sensitivity to urban experience. The 1970's and 1980's witnessed a sort of revenge of those professions able to envision and plan the city in a more sensitive way, able to take on board the imbrication of functions within the urban space and to design public spaces.

The rediscovery of inner urban areas, the new awareness of public space and urban design, and the concern for the inherited city is thus as much a matter of increasing authority enjoyed by professions like architects, landscapers, or urbanists than the result of the spreading of neoliberal conceptions in urban planning.

Finally, a crucial element that is always present in the accounts of urban neoliberalisation is missing in Saint-Etienne, and more largely, in France: a political majority at the national level imposing a neoliberal agenda in a variety of policy sectors and upon subnational levels of government. If there have been “neoliberal moments” in French politics (e.g. the fiscal austerity turn adopted by the Socialist government in 1984 or the Chirac government between 1986 and 1988), these have never been long and cross-sectoral enough, and have faced too many veto points, to produce the effects the Thatcher and Reagan crusades did in the UK and US. If some segments of the French central State, in particular the Ministry of Finance (Jobert, 1994), have converted themselves to market friendly policy principles, they have always faced countervailing tendencies among elected officials and other ministries. More importantly for us, these neoliberal trends have been contradicted by the long term effects of the decentralisation reforms of the early 1980s that have led local and regional government to multiply their intervention in a vast variety of sectors, often along redistributive lines. Moreover, there is no relationship between the neoliberal inclination of national governments and the creation of EPAs. Since the new wave of creation of EPAs started in the mid-1980s, both right and left wing governments created EPAs. In many cases, for the central government the creation of an EPA was a way of rewarding a mayor of the same political majority. Thus, EPAs may have been involved in the implementation of urban policies with neoliberal features, but they can hardly be considered the vehicle for the French government’ imposition of a neoliberal agenda.

## Conclusion

In this paper, we have argued that while the theories of neoliberalisation urban policies and governance might explain some aspects of EPAs objectives and modes of operation, they do not capture the complexity of the reasons that led stakeholders to create such structures and of the very objectives of this kind of agency. Theories that analyse the recent transformation in urban policies and governance in terms of neoliberalisation have undoubtedly immense merits. They have relocated capitalism and modes of production at the heart of debates in the social sciences, an achievement that is important given that the latter have tended in recent decades to lose sight of any

material foundations for social life. They have especially encouraged re-examining the influence of a capitalism that has changed since the 1960s, a period when the Marxism and Structuralism was dominating continental social sciences. It went global and financial, and its interactions with States, territories and cities have substantially changed.

However, the case of EPAs has led us to consider that the thesis of neoliberalisation is insufficient. On its own, it does not provide a sufficiently sharp analytical framework. The mono-causal perspective its proponents propose does not explain the variety of processes of change, motivations and justifications that led to the processes and situations labelled as urban neoliberalism. It might apply to specific situations like the UK or the US where both neo-liberalism and NPM have had dramatic effects and changed profoundly the social and urban fabric and even the field of possibilities for a political change. However, this mono-causal perspective proves ethnocentric when applied to different social, political and urban settings. Recent refinements of the thesis that show more sensitiveness to the varieties of neoliberalisation (BRENNER et al., 2010), or try to show how neoliberal recipes alter while travelling (MC CANN and WARD, 2011), fail to correct this bias precisely because they cannot accept that neoliberalisation is just one trend of change; a powerful one yet just one among others.

Thus, we need analytical frameworks that guide research to analysing processes of neoliberalisation alongside other transformation processes. We need frameworks that can articulate the logics of neoliberalisation with logics, whose effects might reinforce, neutralise or contradict the effects of neoliberalisation. As we have tried to show with the example of the EPAs, modifications of main policy objectives or the choice for new policy instruments might be the outcome of logics of bureaucratic rationalisation or of the transformation of the balances of power between professions involved in policymaking. They might thus have nothing to do with a neo-liberal project. We also need frameworks that would help to think how bearers of neo-liberal projects struggle, sometimes win and sometimes lose or compromise with other kinds of political projects, professional habits and moral values. For instance, neo-keynesianist (GENESTIER et al., 2008) or neo-welfarist visions (FERRERA, 2013) that consider that markets might fail and that economic interactions are not enough to produce social links, remain powerful in several policymaking spheres and urban policymaking networks in particular. Neoliberalism and neoliberalisation should not be concepts that

end discussion. They deserve better than an enclosure in an all-encompassing grand theory.

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# Emergence of the Interns' Collective Actions

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## Abstract :

This paper looks at the protests at both collective and individual levels taken by student interns in Chongqing in the summer of 2013. Drawing on a 5-month participant observation of the protesters' school life and their internships in the electronic manufacturer IYD, this article examines the favourable factors, features and outcomes of the interns' collective actions. The author first argues that the emergence of collective action by these student interns could be attributed to the injured self-esteem during their placement and the culture of solidarity emerged from their lives in school. Regarding the first reason, those student interns from the occupational school had higher self-respect and expectations for the future than their counterparts of previous generations. Meanwhile, the student interns have encountered "coercive discipline" which aimed at eliminating students' humanity during their internship. These two factors contributed to the injury of students' self-esteem in their internship and their resentment towards the factory managers. Second, it is found that the students' collective actions tended to take the form of violent fighting rather than strike due to their previous school experiences. The students usually resorted to violence such as fighting to resolve individual or collective disputes in their school. Third, the author suggests that school violence not only determined their action repertoire, but also help to nurture a sense of solidarity and brotherhood, which in turn provided a supporting network to students, particularly to those who lacked support from their family and teachers, flavouring their workplace resistance. Fourth, the student interns' collective actions tend to be generally scattered and transient. Last but not least, most students who participated in the collective actions were later expelled from factories and schools, negatively affecting their prospects after the internships. This paradoxically consolidated their sense of solidarity, sowing the seeds of future resistance against capitalist exploitation.

*Keywords:* Collective Actions, Interns, school life and solidarity

## Introduction

In his famous work entitled “Learning to Labour: How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs”, Paul Willis (1978) argued that what is central in the process of working-class reproduction is the “counter-school culture”, which is built around resistance to the discipline and control of the school system. This classical study has led to an explosion of literature throughout the world on anti-school working-class subcultures. Chinese scholars being influenced by Willis have started to explore the counterculture among the kids of rural migrant workers and examine its relations to the State and class reproduction since the 2010s. Xiong (2010) and Zhou (2011), for instance, found that the phenomenon of counter-school culture has existed within the schools for migrant workers’ kids throughout the economic reform period. The students in schools for migrant workers’ children, as found by Xiong and Zhou, are usually appeared to be lazy, lacking motivation to learning, boorish, crude, and violent. They argued that the force behind the phenomenon is the state’s attempt to blur class boundaries and deprive workers of citizenship rights through the hukou (household registration) system.

This study, different from previous researches, argue that the research framework promulgated by Willis could not be directly applied to the Chinese context because of two major reasons. First, in the 1970s when Willis conducted his ethnographic research, the United Kingdom have already become an advanced industrial country with highly developed metal manufacturing sector. With strong bargaining power, the workers in “Hammertown” tended to have a high level of self-esteem, and hence aspired to defend and uphold their own culture. On the other hand, migrant workers are one of the most disadvantaged group in post-reform China. They have always encountered stigma and discrimination, and hence have suffered from a variety of psychological distress such as low self-esteem and frustration (Wang, Li, Stanton & Fang, 2010). In addition, different from the 1970s Britain, Chinese migrant workers have been shaped by the hukou system and rural-urban chasm, leading to the spatial separation of production and reproduction of labour (Pun & Smith, 2007). To put it simply, the children of Chinese migrant workers who grew up in rural villages were not borne by their parents. The limited interactions between children and parents have made the prior difficult to follow and inherit the cultural traits of working class from the latter. The paper thus argues that the so-called “culture of violence” among students from rural migrant

families in Mainland China is not a result of intergenerational transmission, but a socially constructive narrative by the state, the market and school managers. In the Midwest China, in particular, there are numerous migrant workers' children attending vocational highschools. The teachers there, as found by the authors, usually associate their students with negative words, like "impulsive", "violent", and "rudeness"; while their students usually use positive words, say "passionate" and "candid" to evaluate themselves. The student respondents generally disagree with the comments made by the school management and claim that they are not violent. In this paper, the authors will first attempt to explore and make sense of these contrasting narratives of students' character qualities, and then critically examine the impacts brought by the discipline measures behind the phenomenon of "violent culture" upon the students' resistance patterns in both classroom and workplace settings.

This article is based on a nine-month intervention research conducted in 2013 at three vocational highschools in Chongqing city. As many other city in Mid-West China, Chongqing has experienced impressive growth in both manufacturing sector and vocational education between 2007 and 2013. The background information about the city are drawn from the review of existing literature, including statistical yearbooks compiled by the Chongqing Municipal Statistics Bureau and the relevant regulations governing vocational schools announced by the Chongqing Municipal Education Committee. The first-hand evidences used in this paper come from the authors' fieldworks in the school L, G, and W (names withheld for anonymity) located in Shapingba district of Chongqing city between March and December 2013. The first author entered the field in 2013 by immersing herself as a social worker in the three schools. The identity of social worker enabled her to approach, observe, and interview not only students from rural migrant families, but also the management, cadres and teachers of the schools.

## **The "Disciplinary Engineering" behind the "Violent Culture" among Students Attending Vocational Schools**

### The Local Government, Enterprises and Labour Market during the Industrial Upgrading in Chongqing City

With the aim to promote industrial upgrading from primary to manufacturing sector, the Chongqing municipal government has established industrial parks since 2002, attracting labour-intensive manufacturing firms to establish production lines in

the city. The introduction of industrial parks have successfully brought about the explosive growth of the information technology and electronic manufacturing sectors. The corresponding growth in the demand for skilled workers has pushed the local government to develop vocational higheducation by introducing a series of policies, measures, and regulations. For instance, according to the article three of “the Chongqing Vocational Education Act” which was announced on July 27, 2007, the vocational education and training sector in the city has to be *“service- and employment-oriented, further integrated with manufacturing production process and technique promotion, and serving the needs of the society.”* The vocation schools in Chongqing, stated in article four of the act, should follow both the lead of the government and the guidance from industries. The article thirty six further requested vocational schools to design curriculum based on the needs of the economic and social development, and the labour market demand. The Chongqing Municipal Education Committee then announced in its work outline to expand the scale of vocational higheducation by enrolling more than 200 thousands of students in 2009. In the same year, the Committee also formulated “the Opinions of the Chongqing Municipal Education Committee on Regulating the Setting of Programmes Offered by Vocational highSchools”, in which the vocational training institutions are requested to open courses meeting the demands generated from urbanization, industrialization, urban-rural development, as well as the needs of labour market and manufacturing firms. Several years afterwards, in 2012, the Committee added further requirements, demanding vocational schools to support the municipal strategic plan for developing several core and emerging industries, such as information and communication technologies (ICT), processing manufacturing, petrochemicals, raw materials and energy resources, logistics and so on.

Particularly, the Committee highlighted that the vocational schools should facilitate the ICT growth in “the 2012 Notice of the Chongqing Municipal Education Committee on the Works Securing the Skilled Labour in the ICT Industry”:

*“Each institution should adjust and introduce programmes relevant to the ICT, and expand student enrolments in these programs.”; “Each region, country, and vocational institution should strengthen cooperation with ICT firms, proactively linking curriculum restructuring, selection of teaching materials, and teacher training with the needs of the firms, so as to fill the ‘reserve army of labour’ for the development of the ICT industry.”; “Each vocational school should adjust its teaching schedule and*

*introduce internship programmes to meet labour demands in the ICT sector. The school should assign highly qualified teachers as internship supervisors, so as to improve monitoring and evaluation of interns' performance at workplaces.”; “Each institution should encourage its students to carry out social practice activities in ICT firms during vacations.”; and “Each school should strengthen its career guidance team, enriching the content of career guidance and providing more information about high quality job vacancies.”*

All the above demonstrate that the recent development of vocational education in Chongqing city is by nature a pro-capital policy, securing a sufficient supply of local skilled labour for the development of ICT industry, industrial upgrading and overall GDP growth.

### Vocational High Schools in the Dilemma

The state-led industrial upgrading and associated structural changes in labour demand have led to the introduction of a variety of policies and measures to promote and regulate the development of vocational schools in Chongqing. These regulations promulgated by the local government has constituted a rigid framework, bounding the management of vocational highschoools in terms of their plans for future development, design of core curriculum, and teaching objectives. In the Shabeiba district where the authors conducted the fieldwork, there are a total of twelve vocational highschoools, of which most of them are concentrated in the Micro Electronics Industrial Park. Among them, only one, i.e. the school L, is public school; while the rest are privately run. Through reviewing the schools' goals, missions, and objectives, it is found that these schools lay emphasis on training docile workers for the needs of industrial development. For instance, as mentioned in its student growth handbook, the school L aims to *“carry out ‘fully closed’ management (that restricts students’ freedom of movement) and implement a model of merging military style with corporate mode of management, so as to enable students to learn how to learn, how to behave oneself, and how to adapt to the ‘real work’ and the work environment after college.”* In a similar manner, the goals of school J are *“to explore a brand new educational model that responds quickly to shifting demands for the labour and rapid market changes, and to be keen on professionalization, marketization, and corporatization.”* The school D also suggested in its educational philosophy that the school would *“adhere to be employment-oriented and competency-based. The school thus defines its educational goals and adjusts*

*existing curriculum according to the latest labour market trend.*” The educational philosophy of school X, as defined in its brochure, is *“to educate for both students and employment”*. The school W, likewise, defines its education objectives as *“to educate students for employment, to train personnel for the State, and to contribute to industrial restructuring and upgrading, and rapid economic development in Chongqing”*. In short, the above description of the schools’ educational philosophies highlights the fact that most vocational highschools in the district are accountable for ensuring a sufficient supply of manpower for the state-led industrial upgrading and the development of ICT industry.

The school management thus might fall into a dilemma: on the one hand, as educators, school cadres and teachers have to protect the interests of their students, making every effort to help them to climb up the social ladder; on the other, however, being forced by the local government and the market environment, they have to turn their students into docile labour working along production lines. This paper attempts to examine the actual practices of school managers and teachers who are facing the dual-role dilemma, and analyse the students’ reactions both inside and outside of classroom. In a specific manner, based on the in-depth case studies conducted in the three of the top four vocational schools in the region (namely school L, G, and W), the authors will address the following research questions: Which type of workforce vocational schools wish to train for the ICT development in the city? How do they run the schools in order to nurture such a workforce? How do students react to the teaching methods and control measures applied by their teachers? What are the implications of the students’ reactions in the classroom context for their resistance at workplace?

#### Quasi-military Management Style

The school L, G, and W are quite similar in terms of their classroom management skills. The teachers there usually deal with students’ disciplinary issues by applying a classroom management approach which is in a “quasi-military” fashion. The so-called “quasi-military approach”, in the field of Educational Sciences, refers to a form of program setting simulating the army socialization process. The measures include, but are not limited to, asking participants to: divide into platoons and squads; live in barracks, have their hair cut short; wear uniforms; and subject military-style discipline (Bloom, 2010). One of our teacher respondents summarize his management style as follows:

*We ask all our students to line up as soldiers every Monday. The newly enrolled are required to participate in a ten-day program of military training which usually starts on August 20. During the military training program, students are ordered to line up in squad form. The program helps us to regulate conduct and students' behaviour. In the dormitory, students are required to make their beds and keep their rooms as clean and tidy as the barracks ... I'm very strict with my students, and thus they fear me a lot. I require my students not to dye their hair or to have the hair too long or too short. They are prohibited to get the super short hair style. For those who profane my regulations, I would usually invite their parents to come into the school and meet with me... 1*

For school managers and teachers, the most important purpose of vocational education is to transform students, who are seem to be not able to “eat bitterness”, “lacking of patience”, and “poor in fulfilling job requirement”, into docile workers who are productive and do not ask questions, answer back or question management authority. The school management has thereby introduced a “quasi-military” style of classroom management, training students ready for the alienated mass production process in the ICT factories. They seldom help students to achieve academic success for upward social mobility.

#### **“De-ruralized” Moral Education**

Apart from applying “quasi-military” management system, the school managers and teachers have attempted to change the behavioural traits of “rural students” by introducing what we called “de-ruralized moral education” into the school curriculum. The newly-added content which prohibits students from doing usual practices at their rural homes such as speaking foul language and expressing themselves directly, aims at nurturing skilled workers who could adapt to the oppressive working conditions at urban factories.

*Our children usually performed badly during their middle or even primary schools. Thus our top priority is to correct their inappropriate behaviour and habits. For example, the students often use rural slangs, especially those swear words at school. These words are extremely vulgar and insulting. The students do not know how to use appropriate language to communicate with others. They speak what they think, expressing themselves directly particularly when they are angry. They never take the feelings of others into account before they*

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<sup>1</sup> Interview with a teacher respondent, November 18, 2013.

*speak and act. These behaviour have to be corrected. Secondly, they seldom express respect for others in their daily conversations. They always use unnecessarily aggressive words and phrases, particularly when chatting with their classmates. The students are so rebellious, exhibiting a strong sense of self-esteem. They have been self-centred since their childhood; some have even been spoiled to the extent that they bring the uncivilized, rural habits and languages to the school without any shame ... They don't know how to speak politely. Some of the students may say "hello" when they meet me in the corridor, but after two of three steps they would swear at each other again ... It's quite natural for them to be vulgar. For instance, they don't think using foul or abusive language is inappropriate. So we have to guide them to develop good habits in the school. We once asked the students to deliver public speeches and presentations in class and hardly say a word ... When they are unhappy, they usually fight with others...<sup>2</sup>*

As shown above, the school managers and teachers usually attribute the students' uncivilized habits and the inappropriate use of language to their rural family backgrounds. In order to nurture students to be "tamed" workers who could contribute to the economic development of the city, the usual practices of the students that are thought to be originated in rural villages, like using foul language and expressing themselves directly, have to be changed, making them used to working life in the industrial parks.

In short, the authors argue that both the "quasi-military" management style and "de-ruralized" moral education aim to sustain the supply of young, cheap, and docile labour in the city, and thus serving the interests of the local cadres and foreign industrialists. Under the pressures of local government and the market, the management of vocational high schools in Chongqing has become "labour-tamer", who seldom stands for students' interests, and is eager to model obedient and capable workers for labour-intensive manufacturing firms there.

Do the students of vocational schools automatically become the "gears" in factories according to the will of the local government and the school management? Based on the observations and in-depth interviews with the students, the authors suggest that the "disciplinary engineering" carried out vigorously in the vocational high schools in Chongqing have not fulfilled its purposes to a large extent. In the following,

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<sup>2</sup> Interview with a teacher respondent, June 7, 2013.



we will discuss and make sense of the students' resistance at both classroom and workplace levels, which has led to the general failure of the project of "discipline engineering".

## **Effectiveness of "Discipline Engineering"**

### **Failure of "Quasi-military" Management Style**

Students are indifferent and even resistant to the "quasi-military" management that the school leaders and teachers relished. The electronic bulletin board of the school G is awash with the angry, even raged expression of students on the "quasi-military" management that the leaders highly praised:

*You are nothing but a school head. Why should you be so cocky? Are you nuts that you bother about everything about us? ... In such a hot day you make the sucking rule that we are not allowed to wear shorts, ah? Must wear knee-high skirts? Is it your business? Have I made you wear it? You S.O.B.!! ...You motherfucker made a militarized management; you think you were a soldier so you are fucking something? You bastard...I didn't obey your rule, I just could not understand your management system, is there something wrong? You sucker...<sup>3</sup>*

*In the beginning I did not get used to the rules and regulations of this school. There are so many of them. I just cannot accept them. However, just after I getting used to them, there comes one who follows me all day long from the classroom to anywhere else on the campus except the dorm. I have no ear for why should the school discriminate against the short-haired. I have never ever got it through. To my shame should every short-haired be arranged with a finger man? What should I call it? Is it an infringement of my portraiture right? I have nothing to say about it.<sup>4</sup>*

*A girl who once attended the so-called "disciplined class" in the school W was very indifferent to the class. She acted on her own way after being disciplined, wearing a miniskirt and an afro. "My hair was cut by the headmaster, at one stroke." When she mentioned the hair cutting, her face flickered with a spurious smile.*

<sup>3</sup> An online forum post made by Gadaomengnv, a student, May 27, 2013.

<sup>4</sup> An online forum post made by Remwoxinzhayongru, a student, November 16, 2013.

Many students showed that they were used to the “violent” head teachers in the school W. For students, the only reason they like a teacher is that the teacher care about them:

*To be honest, T (the head teacher) really disappointed us. We have come here to practice for so long a time and he did not come to see us. None of the group activities he once agreed have been organized.*<sup>5</sup>

The “quasi-military” management does not successfully “discipline” students; instead, it has planted in their hearts the seed to resist the schools’ management.

### Failure of Moral Education

If the “quasi-military” management is detested by students, then it is the moral education augments that bring about students’ denial of the school. The moral education classes in the school L, G and W use the textbook of Professional Ethics and the Laws based according to the syllabus promulgated by the Ministry of Education, which is always mentioned by the students with a disdainful look:

*That class was really boring; we had no idea what the teacher was talking about. Many teachers were just reading the text, forcing us to fell asleep. The textbook was really boring. I didn’t know why I should learn that.*<sup>6</sup>

Teachers of moral education failed to nurture the students from “vulgar language”, “direct and simple act”, and “slackness”. Students were not interested in the content of the class, nor did they consider their language and behaviours problematic. On the contrary, they condemned teachers who randomly labelled them as “immoral” have touched their self-esteem to the greatest extent. This damage to their self-esteem has caused their revolt.

### After the Failure of “**Discipline Engineering**”

#### **Students’ Relying on Small Gangs**

The failure of "Discipline Project" led to students’ distrust of schools and teachers. In schools, it was their classmates who have earned their trust. Many students of W school said that had it not been any intimate classmates, they would have left school for long.

<sup>5</sup> Interview with a student, November 17, 2013.

<sup>6</sup> Interview with a student, June 8, 2013.

*If the teachers had not come to enrol me in school, I would have gone to Guangdong... At that time I had no initiative to go to school anymore. Later, the teacher carried a home visit with my parents and I. On the first day my mom was not at home and my dad was there. Then they came again in the afternoon, kept talking and talking. 'Do you have time for a visit to the school?' The next day they came with a car and I was then brought to the school...I just felt that I was deceived. Anyways, it's just to idle the days away in order to get my diploma. In fact, I made it only for a few good friends, I do feel bored here.<sup>7</sup>*

When some students go out for internship, the others begin to feel even more boring, together with their decreasing identity with the school.

*Those friends of mine have gone out for internship. I was left alone in the school, bored. I did not want to attend classes anymore; Or else go to practice would do.<sup>8</sup>*

*This year, I did not feel the same when I came back to school for that many classmates have gone to practice, and the rest were merged together into a class. I didn't see any connections among us. Those classmates who were my friends were not in school. And I really want to visit them.<sup>9</sup>*

The small gangs of students are made of dorm roommates. The dormitory is the place where students live and play, building up their affection around the living quarters. Little Stone at school W had a small group of seven students, who lived under the same roof, eating, drinking, playing, and sleeping together. Little Stone emphasized that they were the most united group in the class. Other members would give their helping hands without hesitation when any one of them encounter a harsh time. Their friendship is molded in eating, drinking, playing, and making merry.

*Boys in the class enjoyed good relations, except for one dorm chamber. Our chamber was the most united one. We took any other's trouble or depression in mind and tried our best to help them.<sup>10</sup>*

Little stone further explained why he had a deep affection for his roommates:

*We often hang out for fun. We play together, and sleep together, too. We often climbed over the wall to the cyber café for Internet surfing. Ha-ha! We were*

<sup>7</sup> Interview with a student, May 13, 2013.

<sup>8</sup> Interview with a student, November 18, 2013.

<sup>9</sup> Interview with a student, November 18, 2013.

<sup>10</sup> Interview with Little Stone, a student from the school W, June 6, 2013.

*the poorest among all the classmates, but we were the most united. We usually spent over our living expenses by Wednesday, mainly because we enjoyed such a happy time on Saturdays and Sundays, That's a time we often go out for food and drink. Sometimes it would take us more than RMB 50. Our money would be spent at once.*<sup>11</sup>

Inside the small gang of Little Stone were codes of behaviours that the school and teachers had tried hard to change via "Discipline Engineering", including vulgar language and direct action. The use of vulgar language and some indecent fun act were, however, symbolic to their close ties in the eyes of the group insiders. These behaviours just demonstrated that they were intimate by roughhousing, teasing, and making fun of each other, and thus strengthened their friendships, which were established in entertainment and consumption.

*If there's anyone in our dorm who has been bullied, we would vent his anger for him; if there's someone who is in a bad mood against us, we would give him a lesson together...*<sup>12</sup>

According to Little Stone, besides eating, drinking, playing, and making merry, what made the small student gang of fundamental importance was the provision of support and dependency. In an environment where students were distrustful to the school authority, they were badly in need of their own communities which could thereby offer them self-protection in accordance with the insider principles.

#### The Eye-for-eye Principle of the Student Gangs

Inside the small group, students set up their own communication principle, that is a tooth for a tooth, an eye for an eye, based on the so called "vulgar language" and "direct action".

Yanzi, one of our student respondent, by referring to such a principle of action in her life, said:

*I would do better to the one who is good to me; and would give him or her a lesson if he or she does badly to me. That's what we behave.*

*If you're good to me, I will be good to you too; if you bully me, I will return with a blow." This is the principle of action that has prevailed among students.*

<sup>11</sup> Interview with Little Stone, a student from the school W, June 6, 2013.

<sup>12</sup> Interview with Little Stone, a student from the school W, June 6, 2013.

*Students showing goodness to each other usually form a small group quickly, and an offense to a member of the group will lead to the group's retaliation. 13*

Lanzi was once involved into a group scuffle because the “sister” in her small group was insulted. She did not consider the behaviour wrong, on the contrary, she took the scuffle an honourable and, and it was her duty to avenge of her sister’s insult. The small gang once decided for a mass brawl in a small park on a boy who cheated in love for another sister in the group. The plan was stopped by the mediation of other students.

Group scuffle, as a manifestation of collective cohesion of small groups, is the way of consolidating the “eye-for-eye” principle.

#### Dine and Wine, and Games: the Bond to Maintain Small Gangs

If a small gang wants to continue to maintain, it requires interaction between group members. Typically, the interaction between members includes the following: eating, drinking, and playing (ice skating, hiking, playing video games) and so on. By these interactions, the small groups reinforce the feelings between group members.

Xiao Guang from the school W tells his stories of incorporating into the campus life,

*When I just came to this school I was just like a fish out of water, but now I am quite used to campus life. At the very beginning, I didn't know them; they were playing within their circles and I was just here, we were not talking to each other. I just did my own business. It's boring. Now, we are familiar with each other and we chat at spare times... We now go back to climb the mountain. In the past, it would be boring for I climb alone. Now, we have more people, two or three, that's more interesting and we climb the mountain together... Now we often go to town on weekends for various activities, like bicycling, window shopping, and skating... We classmates are very united now, and we often hang out together. 14*

Skating is one of the group activities the students favoured. There's a small town not far away from W school, students often go there for skating at weekends. With noisy music, they frolic and joke with each other. Liangzi went skating every weekend, and she was enraptured when talking about the ice skating,

<sup>13</sup> Interview with Yanzi, a student, June 18, 2013.

<sup>14</sup> Interview with Xiao Guang, a student from the school W, May 24, 2013.

*You do not know how much fun it has. When the music starts, you may feel that you are going to fly. We usually hang out in groups, sometimes in a dozen, and sometimes in 20s or 30s. If you come out with the group, you may have someone teaching you how to skate. And it's cheaper when the cost is shared among group members even if you skate a whole day.<sup>15</sup>*

Liangzi often posts her photos of skating on Q-Zone and gets many "Likes" from other students (evaluation and replies). Also, she often calls classmates in the QQ Group to go skating. Many classmates respond to her call and go skating with her, and her small group has become increasingly larger. Xiao Liang of the small group is always expectant to the coming skating,

*Oh, I tell you, it's funny that we went skating in groups. And you could know a lot of people. Generally the people who go skating are handsome. It's fun to play with them.<sup>16</sup>*

In addition to skating, video games is another group activity that students, especially boys interested in.

*One of the most troublesome condition faced by L, G and W school leaders is that students are addicted to video games. They play mobile games in class, play video games with laptop computers after class, and play online games at cyber cafes by climbing over the wall after the dormitory lights out. Students' love of video games has been a challenge to "Discipline Engineering". Little Stone and his roommates used to climb over the wall together to play LOL (a kind of online game that was popular among secondary vocational students) at cyber cafe. Many students have expressed that they can resume self-esteem in LOL and the collective sense of belonging.*

*LOL is a high-level game, more superior to QQ Speed or QQ Dancer. The most interesting thing about it is that there are many factions, with different roles and skills. Then we will play different roles for different factions. Everyone online discusses how to capture the other factions, as well as the use of strategies. I think LOL particularly helps the exercise of communication and collaboration skills, especially in cooperation. In fact, all the players are acquaintance, but still, it's full of fun. We have discussion on how to beat other*

<sup>15</sup> Interview with Liangzi, a student, May 22, 2013.

<sup>16</sup> Interview with Xiaoliang, a student, November 18, 2013.

*players, who should be the first to go out to fight, which tactic should be firstly used, and so on. We have the feeling of a team within the play.*<sup>17</sup>

Linzi described how his small group often skipped school, played as a team and captured the other factions together when explaining the online game LOL. It seemed that, according to many students, LOL has provided an interactive virtual space for the group, where they have achieved internal cohesion and consolidation.

Most of the students consolidate friendship and sense of belonging between group members through dining and wine. Every weekend, observers can find a long queue waiting in front of the ATM next to W school. Students come to draw money, and some would dine out at restaurants as soon as they have withdrawn cash. For example, the aforementioned Little Stone and his group always spent half of their weekly life expenses at weekend. They reinforced their affection by dining and drinking together.

The Students' Affair Office of W School admonishes the students who are late for the night classes on Sunday. Some of them are late for the class because of drinking. Fangzi was once criticized by teachers for getting drunk and late for class, but she felt the action was alright,

*It is anything but a problem. That day we were supposed to have a dinner. But then we did not feel good, so we got drunk. Everyone poured out her innermost thoughts and feelings under the influence of alcohol. In fact, we would not have said those things if we were not with alcohol. Although we used to laugh and play jokes, everyone has her own depression. That day several of us cried upon drinking, and poured out a lot. The teacher said that we were drunk. Actually we were not. We were clear-headed. We talked a lot on that day, and several of us cried together.*<sup>18</sup>

## From Classroom to Workplace Politics

### Extension of School Gang Practices into Workplaces

The students from rural migrant families have received “disciplinary engineering”, when they first entered vocational high schools. However, it does not mean that the students are passively accept the control of the state, the market, and the management. Following the failure of the disciplinary project, the children's trust towards the school management has been diminished significantly. They have in turn relied on school

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<sup>17</sup> Interview with Linzi, a student, June 25, 2013.

<sup>18</sup> Interview with Fangzi, a student, June 14, 2013.

gangs formed by themselves for assistance. After studying at vocational schools for a year, most students would work in factories as interns during summer vacation. It is found that the students of the school W have continued their lives in school gangs, even though they left school temporarily for summer internships. Little stone, for instance, worked with his three gang mates in the same factory. They described their internship experience as follows:

*We live and work together. We prepare dinner together after work. We play together, when we do not need to work overtime. We never live alone during the internship.<sup>19</sup>*

Little stone and his gang mates worked together again in another factory during the summer between the second and third year of study. It is the first time that they felt stressed at work:

*Our production line leader was so disgusting. Our workload was so heavy. We had to switch between day and night shifts, and are required to produce 2000 units a day. We had no choice but to work overtime. We felt so exhausted.<sup>20</sup>*

The gang mates found that, under mounting pressure, the only one they can freely talk to is one another:

*I sometimes chat with other colleagues in the same production team. Yet, I mainly played with my school friends during the internship. This is because I found that school is totally different from factory. High school friendship is far pure than working relationships, and thus I usually played with my classmates. We usually roamed around on weekends.<sup>21</sup>*

Another student, Yunzi, also emphasized the importance of staying connected with her schoolmates. Shuanger had a similar feeling, even though she made some new friends at workplace:

*I was excited when I knew someone coming from my school. Although we were not close friends before that, we always dined and played together. I cherished the fantastic times with my schoolmates, but not those with the roommates.<sup>22</sup>*

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<sup>19</sup> Interview with Little Stone, a student from the school W, November 18, 2013.

<sup>20</sup> Interview with Little Stone, a student from the school W, November 18, 2013.

<sup>21</sup> Interview with Little Stone, a student from the school W, July 29, 2013.

<sup>22</sup> Interview with Shuanger, a student from the school X, July 28, 2013.



To conclude, factory interns usually connect with those coming from the same vocational high school. The bonding and practices of school gangs could thereby extend beyond the classroom context, shaping the students' behaviours and interactions at workplaces.

### Gang-based Resistance at Workplaces

Generally speaking, our student respondents felt negative about their internship experience at factories. The respondents repeatedly commented that they found their internships to be “exhausting” and “boring”. They also reported that they always engaged in conflicts with the factory management at grassroots level, including production assistants and team leaders. To overcome these conflicts, our respondents usually followed the practices of school gangs and seek help from other schoolmates. On most occasion, they resorted to mob violence against the front-line managers in factories:

*The schoolmates along my production line usually quarreled with the team leaders and their assistants. The conflicts arose mainly because the factory managers harshly criticized us. They usually switched our positions without providing reasons. Some interns from another school refused to do so, leading to fierce conflicts with the managers. They quarrelled with each other, and scheduled to fight against each other somewhere outside the factory.<sup>23</sup>*

As show above, the conflicts between frontline managers and interns busted out because of trivial issues, like position arrangements. On the same day, the student involved in the conflict and some twenty of his classmates waited for the team leader outside the factory entrance.

*There were some twenty students waiting outside the factory entrance. Some of them are the roommates of the student involved; while the rest are his classmates. The line manger also called four or five colleagues for help. They fought against each other fiercely. Some of the students were injured, and both sides at last were fired by the factory.<sup>24</sup>*

The factory interns explained the incident afterwards:

*We have indeed felt hatred towards the line manager for some period of time. He usually blamed us without providing reasons. The student involved in the*

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<sup>23</sup> Interview with a student, August 10, 2013.

<sup>24</sup> Interview with a student, August 4, 2014.

*conflict first grumbled about the manager in the WeChat group, arousing anger among us. We then decided to wait for the team manager outside the factory entrance. We did know prior that the manager would call his colleagues for help. This in turns led to a fierce quarrel and fight between two sides.*<sup>25</sup>

A lot of similar fights took place during the students' internships. The accumulated contradictions in the labour process has continuously worsened the relationship between the front-line managers and factory interns, and thus a trivial matter might also become the fuse of conflicts between them. The students' previous struggle experiences at the classroom setting has indeed shaped their resistance at workplace: they usually mobilize along lines of the pre-existing schoolmate networks prior to their entries into factories; and resort to group scuffle, but not other forms of collective resistance.

## Conclusion

In Mainland China, students at vocational schools are usually depicted as troublemakers, who are lazy, brutal and violent. This article, based on the authors' intervention research conducted in Chongqing city, attempts to make sense of the disciplinary practices and students' resistance behind the "culture of violence" at China's vocational schools. The authors suggest that such a culture, indeed, is not a characteristic common to all students in vocational education. Instead it is a constructed narrative created by the state, the market, and schools through "disciplinary engineering" within the classrooms, taming young labour for the need of industrial development in the city. The "disciplinary engineering", including classroom control measures like quasi-military management style and "de-ruralized" moral education, has led to resentment among students, discrediting the legitimacy of schools' management. The distrust towards schools has pushed students to small juvenile gangs for self-defence, based on "an eye for an eye" principle. The authors also argue that the resistance experience at vocational schools has shaped the way the students responded to the management during their internships on factory lines. The repertoires of interns' everyday resistance at workplace have followed their earlier practices in school gangs, for instance, mocking, collective absenteeism, tricking, and mob fighting. The paper concludes that by joining school gangs to deal with political conflicts in classroom

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<sup>25</sup> Interview with a student, August 4, 2014.

setting, students from vocational schools have learnt how to engage in politics of production and struggle against poor working conditions.

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# On the Political Potential of Confucian Ethicality in the making of Post Cosmopolitan Society

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Nothing is more natural than mutual misunderstanding.  
Paul Valéry  
An eye for an eye only ends up making the whole world blind.  
Mahatma Ghandi

I

Concerning the reality of globalization, Ulrich Beck proposes a conception of nation state as a “zombie category”<sup>26</sup>. It is unique since it does not take either/or position to the reality of nation state when some argue that the era of nation-state is over<sup>27</sup> and some argue that nation-state still matters<sup>28</sup>.

Seen from concepts such as “global village”, “global cosmopolitan society“ or “world risk society” and their empirical correspondence to the world as lived today, centrifugal force that pushes globalization seems undeniably real and nation state as a framework of theoretical or practical engagement with reality seems to be obsolete or anachronic accordingly. But as the saying goes, nobody kicks a dead dog. Although “Nation state” as a theoretical/practical framework might have lost its almost self-evident (taken-for-granted) authority as the breakdown of Berlin walls shows that the boundary of nation state is not fixed (or given) as such but can be challenged and changeable both literally and figuratively, it remains UNDEAD and haunts back precisely as the naming “Zombie category” connotates. Then how is it that “nation state” would not be left behind the “*Runaway World*” and put aside once and for all?

On 2 Sep. 2015, the body of 3-year-old Aylan Kurdi drowned off Turkish seashore<sup>29</sup>. The place his body was

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<sup>26</sup> Beck, U. 2001, p. 185.

<sup>27</sup> Giddens, A., 2000. , *Runaway World*, New York: Routledge, 2000.

<sup>28</sup> Calhoun C., 2007. *Nations Matter*, New York: Routledge, 2007.

<sup>29</sup> It is reported that politicians, upon the terrorist attack in Paris at 13 Nov. 2015 change their position on refugee policy which initially motivated by the body of Alyan Kurdi drowned of Turkish seashore on 2 Sep. 2015.

Sen. Lindsey Graham:

**THEN:** In September, the GOP presidential candidate and South Carolina senator said America has long welcomed those who are fleeing oppression. He said national security should be balanced against the country's character. "I would like to think America's a special place," Graham said during an interview on Fox News. "Go read what's on the Statue of Liberty."

**NOW:** Earlier this week, Graham said Syrian refugees shouldn't be accepted into U.S. borders for the time being. "The one thing I've learned from Paris is that we need to have a timeout on bringing refugees into this country until we have a system that we think will work," he said in an interview with

found, the seashore points to a question. Where does (or does not) he belong? What is the meaning of the entry that he made one step too late?

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Questioned about his position on “cosmopolitanism”, Derrida begins his reply by defining cosmopolitanism as “a formidable question”<sup>30</sup>. To Derrida cosmopolitanism is double headed conception. On the one hand, one should endorse the progress of cosmopolitanism for it means “access to citizenship” and “world citizenship” in particular. Nevertheless, on the other hand, as long as it is a form of “citizenship”, cosmopolitanism represents “a limit, that of nation-state”.

At this point, one faces an aporia of either/or. On the one hand, nation-state, as a boundary of a political space has the positive and salutary role in that, by and through “democratic citizenship”, it provides “protection against certain kinds of international violence (the market, the concentration of world capital, as well as “terrorist” violence and the proliferation of weapons)”. However, on the other hand, precisely because of its exclusionary nature as a boundary of space, nation state has the “negative or limiting effects” that “closes its border to noncitizens, monopolizes violence, controls its borders, excludes or represses noncitizens”.

Hannah Arendt traces how the innate element of exclusion related to the monopoly of violence by nation state might work in the amplification of the “negative or limiting effects” of nation state in her book *The Origins of Totalitarianism*.

Disintegration of Europe’s nation-state system began “with the appearance of a constantly growing refugee movement”<sup>31</sup>. Denationalization by which citizens turn into refugees deprived of legal protection provided to citizenship became “a powerful weapon of totalitarian politics” in that the “constitutional inability of European nation-states to guarantee human rights to those who had lost nationally guaranteed rights” was disguised by blaming the refugees that is victims of totalitarian strategy for the situation<sup>32</sup>. As a result, those whom the persecuting governments had singled out as “scum of the earth-Jews, Trotskyites, etc-actually were received as scum of the earth everywhere; those whom persecution had called undesirable became the *indésirables*

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Fox News Radio. AP 20 Nov. 2015.

<sup>30</sup> Borradori, 123.

<sup>31</sup> Arendt, 270.

<sup>32</sup> When Western democracies uses victims of totalitarian strategy as a ready excuse for their inability to provide the legal protection for the stateless, consciously or unconsciously, they enjoys the mentality of Hitler when he pronounces “right is what is good for the German people.” (Arendt, 275)

of the Europe”<sup>33, 34</sup>. Thus, the problem of “The increasing groups of stateless in the nontotalitarian countries” were solved while producing “a form of lawlessness, organized by the police, which practically resulted in a coordination of the free world with the legislation of the totalitarian countries”<sup>35</sup>.

In the process that nontotalitarian democracies falls into the trap of complicity in the totalitarian strategy, “none of the statesmen was aware of Hitler’s solution of the Jewish problem, first to reduce the German Jews to a nonrecognized minority in Germany, then to drive them as stateless people across the borders, and finally to gather them back from everywhere in order to ship them to extermination camps”<sup>36</sup>. When it comes to a point that Hitler’s strategy came to be regarded as “an eloquent demonstration to the rest of the world how really to “liquidate” all problems concerning minorities and stateless”, Western democracies, consciously or unconsciously, were under spell of totalitarian genius of Hitler.

Under the circumstance that increasing groups of stateless in the nontotalitarian countries were deprived of legal protection by citizenship and put under the mercy of the police, “the only practical substitute for a nonexistent homeland was an internment camp” and was “the only “country” the world had to offer the stateless” (Arendt, 284).

The Jewish question, according to Arendt, “was considered the only insoluble one” and was indeed solved. For current discussion, it is not the fact that the question was solved but how it was solved deserves a closer attention. Namely, it was solved “by means of a colonized and then conquered territory”. Arendt points out that this “solved neither the problem of the minorities or the stateless. On the contrary, “the solution of the Jewish question merely produced a new category of refugees, the Arabs, thereby increasing the number of the stateless and rightless”<sup>37</sup>.

The Jewish question and its solution by colonization and conquer only produced yet another victim and reproduced, if not reinforced, the exclusionary nature of nation

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<sup>33</sup> Arendt, 269.

<sup>34</sup> In this context, it is noteworthy that there was an atmosphere of hatred in the Europe between two world wars. Arendt writes (Arendt, 268): “Nothing perhaps illustrates the general disintegration of political life better than this vague, pervasive hatred of everybody and everything, . . . with nobody to make responsible for the state of affairs-neither the government nor the bourgeoisie nor an outside power. . . This atmosphere of disintegration, though characteristic of the whole of Europe between the two wars, was more visible in the defeated than in the victorious countries. . . Now everybody was against everybody else, and most of all against his closest neighbors-the Slovaks against the Czechs, the Croats against the Serbs, the Ukrainians against the Poles”.

<sup>35</sup> Arendt, 288.

<sup>36</sup> Arendt, 290.

<sup>37</sup> Arendt, 290.

state as a boundary of a political space: the limit of citizenship grounded by the monopoly of violence that controls borders, excludes or represses noncitizens.

In this vein, Derrida puts forward the concept of “democracy to come” which goes “beyond the limits of cosmopolitanism, that is, of a world citizenship”<sup>38</sup>. Democracy to come is “more in line with what lets singular beings (anyone) “live together””. In that form of alliance, the singular beings are “not defined by citizenship, that is, by their condition as lawful “subjects” in a state or legitimate members of a nation-state or even a confederation or world state”<sup>39</sup>.

Derrida’s move envisions an alliance beyond political boundary defined by enforced by state whether it is nation state or world state. However it does not mean “depoliticization”<sup>40</sup>. On the contrary, it demands a radical departure from the conventional conception of political as revealed in the concept of boundary such as “citizenship” or “nation state” and a search of alternative way of thinking and practice of the concept of the “political” or “world” that would realize “democracy to come”, which “remain for some time out of reach”<sup>41</sup>.

What will be the shape of “democracy to come”, that is, an alliance that lets singular beings live together? What should be one’s engagement with that alliance in one’s thinking and practice? How could (should) one respond these questions in the context of Confucian ethicality?

### III

In his discussion on the symbolic function of “family” in religious context, Robert Bellah extends his argument to the Confucian attitude toward political and familial authority and points out that “family” does not function as a symbolic unit in Confucianism. “[F]or Confucianism the family...is the religious context. Honor thy father and they mother is very nearly whole of it”. In other words, there is no conceptual gap between family and the religious context that should be represented by family as a symbol. The way one engage himself is already and always religious in its actuality:

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<sup>38</sup> Borradori, 130.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> Borradori, 131.

“Since one’s relation to the universe is mediated through the parents, one’s primary religious obligation is filial piety”<sup>42, 43</sup>.

Based on this interpretation, Bellah reaches a conclusion: “In China filial piety and loyalty became absolutes” while “it was God alone who in the last analysis exercised power” in the West. Thereby “the father continued to dominate” in China<sup>44</sup>. Bellah further argues that “When we look at the Confucian attitude toward political and familial authority, there does not seem to be any point of leverage in the Confucian symbol system from which disobedience to parents could be justified”<sup>45</sup>.

To illustrate his case, Bellah quotes a passage of Liji (禮記) which is worthy of an attention.

If a parent have a fault, (the son) should with bated breath, and bland aspect, and gentle voice, admonish him. If the admonition does not take effect, he will be the more reverential and the more filial; and when the father seems pleased, he will repeat the admonition...If the parent be angry and (more) displeased, and beat him till the blood flows, he should not presume to be angry and resentful, but be (still) more reverential and more filial. <sup>46</sup>

Bellah’s interpretation of the text <sup>47</sup> points to the innate improbability of disobedience/rebellion against the father/rulers in Confucian sociality. It is not that disobedience to the father or ruler is impossible. “By suffering patiently and by being even more reverential and filial the son can silently reproach his father. But that is all, at least all that is legitimate within the Confucian system”. Although “rebellion against tyrannical rulers has a classical justification...nevertheless there was a strong

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<sup>42</sup> Bellah, 88.

<sup>43</sup> Here Bellah quotes *XiaoJing* (孝經)(1) filial piety is the root of (all) virtue, and (the stem) out of which grows (all moral) teaching.子曰：「夫孝，德之本也，教之所由生也」 (7) filial piety is the constant (method) of Heaven, the righteousness of Earth, and the practical duty of Man.子曰：「夫孝，天之經也，地之義也，民之行也」

<sup>44</sup> Bellah, 95.

<sup>45</sup> Bellah, 94.

<sup>46</sup> *Sacred Books of the East* vol. 28, pp. 375-77. (trans.) Legge, James.

禮記 內則：父母有過，下氣怡色，柔聲以諫。諫若不入，起敬起孝，說則復諫；不說，與其得罪於鄉黨州閭，寧孰諫。父母怒、不說，而撻之流血，不敢疾怨，起敬起孝。

<sup>47</sup> Bellah, 94.



tendency in Confucianism, especially in neo-Confucianism, to regard political rebellion as virtually in the same category as disobedience to parents.

As Bellah sees, it might be the case that parents “could not be disobeyed” in the context of Confucian ethicality. Nevertheless it is not to be belittled that their faults are NOT exempted to be criticized either. Bellah sees that the son could not disobey the father but does not see that the son, even when beaten “till the blood flows”, persists to remonstrate against the fault of the father. If one does not pay due attention to the part of persistence in the text, one’s reading might be out of balance and lose the sight of the lesson between the lines. In other words, what is the meaning of “parents could not be disobeyed”? Does this improbability of disobedience means an imposition of blind obedience? If so, to find “faults” of parents and “remonstrate against them” would not make sense in the first place.

There is yet another point that demands one’s attention. Now the son is required not only to discern “good” from “bad”<sup>48</sup> to remonstrate against the faults but also to be more filial and reverential even when beaten “till the blood flows” when he does remonstrate. Why?

Admittedly “the filial son silently can reproach his father” but the silence of the filial son’s reproach is not silent. Rather it is a firmly committed disobedience to violence. If one could (does) not hear the sound of the silence in the filial son’s engagement with the father, wouldn’t one fail to locate the ethical commitment that is loud and clear? In fact Bellah points out that one is demanded to rebel/revolt against tyrannical ruler in Confucian ethicality. However this moral command earns its full meaning if and when one asks himself whether one should/would implement tyranny to revolt against tyranny. One cannot justify one’s own violence without justifying others’ the point of which is well recorded in the fate of M. Robespierre’s the “reign of terror”.

The ethical significance of persistence of the son to remonstrate against the faults of parent even in the face of violence could be further explored. Why would the son persist to remonstrate against the faults of the father? What could/should be achieved in his engagement of persuasion without resorting to violence?

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<sup>48</sup> 論語，里仁：「唯仁者能好人，能惡人」 "It is only the (truly) virtuous man, who can love, or who can hate, others."

From the perspective of the idea of self-cultivation in Confucian ethics, Bellah's interpretation that "in China filial piety and loyalty became absolutes" while "it was God alone who in the last analysis exercised power" in the West, thereby "the father continued to dominate" in China"<sup>49</sup> is a bit hasty equalization of Confucian commitment to filial piety to Western religiosity in awe of God with "fear and tremble".

Way to Dao is not one but plural in Confucian ethics as one might see in the word of Confucius that "it may be possible to study together without being able to go on the way together. It may be possible to go on the way together without being able to take a stand together"<sup>50</sup> or "to harmonize with others in recognition of differences"<sup>51</sup>. Seen from this perspective, if in fact, as Bellah argues, it is the case that "[F]or Confucianism... Honor thy father and thy mother is very nearly whole of it", then is there any the better way to honor one's father and mother than to revere and empower their own ways towards Dao, their singular way to cultivate themselves?

#### IV

Margaret Thatcher said in an interview that "I think we've been through a period where too many people have been given to understand that if they have a problem, it's the government's job to cope with it. 'I have a problem, I'll get a grant.' 'I'm homeless, the government must house me'. They are casting their problem on society. And, you know, there is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, and there are families. And no government can do anything except through people, and people must look to themselves first"<sup>52</sup>. Whether or not, one agrees with Derrida on his conception of "democracy to come": an alliance that let singular beings (anyone) to live together, Thatcher's argument, ironically, might be pointing where to look to begin to work on the conception: individuals, their singularity.

That is why the body of 3-year-old Aylan Kurdi drowned off a boundary is all the more important. It is an undeniable alert that "democracy to come" is not something distant that one can idly expect "to come", something that "will remain for some time out of reach" but something that demands our immediate attention, something to be experimented and fought for here and now.

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<sup>49</sup> Bellah, 95.

<sup>50</sup> 論語，子罕：子曰：「可與共學，未可與適道；可與適道，未可與立；可與立，未可與權」

<sup>51</sup> 論語，子路：「君子和而不同，小人同而不和」

<sup>52</sup> Womans Own, 23 September 1987.

In this light, the political potential of Confucian ethicality is clear in the making of an alliance of singular beings beyond the exclusionary boundary of nation state or world state. That is as long as it works as relational engagement with others, as implied in Confucian engagement with others by and through filial piety, that reveres and empowers others' own ways, singular ways towards Dao of humanity

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# Metropolis and criminal economies

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*The latest molecule of a hip synthetic drug will find its way to the markets of Shanghai, New York and Moscow almost at the same time.*

Michel Koutouzis, Pascale Perez (2012)

*The fight against drug traffickers no longer has much to do with drugs. But has everything to do with governments. The objective is no longer to simply help the victims and addicts, but to push back against the organised crime's influence on State's themselves.*

Moise Naim (2011)

## Abstract :

In this speech, I will present and discuss four models (or types) of configurations which make it possible to analyse the integration of criminal economies – which are multifaceted economies – in urban and social landscapes. While these economies are of varied urban and social scale, I will especially focus on the role of drug trafficking. My findings are based on extensive observation and interviews in poor French suburbs, as well as upon academic exchanges with colleagues in Brasil and Argentina – that will hopefully soon be complemented by new fields of study (why not in China ?). The first model is well-established : it takes into account the relationship between migration, urban environments and illegal trafficking. The second model, gives a more important place to the interethnic and interracial relations. The third model (or type) focuses more on territoriality and on horizontal relationships. The last model, is a deterritorialised and global one. The goal here is to ask whether or not this last model is the most relevant explanation of the current situation, or whether this situation is best understood through a combination of all four models. I will try to illustrate empirically these four types

taking into account the first results of a collective research project on the social and cultural history of the circulation of heroin since the mid- sixties in France.

## Introduction

### Object :

Four models of configurations to analyse the integration of criminal economies in urban areas in relationship with migration processes and polyethnic networks, focusing on the role of drug trafficking.

### Datas :

Extensive observations in poor French suburbs (Kokoreff, Mignon 1992 ; Kokoreff 1997 ; Duprez, Kokoreff 2000, 2001 ; Kokoreff 2003, 2008 et 2010) international comparaisons (Kokoreff, Péraldi, Weinberger, 2007, Kokoreff, 2015),

Presenting the first results of a collective research on the social history of the circulation of heroin since the mid- sixties in France (Kokoreff, Coppel, Olivet, Lalande, Duport, Péraldi, Terrazonni, Marchand, 2016).

## 1. Migrations processes and trafficking networks

The first model is well-established : it takes into account the relationship between migration, urban environments and illegal trafficking.

According to the classic description, the necessary condition for the establishment of significant drug trafficking in a city is the existence of a long-settled minority ethnic community, especially where this community comes from a country that produces the raw materials.

### Cases study

- Opium in Chicago at the beginning of the XX century with the Chinese community, as well as Paris in the 1930s and 1960s.
- The Turkish and Lebanese diasporas in the 1970s and 1980s, following the renewal of poppy cultures in the Turkish case, and poppy production in the Bekka plane to finance the Lebanon war.

- The Iranian diaspora that imported a white heroine, especially at the beginning of the 1980s in London and Paris.
- la vague de Vietnamiens, des « boat people », à la fin des années 1970.

These networks contributed to the renewal and diversification of the heroin on offer.

Consequences : renewal and diversification of the heroin offer in big cities (Paris, Lyon, Grenoble, Marseille), after the official dismantling of the French connection.

But this does not mean that the dealers were necessarily Turkish, Iranian, Vietnamese or Chinese ; they were also French, just as the street vendors could have different origins.

Criticism :

- model is too homogenous
- does not take into account changes in drug routes and transnational supply networks
- Nor does it take into account the context of increased social demand for drugs and anti-drug policies

## 2. Transculturals alliances and Polyethnics trafficking

The second model, gives a more important place to interethnic and interracial relations.

The networks linking, at the front end, Chinese traffickers, based in Hong Kong or Singapour, – who bring merchandise to Holland – with Tunisian gang leaders and wholesalers, who then distribute the heroin (or cannabis) through their own networks, and feed the markets of Paris (or other cities) by distributing dozens of kilos of heroine.

Case study : Amsterdam

A Amsterdam, en 1975, on compte 4 à 5 000 « junkies ». Des hollandais mais aussi beaucoup de Français et d'Italiens qui constituent une « inquiétante communauté »<sup>72</sup>. Par ailleurs,

<sup>72</sup> Jean-Paul Gén , « Amsterdam et ses freaks », *Lib ration*, 30 janvier, 1, 2, 3 et 4 f vrier 1975.

« Il existe en effet depuis longtemps une petite colonie chinoise à Amsterdam (...) Ces Chinois, dont beaucoup sont originaires de Singapour, ont toujours constitué un milieu très fermé où ils pouvaient mener leurs affaires à leur guise sans être inquiétés par la police qui ne demandait qu'une chose : que les Chinois règlent leurs histoires entre eux et qu'ils laissent le reste de la ville tranquille. En échange, la police fermait les yeux sur les quelques fumeries d'opium et sur les quelques salles de jeux clandestines qu'ils exploitaient. (...) Depuis quelques années, les Chinois d'Amsterdam semblent avoir dénoncé cet accord tacite en se lançant dans le trafic de l'héroïne en gros. Admirablement placés aux deux extrémités de la chaîne par les liens qu'ils entretiennent dans les pays producteurs à Bangkok, Honk-Kong ou Singapour, et par le milieu fermé qu'ils avaient constitué à Amsterdam. (...) Pour lutter contre cette Chinese connection, la police se heurte maintenant à des difficultés qu'elle a elle-même encouragées en laissant se développer le milieu très fermé que constitue la colonie chinoise d'Amsterdam. » 73

Two aspects of this model are worth highlighting :

- on the one hand, the creation of a quasi-monopoly situation linking Chinese and Tunisians,
- On the other hand, at the back end of the chain, numerous street dealers of heroine are Tunisian, whether this is in the Belleville neighbourhood or Montmartre street.

Criticism :

- Does not consider the diversity of provision of suppliers within social words
- Does not consider urban dynamic characterised by the mobility of open drug scenes under influence of police repression and media moral panics

### 3. Urban spaces of ethnicity

The third model (or type) focuses more on territoriality and on horizontal relationships.

A lot of ethnographic researches about drugs trafficking drug dealers have been realised

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<sup>73</sup> Ibid, le 3 février

in a local level, in Philadelphie (Anderson, 1999), Chicago (Venkatesh, 2006 et 2010 ; Wacquant, 2006), New York (Bourgois, 2001), San Francisco (Bourgois, Schonberg, 2009), but also in Brésil, in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo (Misse et Domingues Vargas, 2008 ; Telles et Hirata, 2007), in Europe, in Porto (Di Agra, 2000), Perpignan (Tarrus, 1999), Marseille (Péraldi, Samson, 2011), Gênes (Del Lago, 2006), Naples (Saviano, 2007), and also in France (Bouhnik, 2007 ; Duprez et Kokoreff 2000 ; Kokoreff, 2003 et 2010 ; Mohammed, 2012, etc.).

Luis Fernandez suggested naming as « psychotropic territories » those places that come under the scrutiny of institutions and populations and in which there is a strong probability of finding actors of the drug market (users, sellers, etc.), whose actions are highly codified, even if only to escape repression (Fernandez 2002)

Otherwise, these psychotropic territories » are degraded areas in physical, social and symbolic terms.

For the migrants who arrive in Rotterdam, Paris or Marseille, with destabilised families or without parents, unemployed, and sometimes without identity papers, the worlds of the « street » are gathering places where traffic and consumption are the most immediate responses, which become cultural competences – a means of survival and illegal access to consumer goods.

Criticism :

- The territorialisation of drug problems in poor or deprived neighborhoods wouldn't conceal (or hide) the process of security construction of social problems ;
- If monographies reveal at local scale structural causes of social and urban marginality, they hide the connection between local and global levels.

#### 4. Fragmentation et globalisation

The drug economy is at the heart of globalisation :

- Producer countries of the South send by the ton, cocaine (from Bolivia or Peru), cannabis (from Morocco), heroin (from Afghanistan and Pakistan), to consumer countries from the North, where the social demand is both strong and spread across different social circles.



- In parallel, new markets have opened and developed over the last twenty years, in Latin America, Eastern Europe, the territories of the former Soviet Union, in Africa and in China.
- In the global heroine market, Afghanistan remains the primary producer of opium, with 9000 tons produced in 2014, meeting 90% of global needs<sup>74</sup>.
- The drug economy has taken on new forms that destabilise States : the waves of unprecedented violence ; corruption of the dominant class, elected officials, and civil servants ; and the malfunctioning of institutions.
- The situation in Mexico is particularly dramatic in this respect. Almost 30 billion dollars will be laundered through Mexican cartels, representing 9% of the GDP. The war against and between drug-traffickers has resulted in more than 60 000 deaths in six years within the population. But, evidence of this process is also visible elsewhere – in Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Nigeria, Russia, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and of course Italy and its *mafias*.

Social science outputs also reflect in their own way this gap : on the one hand the global scale of the transnational networks is prioritized, while on the other hand, the focus is placed on the micro-local scale of socially excluded territories : there are here the economists and geopoliticiens and there are here sociologists and anthropologists (Kokoreff, Péraldi, Weinberger, 2007).

A recent book by Michel Koutouzis (with Pascale Perez) analyses these shifts in criminal economies in a world that has become more complex and global.

« In the XIX century, opium dealers had understood the real meaning of globalisation. The economy (produce at low prices and sell at high prices and/or in large quantities), the laws (supervision of opium production by the international community), the political cultures and regimes (industrialised Europe and still deeply agricultural China, cut off from its territory through Western trading posts) offered prospects not due to a supposed uniformisation process, but, instead, because of their differences. (...) Two centuries later, globalisation hasn't changed.. The role of the trafficker, the

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<sup>74</sup> United Nations report against drugs and crime, 2011.

smuggler being to « facilitate » the passage between these worlds, while ignoring borders of any sort, whether moral, ethical, technological, legal or institutional (...). While the authorities voice indignation over « no go areas » and ghetto criminals (hustlers), they refuse to see that well-off and respectable clients give them business. The opposite situation also exists : while we take offence at the number of crack consumers in Guadeloupe, who are « spoiled whites », outcasts and unemployed, we close our eyes to the restaurant owners and property developers, model citizens who provide the drugs from their citadel in Saint-Martin. » (Koutouzis, Perez, 2012)

So the traffickers therefore live from these differences ; they are the « channels » between different worlds. The illegal drug economy functions on the same model as the legal economy : circulation of goods, connectivity, production of intermediate spaces between the uniformised city-world and deprived world-city.

#### To conclude

- The tension between the global and local is key to understanding the function of cities in today's drug economy, as well as its connection to the economy of the night and mass entertainment, and to discrete places where drugs are equally tolerated, even valued.
- The machine that disciplines and punishes continues to turn at full speed when it comes to certain segments of the population and to tolerate/privilege others, without this affecting the price or demand, until becoming an end in itself (« war on drugs »)
- Given that the parallel economy and legal economy continue to overlap, a new governance needs to recognize the change in paradigm induced by transnational organised crime that challenges States, and therefore democracy.

Thank you so much !

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# Identity Definition in Village Shareholding Reform: A case study about the shareholding reform in NM village, Xiangshan county, Zhejiang province

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Since China's reform and opening-up, as large-scale urbanization process proceeds, more and more villages has implemented shareholding reform or "reform from villager committee to resident committee" (RVR). There are two basic approaches of the reform: One is to distribute original collective assets to individuals directly; the other is to allocate them to individuals as shares. In this process, the significant point is about the reasonable defining of the collective membership. While villages are relatively closed communities before the reform and opening-up policy, the boundaries of them are quite clear so that it's comparatively easy to define the membership. However, after the reform, along with the extensive urbanization and population migration, the population structure of the village becomes increasingly diverse and the boundaries among villages are more obscure. It's getting ever more difficult to define the village membership clearly. First, villages differentiated some urbanized population who achieves their urban identity through entering schools, joining armies, accompanying mobility as well as resettlement for land acquisition & demolition. Second, massive half-urbanized population emerged, including township enterprise workers who leaves the land but not the countryside, floating population who works out and villagers who enter cities through resettlement but go back to village after losing job. Third, massive migrants entered the villages located in eastern coast area and suburbs.

Before the year 2000, the market valuation of rural land property increased mildly. And the scale of collective assets of villages were relatively small. The identity as a villager, therefore, was not that valuable which people paid little attention to. However, as urbanization accelerated, the appreciation potential of rural land, especially suburban land, increased. There were more and more villages possessing millions of or (even)

hundreds of millions of collective assets. People became increasingly interested in gaining rural collective memberships. Therefore, it becomes a tough social problem to study the formation mechanism of village boundaries and rational definition of villagers' social identity.

## I Introduction/ Research Background

The processes of shareholding reform in rural areas and reform from villager committee to resident committee(RVR) involve the definition/redefinition of villager identity, which mainly refers to two major kinds of people in addition to natives living long term in villages——emigrants and immigrants of various types. In the previous studies, researchers focused on the logic of dual construction processes of constructing both property rights boundaries and geographic boundaries when defining boundaries of villages (Zhang 2006), emphasized the multidimensional characteristics of village boundaries (Zhe 1996), and provided detailed and accurate case-study data on how villagers established village boundaries, defined and divided collective property rights in the processes of shareholding reform and RVR(Lan 2005; Shen & Wang 2005; Pan 2007; Yan 2005; Jiao 2012).

Based on these researches, we find that in the processes of shareholding reform and RVR, how villagers defined village boundaries——especially when they determined which village members could benefit from collective properties and how many shares of collective properties each village member could benefit from——was closely related to the understanding of collective member identity, which was shared by most villagers in certain specific area. In these processes, to a certain degree, the intervention from central and local authorities, and the rational calculation and power contention existing among villagers could affect the ultimate distribution arrangement, but after all, the “whoever roots locally should benefit” distribution arrangements, especially the relatively reasonable arrangements accepted by each game player, were generally those in accordance with the conception of collective member identity, which had already been constructed among the local players of the game in a specific village.

In a sense, after 1949, a range of socialism practices conducted according to the logic of anti-tradition and anti-capitalism was a gradual process of constructing collectivism. And these socialism practices had also given every social member one of these two categories of social identities: members of state-owned-enterprise/organization, or members of village collective cooperative. During the years of reform and opening up policy, a series of social practices——especially the large-scale population mobility, the enterprise reformation with masses of resettled laid-off workers, and the resettlement for land acquisition & demolition——had forced a large number of peasants who were members of village collective cooperative to live out of their collectives, and had brought them into “state-owned-enterprise/ organization” system. However, for most of those people, the process of transforming identities was not very successful. Just shortly after entering into “state-owned-enterprise/organization” system, again, many of them were abandoned by that system in the large-scale enterprise reformation and the laid-off workers resettlement, and started to get the third category of social identities——a group not consist of “members of state-owned-enterprise/ organization” nor “members of village collective cooperative”.

By observing a series of practices in the processes of shareholding reform and RVR in Shanghai, Ningbo, Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Ji’nan, combined with a focus on the case on economic development and shareholding reform in NM village Xiangshan county Ningbo city, this article examines how people redefined their social identity of “collective membership” during the gradual process of the “collapsing” of village collective cooperative membership.

## **II Identifying collective membership: manifold social boundaries**

One of the most difficult tasks during shareholding reform is to assign membership to villagers. People have developed different understandings about “collective assets” in the long process of RVR (Liu & Jin, 2013). Thus, identifying different types of membership among these villagers introduces contradictions and conflicts, thus leading to an extremely complex membership identification system.

There are four critical social boundaries in membership assignment: a) members of state-own enterprise versus members of village collective cooperative; b) members of village collective cooperative versus members of village collective cooperative; c) native versus immigrant; d) extant versus historical. We developed these boundaries from summarizing the types of social membership formed in RVR. There are 27 types of social membership for NM and 36 for JC were born in the RVR. Note that ST alone, a village in JC, has developed into 35 categories (reservoir immigrant excluded).

#### 1、 members of state-own enterprise versus members of members of village collective cooperative

The boundary between members of state-own enterprise and members of village collective cooperative receives the most debates in that it is critical to identify collective membership. In traditional planned economy era, this boundary was the main demarcating line between rural and urban citizens, which was obvious and implied dramatic inequality in social welfare. Since reform and open-up policy, the boundary has become blurred with the tremendous social transitions such as the influx of rural migrant workers into the city, the emergency of laid-off urban workers, and the massive land acquisition & demolition, even though the inequality of welfare between urban and rural citizens maintained. During this process, the group receiving the greatest influence is the rural citizens who obtained urban citizenship due to land acquisition & demolition, so-called “land workers”.

In the 1980s, it is very attractive to become land workers for rural citizens, and such opportunity was only open for those villagers living in suburb areas. In the very beginning, land workers were treated as urban citizens – with arranged jobs to guarantee the same city life condition as the ordinary urban citizens have. However, the benefits for the later-on were much less. The difference in social welfares led to contrast life trajectories of land workers in different periods. The majority of peasant-to-workers became laid-offs in the tide of enterprise reforming in late 1990s and early 21st century. Many of them even cannot receive any compensation. Upon the shareholding reform in the village, these peasant-to-workers proposed to move their hukou registration back to their original villages, hoping to benefit from the reform as villagers.



## 2、Members of village collective cooperative versus members of village collective cooperative

The problem to define the boundary of members of village collective cooperative lies in dealing with married-off women in the village. Married-off woman refers to those - women who moved to other villages by marriage but keep their hukou registration in the original village; girls who lives with their parents and work in local area; divorced women in the village who have not remarried yet and keep their hukou registration in the village, or those who still live in the village after divorce. The complexity of situation makes it difficult to decide whether one particular married-off woman should be counted as members of village collective cooperative or not. The essence of the decision-making reveals the conflicts between the legal definition of village boundary and the conventional understanding.

## 3、Native versus immigrant

The boundary between native and immigrant citizens relates to how to distribute public property among big grain production households, immigrants, and moved-in construction workers.

## 4、Extant versus historical

It brings multiple considerations of interests to mention the extant and historical issues, like the benefits changes of elderly people, new-born babies and people with inconsistent marital status, and the exclusiveness/inclusiveness of collective membership etc.

# III Interpersonal Transaction and Identification: the Construction of Village Collective Membership

Our case, village NMM, belongs to a county located in the middle of Zhejiang province, which lies in the peninsula, surrounded by sea on three sides. The population of the county is 533,000, and the constructed area is 21.8 km<sup>2</sup>. Village NM is located in the southern end of the old urban area, which became the commercial center of the county. There were 278 families, that is, 667 peasants in the village. Before the reform and opening-up, the villagers lived on farming for generations with 356 km<sup>2</sup> arable land. The core area of the county started to expand to the east and move to the south

since 1980s, as a result, many acres of village NM was requisitioned. Different from the other neighboring villages, the villagers in N refused to hand over all of the land and kept a slice of it. By building up merchandise streets and mansions in collective way, village NM became the richest commercial village with highest income, largest assets, best welfare condition and strongest comprehensive competitiveness in the county. (Bian Wangzhi, 2015)

### 1、Profits Distribution and Types of Collective Membership

After the successful accumulation of assets and profits, the main issue focus moved to distribution mode: who will be qualified to share the collective achievement and how to operate the distribution among various types of villagers. There were five categories of villagers can enjoy the village membership welfare, including:

First category was the members of collective cooperative. They were born in village NM and made living by farming all their lives without being hired as workers. Most of them were older than the other kinds of villagers. There was only one young guy (about 40 years old) who was in the prison when villagers were recruited to the factory in 1983. There were about 100 members in the village, and the female were little more than the male. Male members could receive 60,000RMB per year from the collective income, that is, 5,000 per month, while the female could only get half of the number.

Second was land workers/employers. This kind of villagers were privileged because of the recruitment policy during the period of land acquisition, some of whom were deprived of land, while some of the other were deprived of hukou. They could be further categorized into three types. (1). Most of the land workers took the money leaving hukou unchanged. They usually entered into town-owned enterprises and most of them have laid off. (2) Some of the land workers have not taken the money or changed their hukou, becoming employees in state-owned enterprises or joining the army. These people also did not take part in farming. They were in the minority. (3) Others of the land workers became non-peasants from peasants, taking the money and changing their hukou. Most of them also entered collective or state-owned enterprises and have laid off. There were 50 persons of this kind in the village. Land

workers/employed were treated as villagers and could gain 900 yuan per month. What's more, there was no difference between male workers' and female workers' benefits.

The third category includes the daughters-in-law from other villages and the youth in the village. It mainly consists of the daughter-in-law and live-in son-in-law married the villagers, university students and youth in the village. They could enjoy the obtain the welfare as the ordinary villagers do.

The fourth category covers the administrators and regulators of the village. They got benefit as those members of collective cooperative without any other income. For example, Mr. Shi could gain the same if he were not the party branch secretary of village NM. After becoming the secretary, Mr. Shi did not receive more money than before. Except for 600RMB for communication expense and 3,500RMB as bonus per month, there's no income difference between him and ordinary villagers. However, for the village director, Mr. Qian, his income rose from 20,000 to 60,000RMB per year after becoming the head. There were about 60-70 administrators and regulators in village NM.

The fifth category refers to teenagers. The villagers who were under 18 years old could get a red-envelop with 2,000 RMB during Chinese New Year as children's food money.

In addition to these above, the old people over 60 years could obtain 1,000 yuan per year as an allowance. For the women who have married out of the village, they could have their hukou in the village NM and got the benefit 100 yuan per month less than the other villagers. But the children of these women could not get any more from village NM. Some of the people whose hukou affiliated to the villagers are also permitted to enjoy the interests as the other villagers.

## 2、 Interpersonal Transaction and Identity

How does such an identity system form? Simply speaking, the identity system is formed via a long term interaction within all the relevant villagers. In this section, based on the data we collected through investigation, a preliminary analysis on the process of identity formation of collective membership and the possible reform in the next round of shareholding reform will be delivered.

### (1) Membership, Rights and Interest

According to the Regulations of Economic-Cooperative Community in Zhejiang Province, six types of villagers enjoy natural membership. In the village of NM, however, the natural membership is only shared by the senior working team members who did not participate in recruitment. Regarding to the wages of members, the major argument in history is related to female members. Since the very beginning where benefits are distributed, female members only make half money as males do. Many females had strong different voices when the rule was implemented. The secretary of the village explained as such: according to Chairman Mao, women can hold up half of the sky, so they should only earn half as men do. The slogan referenced from Mao was obviously misunderstood but has sustained this rule for many years. Besides, about the distribution of income on the members, the other major controversy is the huge income gap between members and villagers. Currently, the salary of members is approximately ¥60,000 per year, while villagers can only make less than ¥20,000. Many villagers are against the rule.

### (2) The Identity Boundaries, Rights and Interests of Land workers

Land workers refer to those who left the village through land acquisition and demolition then came back after retirement or unemployment. Land workers were not supposed to participate in the allocation of the village interests. With a growing number of land workers, however, senior members of collective cooperative have considerable sympathy on them. Besides that, the prosperously development of the village also allows them to share the same right as villagers. Currently, there are about 300 land workers in the village, occupying the majority of village labors. Having said that, the salary of land workers is far behind members. Moreover, they have no right discussing how the interests should be distributed since they are not members of collective cooperative.

### (3) The Identity Boundaries, Rights and Interests of Deceased Members

At present, all the welfare of the village is only shared by existing members. Once those members pass away, their welfare terminates. Among 47 senior members in the village, 7 have died in the past ten years. The husband of Ms. Chang is one of them.

According to what she said, her family benefited the least. Her husband, together with the secretary of the village, worked very hard to establish entrepreneurial business. When her husband died, both of their children hadn't got married. In 2014, the secretary decided to compensate these deceased members with ¥2,000 each per year, out of sympathy. However, many villagers were strongly against this, reporting it to sub-district office. Due to the oppositions of these villagers and also the pressure the government put on, this compensation was cancelled eventually.

#### (4) The Identity Boundaries, Rights and Interests of Temporary Members

There are 49 temporary members in the village. Temporary members refer to those who couldn't transfer their rural residence into urban residence after living in counties and remained their residence in the village, for example, children who were sent to county to receive education. In the past few decades, though they remained NM village residence, they basically had very few connections with the village. In the past years, they didn't participate in any forms of interest distribution of the village and they were fine with it. However, as shareholding reform started, some argued that they should also be considered to participate in the distribution. The reason is simply because they have benefited nothing in the past years, though they have the residence of the village, while other villagers were continuously enjoying all the benefits. Thus they should also be considered.

## IV Conclusions and Discussions

In *Identities, Boundaries and Social Ties*, Charles Tilly proposed a model of social identities defining. From the perspective of inter-personal transactions, the model studied how inter-personal transactions produce identities, generate and transform social boundaries, and how they accumulate everlasting social relationships. Tilly built a collective identity consisted of boundaries, trans-boundary relationships, inside boundary relationships and stories.

Based on the case study of N village, this article reveals that the defining of collective cooperative membership/identity, actually, is a process of defining social boundaries, which covers the definitions of multiple social boundaries including

collectivity and members of state-owned-enterprise/organization, collectivity and collectivity, local place and other place, the past and present, etc. During this process, national policy, people's values, power structure and traditional habits of villages, and the different process of definition on rights, all of these above can have influence on the end results. With the long term of inter-personal transactions, the present patterns of identity definition finally formed.

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