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China's Inequality and the New Stage of Development

Li Peilin
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China seen from different theoretical frameworks

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(2) Structural Transformation from rural\agricultural society to urban\industrial society in a theoretical framework of East-Asian countries

The two-T changes carry through together in China

(3) Emerging new big countries analyzed in a theoretical framework of Brics

(4) Emerging economic countries of post-communism

I. The New Stage of Development after the Crisis

1. Changing from relying excessively on investment and exportation to more and more on domestic consumption.
2. Changing from "Made in China" to "Created in China " to promote industry upgrade.
3. Changing from the economic reform to the social reform.

Why are people not spending?

From 2000 to 2010, Chinese consumption rate(namely the proportion of consumer spending to GDP) has declined from 62.3% to 47.4%.

The rate was far lower than America's 70% and Japan's 65%.

Where has the huge amount of money gone?

1. The Chinese Government lacks no money: from 1994 to 2012, China's tax revenue increased from over 80.6 billion US$ to 8.9 1.6 trillion US$, with an average annual growth of 18%, which was far higher than the GDP growth.
2. Chinese people seem to lack no money either: from 1994 to 2012, the total savings of residents increased from over 0.3 trillion US$ to over 5.8 trillion, with an average annual growth of 18%, which was also far higher than the GDP growth.

What is the real reason?

The fundamental reason for China's sluggish consumption lies in the social inequality and income distribution.

Over the recent more than 30 years, China's greatest achievement has been its rapid economic growth, whereas its most challenging problem lies with income distribution.

II. Social Challenge to China Today

Inequality of Annual Income per Capita by Gini Coefficient (0.473 in 2013)



Structure of GDP, Employment and Urbanization（2013）



Decreasing Consumption Rate of Family with Growth of Income(2011)



Consumption Structure of the Urban Family with Different Income (2011)



The Middle Class In China



Self-Identity of Socio-Economic Status



Self-Identity of Socio-Economic Status



Change of Pyramid of Population 1990-2050



Elder increase and labor forces decline in the future



Change of Population Dependency Ratio (elder and children)



III . New choice of Social Policy

1. Keep a Balanced, harmonious, Comprehensive Development

2. Establish the Institutional Triangle among the Socialist Harmonious Society, Market Economy and Democratic

3. Strengthen Social Reform in the new stage of development

- *Thank you*

the Innovation of Social Governance in the Process of Social Transformation of Contemporary China

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Introduction

1. Theoretically speaking, the concept of governance was introduced into China from abroad in the early 1980s. From then on, more and more scholars, especially those working in political sciences, began to talk about the so-called governance change or reform in China;
2. which means, directly or indirectly, the reform, innovation or transformation in the political, economic and social institutions based on more democracy, more marketization more social autonomy and more cooperation between the state and the society, in order to push the whole cause of reform in China.

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3. But in practice, before 2013, the word of reform was always the key word which means to resolve those problems hindering the economic and social development in traditional system---the planning system, and the main strategy was called "crossing the river by feeling stones", which means to reform step by step and at the same to maintain the fundamental system (mainly a top-down ruling pattern) to maximum.
4. In 2013, the central government of China raised a new idea for the reform: through the innovation of governance (including the government governance and the social governance) to realize the modernization of the national governance. It is the first time for the word governance to be introduced into the discourse of national reform of the government. And this means a very important change in the thinking way of reform.

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5. The innovation of social governance, from the view of the central government (the CCCPC), includes reforms of four aspects:
   I. to reform the pattern of social governance from the traditional one focused on the social control and regulation which are based on the centralization of power by the government to a new one which will be based on the decentralization to the society and general participation of the public;
   II. to reform the management system on the social organizations (civil organizations) to stimulate the latter participating the social governance (and social service);

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III. to set up new mechanisms for the mediation and resolution of social conflicts;

IV. to build a new system of public security (including, e.g., public order, the security of foods and medicines, the security in the process of production, and the security of environment).

V. In general, the main object of the innovation of social governance is to establish a kind of modern system of social governance based on the public participation and so-called deliberative democracy in order to realize the self-regulations of the society in China.

VI. So, the innovation of social governance is an important part of the modernization of the national governance set up by the central government of China.

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6. And the essential requirement of the innovation of social governance is to help to set up a new system of national governance through a fundamental change in the relationship between the state and the society.
7. This new system is officially defined as: "the leadership of the Party, the guiding of the government, the cooperation of the society, the participation of the public, and the guarantee of the law system".

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8. In a word, the modernization of social governance means a new functioning mechanism and logic which would entail the organic integration of the management by and service from the government with the self-governance and self-service of the society in order to
   I. improve the livelihood and welfare of common people,
   II. to mediate the interest relationship between different social classes and/or different interest groups,
   III. to resolve various kinds of social conflicts,
   IV. and then to make the society more and more harmonious and stable.

A Simple Theoretical Thinking of Governance

1. For the issue of governance, a lot of writings gave discussions form different theoretical perspectives in the international academia. As a very simple summary, the concept of governance consists of four ideas as follows:
   I. The pluralism of governance agents and multiple centers of governance.
   II. The improvement of the undertaking modes of social responsibilities and the co-operations between the state and the society.
   III. The all-round participation of objects of management and the combinations of top-to-bottom and bottom-to-top patterns in the process of governance.
   IV. The diversity of the methodology and technology of management and the improvement of government's behaviors.

A Simple Theoretical Thinking of Governance

2. So, the modern governance should be of characteristics (or goals) as follows:
   I. Participation and deliberation (deliberative democracy).
   II. Legitimation
   III. Accountability
   IV. Transparency
   V. Rule by laws
   VI. Response (to people's needs)
   VII. Validity
   VIII. Justice.

A Simple Theoretical Thinking of Governance

3. For China at present, the innovation of governance includes four major topics:
   I. how to change the traditional ruling pattern with one ruling agent (the state) and one center (the government) of governance to a new pattern of governance with multiple agents and multiple centers;
   II. how to improve the undertaking mode of social responsibility and to promote the co-operation and partnerships between the government and the society;
   III. how to realize the organized/personal participation of all the citizens and to build the mechanism of efficient interaction between the government and the public in the process of governance;
   IV. how to diversify the approaches and techniques of governance (in order to make the governance more flexible, practical and effective) and meanwhile to improve the government's regulation and leadership on social affairs of all kinds
   V. Of course, it is impossible for China to completely follow any example established by any other country (e.g., western countries).

Why China needs to make efforts for the innovation of social governance from Now On

1. The change of the organizational pattern of Chinese society: the social members from the so-called "unit man" to "social man".
   - the transition of the economic system profoundly changes the organizational modes of social life of people in China, the traditional "unit system" (which means that almost each social member completely lives on a collective or state-owned unit which he/she works for) collapsed to a great degree, at the same time the so-called "unit mans" is changing to the "social mans" (who lose many supports from the traditional organizations on the one hand, and become independent and free to a high degree on the other).
   - At present, among all the labor force, there is less than 100 millions working in state-owned units (including about 10 millions as civil servants, about 40 millions as employees of state-owned enterprises, and about 30 millions as employees of public institutions like public schools, hospitals), the proportion of them in the whole labor force will be about 10%.

Why China needs to make efforts for the innovation of social governance from Now On

2. The great change in the structure
   - the social stratifications and the emerging of new social classes;
   - The rising of the middle class
   - The huge size of floating population
   - The rising inequality of income
   - The diversification of social values and interest pursuits from different social classes and/or interest groups
   - All of these changes means that the traditional pattern of social management based on the centralization of power and planning economic system is becoming outdated year by year

Table 1 the classes based on occupations（%）

	2001	2008	2011
Officials	2.1	1.8	1.7
Private entrepreneurs	1.0	1.3	2.1
management	1.6	2.4	2.5
Professionals and technicians	4.6	5.1	6.5
clerks	7.2	7.3	8.2
getihu	7.1	9.1	10.5
Workers in tertiary industry;	11.2	11.6	11.1
Workers in the manufacturing industry	17.5	15.8	13.3
Agricultural labors	42.9	39.8	39
unemployed	4.8	5.7	5.1

Table 2 the size of migrant workers（10 thousands）

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
In total	22542	22978	24223	25278	26261	26894
1. Migrant workers out of hometown	14041	14533	15335	15863	16336	16610
• migrant workers with their family out of hometown	2859	2966	3071	3279	3375	3525
2. Migrant workers working in hometown	8501	8445	8888	9415	9925	10284

Table 3 The GINI coefficients of income distribution

	From surveys	From the Official Statistics
1999	0.4586	
2003	0.4941	0.479
2005	0.5221	0.485
2007	0.5401	0.484
2010	0.5334	0.481
2012	0.5162	0.474

Why China needs to make efforts for the innovation of social governance from Now On

3. The development of civil organizations
- the change of the organizational structure of Chinese society entails new organizational agents of social affairs: civil organizations (non-profit and non-government organizations) are increasing year by year, which will provide a new social basis for the innovation of social governance in China.
4. the increases of social conflicts and new social risks.
- The increases of crimes
- The increase of collective conflicts (various kinds of collective protests for interest, rights and environment protection).
- Corruptions and the losses of efficiencies of public services provided by the governments at all levels.

Fig.1 the increases of civil organizations



Fig.2 the increases of Criminal Cases Registered in Public Security Organs



The key issues for the innovation of social governance at present stage

1. The first category of focal issues should be the building of governance system on the problems of basic livelihood of people, especially of those vulnerable groups, which consists mainly of
   I. the employment,
   II. income distribution,
   III. housing and social securities,
   IV. Education,
   V. medicare/public health.

The key issues for the innovation of social governance at present stage

2. The second one should be to build a new governance system of issues associated with the public security, to dealing with the safeguard problems existing in the fields of
   I. Food
   II. Medicine
   III. Environment
   IV. public health
   V. and other new social risks.

The key issues for the innovation of social governance at present stage

3. The third one should be the reform in the field of social institutions, e.g.,
   I. the traditional institutions to manage the relationships between the rural and the urban areas of China
   II. the institutions to control the floating population
   III. The system of social undertakings（社会事业）
   IV. The system of the public services (plural agents providing)
   V. The system of social (official and civil) organizations
   VI. The system of the public participation
   VII. The mechanisms of interest mediation between different social classes (especially between the officials and the common people, between the labor and the capital)
   VIII. The system of social security/order; and so on

The key issues for the innovation of social governance at present stage

4. The fourth one should be the reform in the field of social legitimations, e.g.,
   I. The carding and integration of the rights of citizens in the law system
   II. The establishment and improvement of laws in the fields of social governance (e.g., the basic laws for the social/civil organizations)
   III. The system of laws supporting the modern social governance (e.g., the taxation system, the public financial system, the laws about social donations for the resources raising of social/civil organizations and so on)
   IV. In a word, a system of laws to deal with the relationships between the state and the society (and the citizenships) based on the principles of governance modernization.

The new and feasible organizational frameworks for the innovation of social governance

1. According to the modern theory of governance, the governance is concerned with three sectors:
   I. the state,
   II. the market and
   III. the social.
   IV. These three sectors, especially their organized forms, constitute the organizational framework of modern social governance.
   V. Among other things, the most key issue is to build a new-typed relationship between them on the basis of relative independence and equal of each other.

The new and feasible organizational frameworks for the innovation of social governance

2. At the present stage, the most important and urgent task for the innovation of social governance is
   I. to develop the third sector, especially the social/civil organizations,
   II. to accelerate the transformation of those governmental organizations designated to serve the public welfares and social services (especially those so-called GONGOs) in order to make them becoming a part of the third sector.
   III. To improve the legal system concerning to the development of the third sector.

The resources guarantee for the building of a modern system of social governance

The process of social governance is a process of provision of social services, which needs a great deal of resources.

Here are three key points:

1. the reasonable allocation of public resources for the social development and governance, which means that the government should take the responsibility to invest enough public resources into the third sector;
2. the effective mobilization of social resources for the development of the third sector itself, especially the civil organizations;
3. the development of human resources for the third sector, especially the civil organizations: a serious problem facing the civil organizations is the shortage of trained professionals.

THANKS!

What is Ethnicity?

Ahmed Boubeker,
University of Saint-Etienne,
Centre Max Weber

Couldn't ethnicity in France and in other European countries, taken as a mode of construction of immigration's inheritors' experience, be articulated along with other modes of social classification to become a constitutive dimension of the organisational principles of society? In France the question remains a polemical one, provoking controversy amongst the partisans of pluralism the die-hard defenders of the French model of integration. It still stands that, if the endless repetition of public discourses leads one to suspect that nothing changes for the eternal dupes of immigration (the colonial workers of yesterday, then immigrant workers, then suburban youth), the interactionist perspectives (one of the major theoretical perspectives within sociology) of ethnicity have, for their part, been based on a dialogical weave. This is because immigration is still the occasion of encounters at the crossroads of values reinterpreted and of meanings re-negotiated through generational conflicts and interactions with the whole of society. There where official statistics see only problems of integration, anomy, ghetto spleen or stigmata of exclusion, we must re-situate the living subject of ethnicity. We must also ask "how do the individual and collective existences of the children of migrants construct themselves in encounters, alliances and conflicts, through relations of memory and forgetting, through individual choices and collective movements?"

From 1983 on, following the "Marche pour l'Egalité et contre le Racisme", the question of ethnic advocacy in France occupied centre stage. A new generation of activists had entered the public sphere, for the most part the children of immigrants, and they drew attention to discrimination and marginalisation. From the urban uprisings outside of Lyon to those in the Paris region, from the beur[1] movement to the emergence of French Islam – "Islam de France" , from the struggles of organisations against hate and security-based crimes to those opposed to mass deportations a new politically conscious generation asserted itself by reiterating its demand for recognition and equality. However, since the 1980s, these different threads have

[1] Up to the beginning of the 1980s, the children of Maghrebine immigrants were lumped together with their parents and called "young immigrants". After the first urban riots in the Lyonnais agglomeration in 1981, the French publicly discovered that these youths were for the most part born in France: they were, then, first renamed "second generation" and, then, "beurs". This last term comes from the "verlan" of the word "Arab" in Arabic. This form of auto-determination amongst the suburban youth is one manner out of many ("cousins", "rhors", "rebeux"…) for naming oneself, but its exploitation by the media and subsequent celebrity after the March for Equality and Against Racism of 1983 would open up a place for it in the dictionary of the French language

gradually been woven together into a broader quest for recognition. This process is far from complete, but the struggle for recognition has allowed for the emergence of historical ethnic actors. Many of the participants belonging to this generation of activists have become entangled in an existential web of hope and despondency, of seemingly eternal precariousness, and of dreams deferred. But from this canvas of experiences the questioning of French society has remained constant. The real controversy when it comes to ethnicity is to be found in these different dialogical moments, which, in their very dispersion, nevertheless stand as opportunities for the reassertion of democratic principles.

A number of themes thus emerge from this analysis and serve to underscore the obstacles that remain, while also opening up new horizons. The general purpose of this communication is to share some of our preoccupations and views concerning the status of the study of ethnicity in western studies in particular French sociology in contrast with English-speaking countries

I The republic against the multiethnic society

What is ethnicity in France? The sociological theory about ethnicity comes from America and other English-speaking societies, but the problem in France is much harder. Why? First it's difficult to answer to the question: what sort of ethnics or minorities live in France. It does not mean that every French people have the same Gallic ancestor, of course not, because the history of France has seen a lot of invasion. And since the late nineteenth century, many immigrants came to work and live in France - Italian, Spanish first, before migrants from Africa, North Africa and South-East Asia, and many came from countries colonized or formerly colonized. Yet France, unlike the United States, has never conceived itself as an immigration country and discovers that reality recently. The French liked to think of the ethnico-linguistic unification of the country as long-accomplished – the model of a unified nation state and the founding myths of national identity were thus in place - when along comes an afflux of new populations and migrations. The aim of these migrations is not to populate France and no-one presages the hope of citizenship for these uprooted of the Capital, these sub-proletariats submitted to every imaginable form of control, given the meanest tasks along with the statute of temporary work force.

Long a country of immigrants that does not recognize itself as such, France is now a shameful multi-ethnic society. Many migrants have taken up citizenship or had children in France. This has led to the transformation of France into a multi-ethnic society. But the French melting is colorblind to differences, in total contrast to the American notion of melting pot. So

race and ethnicity are not counted in France and minority rights need not exist. Every citizen shares a common identity of "French" far away from the word "multiculturalism." It's the famous French model of integration pot - the "French crucible" (Noiriel, 1988) - which is a model of assimilation. This model can be explained by the Revolutionary and Republican traditions of treating all citizens equally before the law. There are no public policies in France that confer recognition on groups defined as races. For many Frenchmen, race is a taboo term, since it tends to recall the atrocities of Nazi Germany with the complicity of the Vichy French government. The Republic thus maintains the myth of a French exception which is addressed to everyone without regard to origin or race. There indeed exists a shameful memory of the Republic and, by Engels' own admission, the concept of "class war" was inspired by that of "race war" elaborated by French historians. The racial argument was defended by politicians and famous writers like Gobineau, Barrès, Lapouges, as well as by the ethnologists of colonial thought. It was also a biological theory of the foreigner that inspired the demographer-inventors of immigration policy at the beginning of the 20th century. And probably because of this shameful memory but also for reasons related to the centrality of the social question, even today, there's still no such thing as "minority studies" or "ethnic relation studies" in France. Yet, in contemporary western societies, ethnicity, through interrogations on immigration and national identity, has become a focus of political problem. Constructivist or interactionist perspectives on ethnicity are developed in line with Fredrik Barth understand ethnicity as a process of boundaries making (Barth 1969). A large field of studies therefore investigates the impact of historical processes of nation-state building on contemporary ethnicity, referring to Max Weber – "the subjective belief in a common origin (Weber 1968) - or Benedict Anderson - through understanding of States as "imagined communities" (Anderson 1983). But in France, as opposed to the Anglo-Saxon countries, where the neologism "ethnicity" has supplanted a racial lexicon, this term is only little by little assuming a conceptual dimension in the language of social sciences. Because ethnicity is faced with a continuing skepticism by the university institutions which, if they do not regard it as an ideological instrument for actualizing racial theories, at least tend to identify it with a concept localized in the context of inter-group relations in the United States.

Caricature of the American model of ethnicity

Often in France, this American model of multi-ethnic society is seen in a carricaturale way, and the American ghetto is seen like a monstrous figure of a becoming of French suburbs. In fact, in the USA where the Segregation is official until the early 1960s, race is a complex,

multidimensional construct, a fluid concept whose meaning has changed over time. The racial categories included on census questionnaires, as well as the wording of questions, the terminology, and the number of categories, have changed considerably due to research, social attitudes and political factors. Information on race was obtained primarily by enumerator observation through 1950, by a combination of direct interview and self-identification in 1960 and 1970, and by self- identification in 1980 and 1990. Today, the “Revisions to the Standards for the Classification of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity” sets “ five minimum categories for data on race: American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, Black or African American, Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander, and White. There will be two categories for data on ethnicity: "Hispanic or Latino" and "Not Hispanic or Latino."[i] (Federal Register Notice October 30, 1997) The history of census data on Hispanic origin (which is identified as an ethnic origin rather than as a race in federal statistics) is quite different from the history of census data on race. Self-identification starts with the 1960 census and a changing social environment that fostered ethnic pride, but the great wave of ethnicity from 1970 is more a question of identity, memory, or struggle for recognition that will broaden the debate on multiculturalism and political correctness. Every American citizen is usually a member of a particular group for criteria commonly used for making group distinctions, but race and ethnic group labels in America are not clearly based on criteria that everyone understand, agree with, and can easily use. Particularly, the way we assign group identity to others is not always straight forward. What are the defining characteristics of being "white" or "black" in America today? What makes someone white, black or Hispanic? Is it language? Skin color? Country of origin? Cultural traditions? The answers to these questions are not clear to most Americans.

Today, in contrast with the popularly held view of human races, we know that ethnicity and supposed racial groups are largely cultural and historical constructs. This does not mean that they do not exist. To the contrary, "races" are very real in America and other countries. In order to understand them, however, we must look into culture and social interaction. But for the critics, the cultural factor is not clear too. Some ethnic groups share language and practices of tradition, but in some cases, ethnicity involves only some subjectivity without cultural traditions in common. If ethnicity refers to selected cultural characteristics used to classify people into groups or categories considered to be significantly different from others, as a result, someone else may label you in a way that you consider inaccurate and very offensive. This can instantly create a barrier to open communication.

II Ethnic becoming like failure of the French exception

In France, for the majority of the researchers and the political actors, ethnic categorisation implies a connection between biological inheritance and culture.

However, the French model has a basic flaw that is becoming evident as time goes by. It's not only the problem of economic and social differences: it is indeed true that the marginalized populations are primarily from the most recent waves of immigration to France. The first failure of this model founded on the invisibility of differences is that minorities are increasingly visible. A particularity of France is that minorities are always referred to as "immigrés" (which could be translated as "immigrees"). In contrast with the temporary process of immigration, the migrants and also their children become migrants forever. So, the first problem of visibility is a big confusion between real immigrants and the youth of the suburbs who have forgotten country of their parents. They are born in France and their invisibility as citizen in contrast with their visibility as minority is part of the question of ethnicity. Today, the increasing attention to the effects of discrimination in society, racism and Ethnical assignations among the French citizens of colonial descent and the eternal resurgence of urban violence on the public scene draws new internal boundaries for French society. Like a socio-ethnic partitioning of the Hexagon, a color line or a radical rupture between recognized citizens and second-class citizens.

So, France begins despite it to move away from its strict color-blind model and we can discover ethnical objects at the borders of sociology. The researchers identified various factors of social and economic marginality reinforced by discriminations in areas such as employment, educational opportunities, and the stigmatization of teenagers from working-class suburbs, which makes them appear as strangers to French society. But it is impossible to establish precise figures or to count the effects of discrimination in France when speaking of second-generation immigrants (who possess French citizenship, and are therefore not counted in censuses as a separate group). In France statisticians are not allowed to count people by their origins, in contrast with America and other countries where it is a standard practice to categorize the population into groups. The data protection laws prohibit this kind of collect nationwide information, so, official data make it difficult to conduct researches and analyses of the impact of immigration on French society. Inheritors of immigrants from former colonies, they are for the most part French, but their experience proves that in the country of Voltaire and Rousseau, the foreigner is no longer only he who comes from elsewhere. No one knows how many there are and no one knows what to call them: "young immigrants", "beurs", "wild stock", not one stable appellation, not one frame of mind from which to judge the situation of

these new “foreigners of the interior.” The failure of politics as the power to give names and a frame to events, to situate same and other in a common space.

Ethnic challenge behind integration

So discrimination is a fact of life in France for minorities. This fact has forced the issues of ethnic diversity onto the French policy agenda. In the context of the suburbs riots, ethnic and cultural dimension became part of the strategy of the municipalities that are sometimes based on ethnic or religious association leaders to preserve social peace. But specifically, France has developed a territorial approach to dealing with ethnic problems and officially France maintains a color-blind model of public policy. Social development policies or positive discrimination does not target ethnic groups. These local policies are largely based on geographic criteria in the fight against inequalities and to promote integration in marginalized neighborhoods. In the early 1980s, the broadening social development of town districts emphasized the suburban sense of general discomfort (malaise des banlieues) and resident participation. Locality, in its smallest expression, i.e. town districts, seemed to incarnate the social. Public speeches on participation and local democracy’s urban perspectives insisted on the logic of integration and appropriation of residential spaces in order to fight off cohabitation problems, favouring conviviality and setting new goals for social and cultural identities. In such a perspective of urban society, the town-district was perceived as a strategic space where the figure of the local resident was at the centre of development experiments which tried to use local potentials. Public acknowledgement of a communication break-down responsible for suburban violence lead to the search for go-betweens : the focus was then put on developing mediating functions, inventing roles capable of implementing them and finding new contributors for local democracy among the young and other residents. This local democracy’s urban perspective which was at first carried by the project for new citizenship from the beginning of a left newly in power, tended to favour synthesis, or at least connections between cultures and citizenship, territorial and community-based, enterprise or identity orientated, in order to allow each individual to take part again in the social network in which he is immersed. It was the immigration issue which caused the public debate to follow the terms of inter-cultural dialogue as favoured by the access to the public arena of the generation resulting from North African immigration. The Schwartz (1982) and Dubedout (1983) Reports witch correspond to the emergence of a national town policy, then insisted on participation in terms of human resources or social qualifications, emphasizing the importance of social work (recruitment of community leaders and instructors coming from the deprived areas of town, “steaming from the

environment" as they were then being referred to, seemed to be a solution to the social work crisis), the involvement of social participants in a definition of new citizenship integrating the concept of self management as a practical base. But in the early 1980s, at this level of the participation project, this concept was primarily understood as a function of civil society which translated in the emergence or redefinition of professionalism as well as voluntary work and the expression of the association movement, or even by pioneering experiments in matters of economic integration. Nevertheless, this project of the citizen-resident's participation stays hard to reconcile with the French traditional notion of representative democracy. The American model of local power does not correspond to French realities where the defense of citizens does not take into account sectional interests. Local democracy does sprout from the principle that from a town district to the nation, the territorial scales of common goods are inter-dependent, but by the end of the 1980s and 1990s, town policies favoured the shift from town district to town. The concept of participation and the profile of mediators become more institutionalized. This second stage in the participation project favoured instituted local authorities, in particular that of the mayor and programs of social development and rehabilitation depended on more politically dependent mechanisms. For the majority of institutional contributors, elected representatives or technicians, local democracy must not mean the creation of opposition forces which would directly challenge those who have gained their legitimacy from the ballot box. On the contrary, they imagine participation as a complementary measure: residents' groups and associations should, if not merely cogs in the state's machine, at least be considered as valid negotiators. This concept can be found in the criticisms of some residents who denounce mayors for not allowing certain sectors of the population (in particular immigrants with no electoral weight) to take part in local administration. In suburbs like Venissieux or Vaulx-en-Velin near Lyon, resident associations and ethnic minorities, in particular youth groups, denounce what they call "alibi participation" perceived as a conflict prevention technique. Indeed, the vision of the municipal authorities remained that of passive intervention by the public. Even if laws concerning decentralisation have given new competencies to town and villages, the legislative action has only gone as far as to establish citizen's rights over access to information. Paradoxically, these new trends in town policies and the choice to proceed with a shift from town districts to town, linked to the need to unity means and procedures, was often translated into a minimalist vision of local democracy and a certain distancing from local initiatives. In a crisis, the link between those in charge of public services and local political authorities is strengthened often to the detriment of the citizen users. The advantage is therefore enjoyed by resident initiatives which follow the guidelines laid down by local public authorities

and which are involved through the intermediary of professional mediators. On the other hand, other residents find themselves outside this regularized public space, and those limits set to local democracy make the exclusion process even more blatant: segregation, inequalities, and symbolic competitiveness between French and immigrants, between citizens and ethnic minorities, between adults and young. How then to reconcile public thinking which emphasizes the urgency of civil reclamation of the suburbs with institutional practices based on reject and mistrust?

So the methods of participation are therefore narrow. But even worse, the failure of this political project is causing a drift in the ethnicization of social relations. One could not understand the public designation of the precariousness and the difference in some suburbs without referring to the politico administrative system which builds itself on such designation.

We can understand by referring to Michel Foucault (1975) if power imposes political forms of regulation, these forms may exceed the regulatory objectives and lead to paradoxical results.

We can understand that republican integration built ethnizisation of social relations it claims to fight !

It’s the unhappy consciousness of French Republic. The French unrest is a crisis of a political paradigm founded on a single form of universal rationality. The French discontent that provokes the unrest of the suburbs by its refusal to accept the other as a part of a composite whole, as a condition of its own identity. This tends to indicate the extent to which the frontiers between Self and Other have been blurred – the Other having become Self and the Self having become Other, a foreigner to one’s own history, as though the only thing that the French exception had wanted to ignore in immigration and immigrants revealed precisely what France didn’t know about herself and the golden legend of the “French crucible”. Far from abolishing differences in the public sphere, the model of equalization of conditions has only succeeded in imprisoning the inheritors of immigration in stigmatized identities. Thus the inheritors of immigration find themselves the designated “foreigners of the interior”. French society is paralyzed by the questioning of national categories of political understanding and refuses to look at the ethnic dimension of social inequality, which translates from problems of urban segregation, from racial discrimination, and from the denial of recognition. In the face of a perennial crisis, reviving the old demons of racism all the way to the heart of the political class, the denial of the ethnic question and the higher bid of “closed discourse” – according to the formulation of Herbert Marcuse – are and have been the only constants in public action for the past 25 years. If the word were stone, the concrete

running between the walls of all the suburbs in France would weigh nothing in the face of the weight of verbal outpouring that dictates the presuppositions and the words of official orders by necessity out there beyond the periphery. Immigration is caught in the trap of words, and the suburbs of words, of political orders do not correspond to the natives of these suburbs. Paradox: the invisibility of the inhabitants of these areas while at the same time being a subject of complete public scrutiny. This one-upping of symbolic violence in a language that is more and more devoid of any real content, seems to lead to a definitive concealment of the ethnic question… But paradoxically, the unthinkable ethnic question reasserts itself today on the surface behind the effects of the sleeve of republican rhetoric, which has permitted French democracy to become progressively more accustomed to its fractures, to its internal boundaries.

III Ethnicization of social relations and "postcolonial divide"

Rapidly, however, there emerged a striking divide between public policy and the masses of suburban youth. The French suburb is not the American ghetto, but a quarter of a century of social disdain has already put the flame to the powder keg in certain French suburbs, which have become concentrations of misery and resentment. The level of urban mismanagement and waste was of course striking. In terms of social achievements, the significant investment in urban public policy had been essentially wasted. Equal access to employment and housing and social participation remained no more than a mirage for immigrant children, those on welfare, perpetual trainees, the long-term unemployed, or those in prison. The first way in which French society came to recognize the French ethnicity was through the involvement of second generation citizens of foreign origin in riots suburbs. The authorities, incapable of addressing the social roots of the malaise, gradually began to adopt a moralizing, even sanctimonious tone. The public suspicion with respect to immigrant families is that they are deemed responsible for their own condition. There is suspicion of double play or suspicion of community bending. This is the theme of the mafioso, ethnic, islamist, communitarian tendencies in these areas. It represents a new version of L. Chevalier's "dangerous classes" (1978) aligned against the Republic. Images of riots and urban crisis fed the public's greatest fears and fantasies, buttressed by repeated expressions of concern over security made by extreme Right but also by certain intellectuals who denounced communitarian groups. By the mid 1990s, the focus shifted away from the concern with forms of social divide toward the ways in which Islam in the suburbs provided examples of the now increasingly invoked postcolonial divide (Bancel, 2010)

- as a “clash of civilizations” (Huntington, 1997). The socio-political context was preoccupied with the tragic chronicle of Islamic terrorism in the world, and the history of the public encounter between immigration and French society was forever transformed. The public enemy no longer came from abroad but was instead perpetually reproducing himself within society. The specter that was thought to have been exorcised in the dark days after the Dreyfus Affair, and the Vichy Government, once again haunted the public sphere. The image of the “enemy within” was now associated with an islamist polygamist, living off the state, whose children were left loafing on the streets. When they are not portrayed as budding Islamists, the immigrant children are seen as foreigners and treated as such. According to this view, ethnicity and religion are the causes of social and economic marginality. The children of the postcolonial immigration would hang their cultural and religious traditions and it is because of cultural difference they would not want to assimilate into French society.

But ethnicity isn’t shaped by macro-structural processes only. As other types of social identity, ethnicity results from processes of identification that people mobilize in specific contexts to assert, contest, resist, negotiate, give meaning to their place in society. The city is a heterogeneous space where the control of diversity cannot be reduced to an ideology of integration. Taking into consideration the narratives of the journeys of the inheritors of immigration, one always ends up by getting out of the confinement of suburbs. Not only do “those people” play at getting beyond the fortress, but their means of escape outside of the walls of the suburbs participate in a new urban dynamic, in the construction of relay spaces (Roulleau-Berger 1991) anchor points, thresholds of passage, a meeting place between the local and the global. Certain neighborhoods of “ethnic business” thus constitute crossroads of mobility of a “globalisation from below” (Tarrius, 2004). That which escapes from the feeble knowledge of the urban crisis, is precisely this capacity of the inheritors of immigration to cross over boundaries, to bet on the miracle of a path to perpetuate a nomadic construction of doors and bridges between fragmented universes. Between the world, the Hexagon, the city, and neighborhoods, new territories of mobility tie together the courses of exile in networks across which circulate men, merchandise, and information. Some sociologists have suggested abandoning the model of immigration and assimilation altogether, adopting instead the notion of trans-nationalism and Diaspora culture to understand the new experience of immigrant in a post ethnic perspective

More generally, a new way of sociological studies is interested in the social process of identity construction among the children of immigrants. These studies take care at the context in which young interacted with others. Rather than studies of a single group, it’s studies of

French ethnic relations and through these relations we can recognize any ethnic heterogeneity. In France some ethnographic researches, noticeably among stigmatized communities, have well exposed these micro processes of strategic identity. In the French context ethnicity is made initially in relation to each other, to a way to being defined through the eyes of another, without necessary reference to specific cultural practices. Most of second-generation immigrants develop an oppositional identity to deal with this situation - ethnicity primarily signifies an experience of discrimination and the division between “them and us” - through a subculture of suburbs which cannot be confused with Arabic culture, Muslim culture or an immigrant culture, even if this subculture retains an emotional attachment to a particular origin. So, the mass of stigmatized youth resists. It refuses resignation to a phantasm residence in the dumpsters of French history. Hence, the legacy of immigration is the creation of a referential, identitary “us” which can be evoked by different systems of signs incarnated by specific figures in those sights of emergence that are the “worlds of ethnicity” (Boubeker, 2003). Figures, then –figures of the authority of the narrative, of the thing narrated, figures of resistance to a narrative that persists; figures as a cultural base, as an exigency of meaning/sense and as a quest for expression ; figures of the Imaginary of worlds of ethnicity, with its pioneers, heroes, victims or combiners; figures of individual and collective destinies collapsed into one another in an imagery that is popular, but that also symbolizes entire universes of signification; figures that symbolize a communitarian ethos and generational rupture, modes of expression and of communication with the other worlds of French society. Beyond the dispersion of itineraries, it is indeed a narrative of several voices which is speaking itself via a play of individual histories and collective references – a narrative by immigration, and by the suburbs about themselves – an alternative to the golden legend of the French melting pot.

Ethnicity as a political history of postcolonial immigrations

In America, the immigrants experience is an integral part of American national identity. By contrast, the French historiography pay little if any attention to the contribution of immigrants to the national experience and some historians speak about a collective amnesia (Noiriel 1988). Foucault’s concept of “war of races” developed in his 1976 course at the College de France is a model of intelligibility of history that puts an anti history into perspective – the history of the people forgotten by History – towards the classic model of sovereignty. In a context marked by the decline of the nation-state, this concept opens new horizons to the studies of ethnicity through a history of immigration that would not be mistaken with that of an assimilation in the “French melting-pot”.

And yet, current events tell a different story. For the past 25 years, immigration has been at the heart of public debate. The various crusades of the Front National have played a role in this, but their positions point to a much broader crisis in French society that has triggered a kind of paralysis in the face of the challenge made to previously accepted national and political boundaries. Indeed, this French malaise must be inscribed within the larger framework of the decline of the nation-state in the era of globalisation. If we are to follow the arguments of one of the pioneers of 'world history', Christopher A. Bayly, the pursuit of such a history entails more than an approach which is planetary in scale in order to privilege a more focused approach in which specific attention is paid to 'the study of the social fragment, or the disempowered' (Bayly, 2007). As precursors of globalisation, immigrants offer historical experiences that serve to highlight the nonsensical manner in which the official conception of national history was achieved. France has not adhered to its own founding principles, and the entire history of the twentieth century confirms this, especially when we review the ways in which equality has been simultaneously proclaimed and rejected. The goal is not to hold France accountable for its shortcomings. Instead, postcolonial immigration embodies the exception to the universality of the Republic, and the socio-historical experience of immigration stands to provide us with an improved understanding of the dark side of the French Republican model. An alternative history of immigration can demonstrate how this history has been shaped by inconsistencies in the application of universal political values and how in turn it has drawn attention to the gap between principles and justice. Immigrant populations, as downtrodden as they may have been, never conformed to a pattern of domination to the point of resigning themselves to victimhood. Instead, they appropriated the values inscribed on public monuments and adapted them to their own particular circumstances, thereby limiting the degree of domination.

Any scholar who scrutinises colonial and postcolonial immigration in France will be confronted with a patchwork, the logic of which he/she will not be able to fathom merely by considering gradual emancipation. After all, how can we even speak about history (Benjamin, 2013) when experiences of failure and rejection prevail? In fact, only a handful of researchers in France have explored the political history of postcolonial immigration (Boubeker and Hajjat, 2008). The various immigrant struggles which span the twentieth century – from the workers' movement to anticolonialist solidarity, from May 68 to the struggle for housing rights, from the Palestinian councils to the Mouvement des Travailleurs Arabes (MTA) – reveal the tremendous diversity of political and social engagement and the emergence of an 'immigrant consciousness' distinct from a 'class consciousness'. In this way, the descendants of

postcolonial immigration are no exception, with perhaps the slight difference that claims for the recognition of a shared patrimony have been articulated. It is too early to speak of a unified framework, but nevertheless more recent public affirmation by ‘visible minorities’ breaks away from previous forms of engagement.

This process began toward the beginning of the 1970s when the political history of immigration intersected with the history of the suburbs.

The intrusion of the youth of the Minguettes (in Vénissieux near Lyon) on the public scene seems to mark the end of a reciprocal exclusion between French society and the cities of exile. Under the fire of the balustrade, of rodeos on hunger strikes, until the media moment of the March for equality in 1983 that gathers 100,000 demonstrators, the “Minguettes generation” affirms its right to the city beyond the confines of immigration. The press evokes the nationalisation of these young immigrants under the name of “beurs” and the government decrees the urgency of the rehabilitation of the forgotten cities of the Republic. This beginning of public recognition appears like the dawn of a new era where French society can finally heal a festering sore of its history. The time of a heartbeat, the “beurs” are seen as the “heralds of a multicultural future of the Hexagon” (Beau, Boubeker, 1986).

But very quickly, the pendulums returned to the time of an eternal France of assimilation. To publicly ask the ethnic question, this would be to re-instate the universal republican model, for only the extreme right would speak this language of sinister memory! Since 1985, the “beurs” return to the forgotten for the urgency is precisely to oppose the rise of Jean Marie Le Pen who rests his platform on his stance on immigration. It is from this period that dates the huge misunderstanding at the origin of a recurrence of political-media passions on the cities of exile of the inheritors of immigration. This public misunderstanding that incites to limit the “discomfort of the suburbs” to an exacerbated manifestation of the social question, ends in fact by passing to silence the profound mutations of French society. It is therefore the extreme right that takes care of the identity question and becomes paradoxically, like in an inverted mirror, the only space of representation of the increasing visibility of ethnic minorities. By the end of the 1980’s, the socialist left, itself overtaken by the fear of losing power, misses a historical occasion to initiate a huge public debate on the new multiethnic, pluri-cultural dimension of French society. The defect of the debate, some outmoded pain-killers: a celebration of the rights of man against the racist sways and the grandiose proclamation of an old republican scheme to reaffirm common values. However, the suburbs of the 1980’s say a lot in the language of antiracism. Political questions are found to be reduced to a universal morality and the charitable love of mankind. According to this perspective, in order to curb the return of

public fears and racism, it would be necessary to put in place an analysis of the general consensus, in the name of political realism, of the choice of the lesser evil in order to avoid catastrophe. For whoever ascribes to this moral understanding of the "community of citizens" (Schnapper, 1994) it becomes impossible to politically comprehend the revolt of the suburbs and the question of ethnicity. However, the Republic is left naked for whoever rejects the rules of the game. Political impotence based on the impossibility to name the people of the suburbs and to reach a conclusion. As if immigration, in its peripheral position, had become a central fiction of public discourse, crystallizing the verbal tremors of the general movements of French society. Strange story this reality of illusion. It is History of mirrors and memory games that seem to have left things to the state. It is History of misunderstandings and blinders. It is History of a society swept away by the demands of its own reality that it recollects them periodically from the oubliettes of its memory.

Most studies dedicated to the collective action taken by youths with backgrounds in immigration concur when it comes to recognising the steady disappearance of social agents. It would take the uprisings in the autumn of 2005 (The urban uprisings of 2005 saw the emergence of groups such as the Indigènes de la République and the Conseil Représentatif des Associations Noires (CRAN) and issues appeared to be evolving, if not from a social question to a racial question, then at least towards greater public awareness of the postcolonial dimension of the struggle of the descendants of immigration) for this conclusion to be revisited. What seems to have remained inaudible in the public debate is the extent to which the actions and collective experiences of these "foreigners of the interior" stand in contradistinction to an abstract universalism according to which egalitarianism must be premised on forgetting one's own origins and affiliations.

In reality, the cultural, political and social realities of immigrants allow them to lay claim to new incarnations of the social question and therefore offer insights into a new facet of ethnic discrimination. For some of the organisations, the central concern is with the socio-judicial dimension, whereas for others a socio-educative approach prevails, or the rediscovery of Islamic culture as a practical exercise of solidarity in the face of shared disaffiliation. The action of these groups is not therefore limited to the socio-cultural realm, or for that matter even to the local sphere of the suburbs. On the contrary, it is their capacity to create networks and to negotiate partnerships that is the prerequisite to public recognition, which is the essential concern of any struggle. Indeed, if today the question of identity spills into the public sphere in the context of globalisation, this is partially as a result of the actions taken by minorities against the stifling of their singularity. For it is precisely the refusal to accept the kind of dehumanising

representations which result in feelings of disenfranchisement, by daring to express themselves in their own words and by exposing their wounds and their imperfections, that those who are excluded from the French model of integration can escape public disdain and even attain recognition. Furthermore, if the term 'integration' now causes some discomfort, this is above all the consequence of a collective questioning of the concept, for it is in participating in the transformation of French society, rather than conforming to some kind of prescribed mould, that each person today creates her/his own space.

In the end, the descendants of postcolonial immigration are reflecting on the meaning of coexistence. What else are these new activist minorities seeking to compensate for if not the shortcomings of the state, the contradictions between the values and principles of the social Republic, and the discriminatory reasoning at play on the ground? Their demands for justice and equality thus constitute, at the very least, attempts to apply these values, if not then to implement the notion of the political as it is conceived by Jacques Rancière, namely as a reconfiguration of the visible, the thinkable, and the possible (Rancière, 2000). For this to take place, a critical re-evaluation of the great narrative of the nation must be undertaken.

Conclusion

At the end of the 1990s in France new ethnic agents understood that subjectivity was only achievable through self-exposure: to a history, to a memory whose narrative needed urgently to be written both for oneself and for others. The essential issue was therefore to update references to identity and to align a pluralist memory of immigration within the context of the present. More precisely, it became important to create a cultural space in which one could reflect on the very historicity of forms of experience. As such, it is the legacy of this generation of strife which opens up perspectives for the reconciliation of history and memory.

The focus shifted to the role of memory and to finding new ways of posing age-old questions: what exactly does it mean to be an Arab, Berbers, black, West Indian, Sino-Vietnamese or a French Muslim ? One potential risk was that such questions would lead to the overstatement of particular genealogies and spark memory wars. Activist movements multiplied exponentially: Arabs, Berberes, blacks, West Indians, girls from suburbs, Arab-Muslims, and so forth. To outside observers, this new way of conceptualising advocacy could be interpreted as originating in the absence of shared perspectives. Nevertheless, a model of resistance could be evidenced through this diversity of ethnic, religious or gendered approaches aimed at improved representation in the public sphere. What these groups did affirm was the

variety of ways one could live in French society while simultaneously valorising forms of collective empowerment and weaving together the disparate threads of a society built around inclusion. The eclecticism of these groups best translates the diversity of ethnic/postcolonial legacies and the myriad ways in which these historical struggles relate to immigration.

It is in this sense that ethnicity and the legacy of this generation allow us to consider the misunderstandings between history and memory. The link between collective memory and national memory is once again put into question by the overflow into the public sphere of other narratives privileging clandestine memories. The emergence of a pluralist memory of immigration thus underlines the need for a revision of the great national narrative, but also for the incorporation of the forgotten historical archives of those 'peoples without history' – to take up the Hegelian expression – and the resulting re-appropriation of an alternative memory. Of course, such a challenge will seem daunting, especially when confronted with the steadfastness of the custodians of a mythical "vieille France" bent on repeating history and reinventing the foreigner in order to more effectively maintain the stranglehold on the suburbs. And yet, since the 1980s, a symbolic revolution has taken place: immigration, having become the defining element in a broader reflection on identity, has now imposed itself as an undisputable component of French society. Sweet vindication for the silent masses of French History.

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Educational Inequality between Urban and Rural Population in China: 1940—2011

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Sources of Educational Inequalities

- Social segmentations:
  - Class, race, gender, nationality, immigrant status
- In China,
  - *Hukou* system
  - Urban-rural segmentation resulting educational inequality between urban and rural residents
  - Urban-rural segmentation is the most influential factor affecting educational inequality
  - Educational gap between urban and rural population is much larger than that of class, ethic groups, gender and nationalities.

China’s education development

- Since 1949 the government has taken a series policies to develop education
- One of countries with the most rapid expansion of education system over last 60 years
- the largest education system in the world



Question

- What has happened in educational inequality during the rapid educational expansion over 60 years?
- Has educational inequality between urban and rural residents been increasing or decreasing?
- Which level of education (primary education, second education or high education) has the largest educational inequality?

Explanations in existing literature

- Industrialization thesis and educational expansion (Lenski 1966; Treiman 1970): *educational inequality reduces with industrialization and educational expansion*
- Cultural reproduction and MMI hypothesis *(Collins 1971*; Bourdieu 1977; Bowles and Gintis 1976; Carnoy 1974; Collins 1979*): educational inequality remain unchanged no matter how many educational opportunities are created unless education reach saturation, or education inequality change with change in class inequality*
- *Credentialism hypothesis (Karabel 1972; Shavit 1984): educational inequality reduce first in lower level of education (such as primary education) and then higher level (such as secondary or high education)*

China's specific experiences 1950-2010: effect of state policy on educational inequality

- Great transformation in socioeconomic policy and educational policy since the late 1970s (beginning of the economic reform)
- Socioeconomic transformation: from planning-economy to market economy
- Educational transformation: function of education from promoting social equalization to selecting elites and talents

Three major effects on the trend of educational inequality in China

- Educational expansion (Industrialization thesis)
- Change of class structure (reproduction theory /MMI hypothesis)
- State policy (educational transformation)

Examining educational inequality by family background

- Class inequality
  by father's occupation and father's education
- Urban-rural inequality
  by family urban or rural origin (from urban or rural family)

Data

- Merging data of three-times national survey (2006,2008,2011) collected by CASS
- Case number 19705
- Five birth cohorts
  1940—1949: 13.7%
  1950—1959: 21.9%
  1960—1969: 28.1%
  1970—1979: 22.2%
  1980—1989: 14.2%

Model

Logit Models of educational transitions (Mare 1981)

$$\log\left(\frac{P_i}{1-P_i}\right) = \alpha + \sum_k b_k X_{ki} + \sum_c g_c C_{ci} + \sum_{ck} d_c C X_{ci}$$

Dependent variable: log probabilities of educational transitions

Transition 1: access to primary school

Transition 2: from primary to junior high school

Transition 3: from junior high school to senior high school

Transition 4: from senior high school to college

Independent variables: *father's occupation, father's schooling year, family urban-rural origin, sex*

Controlling variable: *birth cohorts*

Interactive effect: *urban family X birth-cohort*

Change in educational inequality between urban and rural residents

Independent variable	Transition 1 Access to primary school			Transition 2 Access to junior high school			Transition 3 Access to senior high school			Transition 4 Access to college		
	B	S.E	Exp(B)	B	S.E	Exp(B)	B	S.E	Exp(B)	B	S.E	Exp(B)
male	1.229***	.061	3.418	.423***	.041	1.526	.195***	.044	1.215	.106	.069	1.112
Father's schooling year	.163***	.011	1.177	.123***	.007	1.131	.112***	.068	1.119	.123***	.011	1.131
Father's occupation (farmer)												
White-collar worker	.244**	.123	1.276	.562***	.077	1.753	.784***	.068	2.189	.308***	.107	1.360
Blue-collar worker	.449***	.130	1.567	.594***	.075	1.812	.395***	.065	1.484	-.014	.105	.986
Urban family	1.585***	.290	4.882	1.268***	.128	3.557	.651***	.094	1.917	-.055	.156	.946
Birth cohort 1940	-1.089***	.083	.336	-.809***	.072	.445	.358***	.121	1.431	.329	.240	1.390
Birth cohort 1950	-1.004***	.096	.366	-.296***	.062	.744	.426***	.092	1.531	-.337*	.198	.714
Birth cohort 1970	.290***	.096	1.336	.154***	.058	1.166	.117	.076	1.124	.574***	.140	1.774
Birth cohort 1980	1.096***	.173	2.994	.912***	.081	2.490	.544***	.078	1.723	.508***	.138	1.661
Urban family X1940	**-.371**	**.346**	**.690**	**-.549*** **	**.170**	**.577**	**-.726*** **	**.179**	**.484**	**-.120**	**.324**	**.887**
Urban family X1950	**.180**	**.337**	**1.197**	**-.189**	**.159**	**.828**	**-.777*** **	**.133**	**.460**	**.244**	**.254**	**1.277**
Urban family X1970	**-.235**	**.470**	**.791**	**.142**	**.206**	**1.153**	**.266****	**.125**	**1.304**	**-.072**	**.191**	**1.075**
Urban family X1980	**-1.213****	**.592**	**.297**	**-.088**	**.307**	**.915**	**.722*** **	**.148**	**2.060**	**.518*** **	**.191**	**1.679**
Constant	1.330***	.063	3.781	-.126***	.047	.883	-1.911***	.068	.148	-1.828***	.133	.161
-2log likehood	8629.319			14972.573			12529.558			5012.577		
Number	19705			16795			11974			5733		

Change in urban-rural gap for different birth cohorts



控制变量:性别/父亲教育水平/父亲职业/出生年代

Educational gap between urban and rural residents:

Transition 3 from junior high school to senior high school



Birth cohort

Conclusion: major findings

- In the past 60 years, the educational inequality between urban and rural residents has persistently existed at all level educational transitions.
- Since primary education and junior high education reach saturation in recent decades, the urban-rural gap starts to reduce at these two levels.
- At present, largest and increasing most inequalities are in transition 3 accessing to senior high school.
- At same time, the urban-rural gap at transition 4 accessing to college displays a modest increase.

Major conclusion

- The trend of educational inequality between urban and rural residents over past 60 years reflect mixed-effect of educational expansion, change of class structure and state policies.
- Educational expansion has brought about educational saturation of primary and junior second education which resulted inequality decreasing at these two levels.
- But at same time rising class inequality of social structure followed by the change of state policies resulted an increase in urban-rural inequality of senior high school and high education.
- The most effective measure reducing educational inequality is to adjust education policy but not only expand educational system
- At present, critical point of educational stratification is senior high school. The policies should focus on this level of educational transition to reduce inequality.

Conference LIA
The fabric of sociological knowledge
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Djaouida Séhili
Gender and Discrimination: What's new with the "job evaluation"?

1. **Progress of my speech :**

- ➔ Starting point: The link between the current methods of evaluation of the work and the repetition of the professional disparity, in particular the wage discrimination, between the women and the men.
- ➔ The current methods of measure of the labor, defined by the American army and inspired by « *job evaluation* » or « *job rating system* », appear in France in the 1980s
- ➔ These evaluations of jobs by criteria sorting gets the attention first of labor unions, in order to create labor classifications with more value, then employers, to break the subdivision of the jobs.
- ➔ This « French-style managerial revolution » is more collectively appointed in France « the logic of the skills ». It opposes with regard to the logic of the qualifications and quickly spreads.
- ➔ The objective standards of this new tool for measure and for quotation are supposed to annul any forms of distinction. But it will produce only very few effects on the processing of salaries, and more widely on the transformation of the social relationships of sex and gender. That will clearly be demonstrated by various sociological searches. Thus, the logic of the skills does not manage to neutralize the sexual stereotypes, this in spite of an almost mathematical armature, said « scientific »
- ➔ In the practice, the objectivity prescribed by « job evaluation » does not

prevent that jobs are evaluated according to discriminating « subjective » criteria. The price of the labor of the women, whatever is the used method, stays still widely and before any the simple transposition of an unequal social relationship.

2. Prégnance of the wage disparities between the women and the men related to mechanisms always discriminating in the new valuation methods of the labor:

Today, in France, in the establishments of ten employees or more, a full-time employee receive a monthly average remuneration of 25 % higher that an employee for the same function and/or job. This gap was reduced a little for executives) (-0,6) and the workers (-0,4). But it continues to remain in spite of the principle of equality of remuneration, proclaimed in the article 119 of the Treaty of Rome, "Equal pay for equal work", and reaffirmed in certain national legal rules (Roudy's law -13/07/1983- Génisson's law -9/05/201-).

The evaluation and, actually, the remuneration for the work thus remain still widely sexual. The valuation methods, said « objective », such as « job rating system », confirms and strengthens this discrimination which seems to be a constant..

These methods are nevertheless presented as being a "managerial revolution" because they announce the transition:

- From the logic of the qualifications or the evaluation of the value of the labor to the appreciation of a collective level of qualification: the diploma and the seniority;
- From the logic of the skills or from the evaluation of the value of the work to the appreciation of an individual level of skill: capacity to adapt itself to a

range diversified by concrete situations.

The logic of the skills is thus at first and before any a managerial tool (a precise example on the presented flyer) which:

- Suggests estimating the work by a determination in points, supposed to be objective, of an employment standardized in terms of mission, environment, activities and ends;
- Is designed as an analytical matrix from which judges have to determine and to estimate the qualities necessary for an employment independently of the person who occupies it;
- Estimate every employment (and not every holder of the same employment) according to various classifying criteria as: « Working and theoretical knowledge; resolution of problem; relational dimension; advice; organization; autonomy; contribution».

Every criterion consists of several degrees situated on an axis of progressing and having each a value in points which determines, in fine, a level of wage remuneration.

3. The methods of measure of the work, defined by the American army and inspired by « *job evaluation* » or « *job rating system* », appear in France in the 1980s

The war periods highlight particularly well the underlying controversies in the fixation of salaries. Indeed, the replacement of the men, gone to the front, or war prisoners, by « not qualified » women and often « non-unionized », is going to disturb the meaning and the legitimacy of the former systems of remuneration. It's thus only because the women had to hold the jobs which, traditionally, were dedicated to male, and in which they had until then no access, that the question of the wage equality is

going to arise thus initially.

It's in this context that « job rating evaluation », worked out by the army, become a must in the United States, during the first world conflict, in order to recruit and train workers by paying them at a level equivalent to those of the men without any commitment to assign them a sustainable qualification. In France, on the contrary, during the same period, the question of the wage equality gives rise to a conflicting debate between the labor unions / “Etat” which finds a solution in an imaginary and unstable compromise.

This disparity in the processing of the question relies on social practices connected to specific national ethics of general organization of the society, supported for the United States, by a « Protestant ethics » (more particularly here the Baptist sects) analyzed by Max Weber. This one illustrates how new faiths valuing the savings, the sobriety, the work, etc., are going to converge with the development of a « spirit of the capitalism » modern. It is for these reasons that I speak of a protesting model in which one the work has a market value directly connected to the capitalist ideology.

And this « spirit of the capitalism » also seems to apply to the women. As precision, Max Weber quotes an example:

- Of workers not having received a Protestant education, offering, especially among the single persons, « the image of an traditionalist and reactionary attitude on working place », showing « of a total lack of good will » and showing itself « incapable to give up methods inherited or learnt for the benefit of other more effective ». According to the German employers, they thus are « incapable to assimilate new working forms, to concentrate their

intelligence there, even more simply to use it ». Also, always according to the latter, the fact of increasing the price of the piece work, keep them with no reaction.

- In contrast, the women who received a Protestant education, considering thereby their work as a « *moral obligation* », develop a « spirit of strict economy », carrying them to increase considerably their yield, by a self-control and a greater sobriety, to increase the earnings that they can take.

What applies to the men, under the cover of the dogma of the predetermination and the divine election, is also valid thus a priori for the women...

Actually, in the United States, job evaluation, from its creation, is carrier of the "faith" that we can succeed in building the bases of an objective evaluation without taking into account finally the sexual division of the labor:

- If the labor market values more the physical strength than the manual dexterity, the system of job evaluation is supposed to adapt itself and, in this case, it cannot be accused of leading to sexual discriminations.
- And as a result, the sexual discrimination established in the system, but on behalf of the variables of evaluation, does not appear as such.

The "pragmatic" ideology carried here bases on the representations of an ethics according to which the price of the work must before any being the transposition of a specific status of the (evolutive) labor market which will be bound (without discrimination) to a working post/function.

Concerning France, it is the "républicano-pro-family ethics" which prevails. It finds its bases at the same time in the values of the Republic "Equality, brotherhood

and solidarity" and, in those of the pro-family ideals of the Vichy government. During the World War I, the question of the wage equity is nevertheless the object of a debate the interlocutors of which are the State, the labor unions and the interlabor-union Committee against the exploitation of feminine labor.

So, the principle "equal pay for equal work" will be only proclaimed for the women replacing the men at the war front… But it will seem normal to deduct from their salary the additional costs engendered by their participation in the work: « *The cost price of all the new modifications in the equipment, in the organization of the work, in the supervision and in a general way, the part of the additional costs coming from by the substitution of the feminine workforce to the male workforce* » (« Circular » of February 28th, 1916).

In this French context, "relatively" male chauvinist, ideological executive, it does not seem inopportune that the feminine work is estimated without the rules which prevail until then and which value at first the qualifications of the male worker. The situation remains unchanged on the eve of the second world conflict. The gaps are always characteristic between the feminine workforce and the male workforce.

During the Second World War, the invasion and the Vichy government is going to strengthen this established fact, within the framework of the negotiations between the French and German authorities. For example, the law of October 11th, 1940 relative to the feminine work:

- Forbidden the hiring of the women married in the public and para-public services,
- Hire the single young women of less than 28 years to look for a husband within 2 years and insures them then a savings (If they came to divorce, they

could be reinstated on the condition of being "profitable" of the divorce),

- Puts on vacation without pay the mothers of less than 3 children with a husband who works,
- Retires automatically the women of more than 50 years,
- Assimilate married women and common law wives for all these limitations,
- And finally, authorize the temporary work — so strengthening the dominant conception of the work feminine as the supplement — On condition besides that is exercised the marital home so that the women can carry out the works of the household.

The ideology asserted then is that the social role of the women's relies mainly in their reproductive vocation and in their capacity to assume their « mother's job » : The social space which is assigned to them is the one of their home and not the one of the professional work. The period of Vichy is thus characterized by the existence of a condemnation of the feminine work, based on a set of pro-family values that the post-war years, and the return of a republican era we could say, do not manage, or do not look for change…

In France, it is thus only in the 1980s that the stemming methods of job evaluation are going to interest more and more labor unions(syndicates), to create in particular new developing labor classifications (the level of the technicians in classifications), Then the employers, to break in particular the subdivisions of the jobs (reduce the hierarchical lines). At first mobilized, to increase the productivity of companies and estimate the work and the financial contribution of executives, they will however be gradually also presented as an innovating way to reduce, even delete, the disparities of salary in particular between the women and the men.

4. **« French-style managerial revolution » ineffective in term of transformation of the social relationships of sex and gender:**

As we previously saw it, in spite of an almost mathematical armature, said «scientific», My own researches showed that the logic of the skills does not manage to neutralize the social prejudices and the sexual stereotypes. If, at first, evaluators (employees of the RH or the consultants) pronounce in favor of a recognition "FINALLY" of the professionalism of the women, it seems however that the treatment of the feminine and the male knows variations connected)to the classic representations of the sexual division of the work in connection with the "républicano-pro-family" French ideology.

An example extracted my own observations during a committee of evaluation: An example extracted my own observations during a committee of evaluation: the subjective reference, made by a evaluator (a man), in the practice of the knitting to depreciate a technical, male employment, borrows more specifically from the register of the sexual discrimination that to those "objectives" of the method. To convince the other evaluators that the employment which they overvalue (according to him) does not cost so much in points, he will not say? : « *When you see a woman knitting, you know, that seems complicated when we do not know the work, but it is easy to make when we learnt! »*

Or still, when it is about a traditionally male employment, as the « commercial » function, the criterion « relational dimension » comes as a qualification acquired by the experience or the training. On the contrary, when it is a question esteeming a traditionally feminine employment, « as staff at the desk », the « relational dimension » is likened to a quality, innate and natural, appropriate to the feminine genre. Useless thus to take into account it in the remuneration.

The objectivity prescribed by job evaluation loses of its credibility in its practice and allows to reveal more gender stereotypes which underlie the debates. The social a priori that every individual -in particular those, men or women, asked to estimate the jobs- concerns it « that it is important to estimate » resurface always completely.

It is what allows us to postulate that the price of the work, whatever is the used method, stays in France, the simple transposition of an unequal social relationship in reality little disputed. The problem does not thus concern both the system of evaluation itself and on a human failure in its practice being a matter of a sex-based discrimination.

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The fabric of sociological knowledge

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Post-Western Space and doing sociology

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We have entered in a Post-Western Space of knowledge. This is a "global turn" (Caillé, Dufoix, 2012)and a methodological one in sociology which imposes theoretical and methodological detours, displacements, reversals and conversions. Considering methodological cosmopoliteanism, *discontinuous continuities* and *continuous discontinuities* between European and Chinese sociologies, Post-Western Space is emerging from connections between situated theoretical and methodological knowledge and multisited knowledge. We are considering different regimes of "compressed modernity" (Li Peilin, 2008; Han Sang Jin, Shim Young-Hee 2010; Chang, 2010) in non-Western societies like "transition societies" like China and in Western societies; so we will identify a methodological theory in this Post-Western Space like a *connected sociology*"[1] which meansto be able to listen to the multivocality of groups and individuals, and especially from subaltern groups, to emphasize the dynamic interminling and interaction between societies. We will suggest a way to produce multiple collective narratives which co-exist in relative autonomy or, on the contrary, interact or interlock (Roulleau-Berger, Li Peilin, 2012). So it means to take accout in the variations of moral economies, access to the 'selves' and individuation, cultural traditions and political structures in each context- here in Europe and in China- to develop methodological experiences and delimit proper spaces and shared spaces of methodological knowledge. In this Post-Western space we will think about the conditions of doing research, how to make life narratives, how to link local knowledge and global knowledge.

[1]We are inspired by the notion of « connected history » produced by Sanjay Subrahmanyam (2004).

1. Post-Western Space and "connected sociology"

In Post-Western Sociology, that one should combat methodological nationalism as Ulrich Beck (2006) proposed is self-evident yet insufficient in this day and age. Methodological thinking in sociology is linked to the evolution of western society which witnessed its birth. If the process of the pluralization of contemporary societies questions the very idea of society as a narrative attached to modernity, particularly European modernity, then here we shall use Eisenstadt's theory of multiple modernities to ask the question of access to the plurality of the narratives of contemporary societies. Here the method will be defined in all its scope as a theory emancipated from the forms of scientific colonialism or Orientalism, forms representing a "western style of domination, restructuring and authority over the East" (Saïd, 1997). Philosophers like Spivak (2009) and historians like Chakrabarty, (2000) had already made propositions within the framework of *subaltern studies* (Bhabha, 2007) to "provincialize Europe" and to consider "subaltern histories" within their own specific dynamic systems and to envisage the different societal contexts without recourse to the mediation of Europe. *Post colonial studies* developed around the idea of escaping from the confines of the great narratives of modernity and the major paradigms of the social sciences by conceiving the (post) colonial as international (Boubeker, 2003 ; Kilani, 2009). In the wake of these approaches, it appears less relevant to produce methods for reflection about the plurality of the "provinces of knowledge" than to conceive the ways of forming continuities and discontinuities between the different societal spaces (Roulleau-Berger, 2011).

In Post-western space the conceptual space is relayed by a methodological space in which sociologists conceive a plurality of temporalities, places, contexts and situations in the construction of tools for field investigation in order to access the plurality of the narratives of societies via a "pluralistic discourse analysis" (Xie Lizhong, 2009, 2012a and b). Multi-sited sociology thus becomes necessary but in no way excludes the implementation of a short- or medium-term investigative procedure in a single place at certain times (Weisskoppel, 2009). So producing a multiplicity of narratives on contemporary societies depends on the competencies of individuals and groups, as well as those of the sociologist who constructs them from adjustments, links of the meaning given to the action in the research process, and produce moral economies. Here, the production of knowledge imposes negotiation competencies between the sociologist and the actors which will give rise to cooperative knowledge, abilities to exchange and share competencies, and to correct and readjust action. More precisely, it is about mastering systems to return knowledge which

configurations of the actors' experiences and activities are based on, to understand the grammar of situations and interactions to which the experiential and pragmatic engagement of the actors conform (Cefaï, 2003).

It also means sociologists need reflexive ethnography (Burawy, 2003). Marcus (1995) also had proposed « multi-sited ethnography »to account for these connections, assemblies and superpositions of a plurality of local situations. To this end, he turned the world-system into a frame of reference rather than a historical macro-context and advocated an alternation between "thin" and "dense" descriptions (Falzon, 2009). Although this authorinitially focused on subaltern subjects as objects of dominations linked to capitalist and colonialist economics, he later proposed a broadening of the field of investigation. Lila Abu- Lughod (1991) also proposed "ethnographies of the particular" as strategies for the fight against culturalist approaches. Although the experience of sociologists can be built up according to the displacements, circulation and movements of the individuals and groups with which they work, sociologists no longer confine themselves to "bounded fields" but navigate between several "shifting locations" (Gupta, Ferguson, 1997). Sociologists can conceive structural processes, situations and actions with sociological methods which are partially based upon multi-sited ethnography. Although this theoretical and methodological advance is important, these new methods cannot completely replace older methods of investigation elaborated in other historical contexts. Indeed if connections, deterritorializations and assemblies are envisaged in the construction of field procedures, the same is true of captivities, sedentarities, segregations and disqualifications.

Nowadays *connected sociology* is the choice which tends to impose itself. This signifies the implementation of multi-situated and contextualized tools to account for assemblies and disjunctions between the narratives of societies which are all legitimate as well as to describe what Ulf Hannerz (2009) calls a "continuum creolization". In this instance *methodological cosmopolitanism* pertains to a conceptual space of interaction between pragmatic sociology and critical sociology – as Luc Boltanski (2009) purposed – here federated around dynamic and non-hierarchical combinations of societal contexts, structural processes, individual and collective actions and situational orders. The conceptual space is relayed by a methodological space in which sociologists conceive a plurality of temporalities, places, contexts and situations in the construction of tools for field investigation in order to access the plurality of the narratives of society and the multivocality or polyphony (Roulleau-

Berger, 2012 ; Bastide, 2013). Just as multi-situated analysis is in no way to be confused with multi-local analysis (Falzon, 2009), *methodological cosmopolitanism* leads to a multi-situated approach which does not necessarily mean fields of investigation in several countries but rather in several differentiated places, an approach which is conceived within a single problematic. *Multi-sited ethnography* thus becomes necessary but in no way excludes the implementation of a short- or medium-term investigative procedure in a single place at certain times (Weisskoppel, 2009).

2. Compressed modernities, crisis of trust and grammars of recognition

Chang Kyung-Sup (2010) has distinguished variations of compressed modernity as internalized reflexive cosmopolitization. Compressed modernity in advanced capitalist societies are “low-order compressed modernity”, in non-Western societies as “high-order compressed modernity” and in “transition societies” like China as “compartmentalized compressed modernity”

In low-order compressed modernity” in Western European countries, as Robert Castel (2009) shows we have moved from a modernity organised on the basis of interlocking collective structures to a ‘disorganised’ form of modernity resulting from the destabilisation of the national-welfare state and the erosion of the bodies responsible for collective regulation; this once again raises the question of economic and social solidarity, along with that of access to social rights. After all, inequalities in access to social rights have proliferated in recent years, and the person ‘without rights or entitlements’ has gradually emerged, raising very serious questions about the principles of democracy (Kokoreff, Lapeyronnie, 2013). The relationship between the constitutional state and the welfare state then becomes strained, particularly when the welfare state is weakened by precarisation, racial discrimination and the curtailment of social protection. The individual’s social independence is called into question and the systems of collective regulation that produce social citizenship are destabilised by a dynamic of decollectivisation or re-individualisation**.** So, In Europe more and moremigrants, unemployed people and young people living in precarious situations lost trust in economic and political institutions.

In the Chinese experience, it means “compartmentalized compressed modernity”, China’s industrialization and urbanization are in accelating period, Li Peilin(2012, 2014) showed the structural change elasticity is still very highsocial mobility is still continuing but the Chinese society is producing multiple inequalities and uncertainties about the social destiny and future of vulnerable people, especially migrants and young people.The process of Chinese modernizationhas developed very rapidly over the last ten years in a society in transition, in which integration occurs predominantly through entry into the market economy, from which part of the population is distanced, both economically and socially. As a result, poor people, nonmingong, young unemployed people…are margilalized in new economy and also raises a crisis of trust (Sun Liping, 2008; Liu Aiyu, 2014).

The question of the ‘crisis of trust’ exists in Europe and China leading us to reconceptualise the question of the construction of social conflict and social trust in societies. So moral insecurity and mistrust that has insinuated into social interactions, particularly between those without access to a place in the society and those who have no place.We have done fieldwork in France and in China with migrants and young unemployed people (Roulleau-Berger, 1999, 2009). So we had to face with the crisis of trust which is reflecting in the interaction between the sociologist and populations. Producing a multiplicity of narratives on contemporary societies depends on the competencies of individuals and groups, as well as those of the sociologist who constructs adjustments, links of the meaning given to the action in the research process, and produce moral economies. Because the crisis of trust in Europe and in China, the production of knowledge imposes negotiation competencies between the sociologist and the actors which will give rise to cooperative knowledge, abilities to exchange and share competencies, and to correct and readjust action (Roulleau-Berger, 2007). More precisely, it is about mastering systems to return knowledge which configurations of the actors' experiences and activities are based on, to understand the grammar of situations and interactions to which the experiential and pragmatic engagement of the actors conform (Cefaï, 2003).

In each societal context the following question is asked: how does the sociologist access their fields? Their relationship with the populations can only be constructed through « grammars of recognition » (Roulleau-Berger, 2007) which differ between different countries... In different cases grammars of recognition are fragile, vary in intensity and above all at any moment could evolve into grammars of mistrust. But the sources of changes from grammars of recognition to grammars of mistrust are difficult to compare and situated on

various societal scales.For example, disqualified fields are protected everywhere, watched over by those wholive there. In addition, sociologists do not enter into them naturally; either they are introduced or they know the norms and are "recognised" almost immediately. Nonetheless, they maintain nothing but a social and moral contract that is not really stabilised with the actors. The more the fields seem to be "mined", for example working suburbs and slums... the less the borders are open and the more difficulties the sociologist meets with in defining a social and moral contract with the actors. Here the sociologist is subject to defiance and suspicion and at every turn must prove why they are there and what their intentions are as quickly as possible.

We have considered that both the people we met during our surveys and ourselves have the same bases of competencies at our disposal. We have adopted an approach which rejected "methodological irony", otherwise known as scholarly knowledge to produce a concurrent analysis, which is even sometimes corrects the attitudes of the members of ordinary society (Watson, 2001). For example, we have considered the *nonmingong* (peasant-workers) requests for recognition in China and of the young French-Maghrebi who live in working-class suburbs in Paris, Lyon and Marseille. The definition of the framework of the research experience can thus be developed around the production of moral economies (Fassin, Lézé, 2013), or the transaction, circulation, and exchange of moral and symbolic goods such as confidence, reputation, and consideration. Transactions and exchanges take place when the sociologist's and the actors in the fields' categories of perception and appreciation are sufficiently close; when acts of mutual knowledge and recognition take place. If, in a field "over here", we can talk about the shared experience when the sociologist and the actors manage to exchange symbolic goods and to determine their value together, the terms of the question are very different in a far-off field. In effect, the modes of recognition refer to various symbolic orders and the value of the goods to exchange is complex to fix and the researcher must prove their situational competencies in order to define their nature and also evaluate what "incurs debt". Knowing what must be given or exchanged with a Chinese migrant worker or an earthquake victim, at which moment and in which situation, is relatively complex.

The production of moral economies is the foundation of the interactions between the researcher and the individuals they meet in various societal contexts and local situations where the sociologist is increasingly confronted by an increase in demands for social and public recognition by populations in situations of vulnerability, poverty and social or economic disaffiliation. It is thus necessary to think about the diversity of multi-sited fields in a

comparative perspective by referring to places of social conflict and to requests for recognition, and when we find ourselves in the fields of disqualification, of "bottom up migration", of vulnerability, of discrimination (Liu Neng, 2006 ; Séhili, 2012 ; Liu Shiding, 2012 ; Shen Yuan, 2013), of segregation …. (Deboulet, 2012, Cousin, 2013) the researcher does not lose ethical responsibility, contrary to what Marcus proposes. This issue clearly appears with the question of recognising discriminated speech. The more fights for recognition are present in the field, the more their ethical responsibility increases; even more so when the fields diversify. Situations with social, ethnic, economic and political tension in fields produce mental and moral loading effects on the researcher.

3. Biopolitical apparatuses and politics of intimacy

In the democratic European states, individualization is the new watchword of public policies which are supported by the injunction to be oneself in local justice frameworks. Individuals in precarious situations, such as the unemployed, refugees and migrants, are assigned to spaces of weak legitimacy. In order to obtain the recognition of social rights such as employment and housing, these individuals have to exhibit themselves before the State or its representatives, to relate their lives including intimate details likely to create emotions and, sometimes, they even have to exhibit their bodies. This means allowing the weakest and the more vulnerable people to enter the mainstream of competition and maintain themselves in it (Ehrenberg 2010). Today, in public policies –migratory policies and employment policies- in the societies of Western Europe, expressing the injunction to be oneself means that the telling of one's life story has imposed itself as a norm both in the employment markets and within the framework of the implementation of public policies of employment, housing and social protection.

In both cases, the public actors manufacture moral economies in differentiated social spaces concerning different populations. European democracies are characterized by a pluralism of institutions and a diversity of biopolitical apparatuses. For example in France, those concerned include the unemployed, the young jobless, migrants and refugees who are taken in by economic and social insertion structures or associations. In China, the biopolitical apparatuses are directly referred to the State and concern migrant workers, the unemployed, "displaced" populations, AIDS victims, etc. The "voice" of *subaltern groups* can be heard in the complaints offices in which the ordeals and injustices confronted by citizens are made public.

These apparatuses have no equivalent in Europe. Chinese populations can also be taken care of within the framework of government associations.

Biopolitical apparatuses are set up and control the intentions and actions of individuals who are expected to produce narrative identities in accordance with the norms of institutions; this double process of injunction to be oneself and of submission to the State could be described as a "double process of subjectification and subjection" (Fassin, Memmi, 2004).The demand to be a Subject appears as a biopolitical norm present in European and Chinese societies. Harnessing bodies and subjectivities is a cornerstone for moral economies in China and in Western Europe. Thus, subjectivity has been domesticated and socially, politically and economically instrumentalized. Different kinds of social groups struggle and compete to gain access to a moral autonomy which is controlled by others. Individuals have to show a sense of autonomy, being able to act and think reflexively on different social *scenes*. These scenes happen to provide self-esteem restoration in a way that will allow the harnessing of subjectivities and the domesticating of the individuals' selves. Those who are ascribed to these situations have to enter a regime of inter-individual competition to be granted access to legitimate moral economies. In China, individuals must increasingly demonstrate their capacity for autonomy and enterprise in a context of great economic development. For example, the injunction to be oneself appears clearly to be the norm with the deterioration of the working conditions of the recently qualified young people.

So for the sociologist what about the policy of intimacy? How does the researcher access the *self* of the individuals when reconstituting biographies? Individuals must show themselves to be autonomous, and capable of action and of reflection in various stages of social plans to restore self-respect which permit harnessing the subjectivities and confiscating the "selves" of the individuals. Individuals, signed up to these plans despite themselves, are constrained to competitive relationships and inter-individual competition to access legitimate moral economies. Here individuals endure *double-bind* hardships where there is a gap between being themselves and capturing subjectivities, so difficulties in accessing the "self".The sociologist is thus also confronted with a *double-bind* situation: on one hand we cannot participate in this process of capturing subjectivities in the survey and on the other hand if they cannot get close to the individuals, no mutual recognition can be installed. For example, fieldwork with invisible populations and « subaltern » groups in fields of "bottom-end" migration, disqualification, discrimination .. . can only take place from the moment that the researcher and

the actors co-produce a moral economy where the researcher accepts to write them with the demands of meaning and recognition, and where the actors recognise this moral, even political, competency that produces an honour system with variable intensity according to situations encountered and political and societal contexts (Laé, Murard, 2011).

When the life lines of individuals and groups met are often exhausted, researchers were regularly confronted by a feeling of self-shame that the individuals experience and which is not always visible or expressed. The life narrative thus became impractical in some instances by getting too close to that which creates the feeling of shame in the individuals. Biographical interviews inevitably reopen some wounds, rekindling ancient sufferings. For example, when we have done fieldwork in 2013 in Sichuan about life after earthquake, it was quite indecent to do biographies with victims. The collective and individual biography in practice does not always allow for respecting the narrative pact, so it becomes necessary to construct a methodological scope to redefine the terms of the narrative pact, to invent a methodological plan where making the narrative allows the redefinition of the narrative pact with individuals. This is achieved by trying less to know how the narrative is determined but rather how it is determining, that is to say how it models the past and the future. It is possible to construct a scope which favours maintenance of self by creating a protected space by avoiding showing situations encountered by individuals, lesions, and sufferings, as too negative. For example we have thus proposed *city narratives* to individuals to avoid life narratives of young unemployed immigrants (Roulleau - Berger,1991); we asked individuals to take us to the places where they underwent the work experiences that they recounted. The *city narrative* thus became another form of life narrative. In foreign fields, the political and local constraints do not always allow a foreign researcher to travel around on their own with the autochtons and the researcher is thus limited in the elaboration of their methodological plan. And city narratives could be individual and collective. Moreover, individual and collective narrative also refers to a conception of the individual in various societal contexts.

4. Multi-sited biography and narrative pact

Complex societies produce multiple collective narratives which co-exist in relatively autonomous way or on the contrary, intertwine or fit together. Narratives of contemporary societies and individual life narratives were increasingly thought about in terms of their dynamics and complexity. Life narratives reveal juxtapositions and overlaps in societal and civilisational contexts and give access to the plurality of collective narratives. For example. we

know that the processes of individuation which are very active in European and Chinesee societies are characterised by a multiplication of biographical changes and reversals of situations. Individual biographies are constructed from junctions that correspond with changes in spatial regimes in the form of geographical mobilities, as well aschanges in economic regimes in the form of professional mobilities. In the journeys of insecure, discriminated, and segregated populations, "biographical crossroads"(Bessin, Bidart, Grossetti, 2010) appear in a repetitive manner.

Along with metropolization, biographies become cosmopolitan and complex, forming plural identities built not only in different situations but also in multisituated times and spaces. A process of differentiation and individuation is helping to produce a plurality and diversity of complex careers that are now replacing life histories built on continuity and stability. City dwellers, especially vulnerable groups, have to adapt themselves to a diversity of new, constantly overlapping work situations that are difficult to hierarchise and to move from one urban activity to another; as a result, they are having to adopt a succession of different identities in the City. The bifurcations are structured in the conjunction of spatial and professional mobility.

Along the intensification of migration the figure of the new transmigrant (Tarrius, 2000, 2013) is really emblematic to imagine new way to define « polygamic biographies »(Beck, 2006), it means to develop methodological theory to be able to catch the multispatiality, the multitemporality of multisited individual and collective biographies. With each change of place, events (wars, unemployment...) have an influence on the repertoires of individual and collective resources that re-organise to compensate for the social statuses, places and identities of individuals. The succession of junctions and the formation of biographical crossroads – especially in migrants's lives- result from the structural processes of the work in different societies and the capacities of action, mobilisation, circulation of various categories of social groups and individuals (Roulleau-Berger, 2010).

For the sociologist, these junctions are difficult to grasp in their materiality in the framework of the fulfilment of biographical narratives, even in a multi-sited ethnographic approach. The biographical narrative can decreasingly be apprehended in a relative linearity but rather as starting from disjointed sequences linked to various spaces and temporalities. For the sociologist, the issue becomes that of taking back the meaning of the conjunctions and

biographical ruptures. Obviously this means thinking about the journeys and contexts while avoiding reducing the contextualisation of journeys into distant forms of determinisms (Demazière, Samuel, 2010). The issue becomes: what causes rupture? what causes conjunction? To respond to these questions, the sociologist takes into account the way in which structural processes play on the construction of ruptures and conjunctions and the meaning that is attributed to them by individuals. The researcher is thus invited to produce a biographical method which allows the pluri-situated dynamic of migrant individual and collective experiences to be recreated. This means following them, for example, in their geographic mobilities and in various societal contexts, it means "multi-sited biography".

Conclusion

We will be considering both the local and transnational dimensions of academic research as part of our attempt to analyse the effects of societal context on the production of theoretical methodologies based on local research situations. However, we will also be analysing transnational flows between the various contexts of knowledge linked to research methodologies and considering both the processes involved in the production of sociological knowledge and cultural variations in research practices. Theories, knowledge and methods cannot circulate until these equivalences have been established and appear to be relatively stable and frameworks based on common conventions and norms governing academic research have been put in place.

The question of innovation in the production of academic knowledge is a permanent one. In the social sciences and humanities, however, it is seldom approached in terms of the knowledge linked to theoretical methodologies. Among researchers in the social sciences, it is sociologists for whom the question of adjusting methods to the field of research is keenest, with the knowledge linked to theoretical methodologies being regularly put to the test. The difficulties of working as a sociologist are at their most intense in the area of inequality and social injustice, riven as it is by dissension, conflict and social, economic and political tension. These situations force sociologists to develop new methodological knowledge in order to produce an academic approach and new research postures (i.e. the relationship between researcher and subject). Practices give rise, in these very different contexts, to sociological knowledge obtained in response to questions that are similar but ‘situated’ in sociologists’ own societal experiences; we will be posing questions about the universal value of sociological knowledge.

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A Neurosis Analysis of Su-ku: Understanding China's Revolution with Classical Psychoanalysis

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Abstract: This paper tries to interpret Su-ku phenomenon with the help of classical psychoanalytical theory. From this perspective, we could find that it would be oversimplified to say that China's land reform or even revolution itself was either a form of liberation or oppression for peasants. The psychological feelings of liberation were always involved into history—the history that was precisely denied by revolution itself. This is the way this paper tries to understand the emotions in the revolution. And this may became a fresh start of re-considering China's revolution and even its effort of modernization in 20th century.

Key Words: Land Reform, Su-ku, Oedipus Complex

Revolution in mainland China has brought about enormous social and political changes in its 20thcountry. The "stunning victory" (Perry, 2002, p.111) of CCP over KMT in 1949 has already inspired lots of sociological studies. Among them, the importance and effectiveness of CCP's mass mobilization strategieshave already attracted scholars' interests heavily. In Mao's opinion, in order to draw the masses onto the side of the CCP, it was imperative that the traditionally feudal distribution of land ownership in rural China be abolished. This radical land reform was a central and fundamental political aim of the CCP almost from its inception and the policies of expropriation, re-distribution and communal re-organization pursued by the party-led Land Reform Movement continued on a massive scale until the mid-1950s.

The promise of the Land Reform Movement and the policy enactment of same Movement through are of tremendous historical significance when attempting to understand the revolution as well as 20th century's China. Many studies have pointed out the manipulative psychological dimension of the activities, actions and instruments practiced during this period in the rural villages and communities by the revolutionary forces. In the efforts to educate and mobilize the peasants' support for land reform and instill nationalist fervor, the techniques included fostering a sense of collective memory;

the oral and public recitation of personal history; and, ultimately, the construction of a new political and social identity among the peasants. (Cheng, 1999; Fang, 1997; Guo, 2001; Guo& Sun, 2002; F. Li, 2000; K. Li, 1999; L. Li, 2007; X. Zhang, 2004)

Those techniques could be all represented by one small but relatively significant political phenomenon, which, in the past ten years of China's sociological studies, has been deemed as a very important clue to understand China's revolution as well as its efforts of modernization in 20thcentury. This Phenomenon is called Su-ku.

In a state-sanctioned dictionary of 1952, the definition of Su-ku was given in the following way:

> *"Su-ku means to share an oral personal history about being persecuted by class enemies both for the purpose of inspiring class hatred in the listeners, while reaffirming one's own class standing."* (Chen 1952: 331)

Su-ku was invented and used as an important political instrument by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to achieve the target of mass mobilization and building up new identities.However, in order to fully understand Su-ku, we must start from the rule of traditional rural China.

1. The rule of Rituals

The Land Reform Movement was carried out in traditional rural China area. As lots of studied have already shown us, it had its own power structure, social structure and traditions before the revolution.

Local elites had attained control and influence over local affairs because of numerous factors such as their age, wealth, education, family pedigree, personal prestige and military power(Fei, 1992; Geisert, 1979; Huang, 1985). As Alitto bluntly describes it, they were a "symbiotic coalition of bandits, militarists, officials, functionaries, landlords and local bullies and evil gentry." (Alitto, 1979, p. 225)

Though there were lots of changes in China's rural society during the late Qing and early Republican period, some basic traditional characteristics still existed. Besides the power resting with local elites, another characteristic of traditional rural China was a particular form of community. According to Fei, pre-revolutionary China can be described as "Chaxugeju", a term which means "differential mode of association". Fei argues that the ingrained concept of Chaxugeju was the foundation around which Chinese

rural society was organized. In essence, Chaxugeju describes how individuals in a community are linked to each other by their different social relationships and these, in turn, construct a series of overlapping social networks. Although there are comparable "differential modes of association" in Western societies, however, in Western societies the Chaxugeju concept is not as crucially important as it was for China's traditional rural society. In rural China, according to Fei, the "self" was embedded in social relationships and the village is a whole community:

> "*No matter what the reasons, the basic unit of Chinese rural society is the village…People in rural China know of no other life than that dictated by their own parochialism. It is a society where people live from birth to death in the same place, and where people think that this is the normal way of life.…Every child grows up in everyone else's eyes, and in the child's eyes everyone and everything seem ordinary and habitual. This is a society without strangers, a society based totally on the familiar.*" (X. Fei, et al., 1992, p. 41)

In this society the most important pattern of social organization, Fei writes, was what the Chinese call "Jia". In rural China, the word "Jia" refers both to the immediate family and to the family lineage: past, present and future. In the most common sense, Jia describes the extended family and the degree of kinship in the family tree. Jia is the central organizing principle throughout the history of Chinese civilization (Bellah, 1965, p. 94) and it is based on Jia, or kinship lineage, that the community of social relationships which Chaxugeju encompass is first made possible. As Fei describes this:

> "*In Chinese society, the most important relationship – kinship – is similar to the concentric circles formed when a stone is thrown into a lake. Kinship is a social relationship formed through marriage and reproduction. The networks woven by marriage and reproduction can be extended to embrace countless numbers of people...Despite the vastness, though, each network is like a spider's web in the sense that it centers on oneself. Everyone has this kind of a kinship network, but the people covered by one network are not the same as those covered by any other…Therefore, the web of social relationships linked with kinship is specific to each person. Each web has a self as its center, and every web has a different center.*" (X. Fei, et al., 1992, p. 63)

In addition to the function of providing social organization, the extended family networks denoted by Jia also have a significant economic function: "The members of this

group possess common property, keep a common budget and cooperate together to pursue a common living through division of labor." (X. Fei, 1983, p. 24)

Chaxugeju, the community-constructing pattern described above, is not solely reliant on Jia, or kinship lineage, as an organizing principle for the society. Fei argues that the pattern of Chaxugejucan also be observed in the nature of "spatial relationships" in traditional rural China: "Every family regards its own household as the center and draws a circle around it. This circle is the neighborhood, which is established to facilitate reciprocation in daily life." (Fei, et al., 1992, p. 64) From the perspective of spatial relationships, physical proximity plays a role in how a village becomes a community, and, in turn, which system of power structures develops. Fei describes it thus:

> *"(1) In the traditional Chinese power structure there were two different layers: on the top, the central government; at the bottom, the local governing unit whose leaders were the gentry class. (2) There was a de facto limit to the authority of the central government. Local affairs, managed in the community by the gentry, were hardly interfered with by the central authorities. (3) Legally there was only one track – from the top down – along which passed imperial orders. But in actual practice, by the use of intermediaries such as the government servants and a locally chosen shang-yao, or functionary, of the same type, unreasonable orders might be turned back. This influence from the bottom up is not usually recognized in discussions of the formal governmental institutions of China, but it was effective nevertheless. (4) The mechanism of bringing influences to bear from the bottom upward was worked through the informal pressure of the gentry upon their relatives in office and out or upon friends who had taken the same examinations. By this means influence could be brought to bear sometimes even upon the emperor himself. (5) The self-governing organization so called arose from the practical needs of the community. The power of this group was not derived from the central imperial power but came from the local people themselves.*" (H.-t. Fei, et al., 1968, pp. 83-84)

Finally, an important distinguishing characteristic of rural Chinese community can be seen in a sense of morality, which was quite different from that of modern society and could be used to organize and explain all the characters above. According to Fei's research, the code of morality was, by and large, based on the philosophy and principles of Confucianism. The guiding precept being, argues Fei, that of "Kejifu li". This is a phrase of Confucianism and its meaning in English is: Subdue thy self and adhere to the

rituals. The cultivation and development of one's self according to Confucianism principles was, for every individual in society "the starting point in the system of morality inherent in Chinese social structure." (X. Fei, et al., 1992, p. 74)The philosophy, or religion, of Confucianism prescribes a number of ritualistic moral obligations which individuals must adhere to in their daily lives. These rituals include filial piety (of children to their parents), fraternal duty (in between brothers), and loyalty and sincerity (between friends).

In a paper titled *Rule of Ritual*, Fei contends that these rituals are, in fact, the rules that governed daily life in rural China. (X. Fei, et al., 1992, p. 96) In his study on Chinese traditions, Bary has pointed out that such rituals afford "an ideal means for ordering one's personal life" and also represent "the ideal mode of governance" (De Bary, Bloom, Chan, & Adler, 1999, p. 43). To explain how this ideal mode of governance functioned at a practical level, Fei undertook a detailed analysis of the practice of Confucianism rituals in rural Chinese society. Fei determined that there are two significant aspects to the concept of such rituals in rural China which encompass "both the ritual itself and the action taken to conform to the ritual" (X. Fei, et al., 1992, p. 98). The rituals are those "publicly recognized behavioral norms" which have been passed down from generation to generation and not only include those "behavioral norms", but also the "accumulated social experience" that can direct or guide behavior and resolve social problems and issues. A major precondition for the rule, or governance, by rituals is the existence of a stable societal structure and cohesive culture. Equally and opposing, in a society undergoing rapid and frequent change, the accumulated social experience and the established behavioral norms based on the society's history lose their validity: "A society governed by rituals cannot easily appear in an era of rapid changes." (X. Fei, et al., 1992, p. 100) Because the societies of rural China had the necessary stability and cohesiveness due to the long tradition of community constructed by "Chaxugeju", it was possible to have governance in rural China based on a "rule of rituals."According to Confucianism, it is this that made the rural society's politics possible:

"There is government, when the prince is prince, and the minister is minister; when the father is father, and the son is son."[1]

Also, In Analects, the central text of Four Books of Confucianism, there is a parable discussing the ritual of practicing humaneness and benevolence called "ren":

> *Yan Yuan asked about ren.*
>
> *The Master said, "To subdue oneself and conform to rituals is ren. If a man can for one day subdue himself and conform to rituals, all under heaven will ascribe ren to him. Is the practice of ren from a man himself, or is it from others?"*
>
> *Yan Yuan said, "I beg to ask the steps of that process."*
>
> *The Master replied, "Look not at what is contrary to rituals; listen not to what is contrary to rituals; speak not what is contrary to rituals."*
>
> *Yan Yuan then said, "Though I am deficient in intelligence and vigor, I will make it my business to practice this lesson."*[2]

In essence, the underlying message for the reader on the practice of the ritual is to strictly "obey"; do your duty and do not act or behave in any manner that is "contrary to rituals".

The external relationship between the rural communities of China with the power structures of the national central government, according to Duara, was conducted, or parented, on behalf of the rural community by the (previously discussed) "local elites". The leading figures of the local elite were, according to the dictates of Confucianism rituals, quite literally viewed as the "parents" of all the peasants in their village. (Bellah, 1965, p. 103) As a practical level of Confucianism, the relationship between the peasants

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[1] Confucian Analects, Chapter 12. See Legge, J. (1966). *The Chinese classics* (Di 2 ban. ed.). Vol. I. (p 256.). Taibei: Wenxing shu dian.

[2] Confucian Analects, Book 12,Ch.1. Legge, J. (1966). *The Chinese classics* (Di 2 ban. ed.). Vol. I. (p 250). Taibei: Wen xing shu dian.

and local elites was defined by the ritual of filial piety. Filial piety is not restricted to the expression of respect and affection towards one's parents, but is centrally about the precept of duty, as the *Hsiao Ching*[3]:

> *The Services of love and reverence to parents when alive, and those of grief and sorrow to them when dead: – these completely discharge the fundamental duty of living men. (Ch. 18.)*[4]

> *Filial piety is the root of (all) virtue, (the stem) out of which grows (all moral) teaching. (Ch. 1.)*[5]

> *Filial piety is the constant (method) of Heaven, the righteousness of Earth, and the practical duty of Man. (Ch. 7)*[6]

Filial piety is one of the five core precepts defining relationships and duties in Confucianism. The determination that the ritual of filial piety is the guiding precept for governance and political relationships is expressed as unambiguously as Confucianism ever expresses itself:

> *The duke Jing of Qi asked Confucius about government. Confucius replied, "There is government, when the prince is prince, and the minister is minister; when the father is father, and the son is son." (Confucian Analects, 12: 11)*

In the political sense, the ritual of filial piety is thus: A peasant must perform his duty as a peasant; a landlord must perform his duty as a landlord. In practice, by the end of the 19th century, the governmental relationship between the central state and the local rural societies were, by and large, dominated by a model which Duara has termed "protective brokerage" (Duara, 1988), in which the local elites conduct themselves as the parental advocates of their rural society, especially in a commercial dealing, with the

[3] *Hsiao Ching*, one of Confucianism *Five Classics*. Its central topic is about Confucianism filial piety.
[4] See Confucius, & Legge, J. (1966). *The Sacred books of China: The texts of Confucianism.* (P488). Delhi,: Motilal Banarsidass.
[5] See Confucius, & Legge, J. (1966). *The Sacred books of China: The texts of Confucianism*. (P466).Delhi,: Motilal Banarsidass.

[6] Confucius, & Legge, J. (1966). *The Sacred books of China: The texts of Confucianism*. (p. 473).Delhi,: Motilal Banarsidass.

central government. However, a fundamental ambition of Land Reform Movement was to overturn and abolish the traditional social structure of rural China. Thus Land reform was presented as an act of class struggle and the peasants needed to be “awakened” to their “class consciousness”.

2. Su-ku and the New China

Nonetheless, the Land Reform Movement, at its most fundamental level, cannot just be viewed as an economic event involving the material re-distribution of wealth and property. Land reform did change the economic structure, but it also altered the social structure, the traditional culture, and the nature of political processes in rural China. The key factor for understanding such immense changes was the state-mandated differentiation of the population into defined classes. (Cheng, 1999, p. 9) The mission and the achieved result of the Land Reform Movement and its implementation policies were to construct a “class society”. Because it is necessary, Mao proclaimed, and it is the only way to know “Who are our enemies? Who are our friends?” Determining this, Mao continued, “is a question of the first importance for the revolution.” (Tse-Tung Mao, 1926, p. 13)

The definition from that state-sanctioned dictionary above encompasses the whole meaning of Su-ku in a very concise way. Each important component part of Su-ku practice is mentioned: Confession (sharing of a self-history), suffering (being persecuted), emotions (hatred and love), and class identification (class enemy and class standing).

Historically, Su-ku was firstly implemented in the CCP’s Land Reform Movement and later on by the PLA army with the express purpose of raising political consciousness. The initial method or technique was improved largely in its use by the army and as such was recognized, in its refined form, to be a practical political tool or instrument; so it was then re-introduced nation-widely back into the campaigns of the Land Reform Movement.

In May 13 of 1946, the CCCCP(Central Committee of CCP) issued a directive on propaganda efforts to promote the Land Reform Movement, and in the second section of that political directive it says:

"In order to support the current mass movement, newspapers in every province should disclose the evils of traitors, the gentry and tyrants, and continually report the suffering and exploitation of the peasants. Newspapers in each province should discover more stories like that of Bai Mao nv,[7] *and report them continually. The exemplary and touching stories of suffering that were found everywhere during past Su-ku actions should be reported in order to show the just nature of the mass movement and the guilt and punishment of the local gentries. Writers and artists should produce more works like Bai Mao nv."* (Archives, C., 1981: 10)

The date of this directive is just nine days after the "May 4th Directive of 1946", which shows how priority the Su-ku Movement was for the larger mission of land reform. From this directive it can be seen that using exemplary stories had already become a central tenet of Su-ku. Moreover, the instrument of conducting Su-ku had also been used in those local bureaus for the training programs which the 16th item of the May 4th Directive mentions. For example, in October of 1946, a directive from Jinji Prefectural Administrative Office[8] advises that: "The principle training program should be one of exemplary reporting, recollection and self-examination." (Archives, H., 1990: 89)

From reports such as this, evidence was gathered that Su-ku could successfully provoke very strong emotional reactions among of masses: Extreme hatred toward landlords, and then toward the KMT, while, at the same time, invoking extreme feelings of love toward the Land Reform Movement and the CCP. The work teams strived to take advantage of the people's emotional turmoil brought up in the Su-ku Assembly in order

[7]Bai Mao nv, translated means 'the white-haired girl'. It is a Chinese operatic ballet, and was also performed at the Beijing Opera and a made into a film after 1950. The opera was based on the true stories of women in Western China in the 1940's. The main story here is about a miserable suffering girl who is persecuted by a local landlord. She can't stand the persecution and escape into the mountains, relying on the support and food from people worshipping the local God in a temple. Her hair becomes white because of a lack of salt. That's why she was called 'the white-haired girl'.

[8] "*A Directive from JinjiPrefectural Administrative Office Concerning the Mass Mobilization for Implementation of Land Reform*" October 08, 1946,Hebei Archives, 1990. Jinjirefers to Shanxi province and Hebei province.

to accomplish its political mission: Gathering accounts of suffering and education or 'brainwashing'.[9]

The standard procedure for accumulating stories of suffering was to create separate gatherings, or symposiums, on different topics of suffering such as accounts from hired peasants, from poor peasants account, etc. "In every kind of symposium, one model did the calculation first, then the others did the additional discussions. Some people started with labor's account, then went to exploitations; some people started with exploitations, then went to labor's account. By doing this, cadres and activists learned how to calculate, and they could do the report to masses so that the later knew how to calculate in separated groups." (Archives, H., 1990: 163). The amassed tales of suffering, statistically documented, brought more "crying, sighing and coughing. In calculation, the people woke up." (Archives, H., 1990: 163)

In its report, the Bohai local bureau uses the word "ShuaNaojin" in reference to a large Su-ku campaign conducted for the purposes of land reform and mass mobilization. In the Bohai local dialect, the word "ShuaNaojin" is an exact translation of 'brainwashing' and the "ShuaNaojin meeting" was part of an indoctrination campaign. According to the bureau's report, there were four topics and related purposes for the discussion at the meeting. The first was to dismantle the "muddled ideas of the Fanshened mass", which refers to those peasants that believed that exploitation was reasonable and felt a moral duty to pay rent. The second topic was to dissolve the apprehensions of the masses about "a change in the weather" –which meant the restoration of the "reactionary rule". The third was to gain the confidence of the Fanshened mass in order to establish organizations. The fourth purpose was to destroy the traditional moral codes that reigned in the rural area.

The enhancement of political consciousness and class consciousness was called "awakening". In its conclusion, the report sums up the results of conducting the Su-ku assembly and the initial procedural steps of gathering accounts of suffering and brainwashing, or education, and said, following those procedures: "People changed their minds totally. This process works to change the people, and also demonstrates our

[9]The report uses a term from local dialect "ShuaNaojin", which can be exactly translated as"brainwashing". The word "Shua" means washing or painting; "Naojin" means head or brain.

exemplary efforts. Doing this well will make people change their minds, and become Fanshened activists." (Archives, H., 1990: 167).

In late September of 1947, Mao personally edited a handbook that was used in PLA for Su-ku movement, wrote a personal dedication and ordered that the Su-ku handbook be published and distributed to the whole of the PLA.(Xiao, hua& Tang, Conglie, 1988, P. 37; Sun, Chengwu, 1994, P.20) Su-ku was soon being used in all the "liberated" areas not only for the educating and boosting morale among soldiers, but also for the implementation of land reform in the villages. Large volumes of the Su-ku handbook were printed and distributed to the PLA units and commanders but also to the work teams responsible for conducting land reform. The success of Su-ku for education and "thought reform" was immediate and great, according to the reports: "Usually after only one Su-ku meeting, they are ready for battle. Liberated soldiers become an important resource of the new PLA army and re-education has become an important part of political work in the army." (LRBT 2006: 261) We can find a further support of how important this ideology education was for CCP in its war with KMT from Mao's works. In March of 1948, Mao especially emphasized the important status of Su-ku and its excellent effect. He said in an essay that:

"…What is most noteworthy, however, is the new type of ideological education movement in the army, which was carried out for more than two months last winter by the methods of pouring out grievances and the three check-ups. The correct unfolding of the movement for pouring out grievances (the wrongs done to the laboring people by the old society and by the reactionaries) and the three check-ups (on class origin, performance of duty and will to fight) greatly heightened the political consciousness of commanders and fighters throughout the army in the fight for the emancipation of the exploited working masses, for nation-wide land reform and for the destruction of the common enemy of the people, the Chiang Kai-chek bandit gang. It also greatly strengthened the firm unity of all commanders and fighters under the leadership of the Communist Party."(Mao, 1948/1956, P. 214)

In 1948, Mao further pointed out that "this new type of ideological education movement in the army" should be combined with land reform.(Mao, 1948/1956, p. 215) Thus Su-ku started to become one of major political techniques that were used in land reform. During land reform, Su-ku was usually organized and conducted by the work teams overseeing the practical implementation. As the most common political instrument

employed by the work teams,[10] and for the land reform efforts, Su-ku was further refined for use at the local village level.

Most of the stories told at such public meetings were common knowledge in the village; such as who worked for landlords, how hard the work was, how little the wages and salary were. The leaders attempted to provoke and draw out a contrast between the landlords' good life and the peasants' miserable lives. Most of the knowledge exchanged at the meeting was common and had been taken for granted by the peasants as such. However, the work teams and the local cadres made every effort to convince the poor and hired peasants to look at the commonplace situations in a new way: from the revolutionary perspective of class oppression. This was an 'awakening' or eye-opening process that consisted, first of all, of educational procedures not only for the local peasants and cadres, but even for some work team members: "The repetition and reminder of old acts of cruelty and the tales of deprivation not only served to enflame peasant hatred but also frequently constituted something of an education for the work team cadres, especially those from 'enlightened gentry' families and from the cities."[11]

In conclusion, considering su-ku from its historical context, the confession is a collective confession since the purpose of the behavior includes both the emotional effect on oneself, and – since it is in public and in a group – on others; and the suffering can be termed here as 'social suffering' since the suffering expressed has been categorized as 'class suffering', which means, it is a suffering coming not only from the individual, but arising from a social and political system. A reasonable consequence, after establishing the evidence proving social suffering, which Su-ku aimed to elicit from the sufferers, was, to paraphrase: *This old social and political system which has brought people so much suffering must be destroyed!* Thus we can take Su-ku as a Chinese political confession: a collective confession on social suffering.

[10]CCJP(*Ch'ang Chiang JihPao*), 8 Jan. 51 [221] and CCJP, 6 Jan, 51 [370]; and [CF], Shue, 1980, 73.
[11]CCJP, 11 Jan. 51 [56], [CF] Vivienne, 1980, 74.

3. A Neurosis analysis of Su-ku

Shneider has already pointed out that if we consider the repressive-repressed relationship from a "social power" perspective, there is a possibility of discussing "social neurosis" (Schneider, 1975: 162). However, different from his interpretation which is based the possibility of neurosis on class struggle within affluent capitalism, I would like to find the possibility of doing social neurosis from an analysis of the "*Su-ku*" phenomena with a horizon of understanding China's revolution.

As Freud says, there are three sources of our modern suffering, in which the third one is the "mutual relationships of human beings in the family, the state and the society" (Freud, 1985: 274). This third one, according to Freud, is the most "astonishing" and the most important reason for understanding neurosis. The possibility of social neurosis, as Freud says, may be found from the diagnosis of some part of the civilization or "some epochs of civilization". This is what I am trying to find out in *Su-ku*.

According to FeiXiaotong and other scholars, China's traditional rural society before the revolution was a self sufficient community that was consisted of kinship lineage, and was dominated by local elites, whether they are "protective brokerage" or "entrepreneurial brokerage". We can describe such a structure also as a patriarchal despotism. The ordinary peasants relied on local elites on almost every aspect of their daily lives because the local elites owned almost all resources including wealth, power, qualification of morality interpretation and connections with the power of central government and with world outside. In such self-sufficient local society, the local elite class played a role of father to local ordinary peasants. There were both love and hatred emotions from the local peasants to local elites. On the one hand, the peasants need landlords on almost everything, and the establishment of landlord's authority is also justified by various aspects including his economic success, political success, even moral superiority and his age. Without his authority, the local society could not go on. Even those entrepreneurial brokerages still had a similar function like a primal father. And local elites were those people who got their "historical rights". On the other hand, there were also hatred feelings toward those landlords, especially in those exiled peasants. However, such kind of hatred and even rebellion toward the authority of local elites were

only about the governing position, or their social superior status, but not about the system. Thus the authority of the rural society and the ordinary peasants formed an oppressing-oppressed structure. And this relationship consists of the very basic political structure of traditional rural China. Along with the love and hatred feelings toward landlords, ordinary peasants put landlord as their model: landlordis their identification. All of these characteristics give us a clear model of Oedipus complex on social level.

In Land Revolution, such a structure was broken, or was reversed: by defining the term people, CCP constructed a new authority in rural China along with the process of Land Reform, classification, and *Su-ku*. This reversion is the very essential meaning of "Fanshen". Ordinary peasants, especially the poor and hired peasants, become the new power holder in revolutionary practices. Meanwhile the former local elites, the former "father" of local society, became the "oppressed" class. Thus we can find three clues about emotions in *Su-ku* practice from Oedipus Complex perspective. The first, a coming true of the dream of Oedipus: the former sons now "fanshen", and become the authority of the local world. And secondly, the realization of such Oedipus dream contains a kind of angry feeling toward the landlords, as we talked above, an angry that comes from peasants for the lost of traditional Confucianism morality. However, there is one more level in this revolutionary Oedipus revenge. Those fanshened peasants still held the emotion that was formed by the former Oedipus complex: the hostility toward their father. In *Su-ku*, the past daily life becomes a story of how did an Oedipus violate his father. In other words, in revolution, the reversion of the past social structure extended into the narrative of *Su-ku*. In such a narrative, even the overthrown landlord class, the former fathers themselves, started to feel that they were the sons and their former daily activities toward peasants were evil: they had been patricidal! According to Freud's Oedipus theory, peasants who joined the revolution should have a huge sense of guilty. However, this sense was abolished successfully by *Su-ku*. The double reversion gave a birth of both the great guilty feelings of former landlords and the conscience feeling of the former peasants. Thus a myth called revolution is produced: in this myth, the children band together to kill their primal father and take the authority. And this is not even the end of the story. Liu Shaoqi pointed out anxiously in his letter of 1947 that a lot of local cadres

"married daughters of landlords as wives" (Archives, C., 1981: 72). This phenomenon can exactly be explained by Freud's words:

"*Identification is known to psychoanalysis as the earliest expression of an emotional tie with another person. It plays a part in the early history of the Oedipus complex. A little boy will exhibit a special interest in his father; he would like to grow like him and be like him, and take his place everywhere. We may say simply that he takes his father as his ideal. This behavior has nothing to do with a passive or feminine attitude towards his father (and towards males in general); it is on the contrary typically masculine. It fits in very well with the Oedipus complex, for which it helps to prepare the way.*" (Freud, 1985: 134).

That is the following story of the Oedipus: after killing his father, he married his father's women. Those CCP leaders, or local cadres, or members of work teams, who used to be the exiled sons of local authority, now come back. After killing their fathers, they take their lands, take over their authority and marry their women. These behaviors clearly indicate their Oedipus complex. They want to become "them". The different thing is just that, those revolutionary Oedipus do that without any feeling of guilty. This Freudian Oedipus revenge hides itself behind the mask of revolution. The practice of revolution and the hidden complex of Oedipus thus fit in together very well.

This historical reversion in revolution brought a double reversion in *Su-ku* practice. In *Su-ku*, the daily life that used to appear no problem to peasants now becomes a problem throughout a problematic process. The former fathers become the "local tyrants and evil gentries" and also the targets of political struggle. The daily life in *Su-ku* become a history of how did the today's bad son, that is, the former landlords, repressed today's justice father in the past years, that is, the former peasants.

Different from Freud's Oedipus myth, which is only against toward the specific father, *Su-ku* turns to criticize the former social and political structure. One important technique of *Su-ku* is to help the peasants to "raise up" their "class consciousness", to help them know that there is a "class" behind the specific person. The reality behind *Su-ku's* critical

confession is the "normal" structure that was constructed by revolution. In revolution, the authority of "people" become normal whereas the former social-political structure become "evil", "sick", or "abnormal". The Oedipus *Su-ku* is a revolutionary moral confessional practice. It is a place where the new feelings of "conscience" and "guilty" were produced. It is also the place where a new kind of revolutionary morality was produced. Thus *Su-ku* brings us a real oedipal topic: patricide is justified! Such a murder gives the senses of conscience as well as guilty: peasant's conscience and landlord's guilty. Most people who did *Su-ku* started to feel both extremely hatred and extremely love: hatred toward "old society" and love toward CCP and "new society". This distinction brings another conclusion: revolution is advanced. People can feel the "good" of revolution and they are getting away from the "old" and "evil" society. By such construction of a linear history, CCP adopted a role of "savior", "God", or a role of "therapeutic": it is the One that can heal the suffering of Chinese; it is the One that can save China.[12]

Such senses of conscience and guilty ironically twisted together with the traditional morality: in revolution, part of the traditional morality was not abandoned, but strengthened. For example, according to Ying Xing's research in Liu Ping village, there were few peasants that were classified as "local tyrants and evil gentries" in land reform. However, there was only one who was executed by new government. And the real reason, according to Ying Xing's research, was his immoral sexual affairs from the perspective of Confucianism. According to Ying Xing's research, such immoral sexual affairs, in the Liu Ping area, were not sufficient reason for execution even according to traditional morality. However, during the period of revolution, traditional morality was ironically twisted together with revolutionary morality and was evened strengthened.

Through the land reform period, in order to become CCP's (or God's) people, kinship families must differentiate themselves. Thus different classes came out. The revolutionary practices constructed a sense of "otherness". The former "embedded" self that FeiXiaotong described had already been abolished. People started to look at themselves and look at each other not through a "we-relationship", but through an eye of

[12] There are a large number of the "red songs" that were written in China's revolution for appraising CCP. And many of them portrayed CCP as the messiah of China.

"class". "Others" that outside the camp of "people" are all in danger and even is evil. And even in people's camp, peasants are also different to each other. The former neighbor now becomes stranger. And this strange other is a Freudian other: "people" cannot find a reason of loving his/her neighbor, on the country, neighbor become the object of hatred. Thus people, as a whole group, adopted a nature of aggressive.

During this construction process of different class, CCP's work teams played a role of authoritarian state exactly as Horkheimer describes. The authority of CCP reached to the every aspect of life and had been enforced to the utmost in all phases of life from the decision of identity to the interpretation of history, from the distribution of land to decisions of life and death. The "free structuring" was also strictly forbidden. The authoritarian state was repressive "in all of its forms". Thus besides the new father that was brought by revolutionary reversion to rural area, that is, besides the establishment of peasants' authority, there is another real "authority" hidden behind: the authoritarian state. *Su-ku*, or revolution provide peasants an access to "modern" factors: it abolishes the former social-political structure in rural society and brought a sense of "state". In revolution, the state took the position of family in the process of individual's growing up. The images of traditional father, "have gradually disappeared behind the institutions" (Marcuse, 1955: 89). CCP's state bureaucratic institutions started to approach and control every aspect of daily life. Along with such a change of super ego, the basic characters of performance principle and surplus repression are all changed, as well as the meaning of love and hatred. Individual had been integrated successfully in the totality of such a society and the result is the "immediate identification of the individual with his society and, through it, with the society as a whole" (Marcuse, 1964: 10). Moreover, by constructing evil and dangerous enemies outside the people's camp, CCP flatted out of the contrast, differences and inequality in-between itself and peasants.

Su-ku, or revolution provides peasants a chance of expressing their internal emotions. This gives us another model of understanding repressive tolerance. CCP encouraged the rebellions of peasants on both thoughts and practical levels. In Su-ku, other words could be spoken and heard, and other interpretations of past sufferings could be expressed, however, under the "supervision" or direction of work teams and local cadres, these words were immediately regulated, or using Marcuse's words, "evaluated". There was a

kind of special language that determined “a priori” the direction of this kind of thought reform movement. Thus under the direction of the Party, “a mentality is created for which right and wrong, true and false are predefined wherever they affect the vital interests of the society” (Marcuse, 1965: 95).

So, by encouraging peasants’ rebellion through Su-ku movement and Land Reform, CCP actually built up and fostered its own control on peasants. The more the peasants did *Su-ku* in a certain way, the more bitter feeling they felt; the more bettering feeling they felt, the stronger emotions they had for CCP as well as KMT.

The standard of classification, as we discussed above, has a clear characteristic of “standard qualities”. A series of policies, directories, and handbooks that were issued and distributed, and a series of conferences that were held by CCCCP and every local bureau ensured such kind of “standard qualities”. The core of this standard revolutionary practice is that the different classes and their different roles in the new revolutionary morality and their social values were actually determined by a series of “quantities” or skills. For example, the more lands a landlord had owned, the more evil he would become in revolution, or the better skills of *Su-ku* a peasant had, there were more chances for him to become a “model” for new morality, and there were more chances he would get to join CCP and become part of new authority. It is here that what Marcuse’s critical analysis on capitalism can also be used for understanding revolution: there was a change of social values and morality from “autonomous judgment and personal responsibility” to “standardized skills and qualities” (Marcuse, 1955: 87). Through such a technique, CCP successfully built up different identities and different feelings for different social-political groups. Thus in Su-ku movement, besides the three kinds of emotions we talked, peasants could also feel one more feeling: class oppression. Under such a circumstance, the psychological repression and sociological class oppression are all twisted together in such a political confession movement.

All of these happened after the restoration of the new authority. Looking beyond the village level, we can find that such kind of new domination, just as Marcuse says, is “normally no longer personal” (Marcuse, 1955: 68). The superego becomes “automatization” and “depersonalized”. And the former self-sufficient rural society becomes part of the “organized” communism state. Now we can say that China

revolution has a similar process of abolishing the traditional family that Marcuse describes. However, there are essential differences between the two processes: what the China revolution abolished was a traditional kinship lineage community; and the self of peasant was not "individual" self, but a self that was embedded into the community. Moreover, different from Marcuse's individual, we can find a different image of individual in China peasant's reaction to the domination of state in revolution. The second perspective we choose above to analyze *Su-ku* has already indicated how did the local society meet and "neutralize" the state domination. The local society was not just "educated" by the work teams. They had their own local politics and traditions that twisted together with the revolutionary power. Furthermore, the third perspective of *Su-ku* even showed us how the peasants used the power of such domination in order to achieve their own target. Revolution was not a "pure" process. And people in such a historical process was not "one-dimensional", neither the revolution itself. There were endless conflicts in various aspects and in every period. From the story of *Su-ku,* what we can find is not only a revolutionary myth of Oedipus, but also a possibility of discussing social neurosis.

My basic purpose of using the term of social neurosis is to describe the daily suffering that is brought by the interaction between individual, local society and state society. This suffering does not only mean the "real" suffering that happens in daily life, but also includes those "constructed" sufferings through *Su-ku* (constructed suffering in the past daily life), and other revolutionary practices such as classification (sufferings of those people from "counter-revolutionary camp"). Suffering is the way for Freud to question culture (Marcuse, 1955: 17). This is also why do I choose suffering as my perspective of looking at China' revolution, in which *Su-ku* itself becomes a test of my Enthomethodology. Because of this, I choose *Su-ku* as an abnormal method for understanding normal or daily sufferings, and furthermore, for understanding the revolution, and even the whole approach of China toward modernity.

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Why is Trust in the Federal Government Higher than Local Governments in Rural China?

--A Social Capital Approach to Study Distributive Injustice

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Abstract: In China, the high-level government is the most trustworthy level of government for the public, while the various local governments and villages are the least trustworthy. This paper would like to propose a viewpoint concerning distributive justice of local governments to explain this puzzle. We first hypothesize that an individual's cognition of fairness in government service reduces the difference between his or her trust in the high-level and local governments. Chinese rural residents enjoy the same high-level government policies without difference, but may find these policies implemented in various ways. In other words, they may receive different treatment from the local governments. A person who receives poor treatment will consider the local government unfair, and this reduces trust in local governments. Following this argument, we then propose that individuals either with rich micro-level social capital or deeply embedded in a community may have opportunities to influence the distribution of public resources which benefit their own interests. Local governments are thus transparent and helpful for them; that raises their trust in local governments. 556 cases sampled from Wenchuan earthquake area are included in our explanatory model. These hypotheses are confirmed, so we conclude that only local governments, rather than high-level government, are blamed due to distributive injustice, since they take responsibility to distribute government resources in executing public policies. When the inequality in rural community increases, the difference between trust in high-level and local government turns to be huge.

Keywords: trust in government; community social capital, micro-level social capital, trust difference

I. Introduction

This paper pays attention to a special phenomenon concerning trust in governments. Some research illustrates that a discrepancy exists between the public's trust in federal and local governments in the United States. That means, the local

government is most trustworthy and the federal is the worst (Jennings，1998；Tyler & Konisky，2008). In contrast to the United States, in China the phenomenon is the opposite. The central government is the most trustworthy level of government for the public, while the various local governments and villages are the least trustworthy. This paper attempts to propose some explanations for the phenomenon.

Trust is an important factor in a political system (Parsons，1969；Gamson，1968；Sztompka，1999). Political trust can be categorized into three dimensions: the confidence and evaluation of the public to government officers; government agencies; and the political system of a state (Easton ,1965；Citrin ,1974；Miller，1974；Hetherington，1998；Shi，2001；Jenny，2005). Trust in government thus may be referred to the public's trust to the institutional arrangements in a political system, to the government agencies and their policy making, or the individual political actors – including politicians and government officers (Norris, 1999). In other words, it is a combination of the public's attitude toward the three dimensions of a political system. The public may not clearly recognize where its trust in government comes from, but if the administrative performance does not fit for its expectation, the public's trust in government decreases. This kind of discontent can be directed a either political leaders, government policies, government agencies or the political system (Citrin , 1974 ; Citrin et al . , 1975；Craig et al . , 1990 ; Craig , 1993)

In 2007, the University of Missouri surveyed 1,000 adults to examine public confidence in government. Respondents were asked "How much of the time do you think you can trust each level of government?" The possible response choices were: "Just about always, most of the time, some of the time, hardly ever, or don't know" (Tyler & Konisky，2008: p2). The responses showed that the public has different levels of trust in local, state, and federal governments. While 45% of the public believes the federal government can "hardly ever be trusted," the percentages of distrust in the state and local government are 30% and 25%, respectively. Furthermore, averaging trust in the three levels of governments, we get 1.57, 1.89 and 2.05 for local, state and federal governments respectively. That means, the public perceives local government as the most trustworthy, followed by state and federal governments (Tyler

& Konisky，2008).

On the contrary, Chinese citizens have a very high level of trust in the central government, but this trust continuously decreases for the lower levels of governments, and the community-level government is the least trustworthy (Shi，2001；Li，2004；Hu，2007；Hu, et. al.，2011；Xiao and Wang，2011；Gao and Zhai，2013). Chinese scholars call this phenomenon “reversed differential modes of association” (Li，2012). Fei (1992) proposed “differential modes of association” to summarize the features of Chinese networking behaviors. For a focal person, the closer a relationship is to him or her, the more he or she will trust in the social bond. Community governments have the most frequent contact with residents, yet are least trustworthy, while high-level governments have no direct contact with Chinese citizens, who still give the highest level of trust to the central government. That is why we call this phenomenon “reversed differential modes of association”.

Chinese people generally distinguish “kind central government” from “greedy local government,” and pay higher trust to the central than the local government (Li、O’Brien，1996；O’Brien，1996). From 1999 to 2001, Li (2004) noticed the phenomenon of “reversed differential modes of association” in four villages sampled from three provinces. During the first decade of this century, it is observed that overall trust in government was steadily rising for rural residents, but “high trust in high-level governments and low trust in local governments” remained the same (Xiao and Wang，2010).

Similar conclusions are extended to urban residents, including those university students and public officers, according to the samples from Xiamen (Hu, et. al.，2011). In a survey of 5500 rural and urban citizens, Gao and Zhai found that trust in government decreases from the high-level to low-level (Gao and Wang，2013). There is no difference between rural and urban residents in this aspect. The most interesting survey was conducted among government officers, and the phenomenon of “reversed differential modes of association” was also found in the officers’ trust in government (Xiao，2005).

Why do Chinese people trust in high-level, rather than local, governments? This paper would like to propose a viewpoint concerning distributive justice of local governments to explain this puzzle.

II. The Theory and Hypotheses

Before we can explain the trust difference in various levels of government, it is necessary to explore the reason why people trust in government. Some researches ascribe this trust to the individual cognition of governmental efficiency and effectiveness. In other words, if a government provides public goods efficiently and effectively and makes a citizen realize its performance, then this individual will trust in the government（Riker，1990；Volcker，1999；Mishler & Rose，2001）. In other words, trust comes from an individual rational judgment about government performance（Mansbridge，1997； Nye.，1997；Newton & Norris，2000.）

Some scholars focus on the studies of government satisfaction, such as the study of New York citizens' satisfaction in city public services by using ACSI model （American Customer Satisfaction Index Model）. High satisfaction in public services generally increases the trust in government; (Ryzin, 2004).
Expectancy-disconfirmation model argues that if the expectation of citizens regarding public services cannot be met, or the promise of a government is broken, then people will feel dissatisfied（Salehi et al., 2012; Morgeson III, 2012; Van Ryzin, 2013）.

In contrast to these micro-level explanations, some macro-level studies focus on cultural and institutional factors. The comparison of political institutions and cultural norms in various societies is thus brought into the argument（Putnam，1993；Inglehart，1997；Mishler & Rose，2001）. One of these viewpoints is related to self-governance (Ostrom, 1990) and voluntary organizations（Putnam，1993; 1995）. It is found that participation in voluntary organizations boosts citizens' engagement in public affairs, which increases social capital and thus brings about more social interactions in public activities（Putnam, 1993；Inglehart，1997；Jenney，2005）. Increased interactions with government and understanding of public affairs help citizens build trust in government.

All of these theoretical explanations are brought into the relevant studies in China. For example, in the comparison between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, it is found that Taiwanese trust in government mainly comes from the efficiency and effectiveness of public services, while Mainland Chinese receives greater influence from ideological propaganda (Shi，2001). However, government performance is still an important factor for Mainland Chinese trust in government（Gao and Zhai，2013），

especially the rapid 30-year economic development which legitimates the power of the Communist Party (Tong， 2011). In a survey of 1,280 Chinese rural residents, the hypotheses of “government efficiency” and “effectiveness of public policy” are confirmed (Xiao and Wang, 2011). It is further found that this “government performance” factor becomes increasingly significant from 1993 to 2003. Hu et, al. (2011) study 572 urban residents in Xiamen, and demonstrate that satisfaction with the city’s and community’s public services help increase trust in government. From these findings, we thus propose the first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: An individual ‘s cognition of government performance increases his or her trust in government.

But, how do these theories give us an answer for the trust difference of various levels of government?

In the field studies of the Chinese rural residents, it is often heard that “the policy of central government is good, but the local governments ruin it”. In the Chinese political system, high-level governments generally take the responsibility to make policies, and local governments are asked to execute these policies (Cao， 2011). In general, local government officers do not have the authority to change the policies, but they may deviate from the federal government policy to carry out administrative duties (Guan，2012). For example, the central government directly announced to rural residents that a 20-thousand-Reminbi loan will be granted to each household for reconstructing collapsed homes after the Wenchuan earthquake. But financial resources were not enough for local governments, so officers chose different ways to execute this policy. For instance, some gave loans to selected earthquake victims first and delayed the loans for the others. What’s more, some local government officers employed wrongful measures to fulfill policy goals (Yang and Su， 2002), such as collecting extra fee to develop the local economy. Distributive injustice and “debauched methods” decrease the public trust in local governments.

Chinese rural residents enjoy the same high-level government policies without difference, but may find these policies implemented in various ways. In other words, they may receive different treatment from the local governments. A person who receives poor treatment will consider the local government unfair, and this reduces trust in local governments. As the saying goes, the policy of central government is good, but the local governments ruin it, Chinese, especially those rural residents,

seldom attribute the unfairness to high-level governments, so the attribution widens the difference of trust between the high-level and local governments, and vice versa. An individual's trust in high-level government keeps the same, the trust difference reduces when he or she recognize local government fair and trustworthy. The second hypothesis thus follows:

Hypothesis 2: An individual's cognition of fairness in government service reduces the difference between his or her trust in the high-level and local governments.

Following the ideas of Putnam (1993; 1995), a person deeply embedded in a community or voluntary organization will have more opportunities to engage in local public affairs, more interactions with community members in public participation, and thus more contacts with and understanding of governmental activities. Participation in civic affairs helps increase trust in government. In addition, closed, dense and intimate social networks in a community or voluntary organization raise interdependence and mutual trust among network members (Coleman, 1990; Yamagashi et, al., 1998). An individual with intimate social relations in a community will have more information concerning public affairs and mutual assistance to get government resources. This is especially true for Chinese rural residents, since they do not have much open access to government information, and governments often distribute information and resources through communities (Luo, et. al., 2013) . So government seems more transparent and trustworthy for those embedded in communities. The third hypothesis is thus proposed as the following:

Hypothesis 3: An individual's embeddedness in a community helps increase his or her trust in governments.

In a community with closure and intimate internal relations, an individual deeply embedded in this dense network will enjoy more government information and resources circulated in this community than those peripheral members. Mutual assistance and interpersonal trust help him or her access these resources more easily. At times, the entire community may together struggle with the extra resources from local governments, and peripheral members and outsiders of the community may not be able to share the extra benefits. All of these activities create more links between the community and local governments, but are unrelated to high-level governments. Just like the argument of "attribution of government fairness" stated above, a Chinese rural resident attributes the transparency of and easy access to governmental services

mainly to the effort of local governments, rather than high-level governments. Individuals deeply embedded in a community may have frequent contact with local governments mainly through the community party secretary, and have opportunities to influence the distribution of public resources which may benefit their own interests. Local governments are thus transparent and helpful for them; that raises their trust in local governments. On the contrary, high-level governments are too far away from Chinese rural residents, and seem always fair and trustworthy to them. We therefore propose the fourth hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4: An individual's embeddedness in a community reduces the difference between his or her trust in high-level and local governments.

In addition to using community assistance to access government resources, by the same token, a village's elite generally mobilizes his or her own social relations to gain access to public services also. Chinese society is "guanxi-oriented" (Hwang, 1987 ; 2009). That means the Chinese generally attempt to create a large ego-centered social network in which rich, diversified and wide-range resources are embedded (Lin, 2001). Whenever it is needed, he or she can mobilize these resources embedded in the ego-centered network, which is often referred as this individual's "micro-level social capital" (Lin, 2001).

On the one hand, village elites with rich social capital will access various resources to have a satisfactory life. In general, a satisfactory life will make an individual feel gratified with government performance, which increases his or her trust in government. On the other hand, the village elite will use his or her wide-spanned social network to reach public services, especially when people are treated differently in accessing government resources. The elite are unable to change the policies from high-level governments, but they may influence the relevant local government and its ways of executing policies. After the Wenchuan earthquake, a lot of resources were distributed to victims and damaged communities in the reconstruction period. Those village elites rich with micro-level social capital may have been privileged with access to government benefits and reconstruct their normal life before other community members. This increases their trust in local governments, and reduces the difference between "low trust in local governments" and "high trust in the central government". We therefore get the fifth hypothesis.

Hypothesis 5: An individual's micro-level social capital reduces the difference between his or her trust in high-level and local governments.

III. The Data and Methods

1. Data

The data comes from a study combined with qualitative and quantitative data collection, which has traced the reconstruction process for five years since the Wenchuan earthquake in 2008. The first quantitative survey was conducted in May 2009, when most residents in the earthquake area lived in temporary shelters and the reconstruction process had just begun. The second survey was done in November 2010, when the reconstruction process was midway in the process. The final survey conducted investigated the conditions right after the reconstruction finished, in April 2012. Most of the earthquake victims in rural areas had built new houses and had gone back to their normal lives at that time.

The dataset utilized a convenient sampling method, in which, for the example in 2012, five counties were first sampled. The counties were located throughout mountains, the western part of the disaster area, ChengDu Plain, the eastern part, and the suburb area of ChengDu metropolitan, which is south to the earthquake's epicenter. Thirty villages were sampled from the five counties, among which five were in the mountain area, twelve in plain area and 13 in ChengDu suburb. In each of village, interviewers randomly sampled 33 to 35 households, in which the Kish method was used to draw out an adult as interviewee. After the samples were gathered the dataset had a total of 949 valid cases, and 556 are included in our explanatory model after removing those with missing variables.

There are 313 cases interviewed repeatedly in all the three surveys. These cases provide a good base for the comparison during the entire reconstruction process. However, only the dataset from 2012 is used for testing our hypotheses, since only the survey from this year has questions concerning the interviewees' cognition of government performance.

2. The Measurement of Variables

The dependent variable is trust in government. Five levels of government are included in the questionnaire, i.e. the central, province, city or county, town and village governments separately. Interviewees are asked to check trust in all five levels from "5" or "most trustworthy" to "1" or "least trustworthy". We then do a factor analysis to classify these five levels into two factors, as shown in Table 1. The

first factor includes the central and province governments, which is coded as "high-level government", while the second factor indicates city (or county), town plus village governments, which is called "local government".

Table 1 is about here

We then average the score of trust in the central and province governments to get the indicator for high-level government, and compute the mean of trust in county, town and village to obtain the indicator for local government. The trust difference is the score of trust in high-level government minus that of local government. As shown in Table 2, the degree of trust in high-level government constantly decreases from 2008 to 2012. Trust in local government decreases in the first half of reconstruction process, but goes up in the second half. However, trust difference keeps the same, i.e. trust in high-level government is always much higher than local government in the rural area.

Table 2 is about here

We can find two questions in the questionnaire to indicate an individual's cognition of government performance. One is related to the cognition of government fairness, and the question "Do you think that government services are fair for everyone?" is asked. Interviewees check from "4", i.e. "very fair", to "1" or "very unfair". Another question asked is "Do you feel satisfactory with present living conditions?" Answers range from 4 to 1, i.e. "very satisfactory" to "very unsatisfactory."

Four types of social networks are surveyed by ego-centered network questions. In the name generators, there are four questions: "Who bai-nien (come to visit your home for greeting) to you in the last Chinese lunar year?"（Bian and Li，2001）[1]；"With whom do you chat about your private life?"; "From whom do you ask for important favors in the last one year?"; and "Which town and village government officers are familiar with you?" They are named after "greeting network," "privacy-discussion network," "favor-giving network" and "officer network." In the following sections, we will combine the privacy-discussion and favor-giving networks together to compute some indicators, so the name "guanxi[2] networks" is created to include these two

[1] Bai-Nien network survey is a tool developed by the paper of Bian and Li written in 2001. It is proved a good index indicating Chinese social network in traditional society.
[2] Guanxi is the term indicating social ties in Chinese, especially refers to strong ties.

networks. The name interpreters survey the interviewees' intimacy, relationship types, duration, and interaction frequency with these contacts.

By utilizing these network data, we compute three indicators for measuring an individual's micro-level social capital. They are up-reachability and scale of an individual's greeting network (Lin, 2001) as well as the percentage of town government officers in this person's officer network.

Three indicators measuring the embeddedness in community are computed from these ego-centered network surveys. They are density of greeting network, density of guanxi networks and number of community members in guanxi networks. Because data concerning relations among contacts in greeting networks cannot be collected, we compute the percentage of extended family members and neighbors in greeting networks as the measurement of density. In a Chinese rural community, one's extended family members and neighbors generally know each other, so a high percentage can indicate dense relations in a greeting network. We use the same method to measure the density of privacy-discussion and favor-giving networks, and then average the two to get a single index of "density of guanxi networks." Two more attitudinal questions toward communities are also included in the measurement. They are separately a resident's trust in community members and personal identity to his or her community.

Several personal socio-economic background variables are also included into the explanatory model as controls, such as gender, level of education, age and party member status. The variable names, measurements and descriptive statistics of these dependent and independent variables are listed in Table 3.

Table 3 is about here

IV. The Analytical Results

We find that there are 13 persons with negative trust difference, i.e. trust in high-level government is lower than that of local government, in the analysis of descriptive statistics. In the comparison with 133 villagers with zero-difference and 409 with positive trust difference, it is found that, shown as in Table 4, these 13 persons are exactly village elites with higher levels of education, younger ages and many more contacts with town government officers. This evidence is

good support for Hypothesis 5.

Table 4 is about here

Table 5 shows the correlations among all variables. It illustrates that trust in local government is significantly associated with trust in high-level government, government fairness, satisfaction in living, percentage of town government officers, scale of greeting network, number of villagers in guanxi networks, density of guanxi networks, and trust in villagers. Trust in high-level government has the same result as local government, except the two variables indicating micro-level social capital are not significant, and in variables of embeddedness in community, it is correlated to density of greeting network rather than density of guanxi networks. Trust difference is negatively correlated to government fairness, percentage of town government officers, and scale of greeting network, and has high positive association with trust in local government, but a high negative correlation with trust in high-level government.

Table 5 is about here

Table 6 illustrates the analytical results of our regression model. In Model 1 and 2, we find that both government fairness and satisfaction in living are significant positive factors for trust in all-level governments. So Hypothesis 1 gets confirmed. In Model 3, government fairness still strongly impacts trust difference. That supports Hypothesis 2. We have five variables indicating an individual's embeddedness in community, and two of them have a significant influence on trust in government. They are number of villagers in guanxi networks and trust in villagers for local government, as well as density of guanxi networks and trust in villagers for high-level government. Hypothesis 3 gets some support from the evidence. But only one variable, trust in villagers, is negatively associated with trust difference in Model 3. Hypothesis 4 is also confirmed, but the support is not very strong. Concerning individual social capital, scale of greeting network is an important factor for both trust in local government and trust difference. Percentage of town government officers is significantly correlated to these two dependent variables, but its effect is controlled in the regression model. Since the rich connection of town government officers is highly correlated to scale of greeting network, it is possible that the former's effect is controlled by the latter.

Table 6 is about here

V. Conclusions and Discussions

This paper tries to answer the question why people trust in high-level government more than local government in the Chinese rural areas, and theorize that rural residents attribute unfair treatment from governments to local rather than high-level government. Cognition of good governmental performance certainly increases people's trust in all levels of government, but only local governments are blamed due to distributive injustice, since they take responsibility to distribute government resources in executing policies. Hypotheses 1 and 2 confirm this argument. Following this explanation, we suggest that a person deeply embedded in a rural community will get more public goods, which generally distribute through community and then make him or her satisfactory with local government. By the same token, a person with rich micro-level social capital will influence distribution directly by utilizing his or her social connections, so this individual enjoys more government resources and thus increased trust in local government. Hypotheses 4 and 5 based on this argument get some support from the evidence.

In today's China, inequality becomes a serious social problem which prevails in most villages. What is the cause for inequality? Who takes the responsibility for distributive injustice? We find that Chinese rural residents attribute unfair treatment toward them to local rather than high-level government. This creates the difference of trust in the two levels of governments.

In rural communities, village elites may influence local governments to obtain better treatments, but for ordinary people, unfairness cultivates distrust in local government. Trust difference is thus created since they do not attribute distributive injustice to high-level government policies. It is clear why they attribute unfair treatment to various levels of local governments, which rural residents have more or less direct contacts with. But, why is high-level government not blamed? This question remains to be a great challenge for future studies.

How does local government execute policy? How do those with good community connections or rich in individual social capital influence the distribution of government resources? How does individual social capital interact with a community network, especially those connections concerning community politics? All

these questions deserve our future studies as well because they are the keys to understanding why people distrust local government due to distributive injustice.

Our data came from rural communities which recently recovered from the Wenchuan earthquake after reconstruction process, cases in which it is good to observe progressive government activities in rural communities. We thus have done qualitative field studies for formulating our hypotheses. It is also found that those interviewees have more engagement in government activities than others in normal communities. So they have formulated the image of governments in their mind through a series of collective actions of rescuing, constructing houses and distributing resources. However, these samples are not taken from a typical daily interaction with government so the generalization of this paper's conclusions to other rural residents must be taken cautiously. Even more, Chinese urban residents have also "reversed differential modes of association" regarding this aspect. Do they share the same reason to distrust local government or not? We need more data from cities to test the explanation concerning distributive injustice.

One more limitation is that our data has random samples in villages, but the selected villages are from convenient sampling. So we have typical cases in verifying our hypotheses. In future studies, it would be better to collect data from random sampling, so that these conclusions may be generalized to explain why all Chinese trust in high-level government more than local governments.

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Table 1 The factor analysis of trust in governments

	Factor 1	Factor 2
County or city government	.780	
Town government	.944	
Village or community government	.920	
The central government		.913
Province government		.838
Cumulative variance explained (%)	59.853	83.355
Cronbach's Alpha	.890	.759

Table 2 The changes of trust in government

	Year	Mean	No. of ob.	Std.
High-level government	2009	4.887	466	0.387
	2010	4.742	313	0.526
	2012	4.462	556	0.737
Local government	2009	3.663	466	1.134
	2010	2.926	313	1.276
	2012	3.395	556	1.016

Table 3 Descriptive data of all measurements in 2012

Variable name	Description of variables	Mean	Std.
Dependent variables			
Trust in high-level government	Averaging trust in the central and province governments. Highest is 5 and lowest is 1.	4.462	.737
Trust in local government	Averaging trust in "county or city", town and "village or community" governments. Highest is 5 and lowest is 1.	3.395	1.016
Trust difference	The score of trust in high-level government minus that of local government.		
Control variables			
Gender	1=male，0=female	.585	.493
Age	The age of interviewees	51.245	15.469
Party Member	1=yes，0=not	.104	.306
Education years	Years in schools	5.753	4.029
Cognition of government performance			
Government fairness	The cognition concerning whether government services are fair to all people or not. The answer "very fair" is 4 and "very unfair" is 1.	2.580	.804
Satisfaction in living	Satisfaction in present living conditions. The answer "very satisfactory" is 4 and "very unsatisfactory" is 1.	2.971	.618
Micro-level Social Capital			
Town government officer percentage	The percentage of town government officers in an interviewee's officer network. The statistics is from 1 to 0.	.140	.596
Up-reachibility of greeting network	The socio-economic status score of the person with the highest status in an interviewee's bai-nien network.	50.182	19.822
Scale of greeting network	The no. of persons coming to greet an interviewee in the last Chinese lunar year.	29.327	29.382
Embeddedness in community			
No. of familiar villagers	Averaging the no. of villagers in an interviewee's privacy-discussion and favor-giving networks. The highest no. is 5 and the lowest is 0.	1.877	1.238
Density of guanxi network	The averaged percentage of "extended family members or neighbors" in an interviewee's privacy-discussion and favor-giving networks. The statistics is from 1 to 0.	.713	.358
Density of greeting network	The percentage of "extended family members or neighbors" in an interviewee's greeting network. The statistics is from 1 to 0.	.625	.353
Trust in villagers	The degree of trust in the villagers living in the same community. The highest degree is 5 and the lowest is 1.	3.657	.783
Identity to community	Averaging four questions concerning identity to community. The highest score is 100 and the lowest is 0.	71.106	12.688

Table 4 The comparison of interviewees with different trust difference

	Trust difference<0		Trust difference=0		Trust difference>0		All observations	
No. of obs.	13		133		409		556	
	mean	Std.	mean	Std.	mean	Std.	mean	Std.
gender（1=male，0=female）	0.62	0.51	0.59	0.49	0.58	0.49	0.58	0.49
Education years	8.23	3.90	5.63	4.35	5.73	3.90	5.75	4.03
Party member（1=yes, 0=not）	0.15	0.38	0.11	0.31	0.10	0.30	0.10	0.31
age	43.08	13.34	47.53	16.07	52.66	15.06	51.24	15.47
Town government officer percentage	0.31	0.63	0.29	0.95	0.09	0.41	0.14	0.60

Table 5 Correlation coefficients of all variables

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
1.gender	-															
2.education years	.136**															
3.party member	.097*	.151**														
4.age	.133**	-.464**	.087*													
5.government fairness	.018	-.066	.107*	.004												
6.satisfaction in living	.002	.024	.130**	.020	.252**											
7.town government officer percentage	.094*	.068	.107*	-.134**	.114**	.021										
8.scale of greeting network	.053	.183**	.034	-.228**	-.014	.049	.172**									
9.up-reachibility of greeting network	.054	.180**	.140**	-.075	.081	-.003	.195**	.461**								
10.no. of familiar villagers	-.082	-.018	-.102*	-.229**	.002	.074	-.018	.240**	.109*							
11.density of guanxi network	-.067	-.163**	-.054	-.092*	-.037	-.068	.085*	.043	-.033	.267**						
12.density of greeting network	-.113**	-.179**	-.073	.016	.008	.055	.015	-.168**	-.251**	.090*	.259**					
13.trust in villagers	.029	-.102*	.007	.012	.238**	.077	.107*	.047	.004	.058	.064	.110**				
14.identity to community	.007	-.123**	-.016	.106*	.013	.154**	.026	.076	-.059	.141**	.086*	.080	.097*			
15.trust in local government	.036	-.088*	.072	.035	.503**	.234**	.137**	.093*	.058	.100*	.089*	.068	.383**	.071		
16.trust in high-level government	.096*	-.135**	.054	.217**	.251**	.219**	-.017	-.079	-.030	.093*	.031	.091*	.270**	.081	.422**	
17.trust difference	.035	-.010	-.035	.128**	-.340**	-.078	-.156**	-.157**	-.086	-.035	-.069	-.002	-.196**	-.013	-.726**	.317**

Table 6 The analytical results of regression

Variables	Trust in high-level government	Trust in local government	Trust difference
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Cognition of Government Performance			
Government fairness	.149***	.526***	-.378***
	(.041)	(.050)	(.054)
Satisfaction in living	.225***	.154**	.071
	(.053)	(.066)	(.071)
Micro-level Social Capital			
Town government officer percentage	-.039	.065	-.104
	(.052)	(.064)	(.069)
Up-reachibility of greeting network	.000	-.002	.002
	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)
Scale of greeting network	-.001	.005***	-.006***
	(.001)	(.002)	(.002)
Embeddedness in Community			
No. of villagers in guanxi network	.079***	.043	.036
	(.027)	(.033)	(.036)
Density of guanxi network	.107	.237**	-.131
	(.093)	(.115)	(.124)
Density of greeting network	.088	.139	-.051
	(.102)	(.127)	(.137)
Trust in villagers	.221***	.381***	-.160***
	(.040)	(.050)	(.054)
Identity to community	-.001	.000	.000
	(.002)	(.003)	(.003)
Controls			
Gender	.071	-.021	.093
	(.063)	(.079)	(.085)
Education years	.002	-.003	.005
	(.009)	(.012)	(.012)
Party member	-.003	.091	-.095
	(.101)	(.125)	(.135)
Age	.010***	.005*	.005
	(.002)	(.003)	(.003)
Constant	1.865***	-.395	2.260***
	(.311)	(.387)	(.416)
F-value	9.975***	21.386***	7.496***

Drugs career and drug dealing[1]

Michel Kokoreff[2]

« How to become a marijuana‘s user ? » That is the well known Howard Becker ‘s question he asked in his famous book Outsiders (1963 (1985)). The answer was in a theory of deviant career built by the “Second Chicago School” and based upon ethnographic fieldwork and biographic methods. The goal was to pass from ethiological and behaviour approachs to a dynamic and sequential model of the deviance as social process or transaction.

How to become a drug dealer ? That is the same type of theoretical question than Becker’s, but which takes into account not only drug users but all those who are « taking care of business » (to speak like Preeble and Casey, 1969), who consider drug traffic as a work.

So, we would like to discuss these concepts starting from long qualitative research

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[1] Ce texte reprend des passages d’un chapitre d’ouvrage, écrit en colloboration avec Claude Faugeron, intitulé : « Drug addiction and drug-dealing : from trajectories to careers. The statuts of sociales sciences in France », in Brochu et *als.* (Dirs.), 2002. L’auteur tient à remercier Isabelle Lenoir pour le sérieux de son travail de traduction et de relecture.

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in the « French banlieues » (popular, ethnic and sitgmatised neighbourhoods) about young « street dealers », but also an actual collective research about process of heroine diffusion in France and drugs users and « old criminals ». We will show that generation after generation, they almost have the same career in urban peripheries. Or more precisely, each generation follows his cycle, and takes the same steps - or almost. The problem on which we would like to conclude is the concept of time behind Becker's deviant careers pattern.

1. Trajectories, careers, biographical lines : The construction of concepts

It is one thing to focus on the temporal dimension of social phenomena in this case drug use and dealing and another to clear up the persistent confusion that is the result of (too often) indiscriminate use of the notions employed in these accounts. In this set of concerns, three forms may be distinguished conceptually and methodologically: first of all, analysis of social trajectories, socially determined, that can also be approached as a set of trajectories (residential, familial, educational, migratory); then approaches in terms of "life histories" or "life stories", "biographies" or "life lines", which have often been developed in reaction to any and all forms of "social determinism"; lastly, analysis in terms of "careers" in a perspective melding institutional dimensions (penal, delinquent careers) and biographical aspects (deviant careers, itineraries), objective positions and subjective positions.

1.1 Dissipating the foggiest notions

We should ask : but where are the dividing lines ? Between a determinist

macrosociological reading of a "trajectory" updating a habitus and an interactionist outline of a "career"? Unless an attempt is made to think out their dialectical articulation? This corresponds to Jean Claude Passeron's position:

> The concept of career, when its use fulfils the promise of its theoretical content, allows us to grasp, by a description both interpretative and explanatory, the indissociably subjective and objective meaning that a succession of actions reactive, defensive, tactical, anticipatory, etc. takes on ex post facto as a career (for the sociologist, but also in the hindsight of the subject), actions that the subject has chosen in his/her own name as a way to handle his/her relationships with the restrictive power of a structure that has anonymously imposed its predetermined scale of sanctions or rewards corresponding to these chosen responses (or lack thereof) (Passeron, 1989, 20).

This articulation that could be operated by social theory nonetheless remains problematic. The definition given is questionable, in particular for the scope granted to this "restrictive power of a structure" in relation to other dimensions. And methodologically the issue is unresolved. How can this succession of actions be observed, from what point of view, using what data?

Another hypothesis can be submitted: the hypothesis that life stories, trajectories, careers are targeting "different levels of organization of temporal experience" (Leclerc-Olive, 1997). To what extent is the retrospective aspect a factor of differentiation between these different terms? Be that as it may, the different forms of causality perceived in sociobiographical studies by de Connink and Godard could be

used to characterize these levels and think their articulation archaeological (a deed generating others), processive (successions of events) and structural (the relation between external temporalities).

1.2 The construction of the concept of career

"The word 'career' has a career of its own", remarked H. Hughes. While one of the fundamental works of the Chicago School was devoted to life histories of Polish peasants, inspiring much work in the 1930s, notably in the area of juvenile delinquency around Clifford Shaw, author of a renowned biography (*The Jack-Roller*), analysis in terms of "careers" developed somewhat later. Hughes reintroduced a broad and non-instrumental conception of this notion in the 1950s at the University of Chicago (Ogien, 1996). For him the succession of events is less important than the moments of transition. The issue is finding out how the passage from one phase to another occurs in a career in which the typical stages are institutionalized, but where "there are many uncertainties and unforeseen irregularities" as well (Hughes, 1996, 176). The study of careers is aimed specifically at this dialectic.

Hughes thus starts from the idea that a career cannot be reduced to a model regulated by a bureaucratic or any other type of organization. It is not a synonym for "success". He underscores the *mobility of positions*, by distinguishing between "central activity" and "secondary activity", and between "work system" and "related systems". This reference to the sociology of professions should be emphasized for the innovative nature of its transposition to the sociology of deviant trajectories. This is tantamount to considering narcotics dealing in terms of work, skills, socialization (Letkermann, 1973 ; Bachmann and Coppel, 1989 ; Duprez and Kokoreff, 1999).

> Some trades exist in systems that offer numerous openings towards other related systems and towards the public at large; when someone comes to the end of his/her career, he/she may be transferred to a position in one of the related

> systems. It may also be that a work system unrelated to the original trade happens to offer a favourable terrain or using the talents and characteristics acquired in the original trade. (Hughes, 1996, 182).

Howard Becker has put this conception to its fullest use. He extends the notion of career to a class of individuals possessing ambition and willpower. The notion is broached in *Outsiders* where an approach other than the multivariate approach of deviance is opposed to the etiological approach of "evil": this is an approach via a model that takes into account the development of behavioural modes according to an ordered sequence. The aim is to differentiate between "a succession of phases, changes in behaviour and outlook of the individual" (p. 46), the cause of each phase being only one element of the final behaviour. Thus H. Becker proposes the concept of "deviant careers", extended in its objective and subjective dimensions so as to account for factors of mobility from one position to another.

To the question of the intentionality of deviance and the motivation thereof, Becker suggests a response via an analysis of the process of *commitment* or the adoption of certain lines of conduct. This implies a long period of study of the author of deviant conduct who has made it a "way of life". A fundamental and controversial, as we will see mechanism by which a durable taste for these activities is constituted, is *apprenticeship* to an organized subculture. In the famous article on marijuana smokers, the analysis is built upon the process of apprenticeship, various forms of which are described: apprenticeship of technique, of the perception of effects, of liking for the effects.

> In short, he (the smoker) has learned to answer "yes" to the question: "Is this pleasurable?" The later course of his usage of the drug depends on his capacity to continue to answer this question affirmatively, as well as on his capacity to respond positively to other questions that arise when he becomes aware of

> society's condemnation of his practice: "Is this prudent, is this moral?" The practice becomes impossible only when certain experiences with the drug engender a change in the smoker's conception thereof, making him lose the capacity to find pleasure in the sensation of "being high". (Becker, 1985, 81).

1.3 From contributions to limits

Although Becker's sequential model clearly continues to have a strong explanatory capacity for describing the typical path of a marijuana smoker, and particularly the conditions of the smoker's apprenticeship and commitment to a deviant career, a double criticism can be made. For one, the model has an all-encompassing nature that assumes a oneness in careers, regardless of the substance and how it is used, whereas other studies have shown that acquiring a liking does not always lead to regular use (Hirsch, 1990). Secondly, this model does not look at careers in dealing, and questions arise as to its capacity to give an account of this aspect, due to the fact that the universe being explored refers back to a world made up of socially acquired positions and dispositions (Fagan, 1995 ; Duprez and Kokoreff, 2000). Third, Becker's approach, since it focuses on the interactions, transactions or adjustments between social groups, takes little account of social determinants that operate at a distance - the so-called "structural effects ".

2. Research on delinquent trajectories

Research work on deviant trajectories reflects the difficulty of organizing research in this field, and more widely, the weaknesses of French criminology (Faugeron, 1991). Statistical work is well represented, but work on trajectories is far less common, particularly for minors. This is in large part due to the non-renewal of researchers who might potentially study these topics, and to the low level of interest shown by public decision makers for this area of study.

Consequently, we will focus primarily on research work devoted more specifically to drug addiction and drug dealing, having received a boost from several tenders in the early 1990s (Faugeron, 1999).

2.1 Trajectories of users and small dealers

This research direction is more turned towards work that attempts to situate behaviours in social pathways and contexts, in an economy of daily life where relationships with families are at play as well as those with peers and institutions. We are thinking of the collective research undertaking directed by R. Castel on the "ways out of substance abuse"; there is also the particularly significant work of this type by P. Bouhnik on heroin addicts, AIDS and prison (Bouhnik, 1994; Bouhnik and Touzé, 1996), and a whole series of recent inquiries into the underground economies of low-income housing estates (Joubert *et al.*, 1996; Duprez *et al.*, 1995, 1996; Kokoreff, 1997; Aquatias *et al.*, 1997; Tarrius, 1997 ; Tarrius and Missaoui, 1998).

Bouhnik (1994), like Castel (1998), is more specifically interested in the trajectories of heroin users. Most heroin users encounter the penal justice system and prison in the course of their lives, but these encounters, or indeed the behaviours that lead to these encounters, enter only tangentially into the course of the research. For the first author, the research subject is to shed light on life systems. For the second, the aim is to understand the processes involved in long interruptions (at least two years) in drug use practices. As for the work done with Dominique Duprez in the north of France and in the Paris area, these studies are centred around the place held by a narcotics economy within the economy of housing estates and neighbourhoods deemed "sensitive", in the drug users' life systems. These researchers recruited a sizeable proportion of the respondents queried in prison or via penal records, and another set in the neighbourhoods under observation. It is therefore not surprising to find more delinquent careers in these last two pieces of research; all the more so because one of the prime research focuses was how small-time drug dealing is

organized. Even so, in all cases the authors point out the frequency of repeated prison stays among these populations, either for acquisition offences, or for possession of illicit substances or petty dealing.

A common factor found in all this research is the epistemological position of the researchers with regards to the subjects of their analyses: they are considered to be actors of their own story, and not objects. They build their social identities through the relations that they maintain with their surroundings. Even when they come from very underprivileged social situations, when they belong to "disaffiliated" categories to use Castel's expression (1995), or when they are highly dependent on a substance, they nonetheless remain social actors capable of managing their poverty or their addiction.

One of the problems encountered in this research is identifying the effects of social structure and classifying these biographies, by singling out factors that contribute to homogeneity (Bourgois, 1997). This research uses typological tools based on Weberian classifications to class individuals in biographical configurations in order to relate them to economic resources and activities.

2.2 The diversity of ways into these careers

For our part, we have analyzed the diversity of ways into these careers, distinguishing three types of itinerary. One appears with reference to a major biographical event that symbolizes a turning point in the individual's existence and the encounter with the world of drugs. This can be called the *rupture* type. Inversely, a second type lies in a progressive entry into the career, punctuated by a series of micro events more or less separated over time. The sum of these events is synonymous with domination, i.e. being "caught" in a process that is perceived as ineluctable. Using again a category from heroin users, we will call this the *mechanism* type. But a third type can be distinguished, which while it has some features of chance circumstances, encounters and opportunities, also manifests the power of the neighbourhood in the unfolding of

these different phases. Here, even more than an apprenticeship, there is a process of socialization via life in neighbourhoods or housing estates. For lack of a better term we will call this the *socialization* type (Duprez and Kokoreff, 2000).

Within these types thresholds have been identified, i.e. "moments which symbolize a change in status and identity, of the relationship to oneself and to others", for instance going from sniffing to injecting.

It should be emphasized that these three types do not exhaust the range of empirically observable situations. Furthermore, they can very well be superimposed, or follow different sequences. For instance, the "mechanism" can be imagined and recounted as an accumulation of breaks. Ultimately they do not function as the "causes" of behaviours, but rather as "modalities" adopted by the careers, even as their dominant tone.

There remains the question of the linking of sequences. We have proposed the notion of "biographical segment", relatively homogeneous in nature, with points of radical shift (Kokoreff, 1997). An example will clarify this point. Take the case of Mokhtar, seen in a treatment facility, residing in the township of Asnières (a municipality with a population of close to 80,000, in the suburbs just west of Paris). One of nine children, who came to France from Algeria in the early 1970s, he shares with many others what is euphemistically called a "difficult childhood" marked by his father's death, and was in addition taken into the care of the state at the age of 8 and spent his teenage years in a group home in the city of Limoges. At the age of 17, when he "got out" as he says, as if talking about a disciplinary or prison establishment, he moved to Asnières. There, through his older brother he met youths in neighbouring housing estates; he began to smoke hashish ("le shit"). But the singular aspect of his career comes in the following segment: while working day and night he began to "run on coke"; in the information technology company where he worked his way up little by little he set up a system with colleagues for buying drugs directly from Holland. Then, too "deep in", he was fired. At this point he fell back into the typical itinerary of a "downward spiral", from coke to heroine, from sniffing to injecting; but he also followed an itinerary of "stopping" (kicking the habit, recovery) and "relapses", up to the time he started on

Skenan and entered a substitution program when he was 33. There are thus four biographical segments, two of which are strongly tied to taking "hard drugs", and the last one constituting a phase of rebuilding experience outside of the world of drugs.

2.3 Users' careers and careers in drug dealing in French suburbs

Heroin consumption in French suburbs can be seen as endemic, linked to living conditions. It is the drug for forgetting, a way of forgetting the harsh realities of life in a neighbourhood branded with a bad reputation, awash in unemployment. Heroin use is in no way tied to specific cultural practices in the sectors in this study, as is the case with the relationship found between ecstasy and house music, for example. Drug dealing is an easy way to make money, a substitute for other forms of delinquent activity. Dealers are often first thieves and robbers. Not all are drug users, but in the Lille metropolitan area, for instance, where dealing by "ants" (drudges, drones) is dominant because of the proximity of supply sources (mainly Rotterdam), most networks are composed of user/resellers.

The legal case files clearly reveal career identities. Groups of youths who are subject to the same modes of socialization (school, community facilities, etc.) start smoking cannabis together around the age of 17 or 18, then very quickly start reselling the product to finance their own consumption, before taking up heroin a few years later. The boys are more exposed to group emulation (challenge, lure of gains, theft), whereas the entryways for girls are more highly correlated to biographical breaks (separation, birth of the first child). In the same way correspondences are seen at work between periods of activity and inactivity, on one hand, and phases of abstinence, moderate consumption or excess on the other. We must not, however, hide the methodological "biases" induced by this type of input. As A. Cicourel saw in studies nearly twenty-five years ago, the effects of the institutional construction of "reality" that operate in different procedures (citation, court appearance, medical and psychological testing, etc.) tend to highlight certain data for the sake of furthering the

legal proceedings. In terms of temporal analysis, it is a matter of emphasizing trajectories in a ballistic sense, for their determining characteristics (failure at school, family problems, prior encounters with the law), to the detriment of careers or types of itinerary, taken for the singular biographical aspects they manifest.

The interviews with drug addicts in jail (Chantraine, 1998) or recently released ones give dramatic relief to this tension between career identity and biographical singularity (Kokoreff, 1997). While these accounts support the hypothesis that drug addiction is a process that requires temporal analysis, and therefore is something that individuals get out of, they also bring into play a range of relationships to time that deserve further investigation. We have mentioned the time of forgetting and absence that corresponds to the active phase of heroin consumption. But there is also a time of living that is more complicated to understand. A discontinuous time line in which a multitude of situations follow each other, often redundant, going back and forth, that nonetheless constitute a regulated, almost coded pathway, perceived as oriented by fatality and destiny. Far from being played out in a single act, these careers are here the outcome of multiple phases or stages that group themselves into recognizable sequences. There are "beginnings": the first needle or "a little smoke", then the craving, the beginning of stealing, the first time in jail, then a relapse after getting out, despite programs, returning home to parents, resolve, because living in such a neighbourhood "falling in again" is inevitable. Then it may be dealing that starts, a second jail sentence, more or less long, release and then, after a few months, another relapse, despite work that helps.

> So, it was, it started in, in Well, I was living in a neighbourhood, uh, what they call a tough neighbourhood, like. So I had some acquaintances like, we had a group of ten-fifteen people, we went out to night-clubs pretty regularly, we were always in a hallway like, we were, we were always around, like, when we got out of school we got together, we hung out. So well there were the nights out on Saturdays like, so it

was always alcohol like, because, ok I was, I was 15, it was in the early 1980s.

Then little by little in the neighbourhood there were the, well there were people who began to sniff cleaning fluid, you know trichlo. Well, for us in our group it was, that didn't get us. That didn't appeal to us. But there was hashish that did, that also came along at about the same time, so that was in the early 80s in the neighbourhood.

So I tried it once like, and it didn't work at all, like, I was really sick, so I didn't ever try again, even cigarettes like, I didn't smoke, I had tried cigarettes and I had been sick too, like. So I couldn't take it, either cigarettes or hashish. So that was that, what, so it was just alcohol in clubs. And when I was, in 84 what, I was about 18, there were two or three people from outside of the neighbourhood who came into the group, what, and they did heroin and so little by little in the group, like, we found out, and there were some who decided to find out, to try and, to taste it, like. Well I was one of those people and well it was ok a little, and then it was there, one thing led to another like.

It can be seen that the "entry" into consumption is regulated by a set of conditions. It doesn't happen all at once. First of all, it is the apprenticeship of the effects of addiction that marks a threshold, almost as much as the first contact with the substance. In the accounts given by heroin users, craving the fix has a central position: it is not only pain and suffering that is involved (although that too), but also the question of resources to pay for consumption that has rapidly become a daily matter, and ways to get them (stealing, dealing, fencing stolen goods, expedients). If there is an "entry" it is characterized by the decisive role of the peer group and entourage. We can speak of intra

and intergenerational socialization, because the acquisition of knowledge and know-how is so firmly rooted in the succession of generations.

As Sylvain Aquatias underscores : "The problem, in these specific areas where vulnerable populations are concentrated, with little access to income from legal work, is not the elasticity of demand, but indeed the possible ways of procuring money (Aquatias *et al.* 1997, 88-89). In this context, the resources offered by selling drugs compensate for the lack of access to the job market and the precariousness of employment. However, the level of income ensured by dealing can be extremely variable. It depends simultaneously on the types of points of sale and their mutual competition, the position in the trafficking hierarchy, the duration and intensity of sales, insertion in networks of sociability and possibilities for expanding the clientele. (On the uncertainty of local dealers' income, see Joubert *et al.* 1996)

The interview quoted above gives a good illustration of the impact that territorial dynamics have on careers. In neighbourhoods on the outskirts of Paris and Lille, a strong tie is observed between the massive arrival of heroin in socially disqualified spaces (the dynamics of supply) and individuals embarking on careers as users and/or as sellers of hard drugs (the dynamics of demand). This process is made possible by a transformation of social relationships: deficient societal controls, on the part of "big brothers" in particular, deterioration of living conditions with rising unemployment and precarious situations, serial incarceration of cannabis dealers, leaving the way open for the sale of other more lucrative products.

But it is also the gradual specialization of local markets that leads to divergence in the itineraries of individuals involved in dealing at a given time. Career and not trajectory, for the systems of values, interactions, the relationship to the surroundings and institutions, the social, physical and cultural leanings of individuals, must all be taken into consideration. Some keep on selling, with declining income due to the every day acceptance of cannabis, others convert to heroin without becoming users of the product, still others feel they are "tough" enough to avoid "falling" but are caught in the trap of chance and depression (Duprez and Kokoreff, 2000).

Overall, in housing estates unlike other places, such as high schools the market shift from cannabis to opiates provides the explanation for the change in dealers' careers; from hashish they move on to heroin or cocaine, which yield bigger profits. Small cannabis dealing networks are all the more subject to this movement in that their members have often become heroin users and their financial needs have soared. While hashish allowed them to live comfortably (clothes, restaurants, cars), with a lifestyle close to that of the middle class, the discovery of heroin forces them to sell the product, and/or steal.

In conclusion

We roughly recalled how Becker's approach brought an obvious contribution to deviant careers and what were its heuristic virtues in the analysis of empirical material, to offer on deviant or delinquent careers a more complex view than that of government or both the media and public opinion.

We tried to suggest what role played local social dimensions (unemployment, insecurity, family stress, school failure, etc.), (segregated neighborhoods, degraded, stigmatized) and institutional (construction of criminal clients, incarceration) in their constitution, without forgetting the diversity of entries in careers and their heterogeneity. It is the combination of these dimensions which allows the understanding of how one becomes a dealer in urban areas, more or less specialized for longer or shorter periods, where the traffic is an economy of resourcefulness and - at least for a time - a job.

Becker's model is based on a paticular concept of time : nonlinear, discontinuous, reversible, marked by turns, breaks ("*turning points*"). Although it offers/adds a certain complexity and introduces an innovative movement that has had a great influence on the work on the sociology of deviance particularly in France, is this very schematically summarized concept of time not a typically westerner one ?

Rather than a time that moves/changes/runs, are we not dealing with a cyclical

time, or a fixed time, standing still, as if at an exit of time? How then compare this conception to other conceptions, adapt it to other cultural settings and other social realities? That may be a path to build bridges between the knowledge to better question what are careers in the worlds of drugs in China and South-East Asia more widely, in international cities. Is it different? Are we dealing with a sort of transnational career model ? What is different? This is an invitation to cross the looks and approaches in this area as elsewhere.

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Narrative sociology : unemployment and poor workers

(Numa Murard)

As one of my colleagues used to put it, policies for the poors are always poor policies, social services for the poors are always poor services. Maybe we could confirm the same thing for science, knowledge. Knowledge of poverty would be a poor knowledge. But it is not true. As early as in the 19th century, poverty, living conditions of the working class, of the peasants, of the ordinary people, have been the focus for attention of many talented, cultivated, commited writers, clergymen, philantropists, reporters, publicists, politicians and of course novellists. From Balzac to Jack London, while outstanding figures of the sociological tradition, like Auguste Comte or Emile Durkheim were trying to establish a science of society, they were trying to understand what was poverty, from where it came and how to eradicate it. Not only, as Wolf Lepennies has shown[1], social sciences have been built against litterature, but also against the profane knowledge of society. At the end of the century, sociology and political reformism converged, the durkheimian concept of solidarity fitted the reformist movement in favour of the working class and the fruit of this meeting was the invention of the welfare state. But in the 20th century, as sociology settled in the university, became an academic knowledge, once again they moved apart.

Let me take a few examples in the early 20th century in order to show the treasure of knowledge imbeded in these works despite their non-acadmic, impure hallmark, the fact that this knowledge has not been produced mainly for academic purpose neither according to academic rules.

1 Lepenies, Wolf, 1990, *Les trois cultures : entre science et littérature, l'avènement de la sociologie*, trad. de l'allemand par Henri Plard, Paris, Editions de la MSH

Let's start with the famous *Marienthal : the sociography of an unemployed community* [2]. When the authors started, in the 1930's, to study unemployment in Marienthal, a small town in Austria, strongly harmed by the economic crisis, with a high level of unemployment, their aim was to help the unemployed, as well as to understand their experience and to study the effects of unemployment on social life at a collective and individual level. Members of the socialist-democratic party, they settled in Marienthal by opening a sort of charitable organization providing free clothes and shoes, gathered in Vienna before the survey through the socialist-democratic party's network. But the scientific output of this work is still to-day, as emphasized by Pierre Bourdieu in its preface for the french translation, of a great value. First by showing, using the time-budget method, how time is dilated by unemployment, social life being restricted because the workers in unemployment will have no more social life with the workers remained in employment ; second, showing how economic deprivation changes the life, stressing for instance the fact that in deprivation unemployed still spare money for their funerals (What else is the famous american sociologist Viviana Zelizer demonstrating in her *The social meaning of money*[3]?). Third typifying, through individual biographies, how the unemployed cope or don't cope with the situation. Showing differences between men and women, the life of the later being less disintegrated because, however in unemployment, they still are in charge of the domestic tasks ; and differrences according to the level of income before unemployment, according therefore to the past experience of each unemployed. As they put it, those who were going badly go worse, among those who were going well the half start quickly going badly and the other half cope with deprivation longer than the others (they have ressources the others don't), and those who cope for the longest time are those who had already been for a long time in poverty.

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2 Marie Jahoda, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and Hans Zeisel, 1932, 2002, *Marienthal : the sociography of an unemployed community,* USA, Transaction publication

3 Viviana A. Zelizer, 1994, *The social meanings of money*, New-York, Basic books

Let's have a glance on the other side of the atlantic ocean, in the same 1930's, with the journalist James Agee and the photographer Walker Evans, reproducing the life of the coton planters in their farms, giving not only a fantastic insight in their private, domestic life, not only a political and philosophical analysis of the relationship between rich and poor, between investigators and investigated, but also a deep analysis of racism between black and white planters although sharing the same condition of deprivation (What else in the famous Norbert Elias and John Scotson, *The established and the outsiders* [4]?).

And i cannot forget, to help with a last example, the Robert Roberts' *Classic slum* [5], a study of a slum in Salford, in the very place investigated by Friedrich Engels for his *Situation of the working class in England*. Having been raised in the slum, son of the slum's grocer, Robert Roberts, by telling his own biography, by framing his own experience into statistical data about incomes, food, clothes, health, leisure... shows how rules of social life, manners, pratices, are sustained despite economic deprivation by the inhabitants of the slum, showing also how small differences of income, within a general condition of deprivation, can be used to create and sustain a social order in daily life. In the grocery, where the rule is to buy not less than an ounce of ham, butter or cheese, the poorest, the most deprived, who cannot afford it, doesn't dare to go by himself to the shop but send his son, his daughter, to buy half-an-once, and the other clients of the grocery, while the boy or the girl is being served, recall the rule, by gossiping, alike a sort of singing in the ears of the child, who will repeat it to the parents when returning home (What else do we find in Max Weber's rationality, or Simmel's philosophy of money).

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4 Elias, Norbert, Scotson, John L., 1994, *The established and the outsiders : a sociological inquiry into community problems*, London, Sage

5 Roberts, Robert, 1990, *The classic slum : Salford life in the first quarter of the century*, London, Penguin books

More examples of the same period could be given, in France too, with Louis Calaferte's *Requiem des innocents* [6] for instance. But they are not so many. Why is it useful to reveal this treasure ? First to enlarge the sociological tradition, to give it a larger sense and scope, to register it in its social and political context. Second, if we agree that it is useful to develop sociology as a « public sociology » (in the terms of Michael Burawoy in its report of 2004 as a President of the American sociological association[7]), to raise the question of forms and styles of knowledge. Of the academic style compared to the style of the writers i have mentionned. These writers are storytellers, the form and style of their writings are as follow : i decided to study that, i went there, i talked to this one and that one, it happened to me this and that, i have seen this and heard that, i felt like this and like that, i understood this and that, etc. Their report is a narrative one, in wich we find other narrators, and the relationships between different narrators and different narratives. Not only individual biographies, - and this is very important, because biographies, as Hans Gadamer stated, are « a reprivatization of history » [8] -, not only individual biographies but collective biographies, the story of what happens to a city, to a social group, in deprivation, in unemployment, or, if you prefer, individual biographies re-located into a context of social transformation, i.e. individual biographies connected to each other ans also affecting each other, transforming the way people tell their own experience, their own story, which points they stress first, which one they underestimate, which ideas and moral or political values emerge, which one are forgotten, how work, love, family, politics emerge in the narratives.

No doubt these features change from one country to another, from one period to the other. Let me tell you a few words about a small town in France where i started to study unemployment and economic deprivation in the 1980's. At this period, factories were closing

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6 Calaferte, Louis, 1956, *Requiem des innocents*, Paris, Julliard

7 Michael Burawoy, 2004, 2006, traduction française, « pour la sociologie publique », *Socio-logos. Revue de l'association française de sociologie*, 2006, consultable en ligne : http://socio-logos.revues.org/11

8 Hans Georg Gadamer, 1976, 1996, traduction française, *Vérité et méthode, les grandes lignes d'une herméneutique philosophique,* Paris, Le Seuil

(opening in China maybe). We studied the life of the unemployed, who were the less qualified of the workers, pure labour force, first dismissed, i.e. The lower working class, with a long past in poverty, they had been gathered together by the local authorities in social housing blocks outside of the city in order to allow urban regeneration in the inner city. In these blocks, where economic deprivation was widespread, only a third of the adults had a job and when looking at the incomes of the group as an overall, we could see that about a third came from work, two-third from welfare, some 10% from informal and sometimes illegal economy. And the differences between the households were very important, ranking from one to ten. They still belonged to working class, shared a working class ethos and practiced what we called a « compulsory solidarity », i.e. The fact that in order to remain in the place, to be accepted, one had to enter into networks of relationships, of economic and symbolic exchange, through which each one would find its place, make a living, or, if not, would be forced to leave, obliged to quit the group. A centripetal social force, forcing each one to give priority to the group, was stronger than the centrifugal one, orienting each one toward the outside world, the institutions. As a whole, the place was a shelter as well as a prison.

30 years later, we received an e-mail, asking why we didn't come any more and what happened to us, giving news also of families we had known, therefore we had to return to the « field », as sociologists and ethnographers call it. Now the value of pure labour force, of the unqualified labour force, of the sweat, is null. To be there was a good opportunity to study the narratives of life, of those whose life we had known 30 years earlier. Most of the adults we met are now retired. Many are dead, many have left the city. When they tell their story, very strong differences appear. Men (males) tell stories structured by their experience at work, the jobs occupied during their life, even if, in fact, they have been unemployed most of the time. One man, for instance, tells his life at work, enumerates his jobs, blaming the ancient neighbours who were lazy, didn't want to work. But when we ask the amount of his old age pension, we discover he gets a very little pension, even not the amount due to a constant worker at the lowest level. Does it mean he is cheating, having actually not worked so constantly ? Or does it mean he has been exploited by employers without scrupules who didn't declare the job, didn't pay the tax ? Maybe the two statements are true. But the lesson is

the importance of work, the force of the duty to work in the moral economy of the group. On the contrary, women, even those who worked for life time, focus their narratives on family, the children, the husbands, the parents, séparations, divorces, sickness, bereavements, placements of children, educationnal stories of the children.

Another output of the research is related to social memory. As you know Maurice Halbwachs, trying to establish a sociology of memory, has shown in his first work, *Les cadres socaiux de la mémoire*[9], that the past informs the present, but on the contrary or simultaneously, in his second work, *La mémoire collective*[10], that the present informs the past. When talking to our witnesses of the industrial past, we could clearly see both of the processes acting in memory. All of them recall a strong collective experience of des-insdustrialization, with the loss of a world, of working class culture, with its urban space, ethos of work, forms of leisure... The past informs the present, the way they understand social change. But they don't recall the past in the same way. Those who remained constantly in unemployement and poverty, show a strong nostalgia of the past, deplore the disappearing of a (widely) imaginary community, while those who are now more comfortable than before, who were lucky enough (or had enough ressources) to find a job again, whose children have profited from school, prefer not to spend too much time in recalling the past, show clearly that they have come by something different, a different life, they made a fresh start. Therefore the present informs the past. Everyone re-buids the past according to its current situation.

It's time for me to conclude with this idea to register narratives into social history, find our path through individual narratives up to the collective frame, context and situation in its changing nature. A very important step could be done if we became able to achieve cross-comparison between narratives from different countries like China and France. For instance, if narratives of chinese domestic migrations (from country to town) could be compared to french ones, we could learn a lot about the relationship between individual

9 Maurice Halbwachs, 1925, 1994, *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire*, Paris, Albin Michel

10 Maurice Halbwachs, 1950, 1997, *La mémoire collective*, Paris, Albin Michel

experiences of migration and the context, social frame of these migrations. The same thing could be said about unemployement and poor workers. Thank you for listening.

Returning Back to Space-Based Sociology: Inheriting Professor Fei Hsiao-Tung's Academic Heritage

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Abstract: The decline of contemporary sociological practices that based on space/place/location as its primary unit of analysis has compelled this article to bring about a timely appeal of returning back to a space-based sociology, with Professor Fei Hsiao-Tung's academic career as a reminding guidance. In the first part of this article, the author makes it clear that space-based sociological work has been among the mainstream of Fei's academic practices. In the second part, the author demarcates some of the reasons that behind such an obvious decline: its methodological source, the underlying sociology of knowledge causes, and the paradigm-shift roots. The third part traces in detail the content of paradigmatic replacement of the Chicago School by Structural Functionalism in American sociology back in 1960s, coming to the conclusion that this challenge has been the single main reason that could explain the decline of space-based sociology world-wide ever since then. However, by convincing the audience that the continuing relevance of Chicago School has for Chinese social sciences, the author explores the internal driving forces and external conditions of reviving space-based sociology within contemporary Chinese academia, and takes this resurgence as a sign of inheriting Fei's academic heritage.

Space as a Unit of Analysis: An Introduction

In sociology's empirical studies, we have always seen stratified layers of, or a "nested" pattern of unit of analysis. The most common level one unit of analysis is a certain kind of individual with distinct socio-demographic traits, such as youth, migrants, people with disability, or prison inmates, who has been in the center of the

process of data-production and data gathering at this level. In general, for quantitative sociological researches, individual has been a dominated breed of unit of analysis, especially when the method of questionnaire survey is used.

For level two unit of analysis, organizations or groups are most apparent examples. For researches that choose organizations and groups as their prime concerns, aggregated bodies of individuals, such as educational teams, sports teams, peer groups, gangs, or corporations, have been the targets of various measurement. This level of unit of analysis, fit both for qualitative studies (such as a participatory observation of a street begging crew) and quantitative studies (such as a national sampling investigation of customer PR practices for the banking or insurance industry).

Level three unit of analysis includes a vast arrow of territorial units, among whom the most common are villages, market towns, urban neighborhoods, and territory-based communities. With the increase of internal scale, it can even include larger territorial unit such as nation-state, or geo-cultural region (for instance, Far East or Latin America).What makes it different is that territory-based unit of analysis has for most of the times a clear pre-determined border line, compared with level two unit of analysis. Furthermore, within level three territorial confines, researchers can observe a full-range of human activities. This geographical vastness and human activity diversity demands huge investments on the part of the researcher both financially and timely, thus making studies at this level are more prone of a qualitative nature, usually in the form of a case study. The only exceptions might be the national statistical systems of modern nation-state, or index-ized evaluation schemata of UN or large international organizations, which depend heavily on level three quantitative data-gathering and data analysis procedures.

Part One: Fei Hsiao-Tung and His Space-based Sociology

The purpose of my discussion of the three levels of unit of analysis above is to pave a solid foundation for this part. I hope this preparation can help us to answer such a question: if we use this methodological frame to classify Professor Fei Hsiao-Tung's major works out of his whole academic career, what conclusion could we possibly reach? My personal judgment is that, much of Fei's efforts in empirical fields can be seen as a space-based sociology, with a clear qualitative flavor. Here I define qualitative space-based sociology as those academic attempts which aim at a holistic understanding of a full-range of human activities, or a specific set of human activity, within a level three territorial unit of analysis.

Table 1 Fei Hsiao-Tung's Representative Work: A Two-Dimensional Outline

		Type of Research	
		Empirical	Theoretical
Research Stage	Early	*-Social Organizations of Hualan Yao* *-Peasant Life in China* *-Three-Village Studies in Yunnan*	*-Rural China* *-China's Reproduction System* *-Chinese Gentry*
	Late	*-Four Observations on Small Town Development* *-Six Cruises Along China's Coastal Line* *-Border Area Development and Social Investigations* *-Unfinished Field Trips*	*-A Theory of the Making of Chinese Nationality: Multi-Origins, Integrated Whole* *-Centennial Social Change and Cultural Self-Consciousness in an Age of Globalization* *-"Mutual Appreciation" and Human Civilization*

Table 1 presents a rough classification of Professor Fei's representative work: by using two dimensions--type of research and the time dimension, four quadrants have been established. The conclusion is rather apparent: Fei's representative empirical works, whether in his early or late academic life, have used territorial unit of analysis as their main methodological background. In his early empirical researches, the territorial entity is as small-sized as a village or a tribe society, while in his late empirical researches, the territorial background has shifted to a series of much bigger ones, that is, towns, urban economic zones, deltas, and ethnic agglomerations. Another major difference lies in the ways that Fei used to depict a human settlement:

in his early empirical researches, a functionalistic standing is preserved, thus we can see that aside from core concerns over the economic life of a certain community, a full-range of diversified human activities and characteristics, such as the reproduction of population and labor force, marriage, folkways, rituals, and the ethos of the community, has assigned equal importance. On the contrary, in his late empirical researches, the focus became unified under a single preoccupation over the mode of economic development of a specific territorial unit, or innovative economic endeavors that social actors in that specific territorial unit have experimented.

Here, Fei's early empirical studies deserve special attentions for further discussions. This is also to do with another major concern of my paper. Out of the subtitle of this paper, I encourage my colleagues in the field of empirical social sciences to inherit Fei's "academic heritage", then, it will be an appropriate move to discuss what accounts for Fei's academic heritage in the first place. I am thinking of using Fei's most famous community studies, the Kaixiangong village study in 1930s, and Three-Village studies in Yunnan in 1940s, to exemplify the theoretical and methodological implications of his space-based sociology. Fei himself has made a concluding statement over the connection of his early and late empirical studies as: "from *Peasant Life in China,* to *The Three-Village Studies in Yunnan,* until my studies on rural-urban relations and border area developments back in 1980s, a theoretical thread has been always maintained, and *Three-Villages Studies in Yunnan* is definitely the most important link on this chain". Thus, starting from the seemingly accidental community study of his hometown, Kaixiangong village, to the intentionally chosen three villages in Yunnan, Fei has established a new method of researching China's rural communities, one he called "a method of type comparison". Unfortunately, the sudden interruption of Chinese sociology right after the establishment of the New China in early 1950s has made such type-searching and type description efforts to a premature end. When Professor Fei regained his academic life in 1980s, the outside world has already moved forward steadily for more than 30 years, and has been experienced the shifting from an industrialization era to a post-industrialization era.

Thus for Fei, industrialization is not an option to choose from, but an indispensible developmental stage for rural China. The only question remain is the concrete route or strategy that it should take to catch up. Therefore, the searching for proper regional economic developmental modes and patterns has been the main focus of Fei's late empirical researches.

Now, there is one more question to ask. Aside from the theoretical attempt of explaining the roots of poverty in rural China and trying to find a way to alleviate it, and the methodological contribution of bring about the method of type comparison, what other academic potentiality can Professor Fei's tradition of space-based sociology offer us? In an commemorate article published in 2008, I have already pointed out that, "in contemporary social studies, we should combine qualitative socio-anthropological case studies with large quantitative sampling survey together in order to harvest the methodological advantages of both approaches….By complementing the usual neglect of institutional contexture for the part of the always shallow social survey method with intensive case methods, the advantages of survey method, that is, a holistic grasp of the whole theoretical picture and the testing of theoretical models, has been popped up. At the same time, while the first wave of survey investigation indicates a macro level theoretical co-variation, successive intensive qualitative case method can help to delineate possible intermediate working mechanisms that connect this specific inter-correlation (Liu, 2008:796)". In other words, the following two statements captured Professor Fei's space-based sociology's theoretical and methodological implications appropriately: qualitative space-based sociology is good at discovering and forming an interesting theoretical hypothesis, while quantitative space-based sociology is apt for testing the hypothesis. Table 2 and Figure 1 combined, has depicted an imagined process of the production of a theoretical hypothesis in the domain of qualitative space-based sociology.

Table 2 Theoretical and Methodological Potentialities of Fei's Space-based Sociology:

Kaixiangong Village and Three Villages in Yunnan

		The Concentration and Mobility of Land Ownership		
		Low	Median	High
Exposure to Modern Industry and Commerce	Low	Village Lu		⬭
	Median	Village Yi	Village Yu	
	High	⬭		Kaixiangong Village

Table 2 is actually a 3*3 table used for positioning the four villages that Fei (and with his colleagues) had investigated during his early academic life. The horizontal axis represents the trend of land ownership concentration and its mobility in a specific village, while the vertical axis means the degree of influences that outside industrial and commercial forces had exerted on that village. As one of the representatives of three unique types of rural community in China's hinterland about 70 years ago, Village Lu is a marginalized rural settlement far away from modern industrial and commercial centers, with a very tight men-land ratio. Although an uneven land distribution was found, the unevenness is quite limited, with the largest land owner had only 25 acre of the land. The typical absenteeism that was common in coastal areas was rare. Villagers with limited land sustained their livelihood by being hired as manual laborers by their land-rich co-villagers. In ordinary villagers' everyday life, self-sufficiency was a main theme, and the invasion of commercialization was almost non-exist.

As a village based on handicrafts, Village Yi is somewhat different. The major local handicraft is using local bamboos for making baskets and papers during spare time, thus incomes from both agriculture and handicrafts helped maintain a large bulk of village population. With regard to land distribution and ownership mobility, Village Yi was still dominated by a rather closed land system, with a least sign of polarization. As a proof, no tenants existed, and only a small number of large land owners owned land located outside of the village confine. Nevertheless, the development of bamboo-based handicrafts and the cash flow that it entailed means that Village Yi's distance from the outside commercial world was somewhat nearer than that of Village

Lu, which depended solely on agricultural output.

The third village, Village Yu, was near from the county-seat, Yuxi, and could be categorized as a half-commercialized village in its early stage of the invasion of traditional economy by modern economy. It showcased the astonishing contrast between the poverty of traditional agriculture and the prosperity of modern commerce. Being located across a famous commercial route, the development of traditional commerce had given rise to a host of very rich merchants and business people among Yu Villagers. While most of the capital accumulated from traditional commerce had been re-invested into the highly spectacular traditional commerce, only a small portion of it had been explored into modern areas such as mining and transportation. Thus, compared with Kaixiangong Village who shared with the same condition of the proximity with an urban center, the distance of Village Yi from modern industry and commerce, was a little longer than that of the former, due to the then already existed East-West gap. Nevertheless, to some extent, the aggression brought about by an active commercial capital did promote the concentration of land ownership and its mobility in Village Yu, in the form of expanding tenancy and increasing landlord absenteeism. For Kaixiangong Village itself, as a typical rural community in East China, the intimate contact with a globalized market system, and the forceful invasion of nearby urban commercial interests, had resulted in various social problems: the breakdown of local handicrafts, hardship of livelihood for ordinary peasants, family financial crisis, which in turn all contributed to the successive transfer and concentration of land ownership, as symbolized by the prevalence of landlord absenteeism.

Therefore, as Table 2 has shown, the extent to which a village as been influenced by modern commercial and industrial forces was highly correlated with the trend of land ownership concentration and transfer, and this hypothesized positive correlation is visualized by the dotted line. If we think of this relationship in terms of quantitative methodological approach, then the miniature scatter diagram and the fitted regression

line in Figure 1 could be used to express this theoretical statement.



Figure 1 Villages in the Form of Four Scatter Points and the Simulation of a Regression Line

This methodological stance of "qualitative space-based sociology producing theoretical hypothesis, while quantitative space-based sociology testing it", has been found its way once at a glance in Professor Fei's *Earthbound China：A Study of Rural Economy in Yunnan*, where he wrote: "field social research starts from a hypothesis, and ends with another one. Our gained conclusion will be the starting point of our future research, and it will then be modified (testified) again" (See Ding, Qiu, and Liu, 1996:1536). In other words, it seemed that after a close contact with American positivist sociology, Professor Fei has recognized and accepted the methodological limitation of qualitative space-based sociology, that is, it can only be useful in formatting a theoretical hypothesis, not testing a pre-existed hypothesis on the field. This might be seen as an adaptive standing point that echoed with the continuing skepticism toward the external validity of grounding theory, of which qualitative space-based sociology is a major breed.

Part Two: Paradigmatic Shift and the Contemporary Decline of Chinese

Qualitative Space-based Sociology

Another core theme of this article is trying to make sense of the contemporary decline of qualitative space-based sociology in China. A casual review of mainstream Chinese social scientific journal articles will give us an impression that, empirical research essays that based on solid territorial unit of analysis are on a gradual recession. At the same time, academic publishing houses are more interested in publishing theory-oriented books, or reports coming out of research projects supported by different levels of grants and funs, or based on other levels of unit of analysis, such as organizational or individual ones. Except for some rare cases, empirical books based on territorial unit of analysis are highly underrepresented. Of cause, there remains some Noah's ark for this seemingly retreatment of qualitative space-based sociology: master theses and doctoral dissertations from major sociology departments, where the trend of using territorial unit of analysis sustained. Thus the decline of qualitative space-based sociology is much more apparent in circles of adult/established sociologists, while in the eyes of sociological students, qualitative space-based sociology still maintains its continuing attraction. What behind this phenomenon?

To my understandings, there are several sources of reason which can explain such an inconsistency: the methodological one, the sociology of knowledge one, and the paradigmatic shifting one. Methodologically speaking, those who stick to the method of qualitative space-based sociology have long failed to understand the intrinsic relationship between qualitative and quantitative space-based sociology, taking for granted that qualitative space-based sociology can test theoretical hypothesis and thus produce theory on its own. However, one of the main methodological challenges facing this way of theory-production is the problem of external validity, that is, can those preliminary theoretical judgments acquired from case studies against territorial unit of analysis be exponentially valid in the context of a larger spatial unit of analysis? The lasting of this methodological skepticism

undermines the attraction of qualitative space-based sociology, which became the first important reason that leads to the decline of space-based sociology.

As for the sociology of knowledge reasons, according to my own personal experience, can roughly be concluded as followings: 1) Chinese social sciences still favor theoretical conceptualizations more than empirical researches, and various institutional supporting conditions, such as editorial policies of publishing houses and academic journals, catalogues of research topics from major funding agencies and the accompanied application guidance, all indicate their love of pure theoretical reasoning instead of theory-oriented empirical researches; 2) the insufficiency of funding in supporting serious research designs that not only based on a territorial unit of analysis, but also expected to unfold the whole research cycle of a qualitative space-based sociology that followed by a quantitative space-based sociology; 3) facing severe time pressure, within the established community of adult sociologists, the would-be and actual investment of time and energy in a specific research space is quite unsustainable; 4) sociology's pace of research on urban space is falling behind that of other disciplines, thus making urban planning, in stead of urban sociology, being the dominate discipline in the area of urban studies in China.

Although all partially contributive to the contemporary decline of space-based sociology, the reasons that I enumerated thus far are not fundamental. It is the reason out of a paradigmatic change that paves the way of this withdrawal. The damage of such a paradigmatic shift had done to space-based sociology can be traced back to the decline of Chicago School more than half a century ago. Since Professor Fei's early academic career were closely interlinked with Chicago School[1], therefore, it will be of

[1] The relationship of Professor Fei with Chicago School can first be traced back to 1932 when Robert Park been invited as a visiting professor at Yan-king University's sociology department, where Fei was an undergraduate student. He took two courses that Park taught: collective behavior and research methodology. On December 16th of that year, Fei attended the Good-bye party for Park at Lake-side Hall of the university. In the next year of 1933, Fei wrote two articles about Park: "Some of the Basic Differences of Park and Giddings' Sociological Thoughts", and "Sociologist Robert Park's View about China". When Fei was pursuing his PhD in London's LSE in 1937, he still paid attentions to and read Park's articles on *American Sociological Review*. In the year of 1943, with other famous Chinese intellectuals, Fei visited USA on a governmental invitation, and Chicago University was the most important station for Fei, where he translated two research reports, "Handicrafts in

great value here for us to review the history of such a paradigmatic shift and the subsequent decline of Chicago School, if we want to make a good sense of the influence of this shift had on Chinese sociology in general.

The nature of this paradigmatic shift entails the challenge toward and substitution of Chicago Sociology, or Symbolic Interactionism, by Structural Functionalism, as represented by Talcott Parsons' work. In other words, during 1930s and 1940s, sociological forces in the East Coast of USA that gathered around Harvard University and Columbia University had launched an institutional challenge toward their counterpart in Mid West of which Chicago University was undoubtedly a center. Table 3 outlines the basic content of such a paradigmatic challenge.

Table 3 Paradigmatic Shift: Challenges that Structural Functionalism Brought about Toward Chicago School

Dimensions of the Challenge		Contents	
		Structural Functionalism	Chicago School
Theoretical	Social Order	Social integration; Latent functions	Social disorganization; Social pathology
	Theoretical Focus	Macro: AGIL; system	Micro: symbolic interaction; life-world
Methodological	Strategy of Data-Production	Variable Paradigm	Contextualist Paradigm
	Strategy of Theory-Production	Grand theory + mid-range theory	Grounded theory + case logic
The shift of Unit of Analysis	Unit of Analysis	Level one and level two: individuals or organizations	Level three: territorial units
	Representative Empirical Studies	Gallup: public opinion poll Lazarsfeld: media consumer research Bereson: voting behavior	Wirth: the Ghetto in Chicago Zorbaugh: North Side of Chicago Shaw and McKay: concentric zone and juvenile delinquency

Table 3 has briefly outlined the concrete contents of the challenges that Structural Functionalism has launched against Chicago School in terms of three dimensions: the theoretical, methodological, and of the changing unit of analysis. First

Village Yi", and "Agriculture and Commerce in Village Yu" into English under the assistance of Mrs. Redfield, daughter of Robert Park, and wife of Chicago anthropologist Robert Redfield, and by using Robert Park's office as a working place. During his late years, Professor Fei still memorized Park's influence on him, and wrote several articles on Park's academic thoughts (please see Fei, 1999; 2000a; 2000b; 2000c).

of all, Structural Functionalism's view of social order focused solely on social integration and paid attentions to the latent functions underlie each of the institutional phenomena. While Chicago School's view of social order was quite different: is centered on the concepts of social disorganization and social pathology, and paid attention to social amelioration more than to the legitimacy of existing social institutions. On the theoretical dimension, difference is also clear, with the former seeing more of the macro social operations, such as the logics that embodied in the conceptualization of Parsons' AGIL model, or the latent functions of seemingly deviant social phenomenon, such as Kinsley Davis' statement on the function of prostitution (Davis, 1945), and the latter spending much of their energies on the micro level interactional patterns and the life-world of individual social actors within a fast-changing social milieu, such as Cressey's work on how Chicago's lower class male migrants satisfied their pursue of social equality, social recognition, and romantic sexual illusions in the form of a commercialized entertaining institution called Taxi-Dance Hall (Cressey, 1932).

The methodological challenges of Structural Functionalism toward Chicago School can be divided into two levels: first of all, from the point of view of the strategy of data-gathering, it turns out to be a replacement of the contextualist paradigm by the variable paradigm[2]; second, in terms of the strategy of theory-manufacturing, Structural Functionalism used both the strategy of grand theorization, as represented by Parsons (1951), and the strategy of mid-range theorization, as represented by Merton (1957). While Chicago School used a methodological strategy called Grounded Theorization, or paid more attention on the disclosure and digging of the case logic out of each of the qualitative case studies.

[2] Andrew Abbott, one of the famous guardians of the Chicago sociology tradition, has concluded variable paradigm's logic as: first obtaining the hypothesized relations between abstract theoretical concepts such as gender, capitalism, education, or bureaucracy; then searching for low-cost, high-validity schemata of operationalization in order to testify those hypothesized relations. On the contrary, the contexualist paradigm that born out of the empirical researches of Chicago sociology, showed its faith on the following statement that, without the understanding of the actions that specific actors implemented under specific time-space background, and the meanings that they attached onto these actions, the understanding of real social life is impossible. In other words, Chicago sociologists believed that, once being de-contextualized, social facts were just meaningless piles of things, since real social facts were embedded into specific spatial patterns and an ongoing process of social praxis (Abbot, 1997: 1152).

Finally, it is the challenge that coming out of the shift of the level of unit of analysis from Chicago sociology's attention on the territorial unit of analysis, to Structural Functionalism's obsession on individual or group/organizational unit of analysis. Of Chicago School's territory-based empirical researches, the most important ones include Louis Wirth's research on Chicago's ghetto (Wirth, 1928), Harvey Zorbaugh's diachronical observation of the changing ethnic relations on the territory he called Gold Coast on the North Side of the city of Chicago (Zorbaugh, 1927), and Shaw and McKay's famous study on juvenile delinquency based on Burgess' concentric zone theory theoretically, and a content analysis of Chicago youth court's verdicts methodologically (Shaw and McKay, 1942). Similarly, we can list some of the representative studies of Structural Functionalism that used individuals as unit of analysis: Gallup's opinion poll of ordinary citizens (Gallup, 1939), Lazarsfeld's market research of media consumers (Lazarsfeld, 1940), and Bereson and his colleagues' study of people's voting behaviors (Bereson et. al, 1942).

Therefore, the shift of disciplinary dominance from Chicago School to Structural Functionalism has become the first important structural change within the history of American sociology. One of the major outcomes of this change is the methodological diversification of later generations of Chicago sociologists, including quantitative sociologists such as Samuel A. Stouffer and O. D. Duncan (Abbott, 1997: 1149).

Part Four: Spatial Contextuality: The On-going Vitality of Chicago School

However, from today's view, we can still realize and feel the on-going vitality of Chicago School. First of all, we come to notice that, there existed a wave of urban neighborhood studies[3] centering on the debate of "the decline of community" in the

[3] One logical inference of Chicago sociology's social disorganization theory is that, with the in-coming of large scale immigrants, and the ecological succession of urban zones, a series of social problems would inevitably plague urban neighborhoods. Traditional sense of belonging and social solidarity that flourished in every primary community eventually diminished and replaced by an "urban jungle" that characterized by economic recession

history of American urban sociology during the first decades of the second half of twentieth century, which showcased the continuality of Chicago tradition. Second, the tradition of Chicago School's space-based sociology has been inherited by two sub-disciplines, social area analysis (Shevky and Williams, 1949; Bell, 1953), and factorial ecology (Berry and Rees, 1969). Third, and most important, is Andrew Abbott's clarification of the methodological stance of Contextualist Paradigm by which he indicates straightforwardly the importance of the following methodological approach to today's sociological investigations: in order to make sense of social life, social actions, and social changes, we have to describe, represent, and understand social facts in a specific time-space context. Therefore, for quantitative causal analysis that Variable Paradigm favored of, although through technical procedures of sampling, researchers can easily find a somewhat "representative" group of individual to study with, these people are nevertheless mutually isolated, their social life not interacted or interlinked, and their individual fates can hardly been understood or unfolded against a common social context. Thus, qualitative case studies, especially space-based ones, still hold their inherent advantage in discovering the logics that submerged in everyday life. It is even true when it comes to the task of locating working mechanisms that underlie the causal relations that Variable Paradigm has postulated and testified.

Andrew Abbott used three concepts to describe the efforts of Chicago School's contextualized academic endeavors: natural area, area-career, and interactional field (Abbott, 1997: 1153-1157). With the move from the first concept to the last one, we can see the level of complexity of the social situation increased accordingly. Table 4 gives out what each of the three spatial contextualities meant, and illustrates each of them by a representative case study.

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and social isolation. Since 1960s, a series of new urban ethnographies were launched to test this social disorganization, or the so-called "decline of community", postulation. The fact was, no matter continuing encounter with all kinds of institutional discriminations, and social segregation and marginalization to a certain extent, the social adaptation practices of different migrant groups within this urban environment had at least brought about rich proofs of the prevalence of supportive primary social relations and meaningful local social order (Gans, 1962; Liebow, 1967; Suttles, 1968; Hannerz, 1969; Anderson, 1978).

Table 4 The On-going Vitality of Chicago School:
Three Levels of Spatial Contextuality

Level of Spatial Contextuality	Meanings and Explanations	Representative Studies
Low-level of complexity: natural area	Based on natural borders such as transportation lines, rivers, specific terrains, or cultural boundaries (cohesive cultural characteristics), a series of 'natural area' could be identified from a certain urban space (city, or other forms of highly developed human settlement). These natural areas constitute basic units of analysis for urban community studies.	Anderson's research on hobos (1923): Chicago's West Madison Street is a main gathering place for hobos, and the shops along the street form a typical 'natural area'. Thus, not only the dynamic social changes of the street itself, but also the revival and decline of the hobo community, should be explained against such a natural area as an indispensible social context.
Mid-level of complexity: area-career	Within one specific natural area, if researchers could introduce a time dimension so as not only to describe the inter-generational trends of succession processes wherein, but also to map the relationship of this natural area with other social forces from larger urban entities, then a unique analytic concept of 'area-career' is needed to document such a time-dimension.	Wirth's research on ghetto (1928): in this doctoral dissertation, Wirth described in detail how ghetto as a natural area had eventually developed into a unique relationship with the surrounding urban space in particular, and the city itself in general. The expansion of the city, the changing structure of Jewish commercial ownership, the inter-generational pattern of power succession, and waves of in-coming immigration, all of these combined to shape the everyday life within the ghetto.
High-level of complexity: interactional field	Within an interactional field, a researcher can find multi-level spatial contextuality and multi-level time contextualality at the same time: all kinds of constraining forces, may it geographical, social, or economic, not only collectively defined the spatial border of one specific interactional field, but also determined processes of inter-dependency and mutual determination that happened within its confine.	Zorbaugh's research on Chicago's North Side (1929): by focusing on this 'interactional field', Zorbaugh described both long-term processes such as changes in the economic structure and the changing mosaic of migrant constitution, and short-term processes such as ecological succession of the neighborhoods, or status mobility of renters. Spatially, he noticed not only long-term trends of differentiation and inter-dependency of North Side with the whole city, but also the short-term spatial phenomenon of the geographical intermingle of parishes due to high mobility of priests and the economic mutual-reliance of each part of this region on each other.

"Natural area" is a term coined by Robert Park, who used this word to describe a geographical area that consolidates within itself emotions, traditions, and a unique cultural history. With the addition of a time dimension, and a focus on the demarcating of multi-level time processes and spatial patterns, 'natural area' eventually evolved into 'area-career' and 'interactional field', and this evolution had definitely increased qualitative space-based sociology's strength in deep description and its analytic power. The three empirical studies that Table 4 outlined--Anderson's

hobo research, Wirth's ghetto research, and Zorbaugh's North Side research—have all proved a bright future of qualitative space-based sociology in the realm of contemporary China's social sciences, since the fast social change of Chinese society has prepared us with numerous changing 'natural areas', which are worthy of us walking along the methodological road of moving from "area-career" to "interactional field", conducting case deep-description for each of the natural areas, thus producing a series of solid theoretical hypotheses and case logics for the purpose of a grounded understanding of contemporary Chinese social changes.

Part Five: Returning Back to Space-based Sociology

Thus far, this article has conveyed to our readers at least several layers of message: first of all, having been deeply influenced by functionalist anthropology and Chicago sociology, Professor Fei Hsiao-Tung's early empirical researches can be categorized as qualitative space-based case studies that have a potentiality of being transformed into quantitative space-based sociology. Second, with the replacement of Chicago School by Structural Functionalism to be among the mainstream of American sociology, qualitative space-based sociological efforts, as represented by the contextualist paradigm, has been substituted by abstract quantitative sociology that the variable paradigm promoted. This trend can also be identified in contemporary Chinese sociology, though to a lesser extent. Nevertheless, my emphasis here is that, the concept of spatial contextuality, which helped legitimizing Chicago's qualitative space-based sociology, not only kept its academic vitality till now, but also very much fitted into the situation that Chinese social sciences face now. In other words, in an era of fast social change, not only can we rely on this methodological concept (of spatial contextuality) to discover case logics of social changes in contemporary Chinese society, but also to use this concept to counter balance the "de-contextualization" error of modern quantitative sociology.

The main purpose of this section is to illuminate the four methodological strategies of how to return back to space-based sociology in the Chinese context. Table 5 gives us a general depiction of these four strategies.

The first strategy advocates pure qualitative space-based case study in sociology, as exemplified by Professor Fei's *Peasant Life in China* (1937), and Harvey Zorbaugh's *The Gold Coast and the Slum* (1928). In research fields such as Kaixiangong Village and Chicago's North Side, there is no need for the formation and testing of theoretical hypothesis at the first place, or the necessity of the addition of a time dimension. The main task is to give a full representation of the spatial contextuality that embedded in the field.

Table 5 Returning Back to Space-based Sociology: Four Strategies

Methodological Strategies	Spatial Contextuality	Theoretical Hypothesis Formation	Theoretical Hypothesis Testing	Nested Data Efforts	Case Illustration
-Pure qualitative space-based sociology	+	—	—	—	*Peasant Life in China*; *The Gold Coast and the Slum*
-Qualitative space-based sociology as pilot study	+	+	—	—	*Peasant Life in China* + *Three Villages in Yunnan*
-Qualitative and quantitative space-based sociology, single level of unit analysis	+	+	+	—	A national sampling survey on village-level practices of land distribution and utilization in mid 1990s, based on a questionnaire designed after careful pilot qualitative case studies.
-Qualitative and quantitative space-based sociology, multi-level of unit analysis	+	+	+	+	This village level land survey repeated after a certain time interval, thus adding a nested time dimension, or a nested spatial dimension by expanding the survey to cover county level data in.

The second strategy advocates hypothesis formation that based on a series of pure qualitative space-based case studies that conducted by one researcher or a group of researchers on different time points, or at different locations. One ideal example is the postulated relationship between “the degree of modern industrial and commercial influences felt by a specific locality” and “trends of land ownership concentration or its mobility of that specific locality” that Professor Fei eventually formed on the comparative information he obtained from the field observations at four villages: Kaixiangong Village, and the three villages in Yunnan. Here, qualitative space-based case work can be seen as a kind of pilot study on which subsequent quantitative space-based sociology paves its foundation.

The third strategy adds a third phase onto the second strategy, that is, the implementation of theory-testing by using a large sample. This is a very attractive academic task, and only governmental agencies or business actors have sufficient motivations and financial resources to do this kind of research, such as the large national sampling survey on land distribution and land utilization that conducted during mid 1990s under the financial support of a foreign government. At the first stages of this research program, deep qualitative case studies have been conducted, thus pave the foundation for high quality questionnaire design and implicitly, for the postulation of causal relations and the construction of a theoretical model.

The final strategy adds another element onto the whole research procedure: with data collected over a series of time points, or the addition of higher levels of spatial unit of analysis in order to form a nested data structure, we can use these complicated data sets to conduct more accurate variance decomposition, thus render a much better chance of testifying the theoretical hypotheses that gained from early qualitative space-based case work.

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Emotions and life narratives

From personal troubles to new vocabularies of personhood

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- The impact of Cultural change in defining the moral components of **personhood**

From emotions to moral economies

France as case study

- France is now facing a major social transition. During the 90s and at the beginning of the 2000s, the country was transformed by a new politics of modernisation and the impact of globalization. It is the end of the so called "French exception"
- What is taken for granted as a change ?
- How does new categories (as social suffering in mental health) change the meaning of a situation ?
- How does society think social change ?

A cumulative multi-site ethnography in France (n=7):

- The private practice of psychoanalysts
- Therapeutic community in a day hospital for adolescents
- house of adolescents and the care for their suffering
- Social suffering and suicides at the workplace
- The psychiatric care in prison
- The use of psychiatric report in justice
- Well-being and happiness at school

The moral economy perspective in the ERC project directed by Didier Fassin

- How do we **treat** people today ?
- Treatment involves **evaluation** : we seek for professionnals' **expectations** and moral **criterions**
- The **link** between a local practice and a new moral view taken for granted around a **set of norms and values**
- Moral economy = *the unequal distribution of a moral sentiment (compassion, severity, etc.) in people's treatment.*

Methodological aims

- How do we link personal troubles with public issues : biography and history ?
- How do we identify key personal troubles ?
- How do we identify key public issues ?
- --> **What are the moral values which became major or threatened ?**

a moral economy of suffering

- the clinical category of suffering has met with great success in the 90'
- It is both a clinical word used in psychoanalytical psychopathology and a political word for doing a "diagnosis of time"
- Listening suffering to *prevent* dangerosity (for oneself in case of suicide or for others) and risk of violence.
- We must listen : Teenagers,inmates, workers and powerless people
- **What is gain and what is loss within this « moral economy » of social suffering in France ? What is made visible and invisible ?**

Conclusions

- Emotions give us acces to moral values
- Life narratives give us access to analysed structural transformations
- Structural transformations define new way to speak about emotions and self (i.e. New life narratives).
- The moral economy perspective is a comparative framework within a society and a dynamic between contemporary societies

Thanks !

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Paradigms and Paradoxes:
Reflections on the methodological knowledge about Chinese religion

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Sociology comes into being in the West, while sociological studies flourish and diffuse to the rest of the world. At present, problematique originated and paradigms constructed in or based on the Western societies become prevailing research schemes in developing countries such as China, but to some degree, the different history, culture and way of life of the latter cannot be simply twisted to be squeezed into the Western patterns.

The contrast between Western paradigms and Chinese experience is nowhere more clear than in the sociological studies of Chinese religion. Or we can say, religious life in Chinese society challenges the main stream discourse which, to a large extent, grounds in the Christian religion. This study is to reflect on the paradigms and measuring about Chinese religion, with the expectation of being helpful for possible new approach.

Reflections on paradigms

Focused on the relation between religion, state and society in modern China, Vincent Gossaert analyzed five paradigms in use, i.e., (1)secularization in Chinese history, (2)continuity of traditional relation between religion and society, (3) repression (from the upper) V.S. revolt (from the bottom) , (4) dichotomies (e.g. orthodox/heterodox, religion/superstition), (5) regeneration of religious societies (Goossaert, 2006).

For studies on contemporary Chinese religion, secularization thesis seems to be relevant to a rapidly-changing society. To put it in a simple way, the so-called

secularization, refers to a historical process of religion's dominance waned and stepped out of the public sphere, it may happened synchronously with the process of modernization, industrialization, or urbanization. In contrast with the overarching prominence once it enjoyed, religion has to find its position and be confined to it. The reception of secularization in china is not only as a research tool but as a decorative jargon in critical remarks on the fast changes around.

But, although secularization as a phenomenon can be seen everywhere, secularization thesis is deeply rooted in western history and tradition. José Casanova suggests three propositions in the theory of "secularization": secularization as religious decline, secularization as differentiation, secularization as privatization. But all start in medieval Europe, where much of the reality was structured through a system of classification which divided "this world" into two heterogeneous spheres, "the religious" and "the secular" (Casanova, 1994, pp.12-15). This semantic and historical interpretation illustrates that secularization theory grows out of the Western society and Christendom.

Since 1970's, the global new religion phenomena, civil right movement invoked by religious motivation, religious-political forces, etc., challenge the assumption that religion may tend to disappear with progressive modernization. Scholars either modify the thesis or step into the post-secular age with new perspective.

The so-called religious economy, or rational choice model claims that religion as the alternative institution of honor or privilege, will be a continuous presence in the future (Stark and Bainbridge, 1985). Using market as a metaphor, this theory could apply the economic model in analyzing the dynamics of religious organization, the structure of state regulation and church development, etc. Other research tools in economics, such as consumers' preferences, choices, supply-demand relations, competitions, etc., can be transplanted conveniently into religious studies. For example, the "three- color market" model is an outstanding work on the flexible relations between state control and Chinese religious market (Yang, 2006).

Paradoxes in China case:

For China, or other countries in the ‘rest’ of the world, either the secularization’s “religion will disappear” tone, or the religious economy’s “religion will be around” claim, may be irrelevant, because they both ground in the Western society and Christianity. Just the proponent of rational choice theory said, social scientific studies of religion are mainly dealing with Judeo-Christian beliefs, activities and institutions (Iannaccone, 1998).

(1), What makes the Western theory less pertinent to Chinese experience, is the historical and institutional context, e.g. the ‘state leads religion follows’ structure in political-religion realm, the different path of modernization and the perception of secularism.

Politics wins the prominence against religion from the early era of Chinese history, not a single religion has cherished the exclusive and dominant position as their Western counterpart. This is good for Chinese people in the first place, for no serious religion clashes or wars ever happened, but the ‘state leads religion follows’ structure makes secularism in modern China has very different meaning.

On the one hand, Chinese secularization takes place by cutting the bandage between religion and society (Goossaert, 2006), on the other hand, science as a new form of authority, was used to attack religion by a dichotomy of science/superstition, thus religion or worship endorsed by the government will be permitted, otherwise forbidden, with temples destructed and assets grabbed.

This forms the secularism in China, i.e., the omnipotent government get its sacred canopy from new expectations like modernization, science or scientism and the fresh concept of nation-state.

(2), survey data also shows that some robust index used by sociologists, such as self-claimed affiliation, denomination preferences, church attendance, attitude toward certain religious items (Bible, God, Jesus, heaven, hell…), etc., could not measure the religious involvement in China in its usual way. This will raise another question: how to define and measure Chinese religious life?

Generally speaking, compared to the Western way, Chinese religion is lack of institutional religious organization, congregational religious life.

A national survey ESVIC held in 2007 shows that of all 7021 respondents, the percent of self-claimed Buddhists is 18.1%, Taoists 0.6% and Confucians 0.2%, people claimed affiliation to Protestant, Catholic, Islam is around 2.5%, 0.2% and 0.2%. Just as the impression of atheist China, of the 7021 respondents, the rate of non-believers is 77.1%; about the approximately 20% self-claiming believers, only 9.2% of them had any conversion ceremonies or alike.

Although the low percentage of affiliation may indicate the 'diffused' aspect, i.e. the low level in organizational capacity and involvement, there are some other items tell other stories.

For example, when asked whether or not they believed in the existence of certain religious items, the percentage of respondents say yes is 8.8% (God), 5.5% (Jesus), 17.6% (Buddha), 22%(karma), and 8.7% (sages).

What draws attention is: the percentage of belief in the existence of God and Jesus is respectively 8.8% and 5.5%, both significantly higher than that of Protestants and Catholics together (2.8%). Similarly, 8.7% believe in the existence of sages though only 0.2% claims themselves as Confucians. On the other hand, 17.6% believe in the existence of Buddha (in contrast with 18.1% Buddhist); those who believing in karma, fate or fortune, spirits of ancestors are all above 20% separately.

When trying to measure religious involvement in the last 12 months, the questionnaire set the stage on temples, churches, mosques, etc. The result shows that 17.4% of the respondent worship in these religious places, while weeping-grave or burning incense happens more often with a frequency of 43.2%. Only 35.2% people claimed that they had done nothing religious during the last year, compare to the 77.1% non-believers, the contour here is a common "practice without affiliation" situation.

Further studies show the linkage between certain belief or religiosity (such as the giving-merit idea) and economic choices, like religious giving (He Rong , 2007; 2013).

Future approach:

New paradigms, and new index of religiosity of Chinese, are still need to be developed. Based on these reflections on sociological studies in Chinese religion, several questions will be urgent for possible new approaches to come:

(1), How to measure religious involvement and understand Chinese religion as it is, instead of distorting the tradition beyond the stretch of those paradigms?

(2), the necessity of combining the interpretation of "meaning" of religious practice, with the measure of certain religious behaviors;

(3), the consciousness of Chinese religion's historical, cultural and institutional context when applying research tools borrowed from different background.

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Governance structure, Path dependence, Income and Social insurance of floating populations in Chinese cities: Comparing studies between Yangzi Delta and Zhujiang Delta

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The social life conditions of floating populations are very different between Yangzi Delta and Zhujiang Delta. About their income, the average salary of Yangzi Delta is about 200-300￥ higher than that of Zhujiang Delta. About their social security, rights and interests protection, Yangzi Delta is also better than Zhujiang Delta. Why are there so much different?

In this paper, I want to find the causes from their different industrialization models in early times. In Yangzi Delta, their industrialization model is Sunan Model, most of their industries are collective enterprises(集体企业), and most of their labors are local peasants. Only after 1995, with the development of foreign investments and the reform of collective enterprises, foreign capital enterprises are becoming the main parts of local industries, and the floating populations are becoming the main labors instead of local peasants. But in Zhujiang Delta, their industrialization model is Zhujiang Model, most of their industries are Sanlaiyibu enterprises(“三来一补”企业),and most of their labors are floating populations from the early times.

In Yangzi Delta, the government structure is Local government-collective enterprises-local peasants, but in Zhujiang Delta, the government structure is Local government-Sanlaiyibu enterprises-floating populations. In different government structure, the status of labors are different, which led to different institutional models about the employments.

With the effect of path dependence, the former institutional models affected today’s institutions, which decided their different social life conditions and social assimilation of floating populations between Yangzi Delta and Zhujiang Delta.

Circulations, mobility and migrant networks in the Mediterranean region

Adelina Miranda[1]

Since the 1990s, population movement in the Mediterranean region has attracted new attention within the world migration scene, by reviving debate on the significance of mobility within what Braudel defined in 1977 as "movement in space". In this paper we propose that the study of population mobility within this cultural arena adds new theoretical and methodological elements to the discussion. Our work began with an observation: the study of migratory facts in the Mediterranean region reveals a lack of attention to the coexistence, overlap and entanglement of different forms of migration stemming from slavery, colonialism, urbanization and industrialization.

During this presentation, we will look more deeply at this issue according to two analytical outlines.

We'll begin by first reconstructing the socio-cultural dynamics linked to the processes of widening and diversification of population movements around the Mediterranean since the 1970s. The entrance of new emigration and immigration countries onto the migration scene, the arrival of new migrants into economic settings in which the local workforce do not know full employment, progressively restrictive migration policies; the transformation of transit countries into countries of final destination leads us to search for a new interpretive paradigm able to integrate these diverse levels of migration.

Secondly we will question the various legitimacies generated by current methodological frameworks of analysis. Despite the variety of migratory flows in the Mediterranean region, immigration has long been perceived as a consequence of the

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demands of industrial capitalism after WWII. Studies have often focused on the image of the male immigrant working in the industrial sector. However a closer look into post-WWII migrations reveals that different kinds of immigration have consistently been significant, including during the 1960's and 70's. The image of the proletarian immigrant does not adequately render the variability and diversity of the migration process. In the Mediterranean context, colonial and post-colonial immigration overlap. These phenomena originated partly from political, financial and cultural continuities which, today still shape the relations between colonizing and colonized countries (Liauzu 2008). This reminds us of two crucial facts:

The first is that the migrant is initially perceived negatively and this negative portrayal is perpetuated despite the variety of developments that occur in this kind of situation.

The second is that representations of migration are dissociated from stabilization processes and/or the individuals' nationalities. The different representations are linked to national history as well as to the political use of the presence of foreigners. In order to pass this segmentation of interpretive migratory categories, we need to take in account what Roulleau-Berger mentions (2012 : 14): "the plurality of temporalities, locations, contexts, situations in the construction of field investigation package".

Adopting such a reflexive methodological approach contributes just as much to constituting a sociological comparative of migrations, which goes beyond a state-centered, euro-centered and Atlantic-centered point of view; as to "the disintegration of intellectual separation between the studies on Western and non-Western regions" (Foucault 1996)

Interwoven migrations in the Mediterranean

Historians have argued that mobility has structured the different Mediterranean societies; they put into perspective the exceptional nature of current mobility and point out that the opposition between "traditional and sedentary" and "contemporary and mobile" societies is obsolete. Temime (1995) outlines that Mediterranean societies, both agro pastoral and maritime, were in constant need of workforce, which

in turn created continual mobility between cities, between the plains and mountains, and rural areas. However in the past, population mobility usually occurred in local areas, were limited in size and renewed each year. In addition, depending on the period, internal and international migrations sometimes crossed paths, or overlapped; political and economic migrations formed differently depending on the structure of social and cultural groups.

This phenomenon acquired a specific configuration after the Second World War, when migrants from southern European countries (Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal) started travelling towards the north (France, Great-Britain, Germany, Belgium and Switzerland). During the 1970s, this began to change. After the Oil crisis, those nations most accepting of immigration adopted more restrictive policies. Part of the migration flow originating in countries south of the Mediterranean started heading towards Italy, Spain, Greece and later Portugal and Cyprus. During the 1980s, this flow became more substantial. The modification of labor market conditions in northern Europe was seen as an explanatory factor and the arrival of immigrants in these countries as a "temporary detour" linked to the absence of restrictive norms regarding immigration.

During the 1990s, however immigration became a structural element of southern European countries, despite their high unemployment rates and long history of emigration. More and more immigrants settled in southern European countries. The Mediterranean Sea can be described as a kind of European Rio Grande (King 1996). Pugliese (2012) states the existence of a "Mediterranean migratory model" and he outlines some central similarities between Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece. In the view of this researcher, the economies of these countries were marked by the same history of land tenure just as their politics were affected by the same fascist History, leading to a kind of social and cultural stasis. The progressive increase of foreigners can be explained by the geographic location of these countries, the lack of border patrols, the difficulty of implementing a migratory policy, the low costs of living and easy access to informal jobs for foreigners. These countries also share a crucial

demographic change: their populations' decreasing birthrate and the rise of their aging-rate. This last phenomenon has created a need for a feminine workforce in the care sector. It should be noted that in these nations of recent immigration, the phenomenon of emigration towards foreign countries is currently driven by young, qualified graduates and we are witnessing the return of internal migrations, as is the case in Italy. Research referring to the "Mediterranean migratory model" has allowed us to understand the dynamics of post-Ford era migration; however it does not answer three major questions. First of all, these studies do not encompass colonialism. Yet, as we know today, colonial History has determined the nature, rhythm and arrangement of migratory flows. Secondly we must remember that the Mediterranean migratory area is also seen through what Tarrius (2002) describes as "transnationalism from below". Migrants travel within networks and appropriate local places, mostly urban, depending on the opportunities offered by legal or illegal economies, using information from those already "settled", whilst adapting to national legislations and going through different work segments and varied judicial settings. Focusing on the fact that Mediterranean migrations cannot be analyzed around assimilation or upheaval poles, Péraldi (2011) stated the necessity of getting past the paradigm of organized migrations reaching for the Ford industry's patterns, previously the standard in migratory paradigms.

Finally, without taking in account the debate on the "Mediterranean area", this analysis supports a euro-centric point of view; it focuses on a few northern Mediterranean countries and renders a homogeneous image of southern European countries' migrations. Dumont (2008) reminds us that there are three different migration areas around the Mediterranean: the African Mediterranean, Asian Mediterranean and European Mediterranean. The author also suggests that we take into account three directions in intercontinental migrations in the Mediterranean: Between Africa and Asia, between Africa and Europe and between Asia and Europe.

Migrations beyond the Mediterranean area

Since the 1990s, the migratory phenomenon in the countries to the south and east of the Mediterranean has acquired greater visibility thus proving that the coexistence of emigration and immigration flows does not affect only southern European countries. Although nations on the southern Mediterranean shore continue to fuel migratory flows towards countries on its northern shore, they are also undergoing substantial transformations. Approximately one and a half million foreigners were living in Libya before the fall of Gaddafi's regime, as well as in Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria. Henceforth, many migrants no longer see these as transit countries but as possible final destinations, because despite high unemployment rates, they can still try to find work in the informal labor market, notably in construction, clothing manufacture and the service sectors, particularly in housework, similar to what is available in Mediterranean European countries.

These migrations contribute to the geopolitical African reconfiguration of North African countries (Bensaad 2005), and additionally to the redefining of traditional mobility as determined by colonial history in and between colonized countries. Similarly, after decolonization, the Algerian government began the third phase of its agricultural revolution and intensified its relations with Niger. From the Nigerien perspective, Algeria plays a different role in the African migratory system and is not strictly associated with emigration (Brachet 2009)

Furthermore, in addition to the simultaneous presence of emigration and immigration, one must also consider the impact of transit migrations and political conflicts. Historians have outlined the importance of "transit" as a component in all Mediterranean countries, and the Eastern Sahara as a mobility area in constant transformation linked to the Mediterranean region. The Mediterranean migratory setting is in addition marked by political conflicts. The Palestinian, Kurdish and Armenian issues, the conflicts in the Balkans, the tensions in the Middle-East; all weigh heavily on Mediterranean migratory arrangements, as shown by the increase in the number of people arriving at the coast of Italy. During the first four months of 2014, official sources registered over 100 000 arrivals, of which 3000 people died

during the journey across the Mediterranean. According to data from the Italian Ministry of Home Affairs, the majority are asylum seekers from Syria, Somalia and Eritrea for the most part transiting through Libya.

This situation reflects the migratory policies in place to the north and south of the Mediterranean: the European Union tends to leave the control of its borders to other countries, while countries south of the Mediterranean waver between policies of repression and tolerance. The migratory phenomenon's recent developments in the Mediterranean area underline the close connection that migration has with a process of Europeanization and the subject of asylum.

Heterogeneous legitimacies in the creation of interpretive migratory categories

Mediterranean migratory history shows us that the coexistence, interweaving, and overlap of various migratory arrangements in the Mediterranean are nothing new. Consequently, the question we ask is why even attempt to analyze them separately? Is the use of segregated categories linked to forms of legitimacy? These questions allow us to follow two methodological lines of thought, serving to clarify points of critical epistemology. When observing simultaneously, different migratory facts in Mediterranean countries, one can see how multi-polarized mobility has become. The Mediterranean Sea is interlaced with migratory flows moving around various economic centers, linking countries from different geopolitical backgrounds. The concurrent presence of different migratory arrangements within the Mediterranean area, often perceived as structured by opposing forces, brings up a series of questions regarding interpretive categories which do not render this complexity sufficiently visible.

First of all, we are reminded that the social representation of the emigrant is not the same as that of an immigrant. Although both images are linked, their entwinement must not hide the fact that the emigrant is not a mirror image of the immigrant. Emigration and immigration embody subordination and domination processes crossing the globalization phenomenon very differently.

Secondly, while sociology – especially of quantification – bases itself on the heuristic validity of statistics, the elaboration of consistent and exhaustive categories is an illusion. We must remind ourselves that the UN defines as “migrants” only people living in a nation other than their native country for over a year. This conception of the international migrant excludes many other groups – for example bi-nationals citizens – and includes individuals that have sometimes have migrated. Indeed the composition of migration on a statistical level depends on an interesting ideological exercise. In the end, the data collected by this sociology is based on criteria established by migratory policies – nationality, birthplace or residency, journey length and motive.

Thirdly, one notes the insufficient use of a single term to analyze dissimilar migratory cases. Migrant typologies refer back to specific legal frameworks based on their motivations and the circumstances of their arrival and departure. However these frameworks neglect the fact that the lines between these categories are reversible and volatile. The complexity of the lives of migrants, of their routes, of the entanglement of causes and motivations to travel, can align or compete with migratory policies or family responsibilities. The elaboration of distinct migratory categories is the result of the difficulty of distinguishing between financial and political causes in migration history (Dufoix 2000) as well as the complex interweaving of state structures, the identification with national identities and mobility configurations.

Working towards a comparative standpoint

The interest of Mediterranean migrations goes beyond the heuristic value derived from its potential specificity. This migratory area shows the existence of devices depending on the globalization process of migration and the analysis of characteristics specific to this cultural region, leading us towards a deconstruction of the conceptual framework of migration. The interweaving of emigration and immigration, internal and international migration, and of transit migration and political migration sheds light on the lack of separated explanatory typologies from a statist point of view. These forms of coexistence between emigration and immigration in countries on the

southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea establish the foundations of an analytical, comparative sociology of migration, which must be constructed on the basis of “methodological cosmopolitism” (Roulleau-Berger 2012 : 14). It can, based on inquiries in different countries and all centered around a sole question, encompass the tensions found in the structure of fields of knowledge about migration.

This observation opens the way to analytical perceptions that one can bring back to migratory ethnocentric and Atlantic-centered paradigms. According to J. and L. Lucassen (1999) dichotomous categories (chosen/forced, work-related/political, economic/cultural migration) take no account of interdependent action and the combination of financial, political and cultural dynamics affecting migrations. Mckeown (2004)highlights that the global migratory system includes different systems. Yet, migrations have been analyzed solely on the basis of the American industrialization process, and the transformations pertaining to the rest of the world – especially in Asia – have been completely ignored. The expansion of the U.S. industrial economy was undoubtedly impressive, but one must also take into account that population mobility also structured itself around trade, the slave market, the agricultural sector, political and cultural forces, and the way they affected different regions of the world. Gabaccia (2014) recently brought to light that migration, which started during the 16th century, is an element of integration structured by a logic of gender. For this author, the use of one gender perspective can help break the Atlantic-centred perception of migrations.

Studies in the Mediterranean setting allow us to appreciate these stances, which in a post-colonial perception of migration increase the number of points from which migration can be observed and analyzed. This fosters the deconstruction of ‘universal’ migratory paradigms and simultaneously guides us in the search for articulations between different migratory processes (Miranda 2008).

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Historians have argued that mobility has structured the different Mediterranean societies; they put into perspective the exceptional nature of current mobility and point out that the opposition between "traditional and sedentary" and "contemporary and mobile" societies is obsolete. Temime (1995) outlines that Mediterranean societies, both agro pastoral and maritime, were in constant need of workforce, which

in turn created continual mobility between cities, between the plains and mountains, and rural areas. However in the past, population mobility usually occurred in local areas, were limited in size and renewed each year. In addition, depending on the period, internal and international migrations sometimes crossed paths, or overlapped; political and economic migrations formed differently depending on the structure of social and cultural groups.

This phenomenon acquired a specific configuration after the Second World War, when migrants from southern European countries (Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal) started travelling towards the north (France, Great-Britain, Germany, Belgium and Switzerland). During the 1970s, this began to change. After the Oil crisis, those nations most accepting of immigration adopted more restrictive policies. Part of the migration flow originating in countries south of the Mediterranean started heading towards Italy, Spain, Greece and later Portugal and Cyprus. During the 1980s, this flow became more substantial. The modification of labor market conditions in northern Europe was seen as an explanatory factor and the arrival of immigrants in these countries as a "temporary detour" linked to the absence of restrictive norms regarding immigration.

During the 1990s, however immigration became a structural element of southern European countries, despite their high unemployment rates and long history of emigration. More and more immigrants settled in southern European countries. The Mediterranean Sea can be described as a kind of European Rio Grande (King 1996). Pugliese (2012) states the existence of a "Mediterranean migratory model" and he outlines some central similarities between Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece. In the view of this researcher, the economies of these countries were marked by the same history of land tenure just as their politics were affected by the same fascist History, leading to a kind of social and cultural stasis. The progressive increase of foreigners can be explained by the geographic location of these countries, the lack of border patrols, the difficulty of implementing a migratory policy, the low costs of living and easy access to informal jobs for foreigners. These countries also share a crucial

demographic change: their populations' decreasing birthrate and the rise of their aging-rate. This last phenomenon has created a need for a feminine workforce in the care sector. It should be noted that in these nations of recent immigration, the phenomenon of emigration towards foreign countries is currently driven by young, qualified graduates and we are witnessing the return of internal migrations, as is the case in Italy. Research referring to the "Mediterranean migratory model" has allowed us to understand the dynamics of post-Ford era migration; however it does not answer three major questions. First of all, these studies do not encompass colonialism. Yet, as we know today, colonial History has determined the nature, rhythm and arrangement of migratory flows. Secondly we must remember that the Mediterranean migratory area is also seen through what Tarrius (2002) describes as "transnationalism from below". Migrants travel within networks and appropriate local places, mostly urban, depending on the opportunities offered by legal or illegal economies, using information from those already "settled", whilst adapting to national legislations and going through different work segments and varied judicial settings. Focusing on the fact that Mediterranean migrations cannot be analyzed around assimilation or upheaval poles, Péraldi (2011) stated the necessity of getting past the paradigm of organized migrations reaching for the Ford industry's patterns, previously the standard in migratory paradigms.

Finally, without taking in account the debate on the "Mediterranean area", this analysis supports a euro-centric point of view; it focuses on a few northern Mediterranean countries and renders a homogeneous image of southern European countries' migrations. Dumont (2008) reminds us that there are three different migration areas around the Mediterranean: the African Mediterranean, Asian Mediterranean and European Mediterranean. The author also suggests that we take into account three directions in intercontinental migrations in the Mediterranean: Between Africa and Asia, between Africa and Europe and between Asia and Europe.

Migrations beyond the Mediterranean area

Since the 1990s, the migratory phenomenon in the countries to the south and east of the Mediterranean has acquired greater visibility thus proving that the coexistence of emigration and immigration flows does not affect only southern European countries. Although nations on the southern Mediterranean shore continue to fuel migratory flows towards countries on its northern shore, they are also undergoing substantial transformations. Approximately one and a half million foreigners were living in Libya before the fall of Gaddafi's regime, as well as in Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria. Henceforth, many migrants no longer see these as transit countries but as possible final destinations, because despite high unemployment rates, they can still try to find work in the informal labor market, notably in construction, clothing manufacture and the service sectors, particularly in housework, similar to what is available in Mediterranean European countries.

These migrations contribute to the geopolitical African reconfiguration of North African countries (Bensaad 2005), and additionally to the redefining of traditional mobility as determined by colonial history in and between colonized countries. Similarly, after decolonization, the Algerian government began the third phase of its agricultural revolution and intensified its relations with Niger. From the Nigerien perspective, Algeria plays a different role in the African migratory system and is not strictly associated with emigration (Brachet 2009)

Furthermore, in addition to the simultaneous presence of emigration and immigration, one must also consider the impact of transit migrations and political conflicts. Historians have outlined the importance of "transit" as a component in all Mediterranean countries, and the Eastern Sahara as a mobility area in constant transformation linked to the Mediterranean region. The Mediterranean migratory setting is in addition marked by political conflicts. The Palestinian, Kurdish and Armenian issues, the conflicts in the Balkans, the tensions in the Middle-East; all weigh heavily on Mediterranean migratory arrangements, as shown by the increase in the number of people arriving at the coast of Italy. During the first four months of 2014, official sources registered over 100 000 arrivals, of which 3000 people died

during the journey across the Mediterranean. According to data from the Italian Ministry of Home Affairs, the majority are asylum seekers from Syria, Somalia and Eritrea for the most part transiting through Libya.

This situation reflects the migratory policies in place to the north and south of the Mediterranean: the European Union tends to leave the control of its borders to other countries, while countries south of the Mediterranean waver between policies of repression and tolerance. The migratory phenomenon's recent developments in the Mediterranean area underline the close connection that migration has with a process of Europeanization and the subject of asylum.

Heterogeneous legitimacies in the creation of interpretive migratory categories

Mediterranean migratory history shows us that the coexistence, interweaving, and overlap of various migratory arrangements in the Mediterranean are nothing new. Consequently, the question we ask is why even attempt to analyze them separately? Is the use of segregated categories linked to forms of legitimacy? These questions allow us to follow two methodological lines of thought, serving to clarify points of critical epistemology. When observing simultaneously, different migratory facts in Mediterranean countries, one can see how multi-polarized mobility has become. The Mediterranean Sea is interlaced with migratory flows moving around various economic centers, linking countries from different geopolitical backgrounds. The concurrent presence of different migratory arrangements within the Mediterranean area, often perceived as structured by opposing forces, brings up a series of questions regarding interpretive categories which do not render this complexity sufficiently visible.

First of all, we are reminded that the social representation of the emigrant is not the same as that of an immigrant. Although both images are linked, their entwinement must not hide the fact that the emigrant is not a mirror image of the immigrant. Emigration and immigration embody subordination and domination processes crossing the globalization phenomenon very differently.

Secondly, while sociology – especially of quantification – bases itself on the heuristic validity of statistics, the elaboration of consistent and exhaustive categories is an illusion. We must remind ourselves that the UN defines as “migrants” only people living in a nation other than their native country for over a year. This conception of the international migrant excludes many other groups – for example bi-nationals citizens – and includes individuals that have sometimes have migrated. Indeed the composition of migration on a statistical level depends on an interesting ideological exercise. In the end, the data collected by this sociology is based on criteria established by migratory policies – nationality, birthplace or residency, journey length and motive.

Thirdly, one notes the insufficient use of a single term to analyze dissimilar migratory cases. Migrant typologies refer back to specific legal frameworks based on their motivations and the circumstances of their arrival and departure. However these frameworks neglect the fact that the lines between these categories are reversible and volatile. The complexity of the lives of migrants, of their routes, of the entanglement of causes and motivations to travel, can align or compete with migratory policies or family responsibilities. The elaboration of distinct migratory categories is the result of the difficulty of distinguishing between financial and political causes in migration history (Dufoix 2000) as well as the complex interweaving of state structures, the identification with national identities and mobility configurations.

Working towards a comparative standpoint

The interest of Mediterranean migrations goes beyond the heuristic value derived from its potential specificity. This migratory area shows the existence of devices depending on the globalization process of migration and the analysis of characteristics specific to this cultural region, leading us towards a deconstruction of the conceptual framework of migration. The interweaving of emigration and immigration, internal and international migration, and of transit migration and political migration sheds light on the lack of separated explanatory typologies from a statist point of view. These forms of coexistence between emigration and immigration in countries on the

southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea establish the foundations of an analytical, comparative sociology of migration, which must be constructed on the basis of “methodological cosmopolitism” (Roulleau-Berger 2012 : 14). It can, based on inquiries in different countries and all centered around a sole question, encompass the tensions found in the structure of fields of knowledge about migration.

This observation opens the way to analytical perceptions that one can bring back to migratory ethnocentric and Atlantic-centered paradigms. According to J. and L. Lucassen (1999) dichotomous categories (chosen/forced, work-related/political, economic/cultural migration) take no account of interdependent action and the combination of financial, political and cultural dynamics affecting migrations. Mckeown (2004)highlights that the global migratory system includes different systems. Yet, migrations have been analyzed solely on the basis of the American industrialization process, and the transformations pertaining to the rest of the world – especially in Asia – have been completely ignored. The expansion of the U.S. industrial economy was undoubtedly impressive, but one must also take into account that population mobility also structured itself around trade, the slave market, the agricultural sector, political and cultural forces, and the way they affected different regions of the world. Gabaccia (2014) recently brought to light that migration, which started during the 16th century, is an element of integration structured by a logic of gender. For this author, the use of one gender perspective can help break the Atlantic-centred perception of migrations.

Studies in the Mediterranean setting allow us to appreciate these stances, which in a post-colonial perception of migration increase the number of points from which migration can be observed and analyzed. This fosters the deconstruction of ‘universal’ migratory paradigms and simultaneously guides us in the search for articulations between different migratory processes (Miranda 2008).

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The fabric of sociological knowledge

A Comparative perspective of urban citizenship in international cities

Agnès Deboulet

Examining citizenship through a sociological lense is a way for unraveling some pre-conceived ideas about the relation between individuals, state, rights and belonging in post-western societies. As stated by Clarke, Coll, Dagnino and Neveu (2014), there is an on-going dispute on different conceptions of citizenship. Away from the dominant assumption, we will argue that plural forms of urban citizenship start to be appreciated by french and european researches as embodiments of ordinary politics, thus contradicting the legalist and republican top-down vision. Thus, citizenship can be captured in a processual manner, as an experiment of social change leading to a renewed sense of politics. It can therefore be linked to a constant learning process. This presentation will be based on an international comparisons of citizen's and citizenship fabric drawing from a situated methodology. We'll draw mostly on examples from surveys undertaken since long in popular peripheral areas in Cairo and will balance it with the examination of urban situations in public housing large estate undergoing urban renewal areas in France. Despite very different social histories, they are both undergoing reconfigurations of citizenship based on somehow converging claims for a plural citizenship and a vocabulary of respect and social justice. Violent changes associated with urbanization process, economic and urban restructuring are perfect sites for exploring variations and common elements in methodological tools, we will precisely focus on contested spaces of elitist reconquest

hosted by most of very large metropolis since a decade, in France and in the Middle-East.

Casting light on various phenomena related to contentious issues car therefore be confronted with local forms of dissent in global restructuring sites. Hence, we can build the first steps of multisituated knowledge articulating the common forms of "practices from below" expressing ordinary politics and plural citizenship. This methodology of "cosmopolitanism" will also be reviewed taking in consideration local expressions of revolt that paved the way for new forms of discontent and alternative expressions of "politicity". Hence, we'd like to emphasize the pivotal role of "situations" in this grounded and multi-sited methodology.

Despite very different basic statutes defining and regulating land use in popular neighborhoods and despite completely distinct urban milieus, national and international development and security discourse tosses both of these forms of urban 'informal' settlements together and considers them problematic and this is reinforced by the frequent use since a decade of the fight against slums as a new universal flagship. A quite similar stigmatization discourse applies till thirty years to the most deprived public housing suburbs in France (as in England) considered as sites of social dislocation, violence and anomy or rebirth of "communautarism", expression mostly addressed to migrants communities supposed to develop segregative and hegemonic practices.

I. Cairo's popular neighborhoods: the persistence of urban pathologies and denial of citizenship

In Cairo we noticed that the state counts and, to some degree, recognizes people living in "clandestine subdivisions" on private agricultural land yet it ignored till the early revolution of 2011 the existence of city-dwellers in the second kind of popular zone made of squatter settlements on state land. Thus, the political and mediatic treatment of the latest suggest that they are risk factors, security problems, or a form of collective illegality. The first areas ("the majority) shelters a heterogeneous

population of lower-middle-class and working-class people, while the other harbors day-workers, or ‘*arzu‘i* (workers paid only a daily wage in the construction or manufacturing industries) and their families. It is as much the laws governing the recognition of formal sector employment as it is the form of labor itself that distinguishes the general social profile of the two populations[1]. This distinction is based on utterly contrasting tax collection and welfare distribution schemes, but it is largely misleading because the frontiers between the two sectors blur most of the time within the Egyptian economy, as they do in most countries (for cases in Latin America, see Gilbert 2002). The first population is stigmatized in both positive and negative ways, while the population of the second group is aware of living in poverty without state recognition of its labor and rights.

The articulation of urban informality as forms of social and urban pathology is a global phenomenon, present in the policy and security discourses of a number of cities that feature inadequate public services and poorly controlled urban development (Chaboche et Navez-Bouchanine, 2013 ; Huchzermeyer and Karam 2006). Misguided representations of pathology emerge, without a doubt, when technical plans are only an afterthought in cities with increasingly large influxes of people and where government is deficient in providing access to housing for this enormous population (among 80% of total 16 million dwellers).

Often, extralegal or infralegal organizations step in to compensate for state weakness. This phenomenon often is described as ‘informal,’ ‘unregulated,’ or ‘irregular’ urban development, or as ‘defective subdivision’ in interwar France and in contemporary Italy. These terms are used most in a number of countries of the global South. They are linked to nonlegalized, self-generated, unregulated working-class housing on state or public lands and they quite often convey their own discourse of

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- [1] The chapter on Cairo draw in part from my article « The dictatorship of the straight line and the myth of social disorder. Revisiting informality in Cairo », in D. Singerman (ed), *Cairo contested-gouvernance, urban space and global modernity*, The American university in Cairo Press, 2009, pp. 163-198
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denigration and justification whereas “state neglect” (Dorman, 2009) had left all (limited) services to be provided by unregistered organizations (construction, education, sanitation, security, vigilante justice, and so on). The dichotomy both excludes and simplifies the comprehension of real social needs and obscures questions of accountability, power, and social relations (Roy and AlSayyad 2003 ; Gilbert, 2007).

To retrace the processes of citizenship denial and citizenship recovery we need to retrace the ways these discourses articulate social disorders and question the foundations of existing discourses on urban order. We should dig into the reason for the fear neglect of the mere citizenship of these dwellers, rarely counted in the official statistics and vastly underestimated (Sabry, 2009). Besides, we must understand how people manage their moral and social needs, which are contradictory to the hegemonic discourse and urban planning ideology of modernism. In addition, we will explore how these communities establish their identities as they create a place where solidarities are forged not only among people of the same *baladiyat* (regional or village origins) but also across many social cleavages.

Current Representations of Social Disorder

The metadiscourse on illegality/informality is omnipresent and too often taken for granted. It tends to assimilate all the newly created, crowded, self-built working-class neighborhoods into its stigmatizing narrative. It also absorbs the ensemble of stereotypes concerning working-class and destitute social groups, which live with few social services. This denigrating language borrows, reinforces, and fuses together a system of negative social signifiers, linking, for example, informality and marginality, informality and disorder, informality and poverty, and informality and rural origins or provincialism (see Singerman, 2009). Generalized misrepresentation function as discursive manifestations, by a play of associations and connotations, rough practices, and repetition. At the same time, they are produced and legitimated by public institutions and thus become hegemonic. These discourses are collectively

generated, rooted in generally accepted evidence, and diffused by multiple support systems, including the press, ‘experts,’ academics, and consultants in the national and international technocratic apparatus, as well as responsible state institutions.

Sociological analysis of urban informality oscillates between two models: a reference to inherited and stable disorders and a reference to the frameworks of ‘classic’ European sociological theories of social integration. Since Ferdinand Tönnies and Emile Durkheim, classic sociology tells a tale of modernity on the march, advocating necessary change through training and social work in the face of an industrial society threatened by the explosion of the working masses, who are floating, morally unfixed, and more or less impoverished (Dubet 2003, 285; Walton 1981). But this type of analysis fails to understand modes of adaptation in the current period, which is defined by an economy that is largely unsalaried and wrenched apart by neoliberalism. Taking this modernist paradigm seriously, an analytical disjuncture is imposed between the community (of cultural links) and society (of modern individuals). This perspective tends to trace problems, or lack of societal modernity, to the persistence of premodern links, such as the clan or ‘tribe,’ thus perpetuating Tönnies’ theoretical frame despite dramatic changes in the global context and the dominance of the urban feature.

Beyond the great divide between communities and insurgent citizenship

The changes occurring in most of the cities of the global South, such as Cairo, should cue one to think about social formations without looking for primitive or atavist perspectives that insist on labeling and essentializing ethnic identities or family value systems as ‘anti-modern’ behavior. In the communities analyzed here, the family and, to a lesser degree, the clan (Miller, …) indeed remain primary social anchors, while in other neighborhoods, such as Giza in the western part of Greater Cairo, the enlargement of nonfamily social networks constitutes the clearest change in working-class society. These sociocultural distinctions are often the dynamic effect of

legal frames, discursive categorizations, policy implementation, and state violence, not the 'primitive' cause of exclusion or chaos.

In the first type, people do not see themselves as poor, but simply as the 'people,' as the majority. They view themselves at the country's economic heart, not its margins. The rural village, not the urban poverty belt, is still seen by Cairenes as the point of reference for poverty. Of course, some urbanites consider the neighborhood next door to be a mere 'village.' People's view express precisely that the first are "the people", referring often to old urbanities quoted by the expression "*bint* or *ibn al-balad*" (doughter of son of the locality) and they generally have a referenced activity (trade or skilled occupation, a *san'a*). They used to depict squatter residents as "poor, unemployed for most of them, sometimes dangerous, wild and not educated", revealing entrenched lasting inequalities, whereas the residents of the 'izba up in Fustat (one of the largest squatter settlement) perceive themselves differently. They may be formally 'unemployed' in that they have no formal steady job, but they work all the time, obliged to take "whatever work they can in order to survive."

These recurrent discourses obscure certain mystifications concerning the megacity, such as the perception that an increasing influx of rural people endangers the city. This theme has already been developed in urban sociology about other Arab cities and dates back to the modernists' global fears about 'ruralization' in the 1950s and 1960s, which is still to be found despite the striking slowdown in rural–urban migration. Certainly, it is difficult to deny that such a rapid increase in population would perturb the civilized lifestyle of the elites. On the other hand, this dominant vision of city dwelling, defined by urbanites as their hereditary right, injures those who do not share it, who have acclimated to the big city and have appropriated its spaces, without a will to exclude others. These new community builders are perceived as a 'wild' or savage menace, destabilizing an old order and contesting an established power. As one researcher suggested, "The phenomenon of wild urbanization . . . influences the country's stability, and represents a propitious terrain for social conflict . . . ." In Egypt, the long-obsolete equation of 'rural equaling growth and urban equaling disorder' somehow remains relevant until today in official

representations, despite the last 2 decades census data, which show a slowdown in patterns of rural–urban migration.

New fieldwork and statistical approaches reveal the positive legacies and contemporary relevance of hybrid forms of self-organization and housing development, as well as the diversity of forms of land seizure, statutes, and occupations in a megacity without borders (Sims 2013). When sociologists concede that informal organization models exist, they can trivialize these models as adopting village forms, as Haenni does in his description of ‘customary justice’ in Imbaba, which resolves about one-fourth of the disputes in that part of Giza (Haenni 2001). Almost a quarter of a century has passed since Judith Perlman (1976) masterfully deconstructed the idea that the inhabitants of the favelas (slums) are apolitical or characterized by anomie. Forms of disaffiliation have begun to gain visibility in public spaces, especially among youth, although social cohesion is still impressively resistant in popular families, clans, or neighborhoods (Castel 1995). In the Arab world, and in the Middle East more generally, a metadiscourse on informality takes over from other social and political representations that present the crowd as unpredictable, uneducated, and as signifying the opposite of urbanity. The residents of cities undergoing rapid growth express the same defensive declarations as those of smaller or mid-size cities about mobile populations, whom rooted city-dwellers suspect of voluntarily withdrawing into themselves. The dimension of city experience and the process of adjustment that new settlers face in the city merits more serious attention.

Behind the dogma of a new urban order, a complex interaction plays out between local discourses and international investment and forces. The vocabulary of informality is not specific to Cairo. In fact, so-called ‘ashway neighborhoods (random or chaotic) translates as ‘anarchic’ in Maghreb countries. Analogies abound and all express the proliferation and fundamentally restive or sick character of the social fabric, often described in the same breath as both ‘cancerous’ and ‘spontaneous.’ These analogies instantly communicate the idea of unmanaged internal, regulatory, and planning matters.

Contrary to such objectifying critical approaches, our fieldwork considers these people as thinking individuals with reflective agency, even if their approach is less technical than practical, and oriented toward singular, not generalized, uses of place. Cairo's popular classes are made up of individuals faced with social constraints that elide their ability to imagine and reason; yet, such abilities are foremost in helping them survive. The least protected of Cairo are the majority population in the most precarious informal quarters. They seek, before anything else, to protect themselves from vulnerability, particularly exposure to risk and deprivation.

Making a City, Creating a World

How can local actors, who lack legitimate resources, build common property of the greatest complexity, a space that becomes a city and that resonates as a shared common space? Here, there are at least two hierarchies that must be rearticulated. The first are urban norms of international importance and status, which produce global, national, and local spaces with their corresponding structures and evaluation of collective abilities. Their evident limitations emerge only after construction has begun. The second set of erected hierarchies is internal to the social relations of risk within the community. People grabbing such land had to face the reality of setting themselves up on virgin land and building homes despite the risks of eviction, failure, new and unpredicted conflicts, and parcel swindling.

This puts into question, as Arjun Appadurai emphasizes, the "spatial production of locality in conditions of contemporary urban life" (Appadurai 2001, 251), not only with respect to the end-product of construction but also as a vital aspect of social life that includes, in particular, the creation and reproduction of the lived experience of neighborhoods. Several issues thus lie behind apparently trivial actions like dividing the land, delimiting it, enclosing it, reserving circulating space, and adapting a place for soccer. These actions are truly a projection of single and multiple group identities as one of the pioneer resident state:

"The people who came here, they have organized. So that the street is good, we have leveled the soil. I'm not greedy and that one over there isn't either; we organized the street together, we cooperated. . . . As for the streets, we made them together so that they would be wide for him, for you, for my son. . .". This urban configuration testifies to the singular capacity of its residents to adapt and reinvent norms in the face of extremely scarce resources and no decreed rules or local, legitimating regulatory authority. Street by street, with variable timing and only occasionally with developers, residents have created a continuous urban community. Following the example of access to the usual material resources, access to the land in effect mobilizes intense social interactions of this 'society of Proximity' (Puig, 2002) which is not synonymous with economic solidarity). It encompasses negotiation capacities both among *baladiyat* and among simple neighbours, all of who collectively create the terms of a shared agreement. Newcomers, however, can disrupt these agreements, especially if their social position allows them to break the common rules. By a stunning paradox, the residents of the oldest established neighbourhoods look with some envy at the urban planning successes and collective agency of the new 'squatter settlements,' whose urban fabric is the most tightly woven. 'Illegals' and socially disadvantaged have appropriated and mastered the right to the city.

Contested spaces of elistist reconquest

Nevertheless, regularization plans have mostly remained limited to experimental sectors in the Greater Cairo Region, such as in Manshiyat Nasir and Bulaq al-Dakrur and have not been extended to other neighborhoods. Concerning our case study, a long-term legal case was brought by a local community-based organization based in 'Izbat Khayrallah. Regularizing (meaning here organizing the legal acquisition of the plots by the settlers) all the neighbourhoods was then perceived as a pragmatic answer to prevent 'clearance' and demolition. The court acknowledged in the late 1990s that the land should be released to occupants. At that time, a popular famous religious leader from 'Izbat Khayrallah made a realistic observation on the absence of real

alternatives: "*Yes, it's expensive, but what can the people do? They are going to sell all that they have to pay for [legalization of their land] so that they might live in peace, find some rest*." More than ten years late, the decision was never implemented, fueling until now contention toward the abstract powers of the 'state.' The weak support of the population within state agencies is a major hindrance to regularization.

Aside from showing the major recognition issue behind regularization, let's equally pay equal attention to the embeddedness of recognition and vulnerability (Honneth 1996). For Umm Kawsar, like so many others, vulnerability is one of the most basic aspects of her living situation. When asked whether she is aware of the risks involved in squatting, she said she was from the first years:

"*I know and I was scared. I built a house because I didn't have lodging. But I only built these two rooms. But, of course, the government will come and what am I going to do, I'm going to go where?". Like many of her neighbours, she is now quite certain that, although not legalized, the area will not be 'removed.' She said, "But now, it's full. The government can no longer have it all destroyed. If they were to demolish it, they would have to kill the people. And if we count all the houses, how many people live here?*".

Threats of demolition and evictions have multiplied since the start of the year 2000's and are now considered among the multiple sources of tension and new open conflicts that have lead to the revolution. Vulnerability has increased since new liberal managements have openly admitted their wish to convert the metropolis into a "green, global and connected" one able to compete with other vibrant emerging economies. In the urban strategies such as Cairo 2050 promoted by a consultants firm, major deteriorated and traditional areas and central but thus informal districts have disappeared from the map. After the strategy of "un-mapping" popular classes faced a new conscient elit strategy of "de-mapping" and erasing conveited neighborhoods from the 3D visions. This new growth program was coincidental with a rebirth of major urban conflicts, never experienced in the capital. Several neighbourhoods started to organize as "urban actors" and joined with group of human rights and "rights to housing" activists to fight state or military police and show their solidarity

to affected residents. The leader of the new Egyptian center for rights to housing underlined in two interviews I conducted with her the filiation with the rights of minorities such as Nubian people. Since a decade, a new conscience of social injustice, violation of rights appeared and help to structure, through many localised on public spaces an insurgent turn echoing largely the description made by J. Holston (2007) in Sao Paulo and urban Brasil. Despite different democratic patterns, the authoritarian liberal regime fuiled competencies to dismiss the legitimacy discourse of governmental agencies and to rebuild confidence on people's rights. The 2011 revolution appeared as a mere combination of the rebirth of worker's movement especially in booming cities of the delta region (lower Egypt) and of specifically urban movements framed about rights, discourse of respect and social justice. These movements do continue to claim residents rights and articulate a new visible discourse of dispossession and claim for freedom and dignity both de-localizing and re-localizing protests. The creation of a common social space at Tahrir square and in the city center created a feeling of unity that was clearly absent since the Nasser area. Squatter residents started then to describe themselves as part of these insurgent groups, not anymore as the "marginals". New activists groups and professionals still continue to reinforce this new expressions of citizenships among people usually "without" and "on the margins" and to provide urban popular settlements. This is the case in the ragpickers (the zabbaleen) living in one squatter area (up to 800 000 dwellers) threatened by the rhetorics of risk and pathologies that started to demonstrate openly (Deboulet, Florin, 2013) and even bloqued major arteries, well-known resistance tactics since long in Argentina by the destitutes (Merklen). The zabbaleens or the residents of other major "informal" settlements now clearly express their desire and sometimes their capacity to resist eviction and reassert their "right to stay" against the modernization discourse which seems quite challenged.

II. Land conflits at stake in new expressions of citizenship in Paris region

An overgrowing distance between work and place has been stated since more than 20 years in social housing dominant suburbs in France. A changing political definition of social and spatial planning in these vulnerable contexts has started in 2003 with a massive demolition program, where theories of defensible space and public-private partnerships are reinterpreted, aiming at deeply changing the local images and bringing more financial value with the introduction of private developers. Demolition of 400 000 dwelling units in social housing located in major so called « zones urbaines sensibles » (critical urban areas, CUA) (see S. Tissot, 2007) is used as a tool for gentrification or as it is quoted « social mix ». Among the 500 sites for this PRU (urban renewal programs) conducted by the *Agence Nationale de Rénovation urbaine* with a large number of elected bodies and territorial partners, we will focus on surburbian sites located within dynamic metropolitain regions. This is where urban renewal do not equate with regeneration but rather with a goal of banalisation.[2]

Since the inception phase, this national program and its local variations has undergone major critics from local associations and oppositions parties in a number of contested urban renewal sites, all located in major metropolitan locations. We have been working on six of these sites since 2004[3] and observed, with several other colleagues two expressions of social conflicts. Two main hypotheses are leading our presentation. The first one is linking risk and uncertainty with the upsurge of local conflict. The other one explores the conditions of contention in contexts usually described as apolitical or eruptive. Both paths allow us to question issues of citizenship as formal representative forms have been eroded by unemployment and impoverishment as well as internal competition. Vote abstention is a major concern is

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[2] See our communication to the International Sociological Association in Gôteborg, Sweden, 2010 and articles published between 2012 and 2014 (last issue in Neveu, Carrel, 2014).

3 We've been working on two settlements since 2005 and coordinated a research program funded by the Ministry of Housing and sustainable development on four other since 200. Our research includes participant observation, and 20 to 30 open interviews with activits and « ordinary » dwellers in each of the site

all these areas especially among the youngsters. This statement does lead to our major hypothesis: to which extent aren't these urban renewal programs opportunities for new forms of citizenship to appear in deprived areas and especially urban citizenship including women's daily and insurgent mobilization (Kokoreff, Lapeyronnie, 2013).

Risk and conflict : information and opportunities questioned

At a local level, demolition program acts as a major pressure, bringing up major uncertainty and risk in contexts where protected housing is often the last protection. Sites choosen for urban renewal are often the most fragile. In some of them riots have occured at several periods, including for the most recent in 2005, (H.Lagrange, M. Oberti, 2006), among others. While is it common to state that most « grands ensembles » are inhabited by resignated dwellers or young people eager to demonstrate their radical indifference to the republic, the national program of urban renewal has been depicted by authorities as a way to diversify population, give a new start and reaffirm citizenship.

Our starting point is double: we rather question urban renewal and citizenship as a by-product of conflicting representations of space and place. Whereas a minor part part of beneficiaries have succeeded to gain from these policies in getting acces to better dwellings and locations, a major part is left without clear explanations about the programs goals and intentions (see Deboulet, Lelévrier, 2014). They have to struggle for saveguarding a place in a suburbian « grand ensemble » which is ultimately considered as a more desirable place than an unknown other social housing estate. Our main argument is to consider that conflict allows to open a path towards a plural urban citizenship (Uitermark, Rossi and Van Houtum, 2005 ; Ion, 2001) as opposed to the strict « republican promise » (G. Duhem, 2006).

How, in a first place, is this demolition program (as well as upgrading, reconstruction) perceived and understood, considering the previous tensions in this sites ? Our investigations show that urban renewal conveys a double dimension of

shock and event that is important to consider within a sociology of conflict and mobilisation (Cefaï D., 2007 ; Murard N., 2008) and that is part of our methodological concern.

> shock : the vast majority of city-dwellers in sites concerned by urban renewal would learn the demolition scheme suddenly. In a sharp oppostion to the legal and framework and growing tendancies of participation in urban issues, demolition programs are not discussed with the concerned people, they are therefore « discovered » as a hidden project or agenda or perceived as a major top-down decision. Many interviewees describe the « *choc* » as the first step of a fear that will last till the individual and collective rehousing solution is to be clarified. Fear can lead to « trauma » of the demolition itself, some years after, or for some others to a feeling of mobility and sometimes liberation.

> event : the focus of personal experience of the demolition is also lived by the group and the vast-majority as a major event. Destabilisation and perturbating schemes of residence are deeply affecting most of the concerned dwellers with many questions such as : when will I be rehoused ? Where ? Will my neighbours be friendly or even worse than the previous ? The cost of the new appartments is also a source of fear, as very often no public actor is able to describe precisely the rise in prices.

As asserted before, housing is the first source of worry. Lack of information and default of concertation also conveys its part of dilusion anger and misunderstanding. In Argenteuil for example, the PRU of Val d'Argent, a huge neighbourhood of 27 000 inhabitants has gone through a demolition program of 446 dwellings. Contrarily to the intentions of the national program, rehousing has been marginally done (5%) in new buildings. Reconstruction is ineffective, as in most of the sites, at the time of demolition and this time gap allows for a real « dispersion » of the concerned households, generally the poorest and often with the largest families (which does concern primarily recent migrants families from Africa). Meanwhile, the remaining poor households tend to be reconcentrated in the same sectors, as many of public landlords or housing associations refuse to rehouse them (C. Lelévrier, 2010).

Thus we've like to emphasize at an individual as well as an collective level plural expressions of risk and injustice, embodied among other elements by the selection of buildings to be demolished and the weakness of reconstruction on site.

Lack of shared understandings and feeling of Injustice

Social movements arise from expressed and open conflicts. Our assumption is that conflicts arise in a first place from splittering values between governants and ordinary citizens. Dynamics of contention should be described briefly hereby in focusing on the primary aspect of ordinary judgment and understanding of the situation creating tensions. Yet, rather than bringing together segments of society left apart and administrative bodies, urban renewal processes seem to accelerate a lack of misunderstandings of PRU operations. On the first hand, ordinary and professionals explanations of what should be demolished differ in most parts. According to quantitative and qualitative research, demolished buildings appear to be representative of a housing stock that has already been cleaned from its most deteriorated items. Thus, selections of the former often encounters a vast set of criticism from dwellers.

Discontent is expressed through a positive description of dwelling units targeted for demolition : they are depicted as large, cheaper than the most recent housing stock including the social one, « beautiful » (benefiting from a nice view), etc. Demolition is a very global phenomena that shakens the whole life of concerned people, even if they find an interest in leaving the place. Not finding material reasons for demolition, these people will look for social ones. Prevails a double set of ideas anchored on a moral grammar of the stigmatized « grand ensemble » (Lapeyronnie, 2008): « they » want to get read of undesirable populations (large families with children left to themselves ; petty delinquents ; households with a disturbing relation to the neighbours and environment...) or « they » (and it is sometimes personalized through the mayor personality or the Municipality itself) want to get read of « us ».

On the other hand, some of the households that have never been explained the complex machinery and temporality of the project remain in uncertainty. Often deprived of clear explanations about relocation (quality-place-prices-social environment) they are also looking for rationales about demolitions, and do not find answers from the planning side, that remains unstable and somehow impenetrable.

As stated by this retired woman, living alone with one of her son in the perimeter of the PRU in the « musicians neighborhood », Argenteuil : « *at once the mayor (the former one) came, in person, at the meeting, then, to explain to us. Yet it is written down on this paper. It is in order to « disenclave » the district. I dont understand well. They will build a road passing through this building in front of it, in order to break the « enclavement »...then, I don't see well... »*

I don't find that the neighborhood is landlocked...I don't see what it would bring... ».

Question : what has been explained to you ?

-What has been told during these meetings, it's what it would lead to. Practically speaking, that people had to move elsewhere, this was necessary to empty the flats, that they were about to be demolished. What I have, personnally I have..., I have understood that it was to mix the population, to prevent...to prevent that...that there would only be foreigners, and especially only poor people...with all the consequences it brings, at school... **»**

Combined with the weakness and the time gap for on-site reconstruction, the qualities of selection (for demolition purposes) leads to perceive these choices as non technical but rather political agendas. This prove to be particulary true among the richest municipalities of the Paris region (Ile de France) well summarized by a local leader in Poissy-la Coudraie after a public information meeting in 2005 where the new refreshed city had been presented to a non-informed population : « *the cake was looking very nice, but it was not for us* ». In some locations, speculative land tendancies and metropolitan issues play a major role in urging for demolition (as eviction from central areas, see Berry-Chikhaoui, Deboulet, Roulleau-Berger, 2007).

This knowledge proceeds to the development of a moral grammar of injustice, that has helped to shape new contending expressions based on a growing awareness of metropolitan issues (and also raising some city-dwellers voices). We should add that well before the « technical » aspect of demolition, the lack of understanding echoes a shared injustice feeling based on the default of participatory schemes. Most of inhabitants, even the activists, would agree for discussing the opportunity of demolition, they use to justify themselves as non-systematic opponents.

A point stressed in this chapter part would also be that controversial justifications of the local and built environment as « qualities » express new capabilities of populations often depicted as apathetic, desiring to escape for better places to live etc. Linking this to participation issues, they suggest that consideration to them is the main issue. New governementality of the suburbs therefore has to learn from the ordinary call for justice through respect and consideration of anchored residents and opinion-bearers, meaning clear early informations. Drawing from Merklen (…) we might call “politicity” of these residents and expressions of this new form of citizenship. Local resistance was often totally unexpected and therefore tells a lot about popular visions of social conflicts mediated through urban policies.

New expressions of local conflicts : dwellers associations and social centers

Conflicts as sheer expression of tensions can be analysed as in Simmel’s paradigm as a tool for reconciliating opposing parties. This vision of conflict is also able to drive our attention towards citizen's expression of refusal in contexts marked by formal depolitisation, exit, structural weakening of the civil society organisations (CBO and NGO or associations) often underlined since the departure of most of the middle-class residents. Our assumption is that urban renewal has been the starting point for a renewed set of enduring conflicts that participate to pluralization of citizenship (Carrel, Neveu, Ion, 2009) in among 20 districts of Ile de France municipalities and the same amount in the rest of the country.

Our conclusions from the case studies in these neighboorhoods reveal that two collective actors have taken an active part to this contest : the local dwellers associations (amicales de locataires) and the social centers financed in part by municipalities. Expressions of organized conflit is linked to mobilisation and collective as well as individual actors involvement. Ressource mobilisation theory (as developed by Mc Carthy and Zald, 2008) matters as history of previous conflicts, the strenght of local grasroots actors, the degree of financial and legal support they can get. This focus is multifold and provides an additional perspective to analysis of conflicts through griveances and criticisms.

In comparing contested neighborhoods and passive reactions to the demolition perspective, this research seeks to understand trajectories of participation and learning processes among major opponants to the PRU. Political opportunities, defined by S. Tarrow (2008, 145) as « consistent -but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national-dimensions of the political struggle that encourage people to engage in contentious politics ». Protest has emerged as the result of a « political opportunity structure » in Tarrows words, among these various neighborhoods, and not among the majority of others, nevertheless it is necessary to understand why and how « contentious politics » has emerged. Opposition to renewal policies in their most disruptive dimensions has appeared in several neighborhods where formal tenants associations were already existing. Some of them were created at the beginning of the « grand ensemble » in the 70's, others have seen their lifecycle interrupted and reborn. In many others, “amicales” appears as remnants of a lost era of consistant mobilisation « against » the rent rises and for the quality of living. Most of them are affiliated to the Confédération Nationale du Logement (CNL), a federation that used to be strongly connected to the communist party.

The constant weakening of involvement in these structures is a source of worry for aging members, often french-born, former specialized workers and having difficulties to incorporate immigrant dwellers and their sons (see Bonino, 2014). The PRU appeared in several municipalities as a real structure of opportunities for renewing the grammar of contest and bringing new residents into the mobilisation.

Bur rather than enlarging the permanent base of housing activists, it has provided a tool for a growing awareness. As stated by the interviewed, active in such structures in an environment characterized by growing economic difficulties, people would mobilize when their own dwelling is endangered or if relocation and various micro-planning (such as enclosure of open spaces) would raise the maintenance charges. Nevertheless, this « event » has brought the vast majority to learn about the existence of the dwellers association, to see its dedication to a global cause and collective interest. These aged activists share a common interest for reviving damaged social links and overcoming what they describe as a general withdrawal from public life, loneliness and ethnicity model.

The language of injustice and consideration plays a dominant role in stimulating and bringing together, at the apex of mobilisation cycles, aged and almost professional activists, members of local Ngo's and their remnants, worried isolated dwellers and their neighbours, members of local mosks, young people speaking out for non french-speaking parents (as observed for instance in the “grand ensemble” of Les Mureaux). Thus it allows for larger social networks to form, broadening the circle of expression and giving strength to the demands for a « demolition freeze ». It is worth to mention that contentious politics, as in many cases already depicted, is not restricted to civil society but touches some corners of state and local institutions. In the french metropolitan grands ensembles, « centres sociaux », be them a former Ngo or municipal creation, all diversely subsidized by local authorities, departments and the state to some extent have played a new federating role. If residents have gained more and more guarantees through struggles (such as a several proposals of new dwellings), it is also because of the shared expertise of both renters associations and Social centers.

Bridging the gaps, social recognition through translocal support

The parallel with local Ngo's is the share critical perspective on demolition and gentrification issues. Adding to this convergence, it is important to show how local

associations, Ngo's and *amicales* broaden their mobilisation at other local actors. Communal actors and loose alliances of citizens and Ngo's have risen their voice to oppose to what is described as an injust treatment of poverty and segregation. Social forums and other emanations of the anti-liberal expression have in some municipalities open up the debate through various forums and help to generalize the discontent. The presence of solidarity networks is necessary for the « production of meaning and the mobilisation of resources », (Della porta and Diani, 1999, quoted in Ballard, Habib and Valodia, 2006). Yet the solidarity networks are even more useful when they are perceived as socially and morally rewarding. A diversity of supports has helped to long-term mobilisation and successful results in a few locations. Let us recall of Poissy (la Coudraie) and Argenteuil where the former mayors were not re-elected in 2008 due in part to a continuous protest, including the socialist party opponent. The « non-concerted » scheme of demolition halted and new programs were then designed, in the first case with the constant follow-up of both the renters association and a large support of a « collectif » composed of the local branch of Attac, the human rights ligue (LDH), the socialist party, « Right to Housing » Ngo (Droit au Logement), a local Ngo opposing the construction of a new link road, etc (see Porta and Tarrow, 2005). Designated by residents as the « collectif de soutien» (support alliance), this large movement is providing expertise and resources through medias, legal help, political pressure.

This new movements organizations are perceived by the most involved residents as indispensable elements for maintening the contention and circumventing the most involved, and especially employed people with families from discouragement. The president of the local Ngo of La Coudraie, a 40 years women born in Turkey from a kurdish descent confessed that when the action against the total demolition scheme (refused by the ANRU) of the grand ensemble started she did not have the experience of public action and voice. A few years after, she was promoted president of a local association originally formed by the aging marocan population. Regarding the struggle anti-demolition she recalled times of discouragement : « *sometimes we thought it was over, they were no more chances ( ) Then ultimately we rided the horse*

again (…). This energy, I think that we got it thanks to all the supporters that were present (…) our strength come from there, they were here to cheer us up, to encourage us, or to warn us ».

Being mobilized nearly every evening during years and years is worth if there is something to gain from it, namely more opportunities and consideration from the authorities. But another immaterial gain is associated with the new friendships and social networks established with outsiders, middle-class citizens, intellectuals, journalists, other activists from nearby cities or central districts. At this point, mobilisation appears as a main tool for preventing some side effects of segregation.

This social movement arises from a serie of traumatic events fueling injustice feelings. Founded by two among the most active local movements opposing demolition (in Poissy and Gennevilliers) the coordination anti-demolition active till 2009 was something quite anew for most of the local activists. If some of them, a minority, had started to be part of other coalitions in the late 90's, it was mainly aroung immigration issues and citizenship in it's political rights definition (the MIB, les indigènes de la République...), including access to various civic and social rights. The « coordination anti-demolition » tends to be broader in its perimeter and social representation. It includes all categories in terms of origin (the aged militants of the most consolidated dwellers associations, new activits from immigrant descent eager to get the same consideration and justice for their neighborhoods as others, supporters living outside of the grand ensembles but expressing their refusal of this « ethnic and social cleaning policy », etc). As for other coalitions, it is supported by many partis, national federations (human rights, immigration, national dwellers federations). Some demonstrations, sit-ins, non-violent occupation of the Anru were supported by trade unions. Finally the coordination succeeded to be received during one year by the Anru to discuss perspectives for bettering the urban renewal policy. It is not the right place to discuss the success of such initiatives, but a slight appraisal will show to a certain extent a relaxing of the demolition and relocation policy and more attention to concertation. Being ultimately connected to local and municipal policies, the degree

of inflexion in the PRU depend as much of the political mobilisation as of a complex interplay between metropolitan stakes and interests (even in some left municipalities, for instance near by La Défense) and social policies (as Vitry-sur-seine, a communist municipality that provide 2 reconstructions (social housing mostly) for one demolition.

Resistance to demolition without participation from most of the concerned city-dwellers (possibly designated as « affected people » as in the eviction programs in the mega-projects of the south) offers a new window to observe the ways-out of vulnerability and uncertainty within major global changing contexts. Regardless of the constraints and pressures experienced in these areas, it shows how local and metropolitan social movements articulate and build a new protest vocabulary common to all these « global suburbs », namely a politics of « fair or just compensation » and consideration in front of eviction. Going back to the actors of these social-local and social-translocal movements, one of the most relevant aspect is the connection between public and socialized expression of conflict and experimentation of the others as well as of the city challenges for people more and more designated as mostly territorialized.

[a head]Conclusion

For some observers, working-class neighborhoods may evoke the notion of urbanity without planning, development without a soul, and dusty roadways deserted by cars and mobbed with chaos be them “informal” or “too formal”. These myths of informality, underdevelopment and rurality on one side (for Cairo and many other cities of the global south) weigh on these communities, which do not have access neither to public services nor to the public sphere in which to challenge their status and representation as ‘illegals.’ These local societies are supposedly either hyperpassive or dangerously explosive, thus contrasting forms of contact and disjuncture with spaces of hegemonic power at the urban, national, and international scale. i The tensions and inequalities between urban spaces categorized as

informal/illegal and those normalized but riddled with infralegality are aggravated by the circulation of resources and expertise associated with globalization.

But in the post-industrial megapolis growing segments of the population remain invisible and unheard (Honneth 2002). While deepening social and political fractures affect the living conditions of the squatters, the most advanced infrastructure is delivered to those who can afford to turn their back on the megapolis, widening a two-tiered urban citizenship. The same neglect of citizenship is to be observed in popular neighborhoods in France, often populated by a large population of immigrant descent and socially invalidated in most powerful representations as places of insecurity, "badlands of the republic" (Dikeç, 2007), forgotten places that have been transformed into sites of experimentation for a strategy of social dispersion through urban renewal. This narrowing down of urban policy (Dikeç, Ib, 123) of urban renewal policies has not only been having negative social impacts but obliges the sociologists to propose a fresh look at citizenship, especially "when citizenship disempowers citizens" (…) whereas "empowerement entails a corresponding sense of subjective power" (Holston, 2007). As in brasilian urban peripheries, in both popular peripheral neighborhoods Cairo and to a lesser extent post-industrial multi-storeys public housing estates of Paris "the insurgent citizenship marched out of the residential peripheries" and has become the battleground for expression of a "differentiated" (Holston, Ib) and expressive citizenship departing from the republican or one-sided view of citizen's and worker's rights.

Sociological knowledge in a global world

As shown by Holston, "the paradigm of differentiated citizenship remains contemporary" (2007, Ib.) and in post-colonial and inequal settings remain a major locus for exclusion from land, political rights, legality or decent services. I'd like to offer some reflexions about the dialectical role of "situations" and of a cosmopolitan

approach to reconsider the forms of citizenship and to give credit to plural and urban forms of citizenship.

Situations are first produced by the combined effect of localization and population that can be summarized as contextual effects. What makes situations somehow quite difficult to compare when considered in a synchrony is the absence of comparable datas such as contextual variables defined at the level of the block such as the IRIS in France (around 2000 people), CUA are overstudied but meanwhile popular suburbs of Cairo attract very little attention and statistical datas are vastly undersestimating the population itself (a ratio from 1 to 5).

The aggregated context datas are yet not sufficient to entangle our understanding of citizenship and reactions to urban restructuring. This is why we argue that situations should also be entangled with major locus of urban and social change under globalization and metropolization challenges. We have noticed that most suburbs, once seen as isolated and marginal have become value assets and become major places for rent seeking as explained by David Harvey in his most recent works. Geography and sociology thus need to depart from their “methodological communalism” (Levy, 2014) describing urban space as rent or monopoly in a “frozen urban space, where rationales of land price force activities and residential functions to be located in strictly divided-up, permanently specialized areas” (Levy, 2014, 2). Situations are created by a specific event disrupting the ordinary course of change for a large group of individuals and therefore bringing them into a same concern. Situations are elements of urban citizenship as they bring fear and interest for the same urban element of change: program, policy, project. Our assumption is that globalization is associated with permanent efforts from policy-makers and growth machines (see Logan and Molotch) to alter the traditional urban and social landscape in order to favour more attractiveness and favour local and transnational elites or upper-middle classes. It is thus mitigated by the remnants of social policies and by resistances, specifically addressed to these new urban elements of crisis that sparkle everywhere: the most important remaining since 3 years Gezi park in Istanbul, street riots in Rio de Janeiro against the world cup.

Therefore we argue that notwithstanding the absence of comparable datas we can overcome some difficulties of comparative ethnographies by introducing situations as entry points to understand the change of mindset of many people “concerned” by external factors of urban change and positioning towards disrupting elements such as eviction, rising land prices, challenge of a weak and twisted information, violent state actions, attempts of top-down processes of participation.

In Cairo or in Paris we have been drawing on ethnographic researches with families in an attempt to understand how urban elements of change (ring roads, demolition schemes in the name of risk prevention in Cairo and urban renewal and relocation in Paris) have affected them, change their world representations, their view of the neighbourhood, of solidarity but also their understanding of the Big logics : “le grand Paris ; Greater Cairo ; international competition, regional interest, value seeking, coalitions between local actors and private developpers…”. To start with, thirty years after Leeds it is still valuable to state “that: On the international scale, the deployment of metadiscourses of informality is eased and enabled by the use of reifying expressions, which are rarely adapted to specific contexts and which reveal limited ways of seeing, researching, and analyzing social issues” Sociologists still talk, for example, about ‘belts of poverty and misery’ when indifferently designating the peripheral areas, as many did during the 1970s in regard to the barrios of Latin America (Perlman 1976; 2003) whereas significant socio-economic differences exist within both type of urban areas. These explanations could legitimize easily regeneration schemes and the social cleansing but this discourse is not anymore convincing anyone. Even among the destitute and the poorest, the daily labourers, the local is acknowledged as a source of security that proves to be vital in an era of permanent change and rising labor informality. The critical capacity to evaluate state policies has changed a lot and this ability to monitor self-reflexive judgements should be taken as tools of international comparisons based on careful site surveys scrutinizing ordinary and resistance practices as vocabularies.

The production of multisituated knowledge is still impeded by the sensitivity of the “situations” (Bouillon, Fresia, Tallio, 2005). This cosmopolitan approach to

qualitative methodologies and ethnography does require an “over-reflexivity” and also the necessity to include the attention to third parties : in sensible situations state institutions, technical agencies, NGO’s, are often to be considered as part of this ethnography. Tensed and conflictual situations in non-democratic urban environements governed by exception (Krijnen, Fawaz, …) increases the difficulty to access to this third party and the necessity for the sociologist to clarify constantly his posture towards “the affected population”. But urban citizenship is also handling plural dimensions and feeds itself from these contacs with engaged researchers, pointing the necessity to reinvest the public sociology paradigm and tools and also the “revisit” of sites (Burawoy, 2010) invested since long, able to lead us to the perception of change through local “situations” articulating global issues.

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Dialogue as *Dao* of Cosmopolitan Humanity

To the query "globalization", at 12 Oct 2014, there were 5,830,000 hits on Baidu (Chinese search engine; cf. 37,400,000 hits on Google Hong Kong). The sheer number of hits testifies "our" relationship to globalization. As for anyone who would find an answer to the question such as What is globalization? What does globalization mean to "us"?, the problem is not that there is no answer but that there are too many.

Present state of human plurality is at the nerve of the situation. Giddens stated that "We are the first generation to live" in "a global cosmopolitan society"[1]. Cosmopolitan in what way? Admittedly, current dangers/risk (or opportunity) brought about by globalization do not know the national boundary and there is no place to avoid the consequences of global warming unless one leaves the spaceship "Earth". In that sense of extension (or depth) of imminent/present predicaments of globalization "we" are Cosmopolitan.

But how about the way to resolve, let alone to define the challenges? Who is to define what the agenda to be faced are, let alone who the responsible parties are? Ulrich Beck succinctly hinted at the situation when he shares his wit: "If EU applies for a membership in EU, it would definitely be declined". As far as the possibility global solidarity to face challenges of globalization is concerned, "we" are not Cosmopolitan yet. Indeed one might say that Beck is in line with Confucian ethics when he defines cosmopolitan way of life as to "live together, equal yet different"[2]. In Confucian terminology "we" may be 同而不和 (to be-with others by assimilation of differences）but yet to be 合而不同 （to be-with others in recognition/harmony of differences）.

In this vein, the (im)possibility of cosmopolitan world, one might argue, is significant not only as a political/social ideal for global society in the making but also as a way to grasp the realities of globalization. Who are the dwellers of cosmopolitan world? What is the

1 Giddens, A., *Runaway World*. 37.

2 Beck, "The cosmopolitan society and its enemies," 197

condition of their being-with? These are the questions among others that demand our attention.

The world community and its obstacles

George H. Mead, in his perceptive examination of the international communality, has furrowed a path for the present task. He thinks that cooperation among “national selves” is possible if “common ground” is reached. In other words, any meaningful cooperation depends on whether or not the national selves are able to share “social object[s]” such as “The World Court” or “the League of Nations” in order to “control the conflicting interests of hostile communities.”[3] However, Mead is well aware of the obstacles and difficulties involved in this path.

"It is far easier” Mead writes, “for the modern man than for his predecessor to put himself in the place of those who are involved in the common undertaking of life with him.”[4] However, he notices "The task...is enormous enough, for it involves not simply breaking down passive barriers such as those of distance in space and time and vernacular, but those fixed attitudes of custom and status in which our selves are imbedded."[5] Long before TV was available, let alone the Internet, Mead realized the possibilities and obstacles of cosmopolitanism. At this point, the gravity of the Meadian dictum becomes clear: "We must be others if we are to be ourselves."[6] Mead sees there is an inherent difficulty in taking up this challenge in that "any self is a social self, but it is restricted to the group whose roles it assumes, and it will never abandon this self until it finds itself entering into the larger society and maintaining itself there."[7]

But then who is this self that abandons its old self and maintains itself in the larger society? For Mead, "The human social ideal—the ideal or ultimate goal of human social progress—is attainment of a universal human society in which all human individuals would possess a perfected social intelligence, such that all social meanings would each be similarly

3. Mead, *The Philosophy of the Present*, 195.

4. Ibid., 193.

5. Ibid., 194.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

reflected in their respective individual consciousness—such that the meanings of any one individual's act or gestures would be the same for any other individual whatever who responded to them." [8]

With all due respect to the social ideal of Mead, one might ask whether there is a theoretical/ practical trap in the essence of this Meadian solution to the problem. How is "a perfected social intelligence" possible? Does not "a perfected social intelligence" presuppose a complete access to other minds? If so, when members of a society have "a perfected social intelligence," do they need "to be others" in the first place? If the meanings of any given acts or gestures of any given individual are the same for everyone involved in social exchange, what would be left for exchange? To be specific, what would be left to be exchanged *socially*? If the affirmation of the same is the predetermined destination of "to be others" or "tuning-in" on with the others, would that not preempt anything uniquely different from being accessed? If so, is not the Meadian conception of "a universal human society" in a danger of becoming a form of totality where the existence of the other or the otherness of different cultures loses social significance, if it is not denied altogether?

Whatever the Meadian possibilities of the "ultimate goal of human social progress" are, current humanity appears unable to reach that goal any time in the near future. Until, if possible at all, one reaches to the point of "a perfected social intelligence," there is no other way but to come to terms with cultural barriers or differences. In other words, unless the idea of "a universal human society in which all human individuals would possess a perfected social intelligence" has a Hegelian conception of the end of history in view, human intercourse with others cannot be accomplished other than "to be others" with limited access to the other minds, which is the very ground of human understanding of the other.

Unless human understanding is completely free not only from "passive barriers such as those of distance in space and time and vernacular" but also from "those fixed attitudes of custom and status in which our selves are imbedded," and furthermore, if those limitations are fundamentally not to be perceived as "barriers" to be "broken" rather than as the

8. Mead, *Mind, Self, & Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist*, 310. One might find a parallelism between Mead's concept of a perfected social intelligence and Kant's concept of "enlarged mentality" which envisions oneself as a member of community of all mankind, as a citizen of the world (cf. Arendt, *Responsibility and Judgment*, 140.).

unavoidable condition of human communications[9], the question is not how it is possible to be above and beyond "to be others," but rather how it is possible "to be others" in human finitude.[10]

The shape of the other after the September 11: "voiceless violence" and "deaf ear"

To follow Georg Simmel's idea that war is a form of social interaction, the confrontation between "the war on terror" and "Jihad,"[11] since the September 11 including the beheading

9. To quote Merleau Ponty, "We will arrive at the universal not by abandoning our particularity but by turning it into a way of reaching others." (Merleau Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, 92).

10. At this point it is noteworthy that Japanese philosopher Watsuji criticizes Karl Marx's concept of world history. Watsuji writes, "'Inter-national' betweenness in the true sense … becomes possible only when each historical nation strives to form the totality of humanity in its own distinct way. Attempts to be 'inter-national' by transcending the exigency of being national is nothing but an abstract fantasy of Marxism today." (Watsuji, "The Significance of Ethics as the Study of Man," 248.) . In fact, Marx argues that "the more the original isolation of the separate nationalities is destroyed by the developed mode of production and intercourse and the division of labor between various nations naturally brought forth by these, the more history becomes world history" (Marx & Engels, *The German Ideology*, 60.) . In other words, the "real connection" among individuals is realized when the "existence of individuals is directly linked up with world history," when the individual becomes a part of "the mass of propertyless workers" that is produced by "the world market through competition" (Ibid., 47.). It should be noted that both Watsuji and Marx develop ways to communality respectively. But they headed in opposite directions. Watsuji sees the way is possible on the basis of nationality, while Marx sees the possibility beyond and after nationality.

11. Reportedly, ISIS (Islam State) has released a new video (entitled "A message to the allies of America") showing the beheading of David Haines (a British aid worker), which follows the execution of two American journalists. British Prime Minister David Cameron responded to the act by calling ISIS "the embodiment of evil" and added "**They boast of their brutality; they claim to do this in the name of Islam. That is nonsense. Islam is a religion of peace. They are not Muslims, they are monsters**."(Emphasis is mine)

Before his death, Haines reads from a scripted statement, saying Cameron is "entirely responsible" for his impending murder. "You entered voluntarily into **a coalition with the United States against the Islamic State**, just as your predecessor Tony Blair did, following a trend **amongst British Prime Ministers who can't find the courage to say no to the Americans**," Haines says. (NEW YORK DAILY NEWS September 13, 2014)

On 11 May 2004, an Islamic website exhibited a film that showed the execution of Nicholas Berg, an American civilian, by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Confirming the content of the film, George Bush referred to the self-announced militant group responsible for the execution, "**barbaric," and "extreme thugs**." But this response might have been one expected from Zarqawi. After all, George Bush is nothing but the archaic "**infidel" or "non-believer**."

of 4 civilians shown in the videos recently broadcasted by ISIS (Islam State) so far, as it is fueled by exchanges of physical or rhetorical violence between the antagonistic counterparts, might be regarded as an example of social interaction that is grounded on what I would call the interdependence of violence or the pact of violence.

Each camp depends on the alleged monstrosity or barbarism of the other for its own legitimacy and thus one's proven legitimacy provides, in turn, the further ground for violence and atrocity against the other. It is nothing but a circle of violence that is formed and enforced by the interdependence of violence.

It is noteworthy that the "organized perpetrators" of the September 11 attack, left behind indications that their act had been religiously grounded. But, Habermas points out that there is "a readily noticeable unbalance between their motive and the means."[12] The question is whether the alleged "religious cause" of the perpetrators of the September 11 attack would stand in harmony, without internal contradiction, with the means adopted thereby; in other words, can and will the means mobilized for the September 11 attack be justified by the alleged "religious cause"?

Derrida joins Habermas's argument in a different way. In the reality of globalization, "Only certain countries, and in these countries only certain classes, benefit fully from globalization."[13] The disparity between those who benefit from globalization and those who do not is not retained and remains outside national boundaries. Imbalance within those boundaries is readily found. Despite the fact that "the organized perpetrators of the 'September 11' attack" themselves are "among those who benefit from this so-called globalization (capitalist power, telecommunication, advanced technology, the openness of borders, and so on)," they "nonetheless claimed to be acting in the name of those doomed by globalization, [i.e.,]all those who feel excluded or rejected, disenfranchised, left by the wayside, [those]whose means are limited to that of the poor in this age of globalization (which is, today, television, an instrument that is never neutral), to witness the spectacle of the offensive prosperity of others."[14]

In terms of Derrida's argument, the perpetrators should answer to the question of

12. Habermas, "Belief and Knowledge"

13. Borradori, *Philosophy In A Time of Terror*, 122.

14. Ibid., 122.

whether or not the disparity of the classes in their homeland should not be attacked in the first place, if their alleged representation is to be legitimate. Otherwise, their representation is another concealment of the reality of others that are excluded within the Islam society.

Habermas suggestively reminds us that the unbalance is a reflection of "the unbalance that is brought about by modernization of the homeland of the perpetrators." Even though one might agree that the process of modernization was so "rapid and radical" that "there seemed to be no redemption from the erosion of the traditional life,"[15] the perpetrators should answer to the question of whether or not the use of civilian aircraft as a weapon of mass destruction was religiously grounded, even if their act of terror was, to them, the only option available to protect their traditional way of life.

Even if it is the case that the World Trade Center was, to the "suicidal bombers," "a symbol of globalizing modernity" and nothing else but "a representation of Satan" ; even if their act of terror was a reaction to the "rapid and radical" modernization and even if their attack was, as Fukuyama defines, a "desperate backlash against the modern world," their act would still seem to involve a self-contradiction[16] because the means of the reaction itself—the highly calculated maneuver of the aircraft-bomb—is the product of the very modernity against which it was used.

Nevertheless, while waiting on the answers to these questions from the concerned parties, there is something that demands "our" attention in the desperateness of these reactions. Derrida argues that as globalization continues to produce its victims, "dialogue" that is "at once verbal and peaceful" is "not taking place." Victims of globalization are those who are "not only deprived of access to what we call democracy but are dispossessed of the so-called natural riches of the client (the exploiters) that conceals the internal differences and imbalances on both sides, "the worst violence [committed by the oppressed and exploited] is often presented as the only response to a 'deaf ear.'"[17]

Reportedly, September 11 attack was executed without any verbal justification. Was it,

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15. Habermas, Ibid.

16. The perpetrators might be able to disregard self-contradiction, if in fact there is one in their act, based on some religious principle. But to locate such a principle is beyond the scope of this paper.

17. Borradori, Ibid., 122-123. Derrida quotes Mandela's case in which "his party, after years of nonviolent struggle and faced with a complete refusal of dialogue, resigned itself to take up arms."

then, an example of a reaction to "deaf ear" by "voiceless violence"? Maybe or maybe not. However, in either case, the September 11 attack and the confrontation between "the war on terror" and "Jihad" afterwards provides a spectacular example what results from the pact of violence.

Circumscribed in the heated context of the interdependence of violence, the framework of "us versus them" becomes a modus operandi with which everyone must comply. It is nothing but a forced choice: "Either you are with us or with them."

The cosmopolitan challenge

Cultural imperialism, to quote Iris Marion Young, is "universalization of a dominant group's experience and culture, and its establishment as the norm" by which "[t]he culturally dominated undergo a paradoxical oppression, in that they are both marked out by stereotypes and at the same time rendered invisible."[18] It should be noted, however, there is yet another type of exclusion. Beck calls it "fundamentalism through the means of relativism." This form of fundamentalism tends to lead to an argument that "only a member born with the identity of [an ethnic minority] can know the history of oppression and reach for the justice that empowers the [decolonization] movement.[19]

Judging from the recent experiences of the September 11 attack and incidents thereafter, the possibility that "national selves" could "control the conflicting interests of hostile communities" faces a radical difficulty. Not to mention, one might find the locale of the difficulty in the absence of the "common ground" as conceptualized by Mead. Indeed, trapped in a peculiar interdependence of violence, the relation between "the war on terror" and "Jihad" is radically different from the sociality that Mead expects to see in a joint effort to reach "universal human society." There, one cannot see any sign of efforts to **be with others** let alone "**to be others**."

In the context of current events, I would argue that the absence of "common ground" between "hostile communities" is not exactly due to the absence of "a perfect social intelligence." Rather, I would ask whether or not precisely the very conception of "a perfect

18. Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, 59.

19. Beck, "The cosmopolitan society and its enemies," 195.

social intelligence" is itself at the root of current predicament[20]. Is not the hostility among communities grounded and fueled by the conviction that only "we" and not "them" have "a perfected social intelligence," in other words, only "we" and not "them" have the ideal of "universal human society" and carry the duty to realize it? [21] Is not this mythical conviction of a monopolistic possession of human ideal that leads to the denial of, if not, in fact, annihilation of the other as exemplified by the relation between "the war on terror" and "Jihad"?

If that is the case, the cosmopolitan challenge today is not about the possibility of a common ground that is above and beyond the differences but about the possibility (or impossibility) of a communality in and through differences, in other words, a communality that is to be achieved not by exclusion, oppression or denial of the other in the name of monolithic universality but by empowering the others in their otherness.

How is the present cosmopolitan challenge to be understood and undertaken? Hannah Arendt's analysis of the implications of "world government" provides a resourceful clue to the issue. It is especially noteworthy that Arendt has a fundamental reservation regarding the idea of "world government" in that she is critical of any totalitarian tendencies, which consciously or unconsciously oppress the plurality of political differences.

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20. Reportedly, Islam State acts of terror are grounded by the religious doctrine Wahhabism. The "pivotal idea" in Ibn Abd al-Wahhab(the founder of Wahhabism)'s teaching is that "**Muslims who disagreed with his definition of monotheism** were **not ... misguided Muslims, but outside the pale of Islam altogether**." (Commins, David, 2009). **The Islamic Supreme Council of America (14 Oct. 2014)** also points out the relationship between Islamic radicalism to Wahhabism and stated that "Traditional Islam views religion as a pact between man and God and therefore the domain of spirituality. In this belief, there can be no compulsion or force used in religion. **From the time of the Prophet Muhammad (s), peace and tolerance were practiced between different religious groups, with respect to distinctions in belief. Contrary to this, the "Wahhabi" ideology is built on the concept of political enforcement of religious beliefs, thus permitting no differences in faith whatsoever. In "Wahhabi" belief, faith is not necessarily an option; it is sometimes mandated by force**."(Emphasis is mine) In a nutshell, "Adherents of Wahhabi Islam do not regard it as **simply one school of thought out of many**; **rather it is the only path of true Islam — nothing else counts**." (Austin Cline, ABOUT.COM. Emphasis is mine) Osama Bin Laden and Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi who headed the most violent jihadist group in Iraq until his death (in a US bombing raid in 2006) were followers of Wahhabism and but it was not Abu Musab al-Zarqawi but the current leader of ISIS Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was called "The true heir to Osama bin Laden," in that he is "more violent, more virulent, more anti-American" (David Ignatius, 10 June 2014, The Washington Post)

21. One may ask whether the Meadian ideal of "universal human society" based on "a perfected social intelligence" would ever be free from this type of exclusionary imperialist conviction or ambition.

Arendt writes, "The very notion of one sovereign force ruling the whole earth, holding the monopoly of all means of violence, unchecked and uncontrolled by other sovereign powers, is not only a forbidding nightmare of tyranny, it would be the end of all political life as we know it."[22] According to Arendt, any given political territory is "not merely a geographical term." It would remain just a piece of land unless it becomes an "in-between space," in other words, unless it becomes a "space wherein the different members of a group relate to and have intercourse with each other."[23]

In that sense, the concept of "one sovereign force ruling the whole earth, holding the monopoly of all means of violence," jeopardizes the constitutional ground of any given political territory exactly because it jeopardizes the existence of the other that is the very condition of the *political*, which is the "in-between space" within or without. That is to say, the very notion of the monopoly of all means of violence essentially conflicts with the presence, or the possibility of "plurality, diversity, and mutual limitations"[24] that demand and necessitate the *political* life.

Above all, it should be stressed that Arendt is not against the idea of "the solidarity of mankind" or "a world-wide federated political structure." However, "if the solidarity of mankind is to be based on something more solid than the justified fear of man's demonic capabilities, if the new universal neighborship of all countries is to result in something more promising than a tremendous increase in mutual hatred…, then a process of mutual understanding and progressing self-clarification on a gigantic scale must take place."[25]

Dialogue as the fabric of Cosmopolitan Space

In his paper, "The Moral Equivalent of War," William James sees "a curious mental mixture" in the modern "civilized opinion" on war. In contrast to the ancient conception of war that glorifies "pure loot and mastery," modern warfare justifies itself by "morally avowable motives" by attributing evil pretexts "solely to the enemy." James observed

22. Arendt, *Men In Dark Times*, 81.

23. Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, 263.

24. Arendt, *Men In Dark Times*, 81.

25. Ibid., 84.

"England and we, our army and navy authorities repeat without ceasing, arm solely for 'peace,' Germany and Japan it is who are bent on loot and glory."[26]

However, the act of blaming the enemy as the solely responsible party for the war and justifying one's own act of war as an inevitable self-defense does not necessarily imply an innocent commitment to peace. On the contrary, James writes "'Peace' in military mouths today is a synonym for 'war expected.'" And "Every up-to-date dictionary should say that 'peace' and 'war' mean the same thing." In fact, "modern man inherits all the innate pugnacity and all the love of glory of his ancestors."[27] Exactly to that extent, in the mentality of modern man "peace" is nothing but a disguised preparation of the next war. All that it needs is an excuse for its own hidden ambition.

Then, what is the peace that is worthy of its name? In other words, what is peace that is not a disguised desire for the next war? Hannah Arendt approaches to the heart of the matter in her interpretation of the relation between peace and violence. "Violence," according to Arendt, is "by nature instrumental." As a form of violence, war is also instrumental and needs "guidance and justification through the end it pursues." Hence, "[t]he end of war" is "peace or victory." But what is the end of peace? Arendt replies, "There is no answer. Peace is an absolute." That is to say, peace is "an end itself."[28]

Peace as an absolute, as an end itself transcends and disobeys the dichotomy of war and peace in the mentality of modern man as long as, in that mentality, peace means a temporary negation of the war at best, if not a superficial excuse for the concealed preparation of next war. As long as peace does work **only as** an excuse (alibi), i.e. **not as** an absolute, for the concealed preparation of next war, "dialogue" that is "at once verbal and peaceful" is indeed not expected to happen. Ironically, however, this impossibility of dialogue reveals the ethical potential of dialogue as the fabric of cosmopolitan space.

Above all, it must be underlined that the very possibility of dialogue per se depends on the presence of the other. No other, no dialogue. Secondly the other as the condition of possibility of dialogue is fundamentally different from the other that is effaced by the imperialistic or fundamentalist suppression, since the latter is no more than an object of

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26. James, "The Moral Equivalent of War," 663.

27. ibid., 661, 662, 663.

28. Arendt, *On Violence*, 51.

domination. Exactly in that sense, to initiate a dialogue is, already and always, an ethical commitment to cosmopolitan humanity since only cosmopolitan recognition of the other opens a space where the other is not to be victimized by hidden ambition of domination. In terms of ethical integrity, dialogue mobilized as a tentative gesture of peace that masks the motives of violence lurking in the background is self-defeating.

Dialogue, in this sense, is possible if and only if dialogue itself is perpetually vigilant about any hidden ambition of violence that denies the political parity of different voices. Dialogue as the fabric of cosmopolitan space questions whether or not any given dialogue is a halfhearted alternative to the violence and whether or not the other is, in fact, "visible" and recognized as one's different but equal counterpart.[29]

Any given social/political boundary can be questioned in terms of its inclusion (or exclusion) of the others and the ethical potentials implicated in its social/political/historical limitations might be sought out to be liberated. When perceived not as given and fixed but as challengeable and changeable, those limitations, already and always, signify the site where dialogue is summoned to realize itself as a *Dao* of cosmopolitan humanity.

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29. Said points out that "no culture or society is purely one thing" (Said, *Reflections on Exile*, 587.) and adds "what it is about culture and civilization that makes them interesting-not their essence or purity, but their combinations and diversity, their countercurrents, the way they have had of conducting a compelling dialogue with other civilizations" (Said, *Humanism and Democratic Criticism*, 28.). To the imperialistic or fundamentalist tendencies which ground "civilization identity" on the purity of any given culture, the different voices that demands attention would be nothing more than either something inferior to be subsumed under the given imperium or something to be silenced as noises.

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Multi-sited ethnography: (Dis)locating power, recovering hidden voices

Since the early 1990s, postcolonial criticshaveshed light on the intimate relations between scientific discourses, rooted in the West, and the structures of colonial power(Bhabha 1994; Chakrabarty 2000; Said 1995). This intimacy between types of knowledge and power relations, whereby Western countries secured their *epistemological* domination over theirdominions was conceptualized through a renewed discourse on hegemony, inspired by Gramsci, Derrida and Foucault(Bhabha 1994, 59). This critic has been instrumental in enhancing scientific reflexivity in the fields of social sciences, both by increasing the awareness of the relationship between scientific knowledge apparatuses and power relationsand, more prosaically perhaps, through the heated controversies it gave rise to (for France, see: Amselle 2008; Jean-François 2010; Bancel, Lemaire, and Barlet 2005).

Postcolonial critics have thus identified the necessary relationship between sciences and universalism, and between universalism and a specific episteme, rooted in European historical experience.As this type of knowledge became dominant – thanks partlyto its pretention to a universal discourse -, it rendered invisible other forms of knowing. Here I am interested, precisely, in this relationship between different types of heuristics, whereby *hegemonic* forms of knowledge about society – forms of knowledge which organize and legitimate a particular form of power and specific social stratification patterns –render invisible a range of social experiences which do not fit in it.

Yet, the critic could be broadened. Indeed, this stratification of knowledge and discourses do not discriminate only between Western rationalism and local forms of knowledge:In any given society, legitimate and marginal means of framing reality are observable. Laying on fieldworks in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, where I followed Indonesian migrant workers between 2005 and 2009, I will show that it is easy to lose this contrast and, for social scientists, to accept a dominant definition of reality as a *matter of fact*, thus losing the sight of minoritary social experiences. I will argue that a good way of avoiding this trap is by developing a multi-sited ethnography, since power relations are always *located*: multiplying locations is thus the opportunity to decipher hidden discourses, which would be difficult to collectif standing only in one site.

Why multi-sited ethnography ?

The development of multi-sited ethnography since the mid-1990s and G. Marcus's seminal paper «*Ethnography in/of the World System: The Emergence of Multi-Sited*

Ethnography » (Marcus 1995)has been a response to a growing dissatisfactionamong social scientists with a deeply entrenched tendency in their disciplines to enclose social phenomena within pre-given substantive “social containers” such as: community, nation, territory or, even, society(Marcus 2009). Since globalization emerged as a critical object of concern, it became obvious, indeed, that social dynamics were always transgressive of these substantive assignations. When dealing with objects such as migration, industrial relocation and transnational production chains, diaspora, cultural hybridization, finance, or even traditional communities transforming under the pressure of “modernization” processes,a genuine commitment toward empiricism could only bringthe profession to question the legitimate limits of fieldwork. Rather than framing a fieldwork according to pre-given social wholes, multi-sited ethnography pleads for an empirical approach where ithas to bedelineated by following the *actual* extension of *actual* practices.In this perspective, any given object forces researchers to re-consider its proper context of analysis: labor relations and work practices, for instance, cannot be understood without considering practices and relations outside the workplace (see for instance: Pialoux 1995).

My own ethnographic practice had pushed me early in the same type of reflection. In 2004-2005, while doing a research on rural-urban migration in Java, I had quickly come to realize a certain number of empirical points: first, that my informants’ experiences in the city could only be understood by digging also in their practices, experiences and relationshipsin their home-places. Second, that what people were able and/or willing to say on their experiences in one place was dependent on the location they were speaking from. Thus, what people would say on their urban experiences while being in the city proved different from what they would say (or, perhaps more accurately what they *could*say)about it while standing in their respective villages. As a consequence, this fact had to be translated on a methodological ground.

This is the reason why, for my Phd, I decided to design a multi-sited research framework. It was a means, first, of testing theoretical hypothesis about the effects of circulating between different social milieus on social experiences. Looking at mobile individuals, I thought, would not be heuristic only in understanding the effects of migration but also, in contrast, the determinants of sedentary modes of living.Among other things, this methodological choice was a way to draw the full consequences of what I had observed in my previous research: thata pragmatic approach of ethnographic situations shows that we do not do anything anywhere, that everything cannot be formulated everywhere and that social actors do not relate to themselves through the same identification patterns, according to where they stand at

a given time. Migrants, as they circulate between different sites, have indeed to adapt to and to deal with changing normative landscape, which command different types of personal display and social practices. Migration, thus, can be understood as an ongoing subjectivation process modulated acrosspartly disjunctive normative orders. Recovering migration experiences then necessarily meant *following* migrants in their various places. In order to do that, I shifted my research scope to the migration of Indonesian workers toward Malaysia and Singapore, to increase the effects of displacements by looking at *transnational* migrations. The idea was, through ethnographic accounts, to capture practices and discourses in the three locations in order to get a grab on the variations of discourses and practices across space, as well as to capture the variation of the relationship *between* discourse and practices across the three sites.

Yet, this type of research framework raises loads of new issues. An important one relates to the necessity of bordering the empirical object. Indeed, if we start by *de-theorizing* the object, as S. Sassensuggests(Sassen 2014) in order to start anew from actual networks of relationships, practices and causalities, then we potentially end-up following unending relational chains. How, then, do we circumscribe a fieldwork? As V. Amit aptly phrased it, we are thus faced with new problems: "*In a world of infinite interconnections and overlapping contexts, the ethnographic field cannot simply exist, awaiting discovery. It has to be laboriously constructed, prised apart from all other possibilities for contextualization to which its constituent relationships and connections could also be referred*"(Amit 2000, 29). While conceiving the outlines of this new research, I was confronted with the very same difficulty: since Indonesian workers are spread among a variety of destinations, mainly located in the Middle-East, East and Southeast Asia, how do we cut a manageable fieldwork in these overlapping transnational spaces?

As K. Fortun put it in her contribution to an important edited book on multi-sited ethnography in 2009, "(…) *the importance of multi-sited ethnography is rooted in the recognition that the "field" of ethnographic enquiry is not simply a geographical place waiting to be entered, but rather a "conceptual space" whose meanings and confines are continuously negotiated by the ethnographer and his informants*"(Fortun 2009, 89). In a similar vein, back in 2005 I justified the scope on my fieldwork as a matter of *problematization*rather than on a pure empirical ground. Besides legitimate practical consideration, related to funding, the definition of fieldwork responded to a range of empirical and conceptual considerations. Among other things, I sustained that it was justified on a socio-cultural level: locating my three sites in the "Malay world" (Indonesia-Malaysia-

Singapore) made sense as it gave a peculiar contrast to the relationship between migrant workers, local citizens and local social and cultural landscapes. As such, it was a proper context to contrast issues of identity politics and othering processes. This felt and anticipated cultural intimacy with the host society, indeed, makes Malaysia and Singapore special destinations for Indonesian citizens willing to migrate. On another level, the choice to work in cities, in Malaysia and Singapore, was a means of exacerbating the effects of disorientation for migrant workers originating from the countryside. In this respect, the scope of the field was also a way to contrast as much as possible the effects of migration on individual subjectivities.

Thus, if the object helped debunking classical analytical social "containers" – for instance: village community -, it had to be re-bordered, but on a self-consciously problematic ground. And that is perhaps the most important epistemological shift allowed by multi-sited ethnography, where social borders are not conceived of as laying naturally in the empirical, but as a matter of scientific construct. In this respect, the limits traced to the object have to be justified on a heuristic ground rather than by invoking "natural" social categories.

Substantial categories and power relations

While trying to deconstruct substantial categories, though, I was faced with another challenge: if empirical relation patterns easily show theinappropriateness of substantive classifications, as they are always and continuously subverted in practices, social actors nevertheless usually strongly identify with them. Thus, when doing fieldwork in Malaysia and Singapore I was constantly faced with informants who understood themselves, the world, and *themselves in the world*, through constant references to social wholes. These "holist categories" (Falzon 2009) could be national: Nita, at the time a domestic worker in Kuala Lumpur, would for instance cautiously avoid mixing up her *Bahasa*[1]withlocal Malay, which she considered a degraded form of Indonesian. She took pride in the distinction[2] that she felt through this valued reference to her nationality, thus turning upside down, by her language skills, the usual racial stereotyping of Indonesians as backward and uneducated, in Malaysia.

This type of reference to a substantial community of belonging – here the nation – also frequently follows more finely grainedcultural and ethnic lines, which deeply frame social representations. On this point, Bakri, a Javanese independent construction worker in Kuala

[1]A shortcut for *Bahasa Indonesia*, the native name of Indonesian language.
[2] In P. Bourdieus' definition (Bourdieu 1984).

Lumpur, is fairly clear: "*His principle… the Floresian*[3]*, his principle goes like that: "You eat rice. I eat rice. You are a human being, your blood is red, just like mine. Ok. Even if I get stabbed or I get… If God hasn't yet given me death, I won't die". The Floresian is like that. It makes him bold. But the Madurese*[4]*… he has to assess first: "how is my opponent, how is he?Oh! Too big! Ok. No problem. In front of him I pretend to surrender. But laterI will use my sickle to stab him from behind." The Madurese, it is his habit, big brother. He seems to surrender when confronted. But silently, from behind, he will stab you for sure. This attitude is a Madurese tradition. The Minang*[5] *works hard, he builds his business cleverly. The Lombokese*[6] *he plays it soft, but he is a fanatic"*. This widely shared way of stereotyping others along ethnic lines is linked here to his self-perceptionas an ethnic Javanese which, by contrast, he sees as baring positive qualities: Javanese are obedient, hard-working, patient, trustworthy.

Yet, these potent representations have to be dealt with carefully, at least for two reasons. First, because their use by social actors varies greatly according to local situations and contexts: while a specific situation might motivate or require an explicit display of national or ethnic identity and loyalties, other situations will make one ashamed of or unwilling to display his belonging to the same social group. For instance, many Indonesian women in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur take a specific pride in their mastery of the body ethos and language style of local urbanites, which allow them to mix seamlessly within urban crowds; while navigating the city, being identified as Indonesian would then be resented as a failure to embrace a modern and urban behavior, valued among their peers. Yet,in interviews, they keep on claiming their deep attachment to this very same Indonesian identity. Likewise, when they are faced with contempt on national ground, in both cities, many migrants proudly assert their nationality, claiming their equal dignity in front of scornful Singaporeans or Malaysians.

Second, there is also an obviousgap between *discourses on identity* and actual social practices. This discrepancy is particularly acute among certain groups of women, who have developed very subversive lifestyles in both metropolises, engaging in conducts which are deemed inappropriate regarding social norms, both locally – in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur – and in Indonesia. These life patterns can simply take the form of a very autonomous lifestyle, which would be impossible to sustain in their home places where decisions would have to be taken collectively. Some women thusengage in many different activities, taking

[3] People from Flores, an island in the Eastern part of the archipelago.
[4] People from Madura, an island located just off the North-Eastern coast of Java.
[5] People originating from West Sumatra.
[6] People from Lombok, the island East of Bali.

courses and certifications, and circulating among various and heterogeneous social circles.But in the range of new practices developed abroad, the most subversives certainly revolve around sexuality. Many women thus develop romantic or sexual relationships outside of marriage ties. Some find boyfriends outside of the Indonesian community, sometimes engaging in several sexual relationships at the same times; some make use of their sexuality to enhance their position by developing occasional prostitution practices, or by accessing resources through chosen boyfriend(s). Yet, most of them continue to express a deep attachment to traditional values and to reaffirm inheritedcultural identities.

As a consequence, there is a need to account *in the same analytical framework* for both the traction of substantive categories of belonging, which frame subjectivities, intersubjective relations and practices, and for the reality of interrelation chains and actual social networks, which*always* undermine the reality of their claims to closure and exclusiveness. A. Tsing (Tsing 2011) has a neat way of resolving this issue: she starts by acknowledging the scientific gains allowed by the developments of Actor Network Theory (for an in-depth introduction to ANT see: Latour 2008). By mapping real social networks instead of relying on pre-defined social categories, this field of inquiry has produced radically new accounts of old objects. Yet, the debunking of what she calls “methodological holism” - the tendency of social scientists to rely on “social wholes” to analyze the social (the village, the culture, the country, etc.) - , should not drive social research to ignore the propensity of social actors to fund their perception of the social on such “natural” classification. Thus, she calls for avoiding “methodological holism”, while taking seriously this “experiential holism”, not as an analytical tool but as an *object*tbio be analyzed.

There is an important scientific stake here, in the search for better heuristic tools. It appeared clearly in the village where my Javanese fieldwork was located. I was faced indeed with this type of problem, as I was witnessing an increasing tension between strong conservative claims about village society as a rooted, clearly bordered, culturally homogeneous social community, while the reality of practices showed that the village was being quickly integrated in wide-spanning networks of new relations and practices. In a locality where 80 to 90% of all households were directly involved in transnational circulations, the village, which used to enclose much more tightly the whole of individual existences, was increasingly downscaled as a specific site within a much wider, transnational set of different places which now frames the new field of social existences and experiences. For instance, the economic reproduction of local life, once more or less successfully insured at a local level, is increasingly dependent on transnational loops. As migrant workers invested

heavily in non-productive consumption goods – most prominently in motorbikes, even cars, and in modern domestic appliances - as well as in houses, the costs of maintenance of this immobilized capital contributed to monetize local economy on a scale unsustainable on a local economic basis.

In front of these evolutions, collective engagement in traditional ritual life and collective events, the upkeeping of a dense network of local associations, usually organized along generation and gender lines, strong claims of cultural allegiancewere pervasive. An interesting feature of this collective display of rootedness and identity is that it is unevenly distributed across social positions: those benefiting of the higher social prestige and political power are also the most active in maintaining and reinvigorating inherited social norms and interactional patterns within the community. They are also the most disturbed by the increasing prominence of transnational circulations (for a detailed account, see: Bastide 2015).I do not have the space here to dwell on this issue. What is important to understand is that the representation of the community as a social whole is also at the center of a struggle for power: this representation of collective life tends to disqualify transnational practices, and to protect local social hierarchies against new forms of social stratifications which are consolidating on migration routes. For instance someamong migrant workers have developed strong circulation skills, becoming able to adjust swiftly to heterogeneous social contexts and to accumulate resources on a transnational scale. Those are often respected among migrant communities abroad, while their cosmopolitanism is seen, locally in Indonesia, as a lack of commitment to their communities of origin. Hence force their position on transnational routes cannot be translated in terms of mobility within local social orders, in Java.

The discourse on communal completeness, on roots, values and identities as well as associated practices, are thus involved in a struggle for power. In this context, discourses on community are part of a hegemonic representation of collective life, which sustains a certain pattern of social relationships and a certain organization of power which produces dominant, dominated and *subaltern*[7]social subjects.

Multi-sited ethnography and the subaltern: why space matters

[7] We agree with G. SPivak who insists on distinguishing between domination and the subaltern. The difference lays in the access to *political representation*: while dominated subject struggle for a position within the social order, subaltern subject's political struggle can only aim at its transformation.Subalternity, indeed, describes the impossibility for a subject to represent his subjective experience in its own term, within a given organization of social order. Her access to political representation, in this context, can only be achieved through the reformulation of her experience in the terms of hegemonic categories of discourse (Spivak 1988).

How do these descriptions connect with our reflection on multi-sited ethnography and the power/knowledge nexus issue? In my understanding the link between these empirical facts, multi-sited ethnography, both as a methodological framework and as an epistemological position, and power relations,is to be found, precisely, in the category of the *subaltern*.

In the context I have just briefly outlined, it is clear enough that "experiential holism" – here the representation of the community as a unified, rooted whole - is ancillary to a conservative organization of power within local society. And this dominant discourse renders invisible certain domains of social experiences, often related to transnational mobilities. A specific organization of discourseson migration isindeed obvious in the village, which is of interest for the discussion. As for any given sphere of discourse(Foucault 2002), this organizationencodes how migration experiences can be represented.It defines both the domain of the "speakable" on the subject, and legitimate ways of speaking of the matter. However, both what can be said of migration experiences and how it can be expressed varies across social categories. And this variation of discourses across society provides useful clues to understand thepower relations and the social struggles at play behind this framing of representation: the voice of women as well as that of strongmen, prove the most uneasy on the subject; andboth categoriesare usually very reluctant to tackle the issuein the village. Women because they can never totally erase the suspicion related to their doings abroad, far from the collective gaze of the community. Migration is a stain on their reputation, since no one can attest of their sexual behavior abroad. In order to overcome this situation, they have to overplay their conformity to traditional gendered roles and to keep clear as much as possible from any reminiscence of their migratory past. Strongmen, on their part, are reluctant to speak about migration because the growing prominence of transnationalism in the organization of local life is a threat to their social stature. Women and strongmen thus share a will to silent transnational narratives because, in so doing, they protect their social standing. Yet, there is a critically important difference between them: their transnational past threatens women *within* the collective order, while the prestige of local elites is threatened by its *dissolution*.

In order to qualify these uneven relationships between social categories and discursive practices, it is useful to turn again to the empirical.A striking instance of the discrepancy between actual experiences and their possible representation is given, indeed, by the way women frame the reasons of their migration. For women in the village, the will to migrate is always justified as a will to contribute to the economic well-being and/oras a concern withthe

social mobility of the family. Contrasting with their situation, men can mobilize a much more varied “vocabulary of motives” (Mills 1940; Bastide 2015). Likewise, while women strive to bury their transnational past after resettling in the village, men can go as far as speaking freely of their sexual experiences or their consumption of alcohol abroad. However, when met in Singapore or Kuala Lumpur, other reasons become apparent behind these official feminine motives: many women explain the genesis of their will to live by a growing frustration with the perspectives locally available to them in Indonesia, and by a discomfort linked to the bounded roles tied to their social position, as women. Yet, in order to be granted the permission to leave, they have to frame their will to migrate according to socially legitimate motives.What is important to stress, here, is that realities which remained invisible in the village became visible from abroad.

As I had started this research with a first 6 months in Indonesia, I was very surprised also, in Singapore and Malaysia, to meet many Indonesian women who were willing to speak at lengthof their experiences in both cities. Actually, Indonesian women were much more willingto speak than men, in a radical reversal of what I had witnessed in Java. The discourses I collected with them were dense and often surprisingly transgressive of social conventions, very far from the few, scattered, very benign and conventional words I had hardly gathered in the village. Women spoke of complicated relationships with their families and their home communities. Many spoke freely of their relationships with men while abroad, be it through happy stories or narratives of sexual abuses. Newsubjectivation processes werebecoming apparent; and it emerged that, in the process, many women developed a complex relationships to the different places they linked while circulating. Long migration careers, where women multiplied migration rounds, never settling back in their home communitieswere thus becoming understandable: as they developed new practices and new social relations abroad, they came to develop as well new ways of relating to themselves and to the world. Many among them then came to see their “old” identity as provincial and backward, while developing new, urbanite selves which they perceived as more appealing. Not only these new identities made them part of what they had come to see as a desirable humanity, endorsed with modern values and coextensive with new forms of social recognition which they identified positively with, they were proud also of having succeeded in the difficult transition from their old selves to these new, cosmopolitan identities.

Seen from this angle, the village community appeared less as a pacified collective being, cohered by warm feelings of belonging, than as a deeply stratified social organization, whose apparent cohesiveness was achieved as much through coercive means than consent. But what

interests me here is that this aspect could only be grasped *from afar*, in places where women are not subjected to the same social constrains and where they are able to articulate a discourse consonant with their subjective experiences.Thus,it is only when recovering the intimate motives women express for their migration*whileabroad* that the social organization of the "vocabulary of motives" available to justify migration, back home, could reveal the impossibility for a subject to be heard in its own terms, and the necessity, in order to be recognized, to translate her claims within hegemonic forms of discourse. As a consequence, it is only *from abroad* that the subalternityof women*back home*could be unraveled, and that they, as subaltern subjects, *could speak*[8].

From these standpoints, the oppressive side of collective life in Indonesia was becoming apparent: Sutina said she had left the country when village society, in her home place in Sumatra, turned against her mother after she divorced her father. Lina,Nurifaand Umieach experienced their returnsto their respective villages in Java as morally exhausting, partly because of the new economic expectations they were subjected to as successful migrants, partly because they had a hard time conforming backto gendered social roles increasingly discrepant with their lived identities as modern, urban women. Sati, who refused to conform to these roles even for a short time, was subjected to collective contempt and numerous malign gossips every time she came back(for a detailed account see: Bastide 2013).

The variations of discourses across locations dispersed on a transnational scalethen showdifferent things: first, that normative orders and related power relations are always spatially inscribed. As a consequence, hegemony and subalternitymust always be referred to a specific *location*, and always need to be re-assessed according to local circumstances. Women who may appear as marginalized beings in the village, poorly integrated within local society, are sometimes also the most involved in transnationalism. Because they have increasingly identified with their new lives abroad, they have come to value less local forms of social recognition. Indah, when she comes back to her village, mainly stays home and intermingles as little as possible with her fellow villagers. Being a divorced, she would have to overplay her gendered role in order to fully reintegrate collective life.Because she refuses to conform to these social expectations, now seeing them as degrading, she has a bad reputation within local society.However, this can only be understood when considering that she finds elsewhere the forms of recognition that she seems to lack here. When considering

[8] This is no surprise in Java as it has been shown that if women have a central economic role within the traditional distribution of social positions, if they also enjoy a strong position in the domestic domain, they are marginalized as political subjects (Robinson 2009, 66-88).

her experience abroad her local situation can thus be attributed to a shift in her identification patterns, which transforms her subjective and affective attachment to “her” different places(Bastide 2013). In the process, she has become more or less immune to local social judgments, as she now values the forms of social recognition she finds among new sociability circles in the City-State.

Many women go through the same type of experiences. However, it is important to stress thatthey never express this discomfort back home. They go silently through these uneasy episodes. This is because feeling increasingly distant from their home communities does not mean they are *totally detached* from it. If Indah is increasingly critical of local social norms and detached from local life, she nevertheless keeps on coming back to see her mother, with whom she keeps strong affective ties. Because she does not want to hurt her feelings, she cannotgo overtly against the community. Likewise, those who cannot stand conforming to local social expectations never openly rebel; they usually just stop coming back, as much as possible. A good reason for that is that they are forbidden to settle in destination countries. A final return to Indonesia, even for those who delay it as much as possible, thus remains the most likely horizon of their experiences.

This is why these realities remain largely invisible at a local level, in Indonesia. And this situation bears important scientific consequences. Indeed, from a purely local point of view, the reality of social life appears stripped from these alternative, often subversive narratives. And local community can look strong, immutable, rooted in traditions. When we combine this local point of view with other sights, taken from other sites, this reality appears much more fragile, as a “lost in advance” struggle for preserving the inherited patterns of social lives, against their fast erosion by transnational experiences. Multi-sited ethnography is thus a methodological means to avoid incomplete empirical descriptions, which can drive to serious misinterpretations: in the present case, accepting the local discourse on completeness would be simply empirically false. It has alsoimportant political and ethical consequences. Endorsing uncritically the local definition of social belongings and the local description of collective identities, community bonds and frontiers, means ratifying a discourse of power, which renders invisible subaltern voices and their struggle for representation. In doing so, important political processes, scaled in different social spaces, are lost. And this is where I see an important relation between multi-sited ethnography and an ethical position regarding research practices:since hegemony is always spatially inscribed, circulating between different locations allows recovering voicesthat could not be heard otherwise. Failing to do so, if we are not very careful, often end up legitimating*scientifically* local structures of power.

Conclusion

Multi-sited ethnography, most importantly, has been developed as an answer to an increasingly obvious inadequacy of availableconceptual tools to account for the fast rescaling of social life, since the late 20th century. In this respect, it is inseparable from a resolute preoccupation for the empirical. This commitment to the "data of experience" necessarily implies "de-theorizing" as a first step in the inquiry, in order to assess the actual intricacy of actual social life.

In the present case, circulating on migration routes shed light on the complicated contemporary conditions of the reproduction of locality, in a context where transnational loops question the inherited reproduction of social positions and relationships. If these uneasy changes are somehow perceptible at a local level, only by following migrants abroad are we able to access dissident,minoritary narratives of collective life: discourses are *always* sited, and only by circulating *between* the sites of social experience are we able to reconstitute the polyphonic, contested nature of reality.

I don't think that this type of research design only fits transnational studies. As it is tightly related to important epistemological stances on the nature of social ties, it is a way of thinking of *any* social object. It is a methodological attitude which seeks to map actual social networks and chains of practices while collecting the social meanings that concerned actors in the field attribute to them. To take the terms of A. Tsing, it opens a narrow pathfor avoiding "methodological holism", by taking the social representations of social actors as an *object* of the inquiry (not a tool), while taking seriously "experiential holism", as the way people make sense of their social reality – through categorization - and according to which social subjects organize their actions.By doing so, we recover the polyphonic and agonistic nature of social and political life, and the conventional nature of social reality.

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Cosmopolitan Significance of Discursive Sociology
Foucault and Habermas in East Asia

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<Abstract>

This paper is an attempt to explore the cosmopolitan significance of discursive analysis (Foucault) and discursive testing (Habermas) within the context of East Asian sociology. Cosmopolitan here is not built into space boundaries like international or transnational but refers to transgression of meaning boundaries like breaking away from fixed presupposition. In China, Xie Lizhong has worked out the pluralistic discourse analysis to open up the cognitive space for pluralities while confronting against the monopoly of knowledge. In Korea, Han Sang-Jin has worked out the concept of discursive sociology and examined the candlelight civil movements. Concrete cases will be examined to demonstrate how conventional claim to knowledge is linked to the power of nation states and how it can be challenged by discursive analysis and testing. Reconstructing pluralities has specific cosmopolitan implications. An attempt will also be made to explore why the social landscape of politics and social movement tend to be more visibly shaped by discourse than ever and how the concept of discursive testing sheds new light on the cosmopolitan deliberation in East Asia.

What do we mean by Cosmopolitan?

For the purpose of this paper it is important to define clearly what we mean by cosmopolitan. Conventionally, cosmopolitan is assumed to be deeply related to boundary-crossing in terms of space. In this case, cosmopolitan may look similar to international or transnational. However, some immediate difficulties are faced because it is not easy to clearly distinguish globalization (globalism) and cosmopolitization (cosmopolitanism). This is particularly true in the East Asian context where these two concepts tend to be translated very similarly to one another.[1] To be sure, there are some undisputable common elements. There

1 The Korean translation of globalization is “sekyewha” and the meaning of cosmopolitanism is usually understood

are many examples that portray such commonality. Both concepts aspire to be universal. They are against ethnocentric preoccupations. They are liberal and open-minded. They both emphasize freedom and equality based on principles. Both grasp the massive structural transformations stemming from the border-transcending movements of capital, labor, and information, the effects of which have been well recognized on every aspect of people's lives (Beck, 2000a, 2006; Held, 2010; Boom & Fine, 2007). Certain values also spread across the world, as exemplified by "global standards" applied to market economy everywhere. Then how can these two concepts be distinguished clearly?

Let's image a situation in where diversities and differences in the world are encountered. What can be done with the so-called "radical others" who seem to be so fundamentally different from other people that it looks almost (if not completely) impossible for them to live together, or reconcile with one another? The situation may differ depending on how the differences and diversities in question are perceived. For instance, it is possible to come up with those 'friends' who show remarkable differences from other people, yet it could be felt that it is still possible to live together with tolerance and respect despite such dissimilarities. On the other hand, in the case that includes the so-called 'enemies' whose actions and value presuppositions can be hardly understood, it is tempting to apply power and sanction globally supported. The global standard is accepted and applied here. Perhaps, a good case in point is the globalization of the market economy. All activities, even those involving education and culture, are portrayed to be regulated by the neoliberal market principle of competition and survival. There is a tendency to emphasize diversity on the surface, but, in reality, advocate the 'universal' values originated from hegemonic countries in the West as principles behind the global integration.

The distinction between hegemonic globalism and cosmopolitanism can be seen as underlying Habermas' critique of 'hegemonic liberalism'. Hegemonic liberalism assumes that formally independent states "would operate under the protection of a peace-securing superpower and obey the imperatives of a completely liberalized global market" (Habermas, 2006a:184). Habermas argues that this assumption is not only empirically misleading but also normatively ill-grounded since the decision can be impartial and justified only when it is based on discursive procedures which "are inclusive (all affected parties can participate); and they compel the participants to adopt each other's perspectives (a fair assessment of all

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as something closely related to "sekyewha."

affected interests is possible).” The universal value of hegemonic globalism is problematic because “the ethical justification of a unilateral undertaking by appeal to the presumptively universal values of one’s own political culture must remain fundamentally biased” (Habermas 2006a:185). What this sort of globalism offers falls short of fully understanding diversities and differences since it is assumed before launching reciprocal dialogue that sanctions must be applied to those who fail to comply with these ‘universal’ values. It is in this historical context that the cosmopolitan emphasis on diversity as well as justice has attracted much attention (Appiah, 2006; Baban, 2006; Beitz, 2007; Calcutt, 2007; Kurasawa, 2007; Mendieta, 2009). It is also why Habermas’ theory of communication, particularly his theory of discourse ethics, popular sovereignty and world government provides a far-reaching cosmopolitan vision with universal orientation.

Debate on cosmopolitanism has increased drastically during the last several years (Beck, 2006; Calhoun, 2007; Held, 2010; Nowicka & Rovisco, 2009). Cosmopolitan change can be explored at various levels. First of all, ‘cosmopolitization’ is a new term[2] coined recently to sensitize attention to the objective process of structural transformation characterized by the rapidly increasing “chains of interlocking political decisions and outcomes among states and their citizens, which alter the nature and dynamics of territorially defined governance systems” (Beck and Grande, 2010: 417). Beck argues that cosmopolitization unfolds independent of cosmopolitanism. Indeed, cosmopolitan change in this sense can be confirmed at all levels of politics, market economy, civil society, and cultures. Beck thus speaks of ‘cosmopolitan imperative’ meaning that, independent of whether it is wanted or not, all nations and societies must adjust to this changing reality. In this context, cosmopolitanism refers to a broad range of ideas and orientations which Belanty (2009: 54), for instance, classifies into three broad strands as moral cosmopolitanism, political cosmopolitanism, and cultural cosmopolitanism within the European tradition.

With the vast literature on cosmopolitanism, I would like to pay attention to its moral and political dimension (Held, 2010), taking cosmopolitanism as a tradition subject to reinvention. Cosmopolitanism then requires reflexive awareness of one’s cultural tradition. Reflexivity means transformation of cultural identity. Cosmopolitanism is distinctive in a way that it presupposes an open-minded attitude towards one’s own as well as other cultures. What is at

2 This term began to be used in the articles published in British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 61(3), 2010. Before t hat, such expression as ‘cosmoplitanization’ was rather used.

stake here is the reciprocal capability that one and the other can interpret each other from counterpart's point of view rather than from one's own familiar viewpoints. In this aspect cosmopolitanism is linked to reflexive modernization, second modernity, as well as multicultural dialogue (Han, 2010; 2011). Cosmopolitanism not only embraces diversities but also aspires to work out a dialogically framed concept of justice as well as the common goal of cooperation without coercion (Archbugi, 2003; Beitz, 2005; Mendieta, 2009).

From this perspective, cosmopolitanism may be defined by radical openness and inclusiveness upon which diversities can coexist. Such a landscape is not limited to human relationships only – it can be extended to the relations between human beings and nature. Nor should it be exclusively transnational. Cosmopolitan orientation plays a significant role in daily life. The question faced is how to transform the hierarchical and hegemonic relationships embedded in social structures and global politics to a new paradigm of coexistence with diversities.

Beck (1992; 1999; 2000b; 2005; 2006; 2009) has probably shown the most committed and impressive scholarship on cosmopolitanism in his overall theoretical framework of global risks that humanity faces today. He and his associates have also initiated an important intellectual movement toward a cosmopolitan turn in social science (Beck & Sznaider, 2006; Beck & Grande, 2010; Grande, 2006; Delanty, 2006; Held, 2010, Turner, 2006). In doing so, Beck has attempted to radicalize the meaning of cosmopolitanism with the concept of "the internalization of the other" (Beck and Grande, 2010: 419). Internalization refers to others no longer being external but rather becoming a part of self. Here, one does not impose any external viewpoint to the other but, instead, methodologically takes other's point of view. Therefore, Beck argues that cosmopolitanism "connects individuals, groups and societies in new ways, thereby changing the very position and function of self and the other" (Beck and Grande, 2010:419). Committed to pursue a genuinely reciprocal understanding, recognition, and appropriation of the other, cosmopolitanism calls for "an active, deliberative and reflexive opening of individuals, groups and societies to other ideas, preferences, rules and cultural practices" (Beck and Grande, 2010:419).

Along with Beck, Delanty (2009:75-88) defines cosmopolitanism in terms of four capacities for 'immanent transcendence.' The first transcendence is self-discovery mediated by encountering with the other. Self is seen not as fixed, but rather transformable as a social and cultural construction. Second, cosmopolitan imagination moves further to see the other

from the value and perspective they hold and accommodate the other as a dialogic partner. The third level is not simply learning from the other but transforming one's own cultures and standpoints. This may be done through open and inclusive multicultural dialogue. Fourth, the capacity for transcending differences and diversities toward "a shared or common culture" is important (Delanty, 2009, p.87). As one moves from the first to the fourth dimension of transcendence, he argues that "cosmopolitan capacities can become progressively stronger.".

What does "Discursive" Mean?

This paper is an attempt to explore the cosmopolitan significance of doing human studies and social science by paying particular attention to a distinctive methodological approach that I call 'discursive.' Discursive methodology contains three different meanings. First, it refers to the self-reflexive mode of doing sociology. Since knowledge is viewed as an articulation rather than as a representation, it is inevitable for sociology to examine the basic conceptual as well as epistemological conditions it takes for granted in a self reflexive manner. Second, discursive refers to a specific mode of analysis which we would like to call "discursive analysis." Discursive analysis attempts to show how reality is constructed out of the process of communication and discourse in the society (Foucault). All knowledge is understood as a social or discursive construction. More often than not, therefore, multiple realities are constructed in a way competitive or contesting. No knowledge can claim the monopoly of truth. Discursive means opening up pluralities in understanding the reality via making explicit what has remain implicit, hidden, unseen, marginal, or excluded. This function of knowledge has something to do with cosmopolitan development within the field of science. Third, discursive also refers to a specific mode of testing validity claims involved in social construction of reality. This component we would like to call "discursive testing" which runs not exclusively by empirical testing alone well institutionalized in the mainstream social science but in a communicative way involving questions, critique, defense, and discursive confrontation in our everyday life (Habermas). Discursive sociology is then composed of discursive analysis which regu1ates social construction of reality and discursive testing of validity in question. Discursive analysis is neither causal nor logical but properly reconstructive. Discursive testing is neither exclusively empirical nor merely logical but properly communicative.

Discursive analysis is aimed at showing the way in which the object under investigation has been made possible within the determinate system of language relationships. The focal point is on social construction in terms of discourses and communication. We can further say that discursive analysis is the conceptual reconstruction of the obvious structure of social life as an intelligible object. What appears obvious or "nature-like" is not simply assumed as given but is reconstructed in such a way that the underlying yet invisible rules of its formation are conceptually grasped, thereby rendering them visible. According to Barthes (1972b: 127), the goal of discursive analysis is "to reconstruct an ‘object' in such a way as to manifest thereby the rules of functioning of this object" to make "some-thing appear which remained invisible, or... unintelligible in the natural object." Therefore, discursive analysis must properly include the analysis of communication in its specificity and complexity. Communication does not merely represent or express something which stands behind or has already been determined elsewhere. Rather communication is the field in which all aspects of reality find their expression and signification.

One step further, the validity of discursive analysis cannot be tested by observation alone but rather must be tested in a way that properly includes discourse among individuals and groups. This dimension of testing never arises in the natural sciences but is important for discursive sociology. Not only empirical hypothesis but also normative claims can be put into the process of testing in which citizens participate by taking up communicative reflection based on reciprocal argument. This represents a fundamental challenge to the categorical distinction between facts and values taken for granted by positivist social science. The specific link between discursive testing and discursive analysis must be recognized. By making explicit something hidden or marginal, discursive analysis is linked to discursive testing in which scientists and citizens as well participate to assess the knowledge claim produced by such an analysis. What comes out of this is a discursive paradigm of radical politics, in which certain cognitive and normative claims in politics, ideology, social movements, and so on are methodically contested. Such argumentative contestation can make significant contribution to cosmopolitan enlightenment.

Discursive Analysis by Xie Lizhong: Mao Zedong versus Liang Shuming

The idea of discursive analysis was proposed and extensively used by Michel Foucault

in his various writings on the emergence of modernity in France with respect to such interesting topics as madness, clinics and hospitals, prison, sexualities, and modern epistemologies of order, men, and welfare. Yet it is extremely difficult to reproduce his methodology since he only left statements with high abstraction at the level of archaeology or genealogy but not in a way empirically replicable. However, the insight that dominant power exercised in politics and everyday life today is not a naked one like physical force and violence, but the power couched with languages and symbols. Thus, the relationship between knowledge and power became a central topic for his research. This insight has become a common sense in social science today, supported not only by Foucault but by many other streams.

Yet the idea of discursive analysis is still meaningful when we confront with those sciences which claim that their knowledge represent the reality as it is, whether it comes from the camps of positivism or Marxism or any kind of realism. Discursive analysis as has been defined above is particularly meaningful when such claim to objective knowledge is closely linked to a hegemonic power. Breaking away from the monopoly of truth via discursive construction of pluralities is an important step to yield cosmopolitan significance as we have seen above.

It is in this context that we need to pay attention to the works done by Xie Lizhong, a sociology professor at Beijing University. He has produced many works to demonstrate how discursive analysis can contribute to multiple realities against all kinds of attempts to monopolize truth. In what follows, however, I will only deal with one of his paper which dealt with the controversy between Mao Zedong and Liang Shuming.

In 1926, an important article was written by Mao Zedong defining China as a class society. Many Chinese leading intellectuals at the beginning of 20th century, including Mao Zedong, shared the conceptual frame which defined China as a class society. Needless to say, value judgments were built into basic conceptual distinctions. The Chinese society were seen as composed of “landlord class and comprador class”, “middle bourgeoisie”, “petty bourgeoisie”, “semi-proletariat”, “the proletariat”, “lumpen-proletariat”, and so on. With this article Mao attempted to offer a “general analysis” of the “economic positions and attitudes of these classes towards revolution of Chinese society”. “Landlord class and comprador class were seen purely as appendages to international bourgeoisie”, representing “the most outmoded and the most reactionary relation of production in China.” They were

“completely incompatible with the goal of Chinese revolution”; “Middle bourgeoisie” mainly referred to national bourgeoisie and represented “capitalist relation of production in Chinese urban and rural area”, “with a contrary attitude to Chinese revolution”; “Petty bourgeoisie” included “owner-peasants, the master handicraftsmen, the lower levels of the intellectuals -- students, primary and secondary school teachers, lower government functionaries, office clerks, small lawyers and traders, etc.” They could be divided into three parts, “left”, “middle”, “right”, according o their economic positions, with different attitudes to revolution; “Semi-proletariat” consisted of “ the overwhelming majority of the semi-owner peasants”, “the poor peasants”, “the small handicraftsmen”, “the shop assistants”, “the peddlers”, etc, and they might be further divided into three smaller categories, upper, middle and lower, according to their economic condition, consequently with different attitude to revolution; “The proletariat” had two parts, industrial proletariat and rural proletariat, and “though not very numerous, the industrial proletariat represented China's new productive forces. They were treated as the most progressive class in modern China and as the leading force in the revolutionary movement”; “Lumpen-proletariat” represented the most precarious existence of all” apt to be destructive. As “brave fighters they were seen as capable of becoming a revolutionary force if led by proper guidance”. As one of the influential programmatic documents for Chinese revolution for a long time, this article has been collected into *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*

But “China as a class society” was not a consensus among the Chinese intellectuals of the day. For instance, Liang Shuming, saw China from a different conceptual frame in his work, *Theory of Rural Construction*. He said, “if we can define modern western society as an individual-based society with class antagonism, traditional Chinese society can be said to be ethically based and professionally divided.”3 He made a distinction between an “ethically based” Chinese society and an “individually based” Western society. Western people either emphasize group over individual, or conversely, but Chinese were short of either side. What Chinese emphasized was the relationship between group and individual, which was ethically based. Ethical relationship originated from the family but was not confined in it. “Ethic means pairing, namely people are in reciprocal relations.” “People develop friendship while they are living in relations.” “An ethical relationship equals a friendship as well as a

3 Liang, Shuming. *Theory of Rural Construction*, Shanghai century publishing group, 2006, p. 24.

relationship of mutual obligations."4 People in ethical relationship "take others to heart mutually so much that a person is not living for himself, but for others". "Professional division" differs from class antagonism of western society. Since Middle Ages Western society has been characterized by class division. "In Western society, there was antagonism between serfs and nobles during the Middle Ages. In modern times, serfs have been liberated because of the rise of urban industrial and commercial development, but antagonism has been transferred into the one between the capitalists and the labor. Therefore, western society has always been a class society".5 But Chinese society has been different. China had only professional, but not class, division. This can be seen by the fact that economically China "had only all kinds of different professions, but no two opposite classes", and politically Chinese sovereignty had not been occupied by nobles but open to all the people (so-called "a person who is a peasant in the morning can become an emperor by the evening"), so "compared with western Middle Ages, China had professions but no classes".6 Liang said, "the several words 'ethic-based, professionally divided' have given a perfect description of the old Chinese social structure." And this special social structure made it possible for Chinese society to have "periodic cycle of order and disorder" but it made impossible to create revolution, because "all revolutions originate from class struggle and a country of class domination", but China was not a class society. "There is no revolution where there is no struggle. All we had was only 'a completely disorder'."7

If we examine the systems of discourse between Mao and Liang, it becomes clear that though both use the concept of "class", there are considerable differences in the usage and definition of "class" between them. For Mao, the "class" means the difference of economic and political status, and the occupancy of capital goods and the source of income. Hence, as long as the difference in the occupancy of capital goods and the source of income exist to a certain extent, we can say the different "classes" have continues to exist. For example, in the books of *Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society* and *How to Differentiate the Classes in the Rural Areas*, Mao differentiated the class according to the criteria above. Mao puts forward definitely that "a landlord is a person who owns land, does not engage in laboring

4 Liang, Shuming. *Theory of Rural Construction*, p. 25.
5 Liang, Shuming. *Theory of Rural Construction*, p. 27.
6 Liang, Shuming. *Theory of Rural Construction*, p. 28-29.
7 Liang, Shuming. *Theory of Rural Construction*, p. 33. Liang's idea was so different from the theory of Mao and Mao's comrades that he received severe criticism and rebukes from the latter, see Mao, Tse-Tung, "A criticism on Liang Shuming's reactionary idea" (*Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, volume 5, the people's publishing house, 1977) and so on.

himself, or does so only to a very small extent, and lives by exploiting the peasants"; "the rich peasant generally has rather more and better instruments of production and more liquid capital than the average and engages in labor himself, but always relies on exploitation for part or even the major part of his income"; "the middle peasant have a fair number of farm implements and derive his income wholly or mainly from his own labor"; "the poor peasants own part of their land and have a few odd farm implements, others own no land at all but only a few odd farm implements and both have to rent the land"; "the worker and the farm laborer as a rule owns no land or farm implements, though some do own a very small amount of land and very few farm implements but they make their living wholly or mainly by selling their labor power".8

However, the meaning of "class" is very different for Liang. The class is related to neither the difference in the social status nor uneven distribution of wealth. The class of this category is very specific. For Liang, the formation of "class" of course has something to do with the difference in the possession of the capital goods. But not all the differences in the social status caused by the capital goods can be called "class"; only in the case in which (1) the extent of difference is so big that some people monopolize the production tools and can let other people do work; and (2) this monopolization is the status of difference which has been fixed for a long time; Liang argued that we can talk of social classes only when the two conditions are met. In the west some people (like noble or capitalist) monopolized the production tools and other people worked for production for a long time; so western society can be called the society of "classes" indeed.9 But China is different. In China, though there was difference in the possession of the means of production, the extent of difference was not big enough to make some people monopolized the production tools while other people work for a long time. Liang suggested three reasons. "First, the land could be bought and sold freely and all the people had the chance to own lands; Second, the legacy could be shared equally and the Chinese society was not the primogeniture; Third, China had no large

8 Mao, Tse-Tung, "How To Differentiate The Classes In The Rural areas ", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung: Vol. I*, People's Publishing House, 1964, pp.113-115.

9 "In the society, it has one situation which is the means of production and the job of production are belonged two types of people; some people take possession of the means of production, while other people do the work; that's called the society of class antagonism. For example in the middle ages of west, the whole lands are belonged nobles and landowners; and to modern times the machines are belonged capitalist; while all the labourers like as the serf and the worker have no the means of production; so it becomes one situation which has the exploiter and the exploited." Liang Shuming, *Theory of Rural Construction*, Shanghai Century Publishing Group, 2006, p.27.

machinery like steam engine and electric engine". As a result, the "China society" can't be called "class society".10

We have paid particular attention so far to the debate between Mao Zedong and Liang Shuming in order to indicate that the basic definition of the Chinese Society and many other stories about China have been constructed out of the processes of discursive formation and interaction. An objective and self-existent Chinese Society which is independent of and separated from a discursive system doesn't exist because the usage of the concept of "class" is very different between Mao and Liang. The different answers by them to the question whether China society is a class society are built into the different conceptualization of social classes.

Nevertheless, different conceptual schemes and the outcomes of social analysis create a space in which reflexive reasoning can proceed. Usually, the Marxist approach to class analysis involves a claim to objective knowledge and truth. To the extent to which such a claim is taken for granted, dogmatic consequences may be unavoidable. Cosmopolitan here means crossing over knowledge boundary by opening up plurality in understanding the reality. Pluralities differ significantly from traditional realism. According to discursive analysis, all objects of our study are constructed out of the interplay among specific symbols, language and discourses. It cannot be treated as given but as constructed. The reality that we human beings feel, think, and talk are filtered by our symbolic systems and they are constructed through specific flows of discourse in which we live. So nothing is completely pure and natural. Cosmopolitan is always against the monopoly of truth and, hence, against all kinds of potential dogmatism.

Discursive Testing: Candlelit Virgil 2008 in Korea

Discursive sociology involves two layers: discursive analysis and testing. Discursive testing refers to the process in which citizens (social groups) are interacting in terms of raising critique and defending in order to test the validity of disputed practical claims in question. Discursive testing is the other side of discursive analysis. Discursive analysis and testing are both integral part of discursive sociology. For instance, reality can be constructed in a radically different way depending on whether we take a new left or new light

10 Liang Shuming, *Theory of Rural Construction*, Shanghai Century Publishing Group, 2006, p.28.

perspective, whether we belong to progressive camp or conservative camp, or whether we take the identity of the mainstream middle class or the identity of the grassroots segment of the middle class. Multiple realities so constructed, however, are subject to discursive contestation since competing groups attempt to establish different frames while confronting each other in politics, social movements and public spheres. This means that discursive sociology is not merely analytic in the traditional sense but practically engaged to test the validity of the claims under dispute.

In order to show this aspect of discursive sociology, in what follows, I want to examine a concrete case of candlelit vigil 2008 in South Korea as an example in which we can investigate action-theoretical issues of discursive contestation. This case is chosen not simply because it represents an extraordinary and epoch-breaking participatory movement in which millions of citizens joined voluntarily for more than three months since April 2008, but primarily because it shows distinctive characteristics of reflexive modernization with respect to citizens' movement as well as the relationship between civil society and the government. It first started with people's worry about vCJD (mad cow disease) that might result from the government decision to re-import the US beef. However, as the protest unfolded, issues much broader than vCJD were in fact intertwined. Consequently, it yielded huge political impact, such as the sharp decline of the President's approval rate from over 60 percentages down to as low as 13 percentages in a matter of one and a half months.

The candlelit vigil has presented a new paradigm of life politics in a sharp confrontation with the old paradigm of power politics, with extra-ordinary success in discursive articulation of frames and contestation. The origin of life politics with the explicit focus on mad-cow disease can be traced back to 2003 when a case of mad cow disease was confirmed at a United State cattle farm. The then government halted imports of the American beef responding to the demand articulated by concerned citizens and animal medicine experts. After the conservative government took office in February 2008, however, the concerned politicians, high-ranking officials, as well as business organizations of the United States began to wield pressure upon the Korean government to resume beef imports. Washington maintained that free trade agreement with Seoul could hardly be ratified unless the Korean government allows the resumption of the American beef imports. In this context, on the first day of President Lee's official visit to Washington, April 18, 2008, the Korean government announced that an agreement between the two countries had been reached and the Korean

market will be made open to the American beef accordingly. This immediately prompted sharp critiques pointing out the dangers to public health, particularly of kids and young students as well as the lack of independence on the part of the Korean sovereign power in negotiating the conditions of imports with the United States. On April 29, 2008 MBC aired a popular news program, “PD Notebook,” showing a video clip of “downer” cows at U.S. farms with the statement that people who consume the American beef could contract the human form of mad cow disease, and that the Korean government had turned a blind eye to this danger to proceed the import resumption swiftly. As a powerful facilitating factor, this news inspired many young people to participate in candlelit vigil to follow whose climax was June 10, 2008 when one million citizens joined in vigil peacefully in Seoul.

Of particular significance in this regard is a sharp competition of two frames representing the mainstream power bloc and citizen alliance bloc. The first was composed of the Korean government, mainstream conservative newspapers, business organizations, economists, and such foreign powers as the U.S. government and international health organizations. The second was composed of young citizens, especially women, groups of animal medicine experts, critically-oriented minority newspapers, MBC television, and some religious groups. The first bloc advocated the paradigm of national interests in relation to free trade agreement with the United States, whereas the latter advocated the paradigm of life politics by putting emphasis on the danger to public health. The two camps struggled hard to get as much popular support as they needed by using all the available means such as the institutional, discursive, ideological, repressive, and transnational resources. The two frames showed remarkable differences in constructing the problems of mad cow disease. The citizen alliance sensitized attention to the people’s right for health and popular sovereignty while the power bloc discredited their worries as relying on unfounded rumors. Despite large disparity between the two camps in terms of opportunity structure and resource mobilization, the citizen alliance was able to gain overwhelming support from the public mass, forcing President to issue an official apology on May 22, 2008.

An interesting question is how the two camps interacted in terms of such strategies of discursive social construction as raising issues, justification, attack and counter-attack, merging frames, and marginalizing the counterpart’s position (Han, 2012). An indisputable fact was that the “PD Notebook” as part of the citizen alliance demonstrated its ability to raise public issues effectively by drawing attention, for example, to the specific risk materials

as cattle spinal columns and brains, which were believed to contain infectious proteins. In contrast, the power bloc attempted to either justify the government decision in a way that soon turned out to be questionable or attack the citizen alliance in an old-fashioned ideological manner that was no longer convincing. Consequently, the seemingly impossible dominance of the citizen alliance could have become realized.

Another interesting point is related to the role of women who accounted for 70 percent of the participants of the candlelit vigil in its initial stage. The paradigm of life politics emerged from the action of women who expressed concern about national sovereignty "from the status of mothers who are the primary caretakers of their families' health.11

> *When safeguarding the dinner table becomes a matter of food industry at the global level, the act of preparing food takes on a political nature, which restructures the boundary between state and family and between the public sphere and the intimate sphere. When one is able to think seriously about safeguarding the dinner table at the global level and think critically about the government being reduced to the status of manager of neoliberalist economic rationale and the global market, one activates life politics by asking questions regarding publicity from the standpoint of an "everyday agent. […] This highlights that the experiences of women participants of the candlelight demonstration should be understood in the context of life politics.12*

The candlelit vigil 2008 signified an important transformation of social movement and politics from the paradigm of power politics to life politics. As referred to above, women emerged as major actor of civil participation demanding for life politics. In addition, individualization began to play significant role. The self-determination by individuals became more and more salient as guiding motive of participation, which differed significantly from the previous model of collective mobilization.

At the same time, it should be stressed that the advanced technologies of digital communication wielded great influence on the quality of the candlelit vigil. Internet intrinsically fosters individualizing decisions and choices. As a breed of digital culture, young people developed their will to participate through Internet communication. Participants located at different places could transcend the limit of space by monitoring the situation via

11 Kim, Young Ok, "Understanding the Candlelight Demonstration and Women's Political Subjectivity t hrough the Perspective of Changing Publicity," Korea Journal, 2101 (Autumn), p.41
12 Ibid., p.64

Internet broadcasting and mobile phone and there were able to join in a loosely evolving process of 'collective' reasoning without a central organization of coordination. For instance, 'Arica,' as an "one-person media, sent out as many as 17,222 accumulated total reports by 425 one-person reporters from May 25 to June 10, 2008. The total number of audience was estimated to be 7.75 million. In this context, collective intelligence refers to "the aggregate knowledge that emerges from the decentralized choices and judgment of groups of independent participants." The candlelit vigil proved that "the wisdom of general public could play no less crucial role in setting collective agenda and resolving social problems than experts' intelligence or elites' authority."

In addition, a post-conventional paradigm of social movement emerged. The best example may be seen in festival-like protest in which not militant activists but popular singers, dancers, talents, and performers play significant role, combining art to the act of protest. Originated from the experience of World-Cup Street-cheering in June 2002, this aspect of reflexive modernization became fully blossomed through the candlelit vigil in 2008.

Concluding Remark

Seen from the perspective of discursive sociology, what is crucial for reflexive modernization is a balanced capacity and development between civil society and political institution. The increasing empowerment of citizens is indispensable for articulating new demands and preferences from bottom as a new energy for change. Simultaneously, it is also important that political institutions upgrade their capacity to respond to these bottom-up demands flexibly and work out good solutions to improve the quality of life. The candlelit marches demonstrated ample evidences of small group discussions on the spot and joyful expression of emotion via parody, metaphors, and humors. However, the candlelit vigil 2008 shows a significant asymmetry between a high capacity of civil society in generating demands from bottom and a low ability of the political parties and state institutions to respond to these energies constructively.

Finally, the candlelight marches showed that citizens were actively involved in the process of testing the questionable claims via various means including debates and demonstration. The key point is NOT which side was right or legitimate. That is debatable depending on where one stands. What is crucial is the fact that citizens were not passive but

active in collective deliberation which is full of cosmopolitan significance. Here cosmopolitan means a collective effort toward enlightenment via discursive engagement as a way of linking the local and transnational arena of public concern.

PhD Candidate Mr. Hu Liangang

Sociology in China: A Brief Retrospect

Sociology as a science originated from France. Auguste Comte put forward the word “sociology” in 1838. Up to now, there are about 180 years. The word “sociology” first appeared in China at the end of 19th century. Now, there are about 110 years. But sociology in China as a kind of New Learning was implanted from the modern Europe and America soil. Therefore, the discourse of “The West” and “The East” was appeared in Chinese intelligentsia. The development of sociology in China can tell us different scheme of discipline development. This kind of historical research can promote mutual understanding of scholars from different civilizations; and enhance our understanding on the diversity of human civilization.

Pre-1949 Chinese sociology

Sun Pen-Wen, a professor of Chinese sociology before 1949, pointed out that there was no sociology in ancient China, and sociology was the product of the modern Europe and America; we could find many pieces of scientific insights from Chinese ancient classics, but strict modern science originated from the west; natural science was so, and social science was the same (Sun, 2011[1948]: 3). Meanwhile, Peake (1934) emphasized that one of the most significant aspects of modern history is the transformation which China is undergoing in reaction to the impact of Western civilization; among the most vital and fundamental phases of this modernization is the introduction of Western science and the application of its methods to the study of the physical and social phenomena of the country and its civilization. At the same time, this article outlined the history of modern science in China during the three and a half centuries that have elapsed since it was first introduced by the Jesuits in the seventeenth century: The first period extends from about 1600 to 1800; the second period includes the greater part of the nineteenth century from 1800-1895; the third period covers the years from the close of the war with Japan to 1912; the fourth period

begins since the establishment of the Republic.

Generally speaking, “Sociology is a Western flower; it was first transplanted into Chinese soil with Yu Fu’s translation of Spencer’s *The Study of Sociology* in 1898”; “sociology appeared in China as a part of the New Learning in the closing years of the imperial Ch’ing dynasty, and was received by Chinese intellectuals with considerable enthusiasm” (King & Wang, 1978). “The original era of the Chinese sociology is followed from its origin out of the French sinology and ethnology, up to the Marxist sociology of Bukharine, including the major theoretical influence of the Anglo – Saxon classics as well as of the missionary sociology of the New York school of social workers” (Schmutz, 1985). From the above discussion, we can believe that the early Chinese sociology has some relation to the French sinology and ethnology, which is worth clarifying in the future research.

Sun (1949) conducted a brief research on the development of sociology in China before 1949. He demonstrated that sociology in China had seen continuous development since its beginning at the end of the 19th century: At first, it proceeded very slowly through a stage of translation and interpretation of European and American sociology; next, it passed through a stage of original research and investigation, first led by American professors, later followed by Chinese sociologists; finally, it reached a stage of synthetic formulation of sociological theories and the application of sociological principles to the fields of social work and social administration, but it is still in the beginning of this stage. Hsu (1931) mentioned that the modern sociological movement in China originated about the end of the 19th century, but it had not attracted nation-wide interest until about the years 1926 and 1927; the sociological movement in China is not a program of any single man or any single group of men, but is the outcome of a variety of efforts to develop the young science of sociology in China by unrelated groups of people. At the same time, Hsu claimed that the formation of the Chinese Sociological Society (*Chung Kuo Hsi Hui Hsueh His*) in 1930 marked a milestone in the history of the sociological movement in

China.

In February 1930, the first annual meeting of the Society was held in Shanghai, and attended by more than two hundred delegates and visitors from all parts of China. Nine executive officers were elected. They were P. W. Sun (chairman), Leonard Hsu (vice chairman), C. C. Wu (secretary), M. H. Tao, Ta Chen, Quantin Pan, C. T. Yu, C. I. Yin, C. Y. Chien. *The Sociological Journal* was continued publication as the official journal of the Society. Before the Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937, it had held six annual meetings in Nanking, Peiping, and Shanghai alternatively. During the war, it held its seventh meeting in Chungking, Kunming and Chengtu simultaneously in the spring of 1943. After the war, it had held two annual meetings in Nanking, Peiping, Canton and Chengtu on the same dates of October 1 and 2. It held its eighth convention in 1947 and its ninth conference in 1948.

Generally speaking, sociology in China pre-1949 had formed two schools: Marxist sociology or “New sociology” and its counterpart, sociology of the Europe and America or Western sociology; the creator of the former was Karl Marx, and the back was Auguste Comte, they were both the student of Saint-Simon, but Karl Marx always stuck to criticizing Auguste Comte’s theory, therefore, the successors of Karl Marx’s theory in Russian and China had double responsibilities: to transmit Karl Marx’s theory and to criticize Western sociology (Yan, 2004: 190).

Post-1949 Chinese sociology

After the Sino-Japanese War came to an end in 1945, the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT) broke out in 1946. As the Civil War came to an end in 1949, some Chinese sociologists moved to Taiwan, some of them left the mainland and migrated to the USA, such as C. K. Yang, but the majority stayed in China mainland.

The majority who had decided to stay were in order to contribute to the building of a new China. The CCP began to unify and transform the nation. Externally, the most significant policies of the People's Republic of China were the emulation of the Soviet model of nation-building; internally, Marxist social theory which had been kept out of the formal institutes of higher education by the KMT became the guiding thought of the country; "A process of re-education was initiated for non-Marxist intellectuals"; "they had to learn Marxist social theory and were made to realize how their past efforts had been mistaken because they had not embraced scientific Marxism" (Wong, 1979: 37). The new sociologists began criticizing the old sociologists. They found grounds for their first criticism in the historical origin and social role of the old (bourgeois) sociology. They criticized the first sociologists in France as below: "With their idealistic point of view, they were incapable, it is said, of disentangling social problems or advancing social development, though they did arouse scholarly interest in some of the unreasonable phenomena caused by capitalism, e.g., crime, suicide, unemployment, and poverty. Lacking the viewpoint of Marxist-Leninism, the new discipline fell into reformism" (Skinner, 1951).

In June 1950, the first national higher educational conference was held. The purpose of this conference was to hear the Soviet expert introduce the Soviet experiences, which would be to direct the reform of China's higher education. According to the main viewpoint in the Soviet Union at that time, the science that took the society as the research object was historical materialism, and cannot be anything but historical materialism. Latterly, this viewpoint dominated Chinese thought field about 30 years (Yan, 2004: 253).

In 1952, during the reorganization of China's education institutions, departments of sociology were abolished from universities. There were a number of arguments for this banishment: first, since sociology had been abolished in the Soviet Union, it should also be in China; second, historical materialism could take the place of sociology; third, there was no necessity for a discipline that dealt primarily with social

problems that would never occur in China under an advanced socialist system (Li, Fang, Wang, Sun, & Qi, 1987). Although departments of sociology in the higher education institutions had been abolished, the CCP had to continue their studies on the minority races in the country (Li, 1966). Therefore, many former sociologists were invited to devote such work. “Some of the well-know and more anthropologically oriented ones, such as Wu Wen-tsao, Fei Hsiao-t’ung, Lin Yao-Hua, were transferred to the newly established Central Institute for Nationalities to teach or to do research on national minorities in China” (Wong, 1979: 42).

Form 1956 to early 1957, the Central Committee of the CCP put forward the principle: “letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend” and “long-term co-existence and mutual supervision” to deal with intellectual problems. At this political context, the proposal to reestablish sociology in China was emerged. But the question of the status of sociology took on political overtones when the issue was taken up by the Chinese Democratic League. “The proposal to reestablish sociology in China was, therefore, bombarded with criticisms, and was defined as an attempt on the part of the bourgeoisie to usurp the leadership of the Communist Party in culture and science in order to work for the eventual restoration of capitalism in China” (Li, Fang, Wang, Sun, & Qi, 1987).

In April 1957, the CCP found intolerable certain criticisms which were far beyond the abstract criticisms of dogmatism and bureaucratism, therefore, the Party quietly began preparing a rectification campaign: beginning in July 1957, a massive anti-rightist campaign was launched; a large number of intellectuals who were actively involved in the Hundred Flowers Movement were stigmatized as “rightists”; many famous sociologists were picked out as targets, and stigmatized as reactionary rightists, such as Fei Hsiao-t’ung, Wu Ch’ing-Cao and Chen Ta (King & Wang, 1978). As a result, sociology as a discipline vanished completely from the China’s higher education system, until 1979.

The rebirth of sociology in China

In early 1979, after the political upheavals of the Cultural Revolution, 60 leading sociology workers gathered at a national conference in Peking to discuss the revival of sociology. While accepting that the teachings of Marx on historical materialism provide Chinese researchers studying social life, social phenomena and social development with their basic viewpoint, theory and method, the delegates argued that "in fact historical materialism has not and cannot replace every kind of social science since all social science (including sociology) needs specialist study"; on this basis the conference set up a Sociological Research Society in Peking, and announced the establishment of an Institute of Sociological Research under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, it also called upon universities to set up their own sociology departments (Braybrooke, 1979).

The establishment of the Chinese Sociological Association in March 1979 marked the rebirth of sociology in China. Fei Hsiao-t'ung was elected as the leader. Fei visited the United States in 1979. Fei invited his classmate in Yenching University C.K. Yang, sociologist from the University of Pittsburgh to Beijing to teach a two – year summer program in 1980 and 1981; Fei also invited Peter Blau and Nan Lin to teach the summer section of a year – long program offered at Nankai University in 1981 to a group of more than 40 college seniors selected from China's leading universities (Bian & Zhang, 2008).

However, the fundamental question was the course of the reconstruction: some suggested importing sociology from abroad so as to bridge the gap created by the 30 years hiatus and following a regular sequence starting from the ABC of the subject; others suggested giving primary attention to applied research and developing China's own sociological theories while participating in the current reforms. At this moment, Fei Hsiao-t'ung argued that "the reconstruction of the discipline should not merely concern itself with the ABC knowledge of the subject and go from one book model to

another"; "what we need to do, instead, is to carry our investigations into the present social conditions, help the State and Government deal with urgent social problems and clear the way for a successful social development along the road to socialism" (as cited in Li, Fang, Wang, Sun, & Qi, 1987). This explains why the development of Chinese sociology after 1979 emphasized empirical research.

Cheng and So (1983) argued that Chinese sociology has two heritages: the bourgeois sociological tradition, with its emphasis on social pathology and its empirical research methods; and the Marxian tradition that emphasizes the unity of theory and practice, historical materialism, and class analysis. On the crucial question of what kind of sociology should be developed in Socialist China, most Chinese sociologists appear to seek a new sociology that incorporates the two traditions and that is distinctively Chinese; the instrumental role of sociology is the sole reason given for its restoration.

Zhou and Pei (1997) conducted a research on the development of sociology in China since 1980. The results demonstrated that most studies were typical of descriptive analysis, often written in the style of the policy-oriented research report, and there were lack of link between theoretical research and empirical research; although empirical research has mushroomed since 1980, sociological knowledge has not accumulated as we might have expected: research projects rarely aim at verifying the findings in previous research or improve existing sociological explanations in a specific area; as a result, there tends to be a large number of reports on similar topics, but the "value added" to sociological knowledge is at times marginal, due to varying quality, incomparability in research design, and lack of sustained research focus.

Bian and Zhang (2008) pointed out that the rebirth of sociology in China that began in 1979 was part of China's reform – and – openness policy to modernization; American influence on the rebirth of sociology in China was instrumental at the start, nowadays Chinese sociologists have laid the foundation of the discipline and

upgraded their teaching and research to international standards; socioeconomic developments, changing social stratification, state – society relations and economic sociology were key areas of research which Chinese sociologists have focused on in the reform era; there were positive trends in research reflected in increasing numbers of higher-quality publications, as well as projects of national impact and efforts at institution building.

Based on the above discussions, we can skim through on the development of sociology in China since the end of 19th century. The situation of Chinese sociologists paid attention to the western sociology and Marxist sociology varied in different period. The fate of sociology in China was easy to suffer from the influence of political context. Nowadays, the researches of sociology in China are mainly serviced for the needs of China's modernization, and Chinese sociologists focus on empirical studies of social problems.

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Uncertainty, social reshaping and intermittent commitments: the case of young workers in a “youth space”

The reforms underway in Chinese society since 1978, including for example the danwei’s (or work unit) break up, let some arrangements that come apart and reveal some fragmentation process. There has been a shift from a planned economy within which the state was strongly committed to a liberal economy in which the individual is only slightly socially protected, engaging growing inequalities. This pertains to a context of uncertain society, leaving more and more individuals facing situations of uncertainty in their career (Beck, 2001).

However, by looking too much on these arrangements, it hides, on the one hand processes of social reshaping; on the other hand the links between the first and the second. We will focus on these social reshaping process through commitments’ path of some young skilled workers (that is to say, graduates of higher education), in places that are called "youth spaces." Here, by commitment we mean rather social than political commitments.

These commitments are influenced by careers (level of education, type of university in which they studied, background and expectations of the family), the place that the individual tries to take in this kind of place ("organizer”, more or less seasoned audience, volunteer -keeping in mind that the same individual can take by turns different roles mentioned above), and depending on the time in the professional career (time of unemployment, time of career switch, will or not to use these commitments to "make a career" or to influence his career). Last but not least, it is important to take into account the watermarked presence of the “great political sphere”, conducive to what we call a constrained context.

The idea here is to see how the conjunction, in China, of arrangements that come apart, of situations of uncertainty and of a constrained context, allow however, the emergence not of total social commitments, but because of the elements that we

mentioned previously, of commitments that can be qualified of intermittent and reversible.

不确定性，社会重建和间歇承诺：去青年空间的年轻工人的情况下

在中国社会自 1978 年开始的改革以来，包括列如单位的撤除，让我们看到分裂的过程。出现了从国家有个比较深的参与的计划经济转向个体只是微微的被保护的自由市场经济。这样导致日益增加的不平等。这也是社会不确定性的背景下，让越来越多人面临不确定性的情况（贝克，2001）。

然而，要是太关注分裂的过程会隐藏两个方面。第一个方面是社会重建的过程。第二个方面是分裂过程和重建过程的关系。我们要通过参与所谓 « 青年空间 » 年轻技术工人（即，高等教育毕业生）的承诺途径看到这些社会的重建。我们要分析的承诺是社会的承诺，而不是政治的。

这些承诺被一些事情影响的（比如教育程度、上哪一个大学、家庭的背景与期望）。也是被个人在这些地方想占用的觉色影响的（比方说“主办方、“或多或少经验丰富的观众、志愿者，等等。在这儿应该强调一个事情：同一个人可以轮流是上述不同的角色）。然后也根据不同的时间，在职业的时间（在失业时间、在选另外个职业方向的时间，是否愿意使用这些承诺为了做个“职业”，还是是否愿意使用这些承诺为了影响自己的职业情况）被影响的。后者，也需要注意的是水印伟大政治领域的存在。这个有助于我们所谓的约束环境。

通过这些事情我们想看到虽然在中国有分裂过程、不确定性和约束的环境的连词，因为前面提到的元素，但是让出现间歇的承诺。

PhD Candidate Ms. Bai Meifei

New Urban Dwellers and Their Life: Observations from a Newly Built Community in the City of Anqiu, Shandong Province

Abstract

With the aggressive urbanization policies promoted by central and local government in China, the past few years saw an obvious phenomenon of bottom-up urbanization trend within the scope of counties, i.e. many previous villagers purchased real estate in towns or counties and became “new urban dwellers”. This speech is about observations to the phenomenon based on a one-week survey in a newly built urban community in Anqiu County, Shandong province.

Efforts will be given to talk about the driving force behind, the link between “new urban dwellers” and their hometown, and their life in the newly built community. Kinds of so-called high quality public services in urban areas, especially education resources for next generation, are what attract these families move to urban areas. The majority of the “new urban dwellers” are nuclear families of young people whose real estate are bought through mortgage loan with finance support from their parents. Their “Hukou”, registered permanent residence, remain in their hometown. They will go back hometown to observe key festivals and events as well as help their parents in farming seasons. Neighborhood is quickly formed among these new dwellers who used to be strangers. They have to deal with conflicts with property management companies, in which new online network tool is used.

These are just part of the previous findings of a long-term team research, which aims to provide some insights through the anthropological and sociological perspectives to studies on urbanization, a currently hot topic in China. Further detailed research will be carried out in the near future.

Jean Tassin　Public　sphere and intermediate spaces in Nanjing

Abstract

This speech proposes to study the structure of the public sphere in Nanjing on the basis of an ethnographical survey in three places of communication: two neighborhood committees, a humanitarian structure and a bookstore-cultural center. It considers that some autonomous spaces appear, are transformed and sometimes become intermediate spaces that affect the totalitarian pretention of the Chinese authoritarian system.

This work tries to answer to the following hypothesis: *The Chinese political public sphere is a totalitarian tending space that doesn't succeed in being total. In the political public sphere itself like in some oppositional spaces or autonomous spaces, we notice that institutions pluralize, develop their own norms and transform the political public sphere in different ways, which are already visible or still in the making.*

I will present this work through three perspectives: First, the studied spaces are involved in the negotiation of their own boundaries. Negotiations are related to the public role of each space but also to practices that are not always public. Second, the studied spaces contribute to transform the public sphere outside their own boundaries. New norms are proposed, which have political, juridical and civic impact. Third, the studied spaces are only temporarily and partially public but they become intermediate spaces that contribute to reshape the urban sociability. Between these spaces appears a sphere that is not autonomous in itself but that creates a non-organized link between different autonomous spaces.

Through these process the public sphere is either positively or negatively affected. Therefore, the study of particular physical spaces raises issues of the limits of a space of communication and diffusion, of interactions between studied spaces and political public spheres, of shapes and modalities of collective mobilization and public appearance in urban China.

Key words:

Public sphere, authoritarian system, totalitarian tending practices, place of communication, institutions pluralization, collective action

南京公共领域与中介空间

摘要

本报告基于对三所话语空间的实地调查，即两座社区居民委员会、一个援助机构以及一家书店／文化中心，研究南京市公共领域的结构。讲者认为各种自主空间形成、转型，拉动中国专制制度的极权型趋势。

本报告考虑到以下研究假设：*中国政治公共空间是一场不能作为极权的极权型专制空间。政治公共空间正如反对空间与自主空间一样， 在这当中，社会机构多元化，构建自己的规范，显性或隐性地影响政治公共空间的形式*。

讲者要从三个角度介绍自己的思考：首先，调查的空间都参与界定自己空间边界的谈判过程。该谈判涉及每个空间的公共角色，但也涉及到他们的非公开的策略。其次，调查的空间参与在自己边界外公共领域的转型。新规范被提出，引起政治上、法律上、经济上、公民上的作用。第三，调查的空间只是暂时地且部分地变成公共，但同时也成为中介空间，参与改变城市社会关系。在这些不同的空间之间出现一个无结构的公共领域：这一领域自己没有任何独立或自主的制度，但它把不同的自主空间连接起来。

在这些过程当中公共领域在正反两个方面受到影响。由此，本研究涉及话语宣传空间的边界、调查空间与政治公共领域之间的互动、中国城市中集体运动与公共显现的形式与模式等话题。

关键词：

公共领域，专制制度，极权型策略，话语空间，机构多元化，集体行动

PhD Candidate Mr. Pei Dianqing:

On the Possibility of Moral Behavior: A Discussion on the Problem in Durkheim’s Moral Sociology

Abstract

There are two contents in the generalized moral: code of conduct and terminal values. Since modern times, these two contents have no longer been correlative closely, and the integrity of terminal values has been disintegrated by the enlightenment ration, which leads to the disappearance of objectivity and absoluteness of morality, following the moral crisis of modern society.

The entire theory of sociology of Durkheim can be seen as a possible interpretation to the crisis above, and he has been trying to reconcile determinism and individualism intending to reconstruct the wholeness of moral. From Durkheim's point of view, the aspect of obligation has been overemphasized in his metaphysics of morals, although he attempts to certify the possibility of categorical imperative via the free will. Withal, Durkheim rises that the desirability can be another one of the two important traits, forming the certification to possibility of moral action.

In this article, we just try to reveal Durkheim’s deliberation in the perspective of moral. Via analyzing his expounding on the obligatory and desirability of moral, this text indicates that obligatory delivers the very connotation of society as the moral authority and the desirability expresses the possibility to surpass the individual itself. Moreover, these two traits are brought into the society being as a whole, so the possibility of moral action obtains its evidence. Ultimately, the evidence forms the proving to possibility of social order exactly.

Furthermore, the logic of Durkheim’s deliberation directing at the crisis expounds profoundly the tension intrinsic to modern society, which is the very origin of rethinking to society.

The African migrants in Beijing : for a sociology of international elites

Mathilde Cambournac

African migration to China is a recent phenomenon, which needs to be understood in a broader context of intensification of economic exchanges between China and Africa, and of diversification of human flows at a global scale. The majority of the African migrants live in southern cities of China like Guangzhou, Hong Kong, Yiwu. Their presence often takes the form of ethnic enclaves inhabited by African traders and nomad entrepreneurs. However, one cannot neglect the diversity of the sociological profiles that can be found in China, because other communities of African migrants are growing elsewhere in the country. These migrants can be seen as agents of change, in a country traditionally of emigration.

Through a four-month fieldwork conducted with the African workers in the city of Beijing, we will try to highlight migration dynamics and individual routes taken by these skilled migrants, leading to careers of international elites. China provides important opportunities in their strategy of social mobility at a global level. Their presence in the city is characterized by social and spatial and similarities, highly visible in the North Eastern and Eastern part of the city, where most of the foreigners also live.

Their belonging to a same international elite helps them organize themselves in the capital, this group of African professionals taking the form of an ethnic and transnational community. They also gather through socio cultural or economical migrant associations, often referring themselves collectively to the same “African” identity. This finally asks the question of the role of this community, in China, and in establishing transnational networks between the host country and the countries of origin.

PhD Candidate Mr. Sun Mingzhe

Leftover Lady or Old Single Woman: A Name from Others

Abstract

As a gender phenomenon, leftover ladies are agued by both the masses and the scholars. Today, there are four sets of interpretation system, but they all have some deficiencies. Through the analysis of discourses from internet about leftover ladies, I will give an overall commentary about the existed interpretation system, and will present a new one. At the end of my study, I also will talk about my point in feminism view. The leftover-lady-phenomenon is a social phenomenon which both challenge traditional value and follow it.

PhD Candidate Mr. Sun Chao:

The Effect of New Technology on Local Governmental Behavior: Based on Three Cases in a County in West China

Abstract

The relationship between technology and institution is always the focus of the sociology of organization. For one thing, institutions can promote or repress the development of technology; for another, the change (particularly the improvement) of technology on its own efficiency, programing and utilization, can also lead the transformation of institutions.

Actually, the bureaucracy, as a stable form of organization, is constantly influenced by the transformation of technology. The revolutionary transformation of technology, as well as its application, will greatly influence the organization of politics and government behaviors. The internet-based new technology revolution has prevailed in Chinese society since the end of 20th century. It has been employed by each level of administration; therefore changing the pattern of government behaviors.

This article analyzed certain related cases in the western cities of China. On the one hand, the new technology, such as GPS, visual signal, and internet platform, has caused multidimensional influences on the local government. They saved the supervision costs, simplified the administration procedures, and extended the information flow in most circumstances. On the other hand, those consequences resulted from the new technology could also be restricted by the organization of administration and social environment. Therefore, technology can to some extent promote the efficiency of the administration; however, it is not able to essentially change the deficits of bureaucracy.